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This dissertation examines the Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) of the Serbian 
Banat (northeastern Serbia) during World War II, with a focus on their collaboration with 
the invading Germans from the Third Reich, and their participation in the occupation of 
their home region. It focuses on the occupation period (April 1941-October 1944) so as to 
illuminate three major themes: the mutual perceptions held by ethnic and Reich Germans 
and how these shaped policy; the motivation behind ethnic German collaboration; and the 
events which drew ethnic Germans ever deeper into complicity with the Third Reich.  
The Banat ethnic Germans profited from a fortuitous meeting of diplomatic, 
military, ideological and economic reasons, which prompted the Third Reich to occupy 
their home region in April 1941. They played a leading role in the administration and 
policing of the Serbian Banat until October 1944, when the Red Army invaded the Banat. 
The ethnic Germans collaborated with the Nazi regime in many ways: they accepted its 
worldview as their own, supplied it with food, administrative services and eventually 
soldiers. They acted as enforcers and executors of its policies, which benefited them as 
 
 
perceived racial and ideological kin to Reich Germans. These policies did so at the 
expense of the multiethnic Banat‟s other residents, especially Jews and Serbs. In this, the 
Third Reich replicated general policy guidelines already implemented inside Germany 
and elsewhere in German-occupied Europe.  
The Banat ethnic German collaboration did not derive from external factors alone. 
Ideological affinity between the ethnic German sense of self and aspects of National 
Socialist ideology, social dynamics within the ethnic German community, and the 
material privileges and perks the Reich extended, combined to ensure that ordinary ethnic 
Germans as well as their leaders proved willing and, even, eager to collaborate. Their 
collusion in the Reich‟s discriminatory and murderous policies escalated over time. It 
culminated in their participation in anti-partisan warfare in Southeast Europe. The 
bitterness and bad blood engendered by the ethnic Germans‟ choice to engage fully in 
policies proclaimed by the Reich resulted in their eventual expulsion and dispossession 
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NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
 
A few words on the ethnic terms and place names used in this dissertation are necessary.  
 The adjective „ethnic‟ preceding an ethnic denominator indicates that the person 
or persons thus named belong to an ethnic group but are not citizens of the relative ethnic 
group‟s nation-state i.e. they are minority members in another state. For example, an 
ethnic German (Volksdeutsche) is a person of German origin and language who was not a 
citizen of the wartime Third Reich. By contrast, Reich Germans (Reichsdeutsche) are 
citizens of the Reich as well as persons of German ethnicity.  
 With reference to some of the Southeast-European ethnic groups discussed, I 
follow the following conventions: 
 Serb is singular; Serbs is plural; Serbian is the adjective; 
 Croat is singular; Croats is plural; Croatian is the adjective; 
 Rom is singular; Roma is plural; Romany is the adjective. (The term „Gypsy‟ is 
today considered derogatory and will only be used in direct translations from original 
documents.) 
Since this is a German-centric examination of a self-consciously German 
community in a multiethnic region, I have chosen to call ethnic Germans by their 
wartime German-language name, „Volksdeutsche‟ (sing. Volksdeutscher). (See 
Introduction for a discussion of this term.) I also refer to the Banat ethnic Germans as a 
group as the „Volksgruppe‟ or the „Deutsche Volksgruppe,‟ deriving this from their 
official name, the Deutsche Volksgruppe im Banat und in Serbien. I refer to other ethnic 
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minorities by their English names (e.g. ethnic Hungarians). I chose to use the German 
names of organizations and official titles (e.g. Volksgruppenführer, Wehrmacht) in order 
to convey the German-centric way these ethnic Germans themselves saw their world. (A 
Glossary of German-language terms provides translations and/or brief explanations.) 
By the same logic, I call towns and villages inside the Serbian Banat by their 
German names. Most of these inhabited places had an official Serbian name and an 
unofficial but commonly used German name; some also had a Hungarian, Romanian or 
Slovak name, depending on the ethnic composition in individual towns and villages. The 
different names were often used interchangeably, even in official documents, both by the 
prewar Yugoslav and by the wartime Reichs- and Volksdeutsche authorities. Only in 
1943 were several dozen place names officially altered so that the German names became 
names of primary usage. Without trying to suggest that the Banat was especially 
Germanized already in the interwar period, I chose, in order to avoid confusion and keep 
my text consistent, to call all Banat places by their German names even in the chapters 
dealing with the period before the Reich invasion in April 1941. A parallel list of all the 
place names mentioned in the text is included, and contains also some major geographical 
terms outside the Banat, which were mentioned in the text.  
With regards geographical features such as cities and rivers located outside of the 
Banat, the ones familiar to English-language readers are called by the Anglicized forms 
of their names (e.g. Belgrade, Danube, Budapest, Bucharest). Less famous ones I call by 
the names they bear in the language of the nation-state to which they belonged before or 
during World War II (e.g. Kraljevo, Zagreb, Timişoara, Ljubljana, Maribor
1
). When 
                                                 
1
 The latter two are in the part of Slovenia which was annexed directly by the Third Reich in 
1941, and had their names officially changed during the war to Laibach and Marburg, 
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citing individual wartime memos sent from one Banat village or town to another, as well 
as postwar depositions and legal accusations, I used German place names even if the 
Serbian name is mentioned in the text.  
I also call geographic regions by the name (and spelling) used in the official 
language of the nation-state they belonged to (e.g. the Vojvodina and its constituent parts: 
the Banat, the Baĉka, the Baranja and the Srem). If a geographic term could refer to more 
than one state, I refer to it by the name it bears in the official language of the state to 
which it is relevant in my text (e.g. the River Tisa could be claimed by wartime Hungary, 
Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia; I call it by its Serbian (Serbo-Croatian) 
name).  
With reference to political movements, I followed a variation on the logic 
outlined above: while I call Josip Broz Tito‟s communist resistance movement by its 
widely known Anglicized name Partisans (in the original partizani), I preferred to leave 
the name of the Croatian fascists and the Serbian nationalist-royalist resistance alike in 
their original forms i.e. Ustańe (sing. and adjective Ustańa) and Ĉetnici (sing. and 
adjective Ĉetnik). The latter have been referred to in English-language scholarship by 
Anglicized forms of their names (including the truly bizarre and unprecedented „Ustashi‟ 
and the inexplicable synecdoche „Ustańa‟ or „Ustasha‟ used to refer to the plural). 
However, this Serbian- (Serbo-Croatian-)speaking author finds those forms stylistically 
ugly, and preferred to use the original forms of the words for these two movements which 
                                                                                                                                                 
respectively. I chose not to call them by their German names in order to avoid possible confusion: 
I call only places in the Banat by their German names.  
Likewise, Zagreb was usually referred to in wartime German documents as Agram, and 
Timişoara as Temeschburg – I left them their Croatian and Romanian names, respectively, for 
purposes of clarity, but included both names on the table in Appendix I.  
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are also relatively less well-known by their proper names in the English-speaking world 
than the ultimately victorious Partisans.  
Since Serbian, Croatian and Serbo-Croatian are phonetic languages which 
„transcribe‟ foreign names in accordance with their own spelling conventions, I decided 
not to „correct‟ the names of ethnic Germans written according to Serbian (Serbo-
Croatian) convention in various documents. All the more so since some clearly preferred 
to use at least the Serbianized version of their first names in order to blend in in the 
postwar period (e.g. Marija instead of Maria).  
The term „Serbia‟ is used here interchangeably with the term „Serbia proper‟ to 
refer to the territory which belonged to the Serbian state before its expansion north of the 
Danube after World War I. In the period 1941-1944, this means Serbia exclusive of the 
Banat. The „Banat‟ or the „Serbian Banat‟ is the subject of this dissertation, and refers to 
that half of the historical Banat region west of the Serbo-Romanian border. „Serbia-
Banat‟ is a compound noun lifted directly from wartime German documents to indicate 
the whole of the occupied Serbian state, inclusive of both Serbia proper and the Serbian 
Banat.  
Finally, the choice between calling the region „Southeast Europe‟ or „the Balkans‟ 
has been ideologically and politically charged especially since the 1990s, and in the 
Greek case since at least 1945. This author considers both equally valid and acceptable, 
since one is a geographic-directional and the other a historic name. They are therefore 
used interchangeably to describe the lands of former Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Albania and Greece during World War II. Hungary was at that time a liminal state, which 
could be counted as part of Central and Southeast Europe depending especially on the 
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diplomatic relationship under discussion. (The Nazis often counted it as Southeast-
European, as they did wartime independent Slovakia.) I should also add the caveat that 
the Balkans are more likely to be called the Balkans when discussing National Socialist 
racial views of this region, since calling them „Southeast Europe‟ while discussing the 









































National Socialism put a premium on perceived racial purity and integration into the 
German Volk. This meant that ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche
2
) – people of German 
origin who were not citizens or, usually, residents of the Third Reich – enjoyed a 
privileged status among Europe‟s ethnic groups. They also bore the brunt of the great 
demands the Third Reich placed on those it embraced as its kith and kin. One ethnic 
German community inhabited the Serbian half of the historical Banat region 
(northeastern Serbia). Between the occupation of the Serbian Banat by Reich forces in 
April 1941 and the arrival of the Red Army in October 1944, the Banat ethnic Germans 
enjoyed a degree of local control and power over their home region unparalleled among 
ethnic German communities in other parts of German-occupied Europe. Nevertheless, 
they remained dependent on the Third Reich for military and ideological support. In 
them, perceived racial suitability, Nazi ideology and the Reich‟s practical interest met 
fortuitously with local conditions in which ethnic Germans proved willing and eager to 
collaborate.  
The Banat Germans‟ collaboration took many forms: political-ideological, 
administrative, military and economic. The ethnic German leadership was the most 
enthusiastic about collaboration, but ordinary Banat Germans almost never openly 
expressed objections to the Nazi regime or its occupation of their home region. This was 
not always a sign of ideological agreement. Instead, it demonstrated how a range of 
                                                 
2
 See below for a discussion of the term „Volksdeutsche‟ in the Nazi worldview. 
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motives could ensure an ethnic group‟s complicity with a violent and exclusivist regime 
like the Third Reich.  
The Reich did not merely project onto the ethnic Germans its ideas about their 
supposed racial excellence. Rather, Reich perceptions of ethnic Germans corresponded to 
ethnic Germans‟ self-perception as superior to their non-German neighbors. There was 
also much tension between how the Reich saw ethnic Germans and how they saw 
themselves. Nazi racial categories solidified preexisting ethnic differences and 
perceptions, making them and conflict between them seem inevitable. The Nazi regime 
ensured the Banat ethnic Germans‟ complicity through a range of material and 
ideological privileges, not the least of which was entrusting them with the daily 
administration of their home region. This, in turn, allowed ethnic Germans to wield 
considerable local power over the ethnically mixed Banat population. It did not, however, 
give them any special leverage vis-à-vis the Third Reich. In all relations between the 
Banat Germans and Berlin, the former willingly played the part of executor and junior 
partner to the latter. 




 It is bound by the Rivers Tisa and 
Danube in the west and south, respectively, and by the Yugoslav-Romanian border in the 
east and north. The historical Banat region was split at the end of World War I and the 
breakup of Austria-Hungary between Romania and Serbia, hence references in German 
documents of the 1930s and 1940s to the „Serbian‟ or „Western‟ Banat. The Serbian 
                                                 
3
 Chef der Militärverwaltung Südost to OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres), “Abschlussbericht 
des Chefs der Militärverwaltung Südost,” April 10, 1945, National Archives and Records 
Administration in College Park, Maryland (NARA), RG 242 Captured German Records, T-501 
[Records of German Field Commands: Rear Areas, Occupied Territories, and Others]/264/214. 
NB: Microfilm from the National Archives will be cited thus: NARA, record group, T-
number/roll number/frame number. Microfiche from all other archives will be cited thus: archive, 
record group, file number, fiche number, (when available) frame number. 
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Banat‟s ethnic Germans accounted for about one fifth of the Serbian Banat‟s population 
in early 1941: ca. 125,000 people, most of them peasants and artisans.
4
 (There were an 
estimated ten to twelve million ethnic Germans in all of Europe, especially in the East 
and Southeast.)  
Using the Banat Germans as a case study in collaboration and the spread of Nazi 
ideology beyond the Third Reich‟s borders allows for a study of how major trends 
evident across the German sphere of influence in World War II played out in interaction 
with specific local conditions. This is also a self-contained microhistory of one specific 
German occupation regime and of a minority collaborationist group, with special 
attention given to the reactions of the ethnic German leaders and of ordinary ethnic 
Germans to their altered circumstances. It examines how ethnic Germans saw themselves 
and the world around them, and how these perceptions prompted them to act as well as 
Reich Germans‟ perception and corresponding use of ethnic Germans. It contributes to 
                                                 
4
 The last census in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia took place in 1931 and used as the basis for 
assigning nationality one‟s „mother tongue‟ (a problematic criterion at best). According to it, in 
1931 there were over half a million ethnic Germans in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Alfred 
Bohmann, Menschen und Grenzen, Volume 2: Bevölkerung und Nationalitäten in Südosteuropa 
(Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1969), p. 233). Because the main criterion for 
assigning ethnicity was language, included among these were some 10,000 German-speaking 
Jews. More than 75% of all German-speaking Yugoslav citizens were Catholics, about 20% 
belonged to the Lutheran or Reformed Churches, and around 2% were Jews (Bohmann, 236).  
The Banat‟s 1931 population consisted of 273,573 Serbs and Croats (46,72% of the total Banat 
population), 120,450 ethnic Germans (20,57%), 95,760 ethnic Hungarians (16,35%), 62,284 
ethnic Romanians (10,63%), 17,884 ethnic Slovaks (3,05%), and 15,589 (2,66%) others including 
Jews, ethnic Russians, Roma, ethnic Czechs, ethnic Slovenes, ethnic Albanians and ethnic 
Bulgarians (Ekkehard Völkl, Der Westbanat 1941-1944. Die deutsche, die ungarische und andere 
Volksgruppen (Munich: Rudolf Trofenik, 1991), p. 63).  
Ten years later, an internal census conducted by the ethnic German leadership in the occupied 
Banat in 1941 posited the number of ethnic Germans there at 130,600 or 23,6% of the total Banat 
population (“Meldungen aus dem Reich,” November 6, 1941, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde 
(BA Berlin), R 58 Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), file 166, fiche 1, frame 38). Given the 
overall low birth rate in the Banat, this number may have been inflated by a few thousand. A 
postwar analysis on the losses suffered by Volksdeutsche expellees at war‟s end probably came 
closest to the mark by extrapolating the number of Banat ethnic Germans in 1939 at 125,800 (L. 
Schumacher cited in Bohmann, p. 236).  
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the historiography on varieties of collaboration in Europe during World War II, the social 
impact and spread of National Socialist ideology, the ambiguities of the Nazi racial 
hierarchy and how this influenced societies in the Reich sphere of influence. 
When the Third Reich and its allies invaded the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 
1941, Hitler decided on this move out of practical need more than ideology. For the 
following three and a half years, ideology and pragmatism were evident in the occupation 
of Yugoslav lands. They existed in an ever-shifting balance. Due to its geographic 
position to the south of the Soviet Union and its shared border with several countries 
which were already Axis members, Hitler wanted to secure interwar Yugoslavia – by 
alliance or conquest – as a flank of the planned invasion of the Soviet Union. As such, 
Yugoslavia was of secondary importance to the ideological war and the racial reshuffling 
the Nazis put in place in their conquered Eastern territories. Nevertheless, policies and 
practices in the Yugoslav lands occupied by the Third Reich ran parallel to policies 
implemented throughout Hitler‟s European conquests, and were shaped by National 
Socialist ideology.  
The Banat ethnic Germans‟ self-identification revolved around the German 
language and culture of their ancestors, who arrived in what was then southern Hungary 
as part of a Habsburg settlement drive in the 18
th
 century. A self-conscious minority, the 
Banat ethnic Germans stressed what they saw as typically German virtues of thrift, hard 
work, and a fundamental defensiveness against their ethnically mixed, largely non-
Germanic environment. Intensely aware of their inferior numbers and strength, they saw 
the unified German state which emerged in 1871 as their protector and champion 
throughout its changes of political system. In the period of occupation by Reich forces in 
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World War II, the close alignment of these ethnic Germans with the German state 
resulted in an alignment of their sense of self and their group interest with National 
Socialism as the prevalent German ideology of the time. This, in turn, inspired the Banat 
ethnic German leadership and ordinary ethnic Germans alike to widespread collaboration 
with Reich German occupiers. Moreover, the very secondary status of Southeast Europe 
in Hitler‟s grand strategy, coupled with the ideological reliability of the Banat ethnic 
German leadership, gave this particular ethnic German community an unparalleled access 
to local power and authority within its home region – though not extending further than 
its borders, and certainly not in relation to the Third Reich. 
 The relationship between the Third Reich and the Banat Volksdeutsche did not 
remain static during World War II. It went through three stages, all of which were 
dictated by exigencies of the Reich‟s shifting interests in Southeast Europe:  
1) From the war‟s beginning in September 1939 until the attack of Axis countries 
on Yugoslavia in April 1941, the Reich‟s foreign policy – specifically the desire to attract 
Yugoslavia into the Axis by peaceful means – dictated a circumspect relationship with 
the Yugoslav ethnic Germans. Circumspection was intended to secure certain privileges 
for ethnic Germans but, more frequently, to cajole the Yugoslav government into 
compliance with Reich interest. In line with the preeminence of foreign policy in 
relations between the two states, the status of ethnic Germans in northern Serbian areas 
bordering on Hungary and Romania depended also on the relative strength of the latter 
two states. Both laid claim to the Serbian Banat in April 1941. Both had to be appeased 
by the Reich as its established allies. These state and ethnic relations will be explored in 
Chapters 1 and 2. 
6 
 
2) Following the division and occupation of Yugoslav lands by German, Italian, 
Hungarian and Bulgarian forces, and the creation of the pro-Reich Independent State of 
Croatia in April 1941, an ethnic German civilian administration was established in the 
German-occupied Serbian Banat. Berlin‟s decision to approve the creation of this 
administration was inspired by a complex mixture of diplomatic, military and ideological 
motives. Wielding unprecedented authority over the inhabitants of its home region – 
ethnic Germans and non-Germans alike – the Banat ethnic German leadership remained 
firmly tied to Berlin‟s overarching need for food deliveries and, in early 1942, soldiers. In 
the first twelve months of the Reich‟s occupation of the Banat and, at least in Banat 
civilian affairs, until the end of the occupation, every concession or sign of preeminence 
the ethnic Germans were granted vis-à-vis Banat non-Germans and the collaborationist 
government in Belgrade confirmed their dependence on the Reich‟s pleasure. Moreover, 
the ethnic German leadership willingly surrendered even the little power to make 
autonomous decision it tried to exercise in the first days of the occupation in exchange 
for long-term guarantees of the Reich‟s ideological legitimation and its military 
protection. 
The influence of the Auswärtiges Amt (AA, the German Foreign Ministry) in the 
Banat but also in Europe waned considerably in this period, especially after the failure of 
Operation Barbarossa to bring about a swift defeat of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the 
importance of diplomacy never disappeared completely. On the contrary, into the last two 
years of the war Hitler continued his 1930s practice of seeking allies wherever possible 
i.e. wherever an acceptable compromise could be made between Nazi ideology on one 





 The influence of the Reich‟s foreign policy on the Banat Germans was greatest 
while Yugoslavia existed as a sovereign country. After the occupation, especially in 
summer and fall 1941, the AA continued to wield great power over these ethnic Germans 
while the possibility of their administration was negotiated between Berlin, Budapest and 
Bucharest. After this new administration was put in place and shortly thereafter 
recruitment for the Waffen-SS began in the Serbian Banat, however, the influence of the 
AA diminished rapidly as Himmler and Hitler‟s vision of an ideological and racial war 
became preeminent.  
The elevation of Banat ethnic Germans to a leading position in their home region 
derived from an uneasy balance between foreign policy and ideology. This remained the 
case in internal Banat matters until the end of the occupation in October 1944. Yet the 
ethnic German leadership was not just a passive puppet of the Third Reich, and neither 
were individual ethnic Germans. Although in the end they always toed the Reich line and 
accepted, albeit mostly implicitly, their inferior position vis-à-vis the Reich and Reich 
Germans, the ethnic German leadership and the rank and file were not averse to making 
suggestions and complaints. However, they refrained from making demands against 
Reich Germans. Demands they usually made, with the Reich‟s agreement, against other 
Banat residents, especially Serbs and Jews. In this period, the Banat ethnic Germans were 
involved in anti-partisan and security activities in the Banat as well as the mistreatment of 
the Banat Jews and the Aryanization of their property. The shifting balance of external 
                                                 
5
 For example, the Third Reich tolerated or deflected the demands of its ally Hungary (including 
the Hungarian ambition to possess the Serbian Banat) for as long as Hungary remained willing to 
follow Germany‟s lead and keep the Axis‟ ranks firmly closed. Failure to do so led to the 
invasion of Hungary by its erstwhile ally Germany in March 1944, a fairly late date in the war.  
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and internal influences which shaped the ethnic German administration will be explored 
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
3) After the failure of the Axis forces‟ invasion of the Soviet Union to conclude in 
a speedy victory in 1941, the Third Reich experienced two parallel developments, both 
related in the Nazi worldview to the need to win the war. One was an intensification of 
the ideological impetus behind the war. The other was a stepped-up search for reliable 
collaborators and fighters for its cause. While the former produced the Holocaust, the 
latter resulted in the rapid expansion of the Waffen-SS. This was the shadow army 
Heinrich Himmler developed in order to increase his influence in the sometimes 
confusing Nazi system of governance with its overlapping jurisdictions. As both the main 
ideological genius loci of the Third Reich (next to Hitler) and an ambitious military 
leader, Himmler was in a uniquely fortuitous position to reconcile ideology with military 
necessity when he started recruiting ethnic Germans into the Waffen-SS. In this, he still 
had to bow to exigencies of the Reich‟s foreign policy, and limit recruitment in states 
which retained at least nominal independence from the Third Reich.  
In the occupied Banat, however, he could and did recruit ethnic Germans with 
impunity. In early 1942 he and Hitler created a separate Waffen-SS division for them, 
called “Prinz Eugen” after Eugene of Savoy, the Habsburg general who had spearheaded 
the settlement of German-speakers in the region in the early 1700s. This third stage of 
Berlin-Banat relations continued until the arrival of the Red Army in October 1944 and 
the end of the Reich‟s occupation of the Banat. While in civilian affairs diplomacy 
continued to matter, in military affairs Himmler became the most important person for 
Banat Germans. Starting in spring 1942, the earlier need to cajole first the Yugoslav 
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government and, later, though to a lesser extent, the ethnic Germans themselves, was 
gone. It was replaced by the complete willingness of the ethnic German leadership to 
collude with the Reich in coercing, when necessary, its co-nationals into paying their 
perceived debt of honor to the Third Reich with weapon in hand. Ordinary ethnic 
Germans, too, failed consistently to raise objections to their mobilization by the Waffen-
SS and their subsequent personal involvement in Hitler and Himmler‟s racial and 
ideological war in the Balkans.  
In this the Banat Germans were guided by several motivating factors, not the least 
of which were their earlier collusion in policies – approved by Berlin but carried out by 
their own leaders – which discriminated against the Banat non-Germans and favored 
ethnic Germans. Also significant in ensuring ethnic German compliance was the skilful 
articulation of themes present in National Socialist ideology, which appealed especially 
to the ethnic German communal sense of self. There was no discrepancy between Nazi 
ideology as it was articulated in the Third Reich and in the German-dominated Banat. Yet 
the fact that the ethnic German leadership stressed themes which appealed especially to 
their co-nationals suggests that National Socialism was more flexible than it is usually 
given credit for, albeit without deviating from certain fundamental points such as the 
centrality of race and the supremacy of communal interest. The National Socialism of the 
Banat ethnic Germans is the subject of Chapter 6, whereas Chapter 7 deals with the Banat 







The biggest challenge to writing this dissertation was the fragmentary nature of the 
evidence. Some of it was lost during the war, especially during the Reich Germans‟ 
retreat from Southeast Europe in late 1944. What remains is scattered in over a dozen 
archives and libraries (see Abbreviations: Archives and Libraries). In order to piece 
together a relatively holistic picture of Banat ethnic German activities in World War II 
and the role they played in Hitler‟s Europe, I used diverse sources in four languages: 
German, Serbian, English and even a single secondary source in French.  
 I first became interested in this topic by examining the Banat German press for a 
research paper on ethnic Germans and ideology, a topic which has received hardly any 
attention until now. Newspaper holdings on microfilm at the Library of Congress and the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum proved to contain a surprisingly rich number 
of issues of these obscure newspapers. To this I later added wartime speeches of leading 
ethnic Germans found in contemporary newspapers and a few rare and precious books 
published by the ethnic German community in wartime Banat.  
In view of the importance of Nazi diplomacy for the Banat Germans, documents 
of the AA – both published ones and those available in archives in Germany (in the 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, the Political Archive of the German Foreign 
Ministry) and in the National Archives in College Park, Maryland – have been 
invaluable. Documents of other Nazi institutions with a stake in Banat affairs (the 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt, the Wehrmacht, the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, etc.) 
illuminated the overlapping interests which existed in a German occupation regime. The 
various branches of the Bundesarchiv (German Federal Archive) naturally contain a 
11 
 
treasure trove of material, but so does the National Archive in College Park. Its Captured 
German Records contain, scattered in a dozen or so thematic groups, a surprisingly high 
number of individual documents and series of documents which touch directly on Banat 
affairs as well as ethnic German affairs and Nazi racial policy in general. 
Official proclamations published in German- and Serbian-language publications 
aimed at administrators and ordinary people in occupied Serbia and the Banat provided 
insight not only into policy, but into perceptions and informal attitudes as well. A number 
of occasionally obscure works of historiography and memoir literature showed how often 
wartime perceptions and ideological ways of seeing the world persisted into the postwar 
period in socialist Yugoslavia as well as among the ethnic German expellees in West 
Germany. The library holdings at the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, the 
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin (State Library of Berlin) and the Narodna biblioteka Srbije 
(National Library of Serbia in Belgrade) contain a wealth of printed material from the 
war as well as the postwar era. 
In addition to research into ethnic German ideology, the most original and 
pleasantly surprising part of my research involved work with two types of documents 
which have been barely used in works of history until now. One consists of wartime 
memoranda sent between different administrative offices within the occupied Banat or 
from the Banat ethnic German administration to the Reich Germans in Belgrade and 
Berlin. These include village notaries‟ reports on the locals‟ mood and activities, 
economic complaints, policy suggestions, applications for residence permits, and many 
other kinds of documents. They are scattered in town, regional and state archives in the 
Banat (Zrenjanin and Kikinda), the Baĉka (Novi Sad) and Belgrade. They are a barely 
12 
 
tapped resource for historical scholarship, and the kind of documents which really allows 
close insight into a community‟s perceptions, ambitions and realities.  
The other type of documents consists of two groups of statements made after the 
war about wartime events. The first contains depositions in Serbo-Croatian made to the 
Yugoslav Drņavna komisija za utvrĊivanje zloĉina okupatora i njihovih pomagaĉa (State 
Commission for the Determining of Crimes Committed by Occupiers and Their Helpers), 
which can be found in the Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore a.k.a. Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archive of 
Serbia and Montenegro a.k.a. Archive of Yugoslavia
6
) in Belgrade. Made mostly in late 
1944 and in 1945, these statements by individual Banat Serbs, ethnic Hungarians, Jews, 
Roma, even some ethnic Germans, and others were compiled as potential evidence at 
planned trials of war criminals (ethnic Germans, Reich Germans and others). Some are in 
the form of prose statements, others are accusations leveled against specific individuals 
and institutions for crimes against individuals and groups during the occupation. 
Although they might be inferred to contain a certain amount of score-settling, collating 
evidence from a sample of these documents provides a consistent and convincing picture 
of the forms and degrees of ethnic German collaboration. The relatively brief period of 
time which elapsed between the actual events and the testimonies lends them further 
credibility.  
The second group consists of testimonies made by ethnic Germans expelled from 
East and Southeast Europe at the end of the war, who settled in West Germany. These 
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testimonies were compiled mostly in the 1950s by the Federal Ministry for Expellees, 
Refugees and Persons Damaged by the War (Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, 
Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte), and can be found in the Bundesarchiv branch in 
Bayreuth in the record group Ost-Dokumentation (Ost-Dok.). Included among them are 
testimonies of Banat Germans. Some of these testimonies are reports from former 
members of the Banat German leadership, which are similar to the memoir literature by 
other expellees in their skewed and exculpatory view of the past (see below). The Ost-
Dokumentation also includes a number of testimonies and questionnaires filled out by 
ethnic German expellees on all aspects of their wartime activities and experiences: the 
war between the Reich and Yugoslavia, the occupation, privileges for ethnic Germans, 
relations with other ethnicities, military service, and postwar events. Though some stress 
the ethnic Germans‟ postwar suffering, many offer a refreshingly balanced and honest 
look into the wartime Banat as experienced by ordinary ethnic Germans. A few historians 
(e.g. Akiko Shimizu) have used these documents, but not to any great extent. Despite 
failures of memory caused by the time elapsed since the war (most of these reports were 
made in 1958) and a certain amount of lying which can be expected, a comparison of the 
information gleaned from these documents with that found in the Yugoslav depositions 
fills out the details of the tapestry of Banat German life and (war)times. 
 
Literature  
Collaboration with a regime as violent, discriminatory, racist and exclusivist as the Third 
Reich has become a dominant theme in historiography in the last thirty or so years. The 
awareness that without willing collaborators the Reich could hardly control as many 
14 
 
European territories as it did has led to many scholastic examinations of the material 
incentives and ideological affinities between various groups in the Third Reich and 
abroad, and National Socialism. Earlier works focused on describing and analyzing the 
Nazi regime per se. Sometimes they interpreted – as did the works of Martin Broszat – 
Nazism‟s influence as primarily instrumental in nature, a tool for the spread of German 
hegemony and the manipulation of domestic and foreign populations to serve Germany‟s 
interests.
7
 More recent works by Stanley G. Payne and Dietrich Orlow, among others, 
have stressed instead the ideological similarities between National Socialism and fascism 
in other European countries, and the corresponding willingness of fascist and far-right 
elites outside Germany to further Reich interests as their own.
8
 However, these authors‟ 
focus on ideology does not explain the full range of motives which inspired collaboration. 
They also cannot account for the collaboration of ethnic and social groups which may not 
officially embrace a far-right ideology as their raison d‟être.  
The phenomenon of collaboration illuminates two aspects of Hitler‟s war: his 
ability to harness support, and the positive responses his armies often encountered, 
especially upon first entering a foreign territory. However much they may have wished to 
rule by blood and sword, the Nazis often found it necessary to cajole, persuade and 
inspire their allies and potential collaborators. Collaboration allowed groups as well as 
individuals in occupied territories to profit materially, oppress others, gain legitimacy, 
power or self-respect. For some, it vindicated their pre-existing view of the world. For the 
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lowest of the low, it allowed for sheer survival. For all those in between, it satisfied a 
broad spectrum of physical, material, psychological and emotional needs. Collaboration 
could take many forms, from outright endorsement of the Nazi cause in the media, 
through administration or armed service, to various degrees of collusion, cooperation or 
accommodation (these terms lack the voluntarism and enthusiasm implied by the term 
„collaboration‟
9
), to a failure to protest or resist Nazi policies. All these degrees of 
collaboration were evident in the Banat ethnic German community.  
In order to ensure these different degrees of collaboration, the Nazi regime 
offered many ideological, psychological and material incentives to collaboration. The key 
issue is precisely the mixture of motives. Jan Tomasz Gross‟s sociological analysis of 
occupied Poland pinpointed the two social groups which made for excellent 
collaborators: either a former governing elite given new legitimacy under occupation or a 
formerly oppressed and aggrieved minority.
10
 Both types of groups profited from 
collaboration by gaining power, legitimacy, wealth and local prestige.  
The prime example of a governing elite which gained a new lease on life through 
collaboration is Vichy France. A similar shift in emphasis occurred in the scholarship of 
Vichy, as it did in the scholarship on collaboration in general. Robert O. Paxton‟s 
pioneering work focused on proving the ideological affinity between Vichy and the Third 
Reich, and the extent of the former‟s complicity with the latter.
11
 A later generation of 
historians including Philipe Burrin and Julian Jackson has examined how the Vichy 
                                                 
9
 Klaus-Peter Friedrich, “Collaboration in a “Land without a Quisling”: Patterns of Cooperation 
with the Nazi German Occupation Regime in Poland during World War II,” Slavic Review, Vol. 
64, No. 4 (Winter 2005), pp. 711-746. 
10
 Jan Tomasz Gross, Polish Society under German Occupation: The Generalgouvernement, 
1939-1944 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 123.  
11
 Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944, revised edition (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001).  
16 
 
leadership used its new empowerment to inspire as well coerce wide sections of French 
society under their rule to accept concessions and engage in professional activities which 
implicated them deeply in Nazi crimes.
12
 However, as Burrin pointed out, a 
collaborationist regime like Vichy had at least limited independence of action and 
sovereignty from the Third Reich, and therefore did not produce very malleable 
collaborators. Because it had its own claim to legitimacy and rested on political and 
ideological traditions independent of those in Nazi Germany, it actually divided its 
subjects‟ loyalty. It took for itself some of the support that may have gone to the Reich.
13
 
In this respect, the second type of collaborationist group described by Gross was a 
better option for the Third Reich. A minority group which had been oppressed by a 
regime dismantled by the Nazis or had perceived itself as oppressed, would have owed its 
new freedom and empowerment to the Reich. As a minority, it could not challenge the 
Reich‟s claim to absolute power and control of its home region. And it had little or no 
leverage with which to bargain against whatever demands the Reich posed it. Such was 
the case in occupied Ukraine: Wendy Lower has shown how quickly ethnic Germans, 
Ukrainians and Soviet POWs were co-opted by the Nazi regime into executing its 
murderous policies.
14
 They were inspired in various degrees by the desire for survival 
(physical motive), the possibility to gain some power, wealth and the opportunity to 
oppress others (material motive), the removal of social inhibitors and the brutalization 
wrought by warfare on the Eastern Front (psychological motive), and the possibility of 
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fitting their ethnic groups within the middle or upper echelons of the Nazi racial 
hierarchy (ideological motive).  
Much remains to be done on the sometimes nearly feudal or colonial regimes 
established under Nazi auspices in various parts of Europe. The title of a recent syncretic 
work by Mark Mazower encapsulates brilliantly the overall relationship between the 
Reich and occupied territories or allied states as that between the imperial center and the 
subjugated-but-also-accommodated periphery.
15
 As Gross pointed out, it was impossible 
for the Nazis to exclude an entire majority population from at least some benefits 
(accrued through collaboration), short of attempting to exterminate it completely.
16
 The 
Nazis attempted the physical extermination of the Jews, and the Jews were not even a 
majority population anywhere in Europe. With other European populations in their sphere 
of influence, the Nazis made various twisted forms of the social contract. 
The literature on collaboration has shown repeatedly the importance of an ethnic 
group‟s standing in the Nazi racial category for its ability to collaborate. Whereas the 
Nazis merely allowed some members of groups of extremely low standing like Jews, 
Poles or Russians to participate in collaboration, the Scandinavian peoples, the French 
and the Czechs were accorded much more respect. This was even truer of ethnic Germans 
(Volksdeutsche), who were officially second only to Reich Germans (Reichsdeutsche) in 
Hitler‟s worldview. In reality, however, different ethnic German communities‟ position 
depended in large part on relations between their host state and the Third Reich. This 
underscored the continued importance of the Reich‟s diplomatic efforts in wartime, and 
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has been demonstrated by many monographs published – like the majority of the 
scholastic literature on ethnic Germans – in German.
17
  
While an overall history of the ethnic Germans during the war is lacking, the case 
histories examined in these monographs suggest that no other ethnic German community 
was given as much power within its home region as that inhabiting the Serbian Banat.
18
 
Ethnic German ambitions in states allied with Nazi Germany were hampered by the 
continued diplomatic need for the Reich not to alienate said host states by promoting the 
ethnic Germans too openly. In occupied territories, on the other hand, the perceived racial 
quality and reliability of the ethnic Germans was too low to entrust them with much local 
power beyond basic policing and concentration-camp guard duty (as was the case in 
Poland and the Soviet Union). If their area of residence was annexed directly by the Third 
Reich, they gained Reich citizenship and thus ceased to be real ethnic Germans (as 
happened in the Sudet and parts of Slovenia).  
The Banat German case is therefore unique in Hitler‟s Europe in that they were a 
minority which gained undisputed administrative control over its home region, thus 
uniting the qualities of the two collaborationist types described by Gross. They were not 
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exceptional, however, in their overall dependence on the Reich, since dependence on an 
outside source of legitimacy and power is the salient quality of collaboration as such. 
The case of the Banat Germans is a part of the historiography of World War II in 
Yugoslavia, and of the emergence of the postwar Yugoslav communist regime out of 
what was both a war of resistance to occupation and a civil war between various domestic 
factions. The failure to examine multiple coexisting motives for ethnic German 
collaboration renders the historiography of World War II produced in postwar 
Yugoslavia of limited use as a source of historical analysis. Leftist ideology required that 
ethnic German collaboration in Yugoslav lands be portrayed as affecting absolutely all 
ethnic Germans, inspired purely by rabid ideology and a pathological hatred of all things 
non-German. Instead of considering ethnic German motives and the interplay of external 
and internal factors which influenced their collaboration with the Reich, these historical 
works focused instead on portraying the war in Yugoslavia as the victorious struggle of 
left-wing, freedom-loving Slavic peoples against the foreign enemy as well as the 
„foreign‟ enemy in their midst.
19
 Some of these works showed more nuance,
20
 but all 
were hampered by a fundamentally simplistic approach to the subject.  
Since the early 1990s, the end of communist regimes in Europe and the violent 
civil war in former Yugoslavia wrought an interest in Yugoslav (now Serbian) 
historiography for ethnic German experiences in the immediate postwar period. New 
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monographs and edited volumes of surviving ethnic Germans‟ testimonies have 
examined the suffering of ethnic Germans incarcerated and dispossessed by the Tito 
regime in the period 1944-1948 as a consequence of their wartime association with Nazi 
Germany.
21
 These works do not, however, examine the war years. Thus the Serbian- and 
Serbo-Croatian-language historiography on ethnic Germans lacks an understanding of a 
key portion of their history. One of the goals of this dissertation is to introduce nuance 
and examine neglected topics of the ethnic Germans‟ wartime activities. 
By contrast, yet with similar overall effect, the memoirs and histories produced by 
ethnic Germans who survived the postwar period of incarceration and expulsion from all 
East- and Southeast-European countries consciously downplayed the ethnic Germans‟ 
wartime collaboration in favor of accounts of their postwar suffering. In this, the 
expellees were abetted by the Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und 
Kriegsgeschädigte, its professional historians (many of whom had engaged in Nazified 
scholarship during the Third Reich
22
), and numerous expellee organizations on the local 
and state level in West Germany as well as the United States, Argentina and other 
countries where expellees eventually settled. Often marked by an unreconstructed 
National Socialist worldview, the memoirs and biased histories which constitute the 
„Leidensgeschichte‟ (history of suffering) of ethnic Germans after the war had a dual 
political purpose. They whitewashed or disguised the ethnic Germans‟ part in the Nazi 
regime‟s crimes by shifting the blame onto the Reich Germans. They also invited 
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sympathy and material benefits for ethnic German expellees in their new home states by 
portraying them as victims and only victims.
23
  
My study ends in October 1944, with a brief overview of the flight of a part of the 
ethnic German community in Chapter 7. I wished to piece together the history of the 
Banat ethnic Germans‟ wartime activities from the fragmentary documentary record 
which survived wartime destruction rather than treat the events of the war years merely as 
the pre-history of the ethnic Germans‟ expulsion. The ethnic German memory of the war 
will be criticized throughout the following chapters, when those remembering the war 
attempted to rewrite their own histories. An examination of memory as a historical 
phenomenon does not, however, fall within the scope of this dissertation. Its goal is to 
examine what happened and why, not how the participants chose to frame events after the 
fact. 
The three major works on the Serbian Banat‟s ethnic Germans currently in print 
are also in German. While these are fine and valuable works of scholarship, they do 
suffer from certain shortcomings. Thomas Casagrande‟s study of the Waffen-SS division 
“Prinz Eugen” hampers a history of the division with sociological and socio-
psychological theory on the individual‟s mental development and the ethnic group‟s 
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absorption by larger (specifically national) constructs.
24
 Akiko Shimizu‟s exhaustively 
detailed history of the occupied Banat is more descriptive and narrative than analytical.
25
 
Ekkehard Völkl‟s study of relations between ethnic Germans, ethnic Hungarians and 
others benefits from the author‟s command of the Hungarian language and focus on 
Hungarian themes, but is very brief.
26
 Moreover, all three books lack certain pieces of the 
puzzle due to the authors‟ lack of facility with the Serbian (Serbo-Croatian) language. 
This restricted their use of materials which survive sometimes only in translation. 
Possibly the biggest gap in the historiography of ethnic German participation in 
Hitler‟s war in any language is an absence of analysis of the ethnic German 
understanding and articulation of Nazi ideology.
27
 The underlying assumption seems to 
be that ethnic Germans adopted National Socialism from the Reich without any 
modification. One of the goals of this dissertation is to examine the extent to which the 
Banat Germans emphasized certain themes to make them accord with their historical 
experience and sense of self, and how this in turn inspired them to collaborate with the 
Reich. National Socialism could be quite flexible within certain strict parameters, as 
suggested by the fact that Hitler‟s regime did not object to ethnic Germans articulating 
common themes in their own way.  
The literature on the ethnic German experience of war and occupation in English-
language historiography is just starting to expand. The most notable English-language 
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works on the topic presently available are Valdis O. Lumans‟ institutional history of the 
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VoMi), the main Reich office in charge of coordinating 
ethnic German activities,
28
 and Doris L. Bergen‟s articles on the role ethnic Germans 
played in the Holocaust.
29
 Bergen especially examines the actual content of the Nazi 
racial category of „Volksdeutsche‟ and concludes that it was at best tenuous – as were 
Nazi racial categories and hierarchies in general.  
The ostensible Germanness of many ethnic Germans in the East was often 
questionable. However, the ethnic Germans of the Serbian Banat insisted on their good 
German credentials, though they may not have spoken German perfectly or evaded 
intermarriage with non-Germans. For this ethnic German community, the burning issue 
was the fundamental ambivalence inherent in the term „Volksdeutscher‟ as used by Reich 
Germans. This ambivalence marked the entire wartime collaboration of the Banat 
Germans with not entirely positive experiences, and was as crucial for their position in 
Hitler‟s brief European empire as were the diplomatic relations between the Reich, their 
host state and neighboring states. Since the dual focus of this work is on ethnic German 
perceptions, choices and experiences as well as the Third Reich‟s view and use of them, a 
more thorough examination of what it meant to be seen – and to see oneself – as an ethnic 
German on the eve of World War II and during the war years is in order. 
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Volksdeutsche in the Nazi Worldview 
The close association of race and space was central to the National Socialist project of 
expansion and conquest. During the brief existence of the „Thousand-Year Reich‟ only 
the negative aspects of this project came to fruition, namely the expulsion and 
extermination of undesirable categories of people (such as the Jews) and the uprooting 
even of favored ethnic groups (such as the ethnic Germans). These negative moves were 
intended, however, to contribute to a positive transformation of the German Volk by 
allowing it to spread, colonize and regenerate areas of Europe, especially parts of Central 
and much of East Europe. Though inhabited by German-speaking minorities amid large 
non-German majorities, in the Nazi imagination these areas were associated with the 
German Reich precisely by this tenuous German presence in the form of people 
descended from medieval or Habsburg-era settlers. In tune with the Nazi rhetoric of racial 
regeneration, geographic locations, too, could be renewed and bettered by being settled 
and cultivated by racially sound stock.  
In the case of East and Southeast Europe with their ethnic German minorities, the 
prospect of improving upon both race and space implied more than merely shifting 
populations around like so much inert matter, disposing of them as though they were 
pieces on a chess board. The connection between race and space was a dynamic link in 
the National Socialist worldview, embodied by the word „Lebensraum,‟ living space, 
meaning not just space in which one could live, but a space which lived in a symbiotic 
relationship with its inhabitants. “„[T]he East‟ implies not a location, but a state of being . 
25 
 




This symbiosis between people and landscape confirmed the preexisting notion of 
the necessity for racially sound settlers, who shared a profound connection with their area 
of residence. Drawing on the bastardized version of biology which was racial science, 
Nazi ideology presumed the existence of an intrinsic, ineradicable link between people 
and the landscape they inhabited, a rootedness of bloodlines in the soil, however 
„uncivilized‟ the soil might seem. “This was the mysterious, disturbing and hazy realm 
that the Germans called the „East‟ – a supposedly uncultivated wilderness of swamps, 
impenetrable forests and steppes on Prussia‟s doorstep – which was only awaiting 
German energy and discipline to be put into order and made productive.”
31
 The dubious 
East could not be improved without a strong bond with the supposed high racial quality 
of its German residents or new settlers. This is paradoxical given the Nazi obsession with 
racial purity and uniformity, which are essentially static modes of being.  
In the period of the Third Reich‟s dominance over much of Europe, the ethnic 
Germans (Volksdeutsche) of Central, East and Southeast Europe existed at the 
intersection of these ideas about racial purity, the possibility of regenerating that which 
was not altogether pure, and the Nazi colonial project within continental Europe. Writing 
specifically about the Volksdeutsche of the Serbian and Romanian Banat in 1939, Reich 
author Johannes Künzig waxed lyrical about the Eastwards movement of German 
peasants since the Middle Ages under the rallying cry “We will to the East! [Nach 
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Künzig interpreted the settling of what had been southern Hungary under 
Habsburg auspices after the expulsion of Ottoman forces in the 18
th
 century as an 
example of the settlers‟ eternal devotion to the interests of the German Volk over those of 
the individual. He also pinpointed the two most important services Volksdeutsche could 
render to Reich and Volk: they could make their area of settlement economically 
productive, and defend it against enemy encroachment.
33
 Such tangible services remained 
central to the Third Reich‟s treatment of Volksdeutsche. Plans to use ethnic Germans as 
valuable racial material for the regeneration of the Volk were never fully separated from 
the possibilities of using ethnic Germans in more practical ways, as producers of 
necessary food, soldiers for the Reich, and diplomatic bargaining chips in the Reich‟s 
foreign relations.  
In an article penned for the Reich journal Deutsche Arbeit in 1942, Ulrich Greifelt 
– Heinrich Himmler‟s right-hand man in Himmler‟s role as Reich Commissar for the 
Strengthening of Germandom (Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums, 
RKFDV), the office in charge of population policy in occupied and annexed areas – 
acknowledged the complex relationship between notions of race and territory: “It was in 
the thousand-year struggle for a German East that we first gained a Reich through great 
efforts at colonization, we became a Volk of soldiers and settlers.”
34
 Greifelt explicitly 
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associated the existence of the Reich with a German presence in the East, and the racial 
unity of the Volk with the practical efforts of soldiers and peasant settlers. The dynamic 
relationship between race and space went beyond ideologically charged plans for the 
colonization of the East following a German victory. During the war, it affected the Reich 
Germans‟ view of and attitude toward ethnic Germans already present in areas designated 
as German by right of historical presence or, barring that, racial superiority. 
Yet another paradox inherent in the National Socialist worldview was that 
between the emphasis on community and unity on one side, and the mania for 
classification on the other. This mania drove Nazi racial experts to classify members of 
individual populations as well as entire ethnic groups according to their presumed racial 
quality.
35
 Even the German Volk, supposedly unified and uniform, did not escape de 
facto division into categories of varying degrees of Germanness, as demonstrated by the 
very existence of the term „Volksdeutsche.‟ A Reich Chancellery memo defined 
Volksdeutsche rather vaguely in early 1938 as persons “whose language and culture are 
of German origin, but who do not belong to the German Reich as its citizens.”
36
 
Following the Reich‟s invasion of rump Czechoslovakia in March 1939, a secret memo 
from the Reich Interior Ministry built on the 1938 document to define Volksdeutsche as 
German Volkszugehörige (persons of German ethnic origin) who did not have Reich 
citizenship but consciously professed their Germanness as well as displaying such 
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„objective‟ hallmarks as German language, culture and education.
37
 While this document 
introduced race into the equation with the use of the term „Volkszugehörige,‟ it left much 
leeway for the planned assimilation of at least some Czechs into the German Volk, even 
declaring: “A more precise elucidation of the term “deutscher Volkszugehöriger” is not 
possible in the current conditions.”
38
 
 The conditions alluded to in the 1939 document refer to Germany‟s continued 
efforts to expand and attract allies by diplomatic means. The outbreak of World War II in 
September 1939 and, especially, the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 
contributed to an evolution and exacerbation of Nazi racial policy which led eventually to 
the Holocaust. It also meant the evolution of more precise racial categories for desirable 
and undesirable populations, so that a pamphlet issued by the Nazi Party‟s 
Rassenpolitisches Amt in 1942 outlined several categories of Germanness. It defined a 
„Volksdeutscher‟ as equivalent to a „deutscher Volkszugehöriger‟ but stressed that, 
despite residing in a foreign state, sometimes for generations, a true Volksdeutscher 
“remained true to his German Volkstum,” accepting foreign citizenship as but an 
“external bond” for purposes of legal and economic security.
39
 While this conscious 
identification with and expression of German language and culture were desirable, racial 
affinity with Reich Germans was the crucial element separating the Volksdeutscher from 
persons who were of German origin but had become assimilated into the host society, or 
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had more foreign than German blood, or belonged to a Germanic (but not the German) 
people, etc.  
 In the words of an author writing during the first year of the war, “this word 
[Volksdeutsche] means the organic unity of Germandom [living] in foreign states, as 
opposed to the Western-democratic term “minority” with its dependence on numbers.”
40
 
Volksdeutsche were recognized as belonging to Volksgruppen, organic, indivisible units 
comprising racially and ideologically superior individuals – though not quite on a par 
with those living in the Third Reich itself. Contrary to the manner in which cultural and 
religious anti-Semitism predating the Nazi period was overlaid and exacerbated by racial 
science, Nazi exaltation of Volksdeutsche as guardians of Germanness in foreign lands 
was tempered by deeply ingrained xenophobia and a kind of latter-day kleindeutsch 
(limited to the physical borders of Germany) view of who could count as a fully fledged 
member of the German people.  
This did not mean that the term „Volksdeutsche‟ became static or set in stone. The 
two final elements in the gradually crystallizing Platonic ideal of the Volksdeutsche 
involved criteria for membership in Volksdeutsche organizations and the 
Volksdeutsche‟s likely future. In July 1942, with the Holocaust and the attendant removal 
of racial undesirables from the East underway, Himmler signed a set of guidelines for the 
application of the Nuremberg Laws to Volksdeutsche, regardless of their host state. 
Mischlinge of the first degree (half-Jews) and most Mischlinge of the second degree 
(quarter-Jews) were banned from membership in Volksdeutsche organizations, as were 
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Volksdeutsche married to Jews.
41
 While the conscious choice of individual 
Volksdeutsche to use the German language and to situate themselves within German 
cultural traditions remained significant in individual German Volksgruppen, the 
importance of race was acknowledged as paramount in determining who could belong to 
the Volk and who had to be excluded from it.  
At the same time as the category of „Volksdeutsche‟ was circumscribed and 
streamlined, Berlin made it clear that leaders of German Volksgruppen in various 
European states should be made cognizant of these guidelines, but not of the fact that 
they had been approved by Himmler. The Volksgruppenführer (leaders of ethnic German 
communities) were also forbidden from publicizing these guidelines, effectively 
embroiling them in a pact of silence with the Reich, against their own co-nationals within 
the Volksgruppen.
42
 This decision stemmed at least in part from the Reich‟s continued 
desire not to alienate those of its allies, like Hungary and Romania, whose anti-Semitic 
policies were not as extreme as German ones, and whose attitudes to their ethnic German 
minorities were often fraught with tension and resentment.  
This decision also speaks volumes as to the essentially distrustful attitude of 
Reich officials dealing with racial Germans living outside Reich borders. While for many 
Germans in the period 1933-1945 the term „Volksdeutsche‟ “carried overtones of blood 
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and race not captured in the English translation „ethnic Germans‟,”
43
 the Volksdeutsche 
still seemed not quite German enough. The war did nothing to alleviate this inter-German 
tension. As late as summer 1944 Berlin expressed concern over a “certain pejorative 
meaning”
44
 attached to the term „Volksdeutsche,‟ but could do little more than point out 
the continued effective division of the Volk into „better‟ and „worse‟ Germans.
45
 
However much the individual Volksdeutsche may have seemed to fit the parameters set 
down by the Reich‟s racial experts, the facts of their residence abroad, often among 
majority non-Germanic populations, rendered them ideologically and racially suspect.  
German occupation officials tended to see the Volksdeutsche in East and 
Southeast Europe as useful collaborators, traditional guardians of Europe‟s cultural and 
civilizational borders, and somewhat sympathetic, yet ultimately pathetic, racially 
dubious, and far less important than Jews, anti-Axis guerrillas or the Reich‟s labor needs. 
The truly ideal Volksdeutsche would have been content to follow orders from the Reich 
without complicating relations with their host states through individual initiative or 
policy suggestions. Himmler summed up the issue: “In order to secure the Reich‟s 
control over individual Volksgruppenführer, we need to find local men willing to obey 
Berlin‟s orders blindly, whether they agree with said orders or not, whether they even 
understand them on the basis of Volkstumsarbeit [the Reich‟s efforts to confirm and 
solidify ethnic Germans‟ Germanness] already done.”
46
  
                                                 
43
 Bergen, “The Nazi Concept of „Volksdeutsche‟,” p. 569.  
44
 “eine gewisse abwertende Bedeutung” VoMi to AA, June 1, 1944, PA AA, Inland II Geheim, R 
100896, fiche 2295, frame 393,474. 
45
 VoMi to AA (1944), PA AA, Inland II Geheim, R 100896, fiche 2295, frames 393,474-475. 
46
 “Um den Führungsanspruch des Reichs gegenüber den einzelnen Volksgruppenführern 
sicherzustellen, seien draussen Männer zu finden, die bereit sind, den von Berlin gegebenen 
Befehlen blindlings zu gehorchen, ob sie mit diesen Befehlen einverstanden sind oder nicht, ob sie 
diese aus ihrer Volkstumsarbeit heraus verstehen oder nicht.” Himmler memo, May 16, 1939, 
32 
 
In a recent book on Nazi population and resettlement policy, historian Markus 
Leniger pointed out the contradiction inherent in concepts of Volkstumsarbeit and 
resettlement. While the former aimed to strengthen and entrench Germans wherever they 
already lived in Europe, the latter was to be their shared postwar fate after a planned 
German victory (and was, indeed, implemented for some already during the war).
47
 
However high the degree of suspicion directed against Volksdeutsche on grounds of 
racial pollution and cultural assimilation,
48
 their main role in Hitler‟s master plan was as 
human raw material for the settlement-cum-re-conquest of the East. This again highlights 
the unexpected flexibility of Nazi racial categories. Volksdeutsche may not have been 
German enough for some Reich German tastes, but they would do for purposes of 
recreating a German Eastern paradise – likely not least since, unlike Reich Germans, 
Volksdeutsche were accustomed to living among non-Germans and in conditions inferior 
to those prevalent in Central Europe.
49
  
Despite Hitler‟s grandiose proclamation of plans to resettle all Volksdeutsche 
back to the Reich,
50
 foreign policy demanded that most of these plans be postponed till 
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 Specifically in the case of Southeast Europe, in late summer 1941 the 
resettlement of most of the roughly 500,000 Volksdeutsche living in what had been the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia was officially postponed till after the war.
52
 Germany‟s allies 
Hungary, Italy and Bulgaria occupied substantial portions of Yugoslav territory. 
Diplomatic relations with these states dictated that plans for ethnic Germans be ratified 
by their host states. Such diplomatic processes not only took time, but were often 
interpreted as Reich interference in other states‟ internal matters, and resented by the 
Reich‟s allies. Not upsetting allies was crucial so long as Axis countries fought a joint 
battle in the Soviet Union, which effectively prevented Hitler from forcing the issue until 
it was too late for his regime, let alone for peaceful resettlement of ethnic Germans. They 
were eventually „resettled‟ under duress i.e. expelled en masse by the Red Army and the 
postwar regimes in East and Southeast Europe between late 1944 and 1948.  
Given the way in which the material circumstances of warfare and diplomacy 
modified Nazi ideological plans for ethnic Germans, Leniger‟s conclusion does not 
completely do justice to the issue. Foreign policy and ideology were sometimes 
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contradictory to each other. Other times, the former could actually influence the latter. 
For as long as resettlement of all ethnic Germans remained a theoretical plan rather than a 
detailed policy ready for implementation, the Third Reich had to invest human and 
material resources into Volkstumsarbeit in order to ensure that the essential Germanness 
of the Volksdeutsche was not diluted any further. While resettlement remained the only 
long-term solution envisioned by Reich offices, for the duration of the war ensuring that 
Volksdeutsche had cultural autonomy and, if possible, special legal protection within 
their host states was crucial.
53
 The idealization of the original German settlers and the 
real suspicion of their descendants in the East and Southeast influenced the Nazi 
leadership‟s willingness to let the matter of resettlement rest for the duration of the war. 
Nevertheless, the necessity of leaving Volksdeutsche where they were for the foreseeable 
future influenced the Reich‟s willingness to bolster their Germanness by providing them 
with political legitimation, armed protection, monetary aid, personnel, books and 
magazines, student trips to the Reich, etc.  
* 
The Volksdeutsche inhabiting the Serbian Banat in this period existed in a field of tension 
between National Socialist ideology (with its contempt for Slavs and Jews), the 
diplomatic tug-of-war between Germany, Hungary and the countries of Southeast 
Europe, German economic demands, and the Volksdeutsche‟s own group identity as 
articulated by their Nazified leadership. The key concepts which shaped Berlin‟s view of 
the Balkans were those of Lebensraum (living space) and Grossraumwirtschaft (the 
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planned revamping of European economies to ease the exploitation of raw materials from 





The linking of these concepts is evident already in Weimar-era literature on the 
Volksdeutsche in the interwar Yugoslav state. The distinguishing characteristic of the 
ethnic German peasant was understood to be his devotion to hard work and his resultant 
material prosperity, most evident in comparison with the relative poverty of his non-
German neighbors. While racial rhetoric did not figure prominently in these works, they 
did delineate a clear hierarchy of ethnic groups in the Balkans. The ethnic Germans stood 
firmly at its apex, even as these works posited economic success as the ethnic Germans‟ 
main claim to fame.
56
 That ethnic Germans were not wholly acceptable as Germans even 
before the Nazi period is evident. Their devotion to work and material success was a 
back-handed compliment. It highlighted the ethnic Germans‟ lack of deep spiritual and 
cultural interests (Kultur), but this was ascribed to the school of hard knocks which was 
the settler‟s life in a foreign land.
57
  
In Weimar, ethnic Germans were routinely portrayed as physically and spiritually 
oppressed by the Yugoslav authorities. This established the image of them – internalized 
even by many ethnic Germans – as essentially hapless, helpless, and in need of 
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Germany‟s protection and support.
58
 Whatever the flaws of interwar Yugoslav minority 
policy, this insistence on the lack of acceptance ethnic Germans encountered could only 
become exacerbated with the rise of a violently racial ideology like National Socialism 
and the concomitant rise of Germany as Europe‟s leading economic, diplomatic and, 
eventually, military power in the course of the 1930s.  
Already before the beginning of World War II, ideas about the East (and 
Southeast) prevalent in German culture became systematized and exacerbated by an 
overlay of racial biology, which provided a seemingly objective interpretative framework 
for earlier notions of Eastern inferiority. Physical encounters with the East and its peoples 
during the war served only to sharpen these perceived contrasts.
59
 But the surface contrast 
between Central Europe and the East in terms of living standard, economic development 
and prevalent languages and cultures does not completely explain Nazi hostility. It was 
due in large part to the very real awareness of just how close everything the East stood 
for was. This was nowhere truer than in the Balkans. The Reich Germans called the river 
Danube a “Kulturgrenze”
60
 separating the West (Germany and its still-scattered Volk) 
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from the (South)East, the hallmarks of which were blood feuds, banditry, patriarchal 
backwardness and pervasive corruption.
61
 Yet the Reich could not ignore the reality of 
German minorities sharing space (both in terms of landownership and in terms of 
residence in a state) with hostile or, at least, suspicious non-German majorities. The 
ethnic Germans could afford to ignore these facts even less. 
Johannes Künzig waxed lyrical in his description of a young, blonde girl from the 
Serbian Banat: “The face of a true German girl, a sign that the Banat Germans retained 
their racial purity untainted for more than two hundred years.”
62
 Again, in reference to a 
gloriously mustachioed elderly peasant from the Romanian Banat: “A breed of people far 
from their homeland [Heimat] has unmistakably preserved its race-specific appearance 
for a hundred years. We might encounter this peasant equally well in the Böhmerwald 
today.”
63
 Even while they willfully ignored the practical impossibility of absolutely no 
mixed marriages having taken place during two hundred years,
64
 Künzig and other Reich 
authors routinely combined praise of Banat Germans‟ racial purity with fears of the 
danger posed to it by a low birthrate and pervasive modernization, those eternal bugbears 
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of Nazi population policy.
65
 Paradoxically, material well-being was represented as both a 
just reward for the ethnic Germans‟ generational hard work (which visibly distinguished 
them and the landscape their work had shaped from that of their non-German 
neighbors
66
) and a dangerously seductive factor of their lives. Wealth seduced 
Volksdeutsche into forgetting their duty to the Volk, having few children, intermarrying 
and allowing non-Germans to work their fields as wage laborers.  
The Reich observer saw the average Banat Volksdeutscher as both a keeper of 
German cultural and racial identity in a foreign land, and as someone who “easily 
embraces alien [influences] in foreign countries.”
67
 The Volksdeutsche were therefore 
fundamentally unreliable, in need of constant Reich supervision, ideological and material 
support. Well might the German Volksgemeinschaft be posited as the “[c]oncept of 
overarching importance, which the hundred million Germans on this earth – including the 
Germans in the Southeast – long for and to which they pay homage.”
68
 In reality, 
Volksdeutsche could not be trusted to make independent decisions which might place 
their individual or group interest on a par or even above the interests of the Third Reich. 
They were forever junior partners in the National Socialist scheme. Many Reich 
policymakers (Himmler included) would likely have preferred Volksdeutsche to be inert 
racial material without powers of independent thought or reasoning, which could be 
disposed of and resettled as needed.  
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In reality, obedient as the leaders of the individual German Volksgruppen were, 
they were never without ideas of their own about how their areas of settlement should be 
administered, secured and treated in the overarching scheme of the Nazi „New Order.‟ In 
his recent history of World War II in Yugoslavia, Stevan K. Pavlowitch suggested that 
this phrase is a misnomer. According to Pavlowitch, the „New Order‟ meant an uneasy 
marriage between grand (and vague) long-term plans for population movement, racial 
renewal and economic restructuring of Europe, and these plans‟ practical, short-term 
realization in the form of unrestricted economic exploitation of occupied territories and 
subjugated populations in the interests of the Reich‟s war machine.
69
 Quite apart from the 
grandiose vision of a future Germanic East, the peripheral areas of Hitler‟s wartime 
empire served as convenient purveyors of food and raw materials for the Reich, and as a 
dumping ground for undesirable populations.
70
 The Volksdeutsche of the East and 
Southeast gained the dubious distinction of continued residence in a racially suspect area, 
where they were expected to continue to represent the civilizational superiority of the 
German Volk. They were also supposed to feed the very Reich whose citizens looked 
down their noses at Volksdeutsche, and fill the depleted ranks of the Reich‟s armed 
forces. All the while, Volksdeutsche were not meant to show too much initiative, merely 
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CHAPTER I CONTESTED GROUND:  
THE SERBIAN BANAT IN THE THIRD REICH‟S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
WITH YUGOSLAVIA, HUNGARY AND ROMANIA BEFORE AND DURING THE 
APRIL WAR 
 
The invasion and partitioning of Yugoslavia by the Third Reich and its allies Italy, 
Hungary and Bulgaria in the so-called April War
71
 of 1941 consolidated the trend evident 
throughout the second half of the 1930s for Southeast European states to reach 
rapprochement or be forced into an ever closer diplomatic, economic and military 
relationship with the Axis powers. The Reich wooed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia into 
signing the Axis Pact on March 25, 1941 in order to secure it as a source of food and raw 
materials for German markets, and to prevent its being used as a tool of British wartime 
diplomacy. (The latter was also the main reason for the Reich‟s invasion of Greece, 
which also took place in April 1941.) After the overthrow of the Yugoslav government 
which signed the Pact on March 27, the destruction and occupation of the country 
became the next best option for the Reich. However, even after the destruction of the 
Yugoslav state, diplomacy remained a significant element in the Third Reich‟s relations 
with its Southeast-European allies and with the Yugoslav territories occupied by it and 
said allies. 
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The actual division of the defeated Yugoslav state was a result of the practical 
need for resources and allies rather than National Socialist ideology, although ideology 
was often used to justify and solidify the territorial settlement. The Reich‟s foreign policy 
necessitated harmonious relations with its allies Hungary and Romania on the eve of the 
invasion of the Soviet Union. Paradoxically, this desire for stability in Southeast Europe 
also opened up space for tension as both Hungary and Romania made demands which 
endangered the provisional territorial settlement, and thus weakened the southern flank of 
Nazi Germany‟s projected Eastern Front. Even though the Third Reich was the dominant 
power in the Axis Pact and Europe in general in the spring of 1941, it relied for much of 
its influence on the support of its allies. Therefore its policies were never completely one-
sided, as is illustrated by the tensions inherent in the three-way relations between the 
Third Reich, Hungary and Yugoslavia before the April War, and relations between the 
Reich, Hungary and Romania after it.  
 The nexus in which these three-way relationships played out was the Serbian 
Banat, the western portion of the historical Banat region divided between Romania and 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (called after 1929 the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia) in 1918. In 1941 the Serbian Banat was occupied by the Wehrmacht but 
claimed – with varying justifications – by both Hungary and Romania. In Berlin‟s 
perspective this was an issue of, at best, secondary importance in view of its plans for the 
invasion of the Soviet Union. The Banat gained in importance due to its forming a wedge 
of territory between Hungary and Romania.  
On the eve of Operation Barbarossa, the ostensible reason why Operation 25 (the 
invasion of Yugoslavia) and Operation Marita (the invasion of Greece) were undertaken 
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was that the Reich could not afford for Hungary and Romania to engage in open enmity 
over this piece of land. Adding to this the fact that the Banat was inhabited by some 
120.000 ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche), who saw occupation by the Reich as vastly 
preferable to that by either of the other two contenders, the Banat came under the 
jurisdiction of the Reich German (Reichsdeutsche) military occupation authorities, whose 
seat was in the Serbian capital of Belgrade. This arrangement was a matter of expediency 
which – much like the Second Vienna Award of 1940, which benefited Hungary – failed 
to fully satisfy either Romania or Hungary, but it prevented them from starting their own 
war over this contested territory. Another unforeseen result of these expedient measures – 
again more practical and strategic than ideological in nature – was the laying of the 
groundwork for a semi-autonomous Volksdeutsche administration in the occupied Banat, 
which will be discussed at length in Chapter 2.  
 
Wartime Diplomacy 
The historiography dealing with the Axis attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941 can be 
divided into work done by Yugoslav historians in the postwar era and work done by their 
West German counterparts. Velimir Terzić‟s work is representative of the former: Terzić 
makes the claim that Operation 25 was strategically related not only to the attack on 
Greece, but also to Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 
1941.
72
 This assertion lends importance to the April War as a crucial part of the biggest 
Axis campaign, the undertaking which eventually spelled out the doom of the Third 
Reich.  
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By contrast, historians such as Holm Sundhaussen, Hans-Ulrich Wehler and 
Detlef Vogel deflate this sense of Yugoslav self-importance. Wehler associates the attack 
on Yugoslavia with the attack on Greece (Operation Marita), which was caused by Italy‟s 
inept invasion of the latter.
73
 Sundhaussen suggests that the Balkan campaign as a whole 
hardly detracted from preparations for Barbarossa, since only about 10% of the forces 
planned for deployment in the Soviet Union were actually dispatched to the Balkans.
74
 
Moreover, most of these troops were withdrawn soon after the conclusion of hostilities 
there, and returned to the pool of soldiers mustered for Barbarossa.
75
 While a meeting 
between Adolf Hitler, Reich Marshall Hermann Göring, Field Marschall Wilhelm Keitel 
and Keitel‟s deputy General Alfred Jodl held on March 27, 1941 concluded that 
Barbarossa would have to be delayed by four weeks, the participants agreed to use 
soldiers mustered for said campaign in order to secure a swift victory in the Balkans. 
They did not seem overly concerned about the effect this might have on the Soviet 
campaign.
76
 If Operation 25 decisively hastened anything, it was the success of Operation 
Marita. Its effect on the eventual failure of Operation Barbarossa remains open to debate. 
 In terms of the Third Reich‟s plans for the occupation of the Balkans, German 
historian Walter Manoschek acknowledges that it was useful for Nazi Germany to 
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partition Yugoslavia and control Greece in order to secure the southeastern flank of the 
Russian campaign. This need for secure flanks was rendered acute by the Third Reich‟s 
failure to completely secure the conquest of Western Europe with the abandonment of 
Operation Sea Lion against England.
77
 Manoschek also asserts that – unlike Barbarossa – 
the attack on Yugoslavia and Greece was not intended to be an “ideologically-motivated 
war of racial extermination.”
78
 This is not contradicted by the streak of anti-Serb 
prejudice current in Austria since World War I, articulated by Hitler at the March 27 
meeting with Göring and the Wehrmacht commanders. Hitler considered leaving the 
southern flank of Barbarossa in the hands of an unreliable, weak and essentially anti-
German Yugoslav government to be potentially disastrous for the whole enterprise.
79
 
Strong as it was, this prejudice did not amount to a plan for racial annihilation. Instead, 
the Balkans were seen primarily as a strategically important part of a larger campaign, 
and as a source of agricultural products and raw materials for the German war economy. 
The latter followed the same logic which had governed ever closer economic relations 
between the Third Reich and Yugoslavia during the 1930s.  
As German historian Klaus Olshausen cogently noted already in the 1970s, the 
occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece did not mean their automatic incorporation into the 
Nazi New Order. Instead, Operations 25 and Marita were expedient measures intended to 
prevent the possibility of a British-led Balkan front against the Reich, and to ease 
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economic extraction from these countries.
80
 Having failed to honor the Axis Pact signed 
by its penultimate prewar government, Yugoslavia no longer merited even the position of 
junior partner in the new, German-dominated Europe. The fact that its Serbian population 
was also seen as racially inferior and congenitally treacherous further justified its 
treatment as subjects without a right to claim as their own the land they lived on and the 
resources they used. 
 Sundhaussen‟s claim that Nazi Germany was unwilling to commit many troops to 
the Balkan campaign, which was seen as of secondary importance vis-à-vis the planned 
campaign in the Soviet Union, is upheld by the March 27 meeting, at which it was 
decided that Germany would obtain Italian, Hungarian and Bulgarian military assistance 
against Yugoslavia. In Hitler‟s view, if the Yugoslav government and its people had 
forfeited the right to their territory by rejecting the Axis Pact, then Germany‟s three tried 
and tested allies would be rewarded by a promised return of territories that were the 
object of their revisionist claims.
81
 It was also decided that, although it too was 
Germany‟s ally, Romania‟s forces would be reserved for the upcoming Russian 
campaign, and not used in the attack on Yugoslavia. This was reiterated in General von 
Brauchitsch‟s guidelines for the Balkan campaign of March 30, 1941: Hungarian forces, 
subsumed under the Reich‟s overall command, had to be ready to enter Yugoslavia by 
April 14, whereas Romania was to limit its activities to securing its border with 
Yugoslavia without crossing it.
82
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In the case of Hungary, the piece of Yugoslav territory slatted for it was the 
Serbian Banat, according to the Führer Directive of March 27 on the conduct of the 
Balkan campaign.
83
 These early decisions set the stage for a prolonged battle of wills 
between the Third Reich, Hungary and Romania regarding the validity of the latter two‟s 
claims to parts of Yugoslav territory and the extent of the territories involved. They also 
placed the Romanian claim in a position inferior to that of Hungary from the very 
beginning.  
Hungary was to deliver the most aid to the Wehrmacht in northern Yugoslavia i.e. 
the Vojvodina and northern Croatia. Since the Vojvodina region (comprising the Baĉka, 
the Banat, the Srem and the Baranja) had been a part of the Hungarian half of the Dual 
Monarchy until 1918, its recovery had been a mainstay of Hungarian state policy in the 
interwar period. Revisionist texts purported that this once purely Magyar land had been 
settled by Serbs, Romanians and Germans during the Ottoman and Habsburg periods in a 
clear attempt to wrest it from its rightful, Magyar owners. These efforts were later 
compounded by supposed blatant Germanization under Emperor Joseph II. Ultimately the 
underhand scheming of the Serbian and Romanian states, exponents of a specifically 
Balkan backwardness, snatched the whole region from Hungary‟s civilizing influence 
after World War I.
84
 Returning these and other lands Hungary lost by the Treaty of 
Trianon (1920) – i.e. reconstituting the „lands of the Crown of St. Stephen‟ – became the 
ultimate goal of interwar Hungarian foreign policy and one of the reasons for the 
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rapprochement between Regent Miklós Horthy‟s conservative dictatorship and the Third 
Reich.  
This goal also meant that diplomatic relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia 
were never free from tension, nor did the prospect of returning to Hungarian rule leave 
the multinational population of the Vojvodina cold. Constructive proposals for settling 
the issue were few and far between. Even when a plausible proposal was made it was 
hardly feasible, given the nature of the two states. Thus, when the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry tentatively proposed an exchange of populations in October 1940 – the 600,000 
ethnic Hungarians from the Vojvodina for the 300,000 Slavic Ukrainians from Hungarian 
Carpatho-Ukraine – the Hungarian ambassador in Belgrade immediately demanded that 
the 200,000 Carpatho-Ukrainian Jews be included in the exchange, effectively sabotaging 
the proposal. Moreover, Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Imre Csáky was doubtful, 
since “[i]t would be difficult, for practical reasons, to resettle Hungarian peasants, who 
inhabit these rich, Yugoslav-held lowlands, to the thickly forested and mountainous 
Carpathians.”
85
 Apart from both states‟ reluctance to accept large Jewish populations, 
large-scale population transfer was quite beyond the realm of possibility for these two 
essentially conservative states. Both lacked the ideological radicalism and the removal of 
peacetime constraints which rendered such projects perfectly feasible for the Third Reich, 
especially during the war years.  
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Despite the failure of this proposal, there was a marked improvement of 
diplomatic relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia in late 1940, crowned by the 
signing of a treaty of “constant peace and perpetual friendship”
86
 in Belgrade on 
December 12, 1940. Though proposed by Csáky and represented to the Romanian 
Foreign Ministry – ever jealous of any perceived favoring of Hungary over Romania – as 
a purely internal matter between the two states,
87
 it is fairly clear that this Friendship 
Treaty (Freundschaftsvertrag) was suggested to Hungary by the Third Reich. An outline 
of the Treaty was submitted to German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop for 
approval before it was signed, acknowledging Germany‟s dominant position as extending 
even over its allies‟ individual diplomatic moves.
88
 The Treaty was meant to draw 
Yugoslavia by degrees closer to accepting its accession to the Axis, which the Reich had 
been persuading it to do for over a year.  
Although the Yugoslav side officially clung to the belief that the Treaty signified 
the loss of any leverage Hungary may have exerted to fulfill its revisionist ambitions,
89
 it 
remained clear that while “Hungary would not assert its territorial demands vis-à-vis 
Yugoslavia for the time being, [it] cannot expressly abandon them either.”
90
 A German 
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agent given the code number 6625, who was active in Belgrade before the April War, 
reported just a day after the Treaty was signed that neither side had much faith in it. 
Hungary wanted a peaceful southern border so it could return to expanding its territory at 
the expense of Romania (started with the Second Vienna Award earlier that year), 
whereas Yugoslavia knew that once that was settled, Hungary would inevitably turn back 
to the Yugoslav territories it coveted.
91
 It was equally impossible to divorce the 
Friendship Treaty from the prospect of closer cooperation between Yugoslavia and the 
Axis.
92
 The Treaty was therefore more in the nature of a gentlemen‟s agreement, and a 
provisional one at that, and could only have held in peacetime or in the case of a 
Yugoslav accession to the Axis. Much like the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939, neither side 
took the Treaty seriously in the long run, although, as we will see, at least one Hungarian 
politician did consider it a valid and binding document even after the Yugoslav royal 
coup of March 27, 1941, which overthrew the government which had agreed to 
Yugoslavia joining the Axis.
93
 
In the days preceding Yugoslavia‟s accession to the Axis, the Hungarian 
government expressed concerns lest the close ties between the Reich and Yugoslavia 
should put a damper on Hungary‟s revisionist ambitions. Hungarian Foreign Minister 
László Bárdossy deferred to Germany‟s superior position in the three-way relationship 
between the Third Reich, Hungary and Yugoslavia by requesting that the Yugoslav 
accession to the Axis be made contingent on the German guarantee of a final border 
settlement between Hungary and Yugoslavia. He also dispatched the Hungarian 
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Ambassador in Berlin Döme Sztójay to take up the matter with Joachim von 
Ribbentrop‟s representative, State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker. At the time, these 
concerns were duly taken into consideration by the AA (Auswärtiges Amt, the German 
Foreign Ministry), but did not merit special attention.
94
 
However, once the royal coup ostensibly rendered Yugoslavia‟s membership in 
the Axis a moot point, Hungarian revisionism was given a new lease on life in Berlin, 
since it provided a useful excuse for Hungarian participation in an attack on Yugoslavia. 
On March 28 Hitler made a fateful, sweeping promise, presenting the situation as a 
“unique opportunity for Hungary to obtain revisions for which she would perhaps 
otherwise have had to wait for many years.”
95
 He also instructed Sztójay to inform 
Regent Horthy that in an armed conflict between Germany and Yugoslavia, “Germany 
would place no restrictions on Hungary‟s revisionist desires.”
96
 More specifically, a 
memorandum produced most likely around April 6, stated explicitly that “[t]he formerly 




The very imprecision of these promises sowed the seeds for future difference of 
interpretations. Nevertheless, Horthy was more than happy to accept Hitler‟s veiled 
                                                 
94
 Erdmannsdorff to AA, March 16, 1941, NARA, RG 242, T-120/199/152,569-570; Weizsäcker 
memo, March 17, 1941, in DGFP, Series D, Volume 12, document no. 172.  
95
 Hewel (aide to Ribbentrop) memo, March 28, 1941, in DGFP, Series D, Volume 12, document 
no. 215.  
96
 Ibid.  
97
 “Der an Ungarn angrenzende, ehemals ungarische Teil (bis zur Donau) fällt an Ungarn.” 
Unsigned memo, “Allgemeine Absichten für die spätere Organisation der Verwaltung im 
jugoslawischen Raum,” no date, in Akten, Serie D, Volume XII.2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1969), document no. 291. 
51 
 
proposal for a joint attack on and partitioning of Yugoslavia,
98
 thus creating a dangerous 
precedent. The attack on Yugoslavia was the first instance of Hungary actually going to 
war in order to fulfill its revisionist aims, and it made it that much easier for the country 
to be drawn into Hitler‟s crusade in the Soviet Union two months later.
99
  
The agreement to divvy up northern Yugoslavia between them did not mean that 
German and Hungarian views of the Balkans were completely aligned. This became 
apparent in the days leading up to the April War. The Third Reich‟s superior position was 
acknowledged by its Hungarian ally, who continued to heed German advice – and 
warnings – in all its future attempts at border revision. Ironically, then Yugoslav Foreign 
Minister Aleksandar Cincar-Marković captured this power relationship in a nutshell on 
July 1, 1940, when he told the Münchner Neuste Nachrichten that he did not fear 
Hungarian revisionism since Hungary “could hardly undertake anything without 
Germany‟s approval.”
100
 Furthermore, the grand yet vague promises Nazi Germany made 
while courting Hungary‟s assistance in the attack on Yugoslavia would have long-term 
repercussions, since the two allies would interpret these promises very differently under 
rapidly changing circumstances. Illustrating both these points was the Führer Directive of 
April 3, 1941, which set down specific tasks Germany‟s allies would have to perform in 
the Balkan campaign and the Yugoslav territories they would receive. It also 
unequivocally gave Hitler the supreme decision-making power in both military matters 
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and issues regarding the occupation of Yugoslavia, which decisions were conveniently 
deferred until an unspecified later time.
101
  
For the moment at least, harmony seemed to reign between the two allies. 
Hungary‟s decision to close ranks with the Third Reich against Yugoslavia did not, 
however, pass without internal objection. Hungarian Prime Minister Count Pál Teleki 
committed suicide in the night of April 2-3, 1941, in large part due to an avowed 
“conflict of conscience” provoked by Horthy‟s decision to disregard the Hungarian-
Yugoslav Friendship Treaty, thus sullying Hungary‟s honor and its standing in the 
world.
102
 Teleki also despaired over the likelihood of an imminent conflict with Romania 
over possession of Northern Transylvania (ceded to Hungary at the Second Vienna 
Award)
103
 and concern that a Hungarian attack on Yugoslavia would have the disastrous 
effect of a British declaration of war against Hungary.
104
 Yet the perceived injury to 
Hungary‟s honor clearly carried the most weight with the late Prime Minister.  
Horthy seemed sufficiently disturbed by Teleki‟s act to backtrack, but only a 
little. Instead of exposing his country to Hitler‟s wrath, not to mention abandoning his 
revisionist ambitions, the Regent of Hungary requested that Hitler salve Hungary‟s 
conscience by providing an excuse for the abandonment of the Friendship Treaty. Two 
excuses were proposed by Horthy himself: either a Yugoslav attack on or an overt 
Yugoslav threat to Hungary, or a declaration of independence by Croatia, which would 
effectively end the existence of Yugoslavia and be endorsed by Hungary.
105
 Since the 
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proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drņava Hrvatska), which 
would be ruled by Croatian fascists, was a part of German war plans in the Southeast 
Europe, Hitler proved amenable to Horthy‟s request.
106
  
On April 5 Ribbentrop informed Bárdossy – who replaced Teleki as Hungary‟s 
Prime Minister – of the official German line regarding Yugoslavia, accusing the 
“conspiratorial clique in Belgrade” of giving Germany‟s overtures for peace an answer 
which was “as dumb as [it was] criminal.”
107
 This was an example of the familiar Nazi 
technique of preserving the moral high ground by accusing their victims of malicious 
intent and aggression.  
Only one day later, the day when the early-morning bombing of Belgrade by the 
Luftwaffe heralded the undeclared start of the April War, German Ambassador in 
Budapest Otto von Erdmannsdorff reported that German assurances had had the desired 
effect of destroying the reticence caused by Teleki‟s suicide and prompting the 
mobilization of additional Hungarian forces for the campaign against Yugoslavia.
108
 In 
the same spirit, on April 11, 1941 – five days after the initial German attack on 
Yugoslavia – Horthy issued a statement which accused the Yugoslav government of 
continuing the warmongering Serbian tradition of 1914, saulted the creation of an 
independent Croatia, and proclaimed Hungary‟s avowed goal and duty to win back its 
lost territories from Yugoslavia.
109
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The Hungarian claim on the Serbian half of the Banat seemed at that point clear-
cut. However, the ownership of this region was contested by Romania, which had no 
historical claims on the Serbian Banat, but had three arguments in its favor: the presence 
of an ethnic Romanian minority in the Serbian Banat as well as the fact that this area 
formed one traditional entity with the Romanian Banat on the other side of the Yugoslav-
Romanian border; long-standing Romanian-Hungarian rivalry, which guaranteed that no 
Hungarian territorial claim in either eastern Vojvodina or Transylvania would go 
unchallenged; and, most importantly, the importance of Romanian oil for the Reich‟s war 
effort as well as Romanian Minister President Ion Antonescu‟s commitment to Romanian 
participation in Operation Barbarossa, neither of which had anything to do with the Banat 
but could be used as bargaining chips. The latter was also the main reason for Hitler‟s 
decision to limit Romanian participation in the April War to securing their side of the 
Romanian-Yugoslav and Romanian-Soviet borders.
110
  
Ironically, Antonescu‟s commitment to the Russian campaign weakened his 
country‟s claim on the Serbian Banat, since no Romanian troops would be present 
anywhere on the soil of defeated Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the arguments listed above 
enabled Antonescu to make Romania a factor in the power relationship between the Third 
Reich and Hungary, effectively replacing the destroyed Yugoslav state in this three-way 
relationship.  
Already on April 1 Antonescu expressed an interest in the Serbian Banat, but 
stressed that Romania‟s foreign policy would always defer to Germany‟s foreign-political 
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 Antonescu thus took the same position as Hungary vis-à-vis the Reich‟s 
relative superiority in Europe in the second year of the war: the Third Reich was the 
dominant diplomatic power in Europe in 1941 not only because it was Europe‟s dominant 
military power as well, but because its allies gladly ceded it the top position in exchange 
for the prestige and power they gained by association.  
If the Hungarian leadership had to overcome scruples raised by Teleki‟s suicide, 
Antonescu labored under intense political pressure at home – not least from the fascist 
Iron Guard – urging him to assert Romania‟s claim on the whole of the historical Banat 
region. He did so by “hinting at certain rights over the Romanian Banat,”
112
 a choice of 
words that caused understandable confusion in Berlin and had to be explained by the 
German representative for economic affairs in Bucharest, Hermann Neubacher: “The 
term used by General Antonescu, “the Romanian Banat” means that part of the Banat 
which belongs to Yugoslavia at present.”
113
  
Calling the Serbian Banat Romanian was not enough to win the Third Reich‟s 
support for a Romanian occupation of the region, any more than Csáky‟s calling the 
Vojvodina “Yugoslav-held lowlands”
114
 bolstered his country‟s claim to rightful 
ownership of said lowlands. Antonescu therefore bolstered his claim by informing 
Wehrmacht General von Brauchitsch and Neubacher on April 3 that he respected Hitler‟s 
decision not to have Romania take part in the attack on Yugoslavia but, should Hungarian 
                                                 
111
 Reich economic envoy in Bucharest Hermann Neubacher to AA, April 1, 1941, NARA, RG 
242, T-120/199/152,770-771.  
112
 “gewisse Rechte auf das rumänische Banat durchblicken lassen” Neubacher to AA (1941), 
NARA, RG 242, T-120/199/152,771. 
113
 “Unter von General Antonescu gebrauchtem Ausdruck “rumänisches Banat” ist Teil Banats zu 
verstehen, der jetzt zu Jugoslawien gehört.” Neubacher to AA, April 2, 1941, NARA, RG 242, T-
120/199/152,788. 
114
 See p. 47.  
56 
 
troops enter the Serbian Banat, they would be met there by Romanian troops defending 
their country‟s claim to the territory.
115
 Reinforcing the prospect of a localized war 
between Hungary and Romania was the complaint lodged the following day by 
Romanian Ambassador in Berlin Raoul Bossy about the prospect of a Hungarian 
occupation of the Serbian Banat.
116
 
All this prompted a meeting between Ribbentrop‟s aide Karl Ritter and Bossy on 
April 5. At this meeting, Ritter carried out Ribbentrop‟s instructions and assured the 
Romanian ambassador that whatever Hungarian troops were deployed in the Vojvodina 
would stop west of the Tisa River, which divides the Baĉka (which was occupied by 
Hungarian forces) from the Banat. The “so-called Serbian Banat” would thus remain 
“free of Hungarian soldiers.”
117
 Despite the lip-service paid to Romanian sentiment by 
these turns of phrase, Ritter‟s promise did not amount to a German permission for 
Romanian troops to enter the contested territory,
118
 nor did it allow for any confusion as 
to which Banat was meant (a map was used). It did, however, mean that there were now 
practical obstacles to Hungary realizing a sweeping territorial revision in northern 
Yugoslavia, as it had been promised on March 28.  
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As the dominant partner in this three-way relationship at a time when the bulk of 
its energy was consumed by preparations for Operation Barbarossa, the Third Reich 
could not afford a clash between its junior partners – Hungary and Romania – or the 
destabilizing of either government.
119
 As Hitler explained to Bárdossy already on March 
21 – pairing a political with an economic argument – such a conflict would create a 
power vacuum which might allow for the spread of Soviet influence in Southeast Europe, 
not to mention prevent the free flow of goods along the Danube.
120
 If Southeast Europe 
was to serve as a secure flank for the Russian campaign, relative stability in the whole 
region had to be preserved. Hitler therefore decided to keep Hungarians and Romanians 
physically apart by having the German forces slatted to occupy Serbia proper,
121
 occupy 
the Serbian Banat as well.
122
  
The OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the German Army High Command) 
informed the commanders of the Romanian and Hungarian armies of this decision, with a 
reiteration that Hungarian troops were not to cross east of the Tisa, whereas Romanian 
troops were to hold to their side of the Romanian-Yugoslav border. This reneging on 
Hitler‟s promise to Horthy – that Hungary could occupy all Yugoslav lands north of the 
Danube – was glossed over with a reference to the relative weakness of Hungarian troops 
                                                 
119
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 This was mere lip-service, however: Hitler relied on 
Horthy‟s awareness of his weakness to implement military action independently of the 
Reich.  
The April War lasted barely twelve days. The Yugoslav defeat was sped along by 
thinly stretched divisions, the moral and material setback produced by the bombing of 
Belgrade, airfields and major communications, and the secession of Croatia on April 
10.
124
 The successful occupation of the country culminated in the fall of Belgrade on 
April 13 and the capture of the Yugoslav Army High Command near Sarajevo on April 
15.
125
 The Yugoslav side requested an armistice and negotiations commenced on the 
same day.
126
 The Yugoslav capitulation, signed on April 17, went into force the following 
day at noon.
127
 In a message to Horthy, Hitler termed the collapse of Yugoslavia “the best 
Easter present for all of us.”
128
 
In the aftermath of victory, the tension produced by the ongoing territorial dispute 
between the Third Reich‟s allies had to be addressed, however provisionally. The AA 
proved itself a loyal Nazi institution by following Hitler‟s evasive example in formulating 
its official position: “all these questions [of future ownership of former Yugoslav 
territories] will be clarified at the end of the war.”
129
 In the case of the Banat specifically, 
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Keitel‟s instructions, issued on April 18 – the day the April War ended with an Axis 
victory – stated as one of German aims in the Balkans the “occupation of the Yugoslav 
territory between the Tisa, the Danube and the Romanian border [i.e. the Serbian Banat] 
as a territory occupied temporarily by Germany [underlined in the original].”
130
 Later 
Reich claims that Hungarian revisionist goals had not been forgotten and that the Reich‟s 
occupation of the Banat was not intended to be long-term in character thus seem to 
contain an element of truth. In the short term, however, keeping the Hungarians and 
Romanians physically apart in order to ensure relative stability on Barbarossa‟s 
southeastern flank mattered more to the Reich than actual ownership of the Banat.
131
  
For the Hungarians, this decision meant yet another delay in the realization of 
their revisionist goals vis-à-vis the territories of former Yugoslavia. Already on April 12, 
Sztójay informed Weizsäcker that Romanian threats of responding to an armed 
Hungarian presence in the Banat with soldiers of their own would have negative 
repercussions for the Romanian side.
132
 Two days later, Bárdossy supported this by 
reminding Berlin, somewhat disingenuously, of Hitler‟s promises to Horthy regarding 
Yugoslav territory, and suggested immediate Hungarian occupation of the Banat so as 
“not to give the Romanians false hope and [have them reach] wrongheaded 
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 The pedantic, badgering tone of these missives failed to evoke sympathy 
in Berlin. 
Sheer frustration may have prompted Hungarian troops to cross the River Tisa on 
April 13, occupying the northernmost tip of the Serbian Banat as far as the villages of 
Aranka, Mokrin and Verbitza, and the Grosskikinda-Aratsch railroad:
134
 a tiny patch of 
land, but great in symbolic value in these days of jealous tension over territory. 
Antonescu complained to German Ambassador in Bucharest Manfred von Killinger that 
this Hungarian action had had a “depressing” effect on wide circles of the Romanian 
army and government, prompting the AA to warn the Hungarian government against 
penetrating deeper into the Banat. The Third Reich‟s claim that the temporary occupation 
of the Serbian Banat by its forces was meant to prevent Hungarian-Romanian clashes – 
not to impinge upon Hungarian revisionist claims – and had been made at Romanian 
urging
135
 merely exacerbated the Hungarians‟ disappointment. 
In the period April 14-17, 1941 the Hungarian government continued to pelt 
Berlin with communications, trying to force the Reich‟s hand by three principal means: 
requesting German confirmation that the Hungarian claim on the Banat remained 
undisputed, also making explicitly known Hungarian objections to the use of the term 
“later”
136
 in relation to possession of the Banat which had been promised to them; listing 
earlier meetings and memos in which the Reich promised the Banat to Hungary
137
; and 
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proposing yet again the immediate Hungarian occupation of the Banat as a preemptive 
strike against rumored Romanian preparations to invade this territory.
138
 It was even 
rumored that Hungary might leave the Serbian Banat to Romania in exchange for 
Romanian territory north of the River Mureş and, more than likely, large parts of 
Transylvania including the towns of Arad and Cluj.
139
 No such offer was ever actually 
made by the Hungarian government, which is not surprising considering it could hardly 
have been called a fair exchange. No Hungarian argument – nor the sheer repetition 
thereof – managed to persuade the Reich government to change policy again in such a 
short time, leaving possession of the Banat an open issue in the relations between Nazi 
Germany, Hungary and Romania throughout the summer and fall of 1941, and even later 
(see Chapters 2 and 3).  
German excuses that a final division of the Yugoslav territory would have to be 
left till after the war also failed to calm Romanian fears, especially in view of the fact that 
Romania had lost territories to Hungary and Bulgaria at the Second Vienna Award, and 
was then asked not to participate in a campaign which brought still more land to both of 
the latter.
140
 Killinger reported already on April 10 that the German consul in Jassy had 
observed motorized units of the Romanian army on the move, supposedly headed 
towards the Hungarian border in order to respond to a potential Hungarian entrance into 
the Banat.
141
 Two days later, the AA instructed the German Embassy in Romania to 
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deflect all Romanian requests for participation in the invasion and partitioning of 
Yugoslavia as unnecessary. As for Romanian claims on Yugoslav territory, these were to 
be delayed till “the conclusion of peace,” since “with respect to anything definitive one 
would still have to wait for a considerable period of time.”
142
 This vague language 
suggests that what was a pressing issue for Hungary and Romania, was not so for 
Germany. This did not mean that Reich policy – however improvised – was easily 
altered.  
In the unkind phrase used in a German report, “[t]he Romanian press seized upon 
the catchphrase “Romanian minority in Yugoslavia””
143
 in an attempt to sway public 
opinion in favor of Romanian military action in the Serbian Banat during the April War. 
The main arguments used were supposed Serbian treachery in seizing a territory 
rightfully Romanian at Versailles, and the erroneous claim that the Serbian Banat was 
inhabited by as many as half a million ethnic Romanians (a gross inflation).
144
 Yet 
Romanian public opinion remained most interested in territorial revision at Hungarian 
expense,
145
 and was backed by certain members of Antonescu‟s government. Propaganda 
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Minister Nichifor Crainic commented piously that “Romania should not benefit from the 
misfortune of a neighboring country”
146
 (presumably unless that country was Hungary).  
Antonescu then tried a different tack. Invoking his tender concern for the 
estimated 130,000 ethnic Romanians in the Serbian Banat – an inflated yet conservative 
estimate vis-à-vis those offered by the Romanian press – on April 15 he suggested the 
introduction of a Romanian commissar to liaise between them and the Reichsdeutsche 
authorities in Serbia and ensure their protection from attack by Serbs. He also proposed 
the introduction of Romanian administrators to take some of the burden off the 
administration in the occupied Banat,
147
 which would effectively give Romania a stake in 
the daily running of the Serbian Banat. Feigned disingenuousness served Antonescu no 
better than it had served the Hungarian side, which could hardly have been expected to 
accept a civilian infiltration of the Banat by Romanian clerks.  
Ribbentrop instructed Killinger to remain “wholly receptive” to Romanian 
desires, but also to reject Antonescu‟s suggestion politely but firmly on the grounds that 
the ethnic Romanians in the Serbian Banat would be under the full protection of the 
Wehrmacht.
148
 An internal AA memo of April 21 makes it clear that Berlin knew 
perfectly well there were no more than 65,000 ethnic Romanians in the Banat. The AA 
forbade all encouragement of Romanian illusions regarding their chances of occupying 
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the Banat by force of arms or administrative personnel through any speculation with or 
coming from the German Embassy in Bucharest.
149
 
At the same time, Berlin recognized the need to compensate Romania with a slice 
of former Yugoslavia in order to preserve Romania‟s standing as the Reich‟s ally and 
soothe its pride in the face of Hungarian gains in the Baĉka, the MeĊimurje (in Croatia) 
and the Prekomurje (in Slovenia). At the meeting between Ribbentrop and Italian Foreign 
Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano, which took place in Vienna on April 21-22, 1941, the 
division of Yugoslav territories was the main topic of discussion. However, before the 
meeting Ribbentrop made it clear that he would merely inform, not consult Ciano on the 
disposition of the Vojvodina, since this fell far outside of the Italian sphere of influence, 
but was of paramount importance for the Third Reich as a source of food.
150
  
So far as a Romanian claim on Yugoslav lands was concerned, the final summary 
of the meeting was as vague and hope-inspiring as Hitler‟s March 28 promise to Horthy: 
[The Baĉka and the Banat] will go to Hungary . . . The Banat will initially be 
occupied by German troops in order to prevent clashes between Hungarians and 
Romanians. The necessity to provide compensation for Romania elsewhere is 
recognized, despite the difficulty inherent in finding [a] suitable object. A 
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The decision which territory Romania could be granted was thus deferred until an 
unspecified future time. This was due not least to Hungarian objections that, while 
Romania was a valuable ally and certainly ought to be appeased with a bit of Yugoslavia 
(other than the Banat), Antonescu‟s constant clamoring for the Banat was irritating and 
difficult to explain to the Hungarian public even on the grounds that the Romanian leader 
was severely pressed by his domestic opposition and had to give a show of strength by 
attempting to unite all of the historical Banat region under the Romanian flag.
152
  
Lacking allies in this diplomatic tussle, in the days following the Ribbentrop-
Ciano meeting Romania even turned for support to the Third Reich‟s other Balkan ally: 
Bulgaria. This attempt to play Bulgaria against both the Reich and Hungary failed 
quickly. Ribbentrop instructed the Bulgarian government in no uncertain terms to display 
the “greatest reserve”
153
 regarding Romanian demands, and to claim a lack of information 
about Germany‟s plans for former Yugoslav lands: “I would like to point out that – since 
the Führer and myself are personally in charge of these discussions – we do not find it 
desirable to let ourselves be drawn into a discussion with any third government.”
154
 There 
is no further record of Bulgaria‟s involvement in the issue of the Serbian Banat, but this 
would not be the last time that Romania sought allies within the Axis camp to support its 
territorial ambitions.  
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A pattern quickly crystallized around the issue of the Serbian Banat‟s ownership. 
Its components were mutual suspicion between Hungary and Romania; attempts by both 
to play the Third Reich and its other allies off against each other in order to gain territory 
for one‟s own country; and both countries‟ refusal to either make a decisive bid for the 
Serbian Banat without German approval or stop agitating to that effect. This pattern was 
premised on the understanding by both the Hungarian and Romanian governments of the 
provisional and improvisational manner in which demarcation lines were drawn across 
occupied Yugoslavia. It also relied on Hungary and Romania‟s acceptance of their 
inferior role vis-à-vis Nazi Germany as the leading force in the partitioning of defeated 
Yugoslavia. 
These two governments failed to appreciate that Nazi Germany had no intention 
of relinquishing any of its decision-making authority to its allies. However provisional 
and improvisational the demarcation lines between zones of occupation in Yugoslavia 
may have been, they were still determined by the Third Reich. The Reich government 
failed in its intention to defeat Yugoslavia quickly and then return all of its energies to 
preparing for Operation Barbarossa: the very fact that Berlin continued to have to 
arbitrate between its allies‟ bids for possession of Yugoslav lands kept it firmly involved 
in the Balkan Peninsula for the remainder of the war.
155
 Ribbentrop stated this implicitly 
in an April 16 memorandum urging that an agreement be immediately reached with Italy, 
Hungary and Bulgaria regarding borders between zones of occupation in defeated 
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Yugoslavia: “Even if an understanding were only temporary in character, it will naturally 
have great import on the future conclusive territorial settlement in the Balkans.”
156
  
However temporary the arrangement seemed in April 1941, for the foreseeable 
future the Serbian Banat would remain – German. In the days leading up to the April 
War, its ownership became the locus for Hungarian-Romanian tensions predating the 
crisis in Southeast Europe. As such, the occupation of the Serbian Banat became an 
example of the Third Reich‟s ability to balance diplomacy and military power even at the 
height of its martial success. The Banat was occupied by Reich forces and attached to 
German-occupied Serbia proper, but another factor would make it even more „German.‟ 
The 120,000 Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) inhabiting the Banat were also a factor in 
the power play between Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania and the Reich. Though their role 
in the conflict was largely that of non-combatants, these Volksdeutsche provided a 
material and ideological justification for a Reichsdeutsche occupation of their home 
region by their two-centuries-long presence in the Vojvodina and by their leadership‟s 
ever greater closeness to the Third Reich in the months preceding the April War.  
Routinely labeled a treacherous „fifth column‟ by postwar Yugoslav historians, 
the Volksdeutsche community of northern Serbia never openly broke their host state‟s 
laws or opposed its government before the royal coup of March 27, 1941. It did, 
however, maintain ties to Nazi Germany, which rendered many of its activities suspect. 
In the ten days between the royal coup and the start of the April War, the 
Volksgruppenführung continued to express loyalty to the Yugoslav state. By that point, 
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however, it was also exhorting Yugoslav Volksdeutsche to actions which benefitted the 
Reich rather than their host state. The process by which these Volksdeutsche‟s loyalty 
tipped decisively away from Yugoslavia (the country of their birth, citizenship and 
residence) and toward Germany (the country of their origin, with which they shared 




































CHAPTER II DIVIDED LOYALTIES:  
YUGOSLAV VOLKSDEUTSCHE BEFORE AND DURING THE APRIL WAR 
 
Although their supposed mistreatment offered a useful propaganda ploy for the Axis 
attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941, Yugoslav Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) had not 
been the primary reason behind this attack. They were a useful „tool‟ to justify 
Reichsdeutsche (Reich German) armed presence and strengthen the Third Reich‟s claims 
in the northern Balkans. Both before and after the April War, these Volksdeutsche‟s 
continued presence in Southeast Europe was subject to exigencies of Reich policy, 
especially foreign-political relations with the Reich‟s allies Hungary and Romania. 
German foreign policy was not free of National Socialist ideology, but the Reich‟s 
diplomatic corps went about realizing Hitler‟s grand ideological plans in very different 
ways from Heinrich Himmler‟s ideological corps, the SS and the 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA). In late 1940 and early 1941, the Yugoslav ethnic 
German community (Volksgruppe) responded to this diplomatic and jurisdictional tug-of-
war and to internal conditions in Yugoslavia by turning gradually away from its 
Yugoslav loyalties. The recipient of frequent mixed signals from Berlin, the Volksgruppe 
nevertheless persisted in its idealization of the Reich as its ancestral homeland. It adopted 
the Third Reich‟s interests as its own, albeit in ways which did not openly threaten the 
precarious status quo between the Reich and Yugoslavia. Rather than actively 
undermining the Yugoslav state from within, the Volksgruppe showed itself dependent 
on external factors (namely, Reich foreign policy) by following its dictates closely both 
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before and during the April War. This dependence on the Reich‟s pleasure would remain 
its salient feature until the end of the war.  
The Reich‟s essentially ambiguous attitude to these ethnic Germans persisted 
throughout the war. Before the beginning of World War II, Adolf Hitler decreed that 
relations between all Volksdeutsche communities and the Reich were to be regulated by 
the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VoMi),
157
 the main Reich office for relations with ethnic 
Germans, headed by Himmler‟s man Werner Lorenz, and an office tied to the RSHA 
under Heinrich Himmler. Volksdeutsche affairs – concerning, by definition, German 
minorities living in countries other than the Reich – were thus explicitly tied to matters of 
security and race-cum-nationality (Volkstum), which fell within the jurisdiction of an 
office concerned with internal as well as external affairs of the Third Reich. This in no 
way diminished the importance of Reich diplomacy in Volkstum matters, since 
Volksdeutsche were by definition foreign citizens. The jurisdictional conflict between 
Himmler and Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop regarding Volksdeutsche 
persisted until the very end of the war. 
With the start of hostilities the need arose to regulate these matters further, since a 
salient feature of the Third Reich‟s war effort was the continued diplomatic activity of the 
Auswärtiges Amt (AA, the German Foreign Ministry) toward countries allied, potentially 
allied or not yet attacked by Germany. This “primacy of foreign policy,” to borrow 
Eberhard Jäckel‟s phrase,
158
 was a clear indication that, while the Reich was concerned 
with German minorities‟ usefulness as racial stock for the future regeneration of a 
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Germanic Europe, in the context of World War II ethnic Germans were seen by the Reich 
primarily as a means to realize its foreign-political schemes. While this did not deprive 
Volksdeutsche communities in Europe of the ability to make their own policy proposals 
and to agitate for their interests, it tied the feasibility of said proposals to the Reich‟s 
interests in the Volksdeutsche‟s host states. While Volksdeutsche had to fulfill their 
duties as citizens of their host states, their leaders looked increasingly to the Reich for 
fulfillment of the ethnic Germans‟ specific interests – a precarious position even in 
peacetime, but even more so during the early war years.  
As a direct result of this, even the most innocent initiative undertaken by an ethnic 
German Volksgruppenführung (leadership) was often interpreted by the host state as 
treasonous or, at the very least, seditious activity. In a state like the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, holding desperately on to its status as a neutral yet tied by economic and, 
increasingly, political ties to the Third Reich, this led inexorably to Yugoslav 
Volksdeutsche and their leaders becoming identified with the interests of (and the 
pressures on Yugoslavia exerted by) the Third Reich. As a Südostdeutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (Society for the Research of German [Life] in the Southeast, a 
Nazi research institution in Vienna) report cogently put it, any Volksdeutsche-community 
leader (Volksgruppenführer) in Southeast Europe had a ready argument to bolster his 
demands to the host-state authorities: the “unspoken formula, “behind me are the eighty 
million [Germans]”.”
159
 Such an argument, based on the premise of Nazi Germany‟s 
physical, economic and armed superiority, hardly contributed to the same 
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Volksgruppenführung‟s endeavors to represent its co-nationals as loyal citizens of their 
host state.  
 
From Staatstreu to Volkstreu 
The official motto of the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche in the interwar period was that of their 
political party, the Partei der Deutschen in Jugoslawien: „staatstreu und volkstreu,‟ loyal 
to the state and to the Volk. After this and all other Yugoslav political parties were 
banned by King Aleksandar KaraĊorĊević‟s royal dictatorship of 1929,
160
 the 
organization of all public Volksdeutsche activities devolved to the Schwäbisch-Deutscher 
Kulturbund (Swabian
161
-German Cultural Association), an ostensibly non-political 
organization which inherited the defunct political party‟s motto in its relations to the 
Yugoslav state. Following Hitler‟s rise to power in Germany, a younger, more radicalized 
generation of Volksdeutsche leaders appeared in Yugoslavia. They called themselves the 
Erneurer (Renewers) and were led by Josef (Sepp) Janko.
162
 His election backed by the 
Reich, Janko took over leadership of the Kulturbund in August 1939. Although he 
                                                 
160
 As part of this dictatorship, the king also changed the country‟s name officially from the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia („South Slavic State‟), in 
an attempt to project the impression of ethnic unity within the multinational state.  
161
 The moniker „Banater Schwaben‟ or „Donauschwaben‟ was emphasized by those it referred to 
– occasionally in the 1930s and early 1940s, more so after World War II – to stress the distinction 
between Volksdeutsche residing in the Danube Basin and Volksdeutsche elsewhere in Europe. It 
stemmed from the common belief that the majority of the 18
th
 century German-speaking settlers 
in Southeast Europe came from Swabia. They came, in fact, from several parts of the Holy 
Roman Empire inhabited by German speakers, and even included some French speakers from 
Alsace and Lorraine. 
162
 Born into a peasant family in the Volksdeutsche village of Ernsthausen in the Serbian Banat in 
1905, Josef „Sepp‟ Janko studied law in Germany and Austria, where he came into contact with 
National Socialist ideas in the years immediately preceding the Nazi takeover of 1933. Upon 
returning home, he worked as a lawyer in Grossbetschkerek (the administrative center of the 
Serbian Banat) until his election to the position of Kulturbund leader in 1939. “Das Porträt des 
Tages. Dr. Sepp Janko,” Donauzeitung [German-language newspaper published in Belgrade], 
August 3, 1941, p. 3.  
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assumed the title of Volksgruppenführer to indicate the adoption of the National Socialist 
Führerprinzip as the organizational principle of the ethnic German community, the 
official emphasis on loyalty and obedience to the Yugoslav state as well as to the Volk 
remained:   
We strive to be, not an element of unrest, but a constructive element of order, and 
to give the state no reason to distrust us, rather to see that order and discipline are 
the order of the day in our Volksgruppe, and that we have fulfilled all the 
prerequisites for a healthy economic development and for positive achievements 




Despite Janko‟s effort at demonstrating continuity, he represented a less traditional, less 
conservative, more Nazi-oriented current within the Kulturbund. This younger, Nazified 
group began to speak for the whole community at precisely the time when the Third 
Reich became, not only the dominant economic power in Central and East Europe, but 
also the dominant military power on the European continent. It was in this spirit that the 
Kulturbund‟s name was changed to Volksgemeinschaft der Deutschen Volksgruppe im 
Königreich Jugoslawien (National Community of the German National Group in the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia), or Deutsche Volksgruppe for short. The old name was not 
completely discarded, in order to project a sense of continuity and loyalty to the state 
unaffected by the change in leadership. Even so, the new Kulturbund leader certainly 
aspired to carrying out a mini-Gleichschaltung of the Volksdeutsche community along 
the lines of the cooptation of German society by Hitler in 1933.  
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Janko‟s election to the position of main Volksdeutsche representative in 
Yugoslavia – albeit one without official political power – demonstrated increased Reich 
influence on what should have been an internal matter of the Yugoslav state. In the 
increasingly polarized atmosphere between the outbreak of World War II in September 
1939 and its arrival in the Southeast Europe in April 1941, the twofold loyalty of the 
German Volksgruppe in Yugoslavia became more and more difficult to maintain.  
This was evident even in the Volksgruppenführung‟s public announcements from 
this eighteen-month period. Whereas in 1939 Janko emphasized the integration of the 
Volksdeutsche into the economic and social fabric of Yugoslavia, already in spring 1940 
he stated that the Volksgruppe‟s main task was to act as a “bridge between two cultures,” 
Yugoslavia and the Reich.
164
 The bridge metaphor was meant to convey a sense of 
positive rapprochement between the two states,
165
 but really it suggested Volksdeutsche 
alienation from both. Not quite as German as Reich citizens, and not fitting the South 
Slavic model of the ideal Yugoslav citizen, the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche could not claim 
either country as completely their own, and were not fully accepted by either. In the same 
period, Janko wrote the following equivocal programmatic statement of his political goals 
for the ethnic German community:  
[J]ust as no one will ever succeed in driving us from this home turf 
[Heimatscholle], which we have labored over, or in swaying us in our sense of 
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duty vis-à-vis the state, so no one will ever restrict our natural right, to which 
every Volk is entitled: the right to perfect ourselves spiritually, to profess the 




Despite the disclaimer about loyalty to the state and real resistance to resettlement (see 
below), the weight of this statement rests squarely on Janko‟s desire for freedom to 
regiment the Volksgruppe along National Socialist lines – something which not all 
Volksdeutsche looked favorably upon.  
Finally, a late 1940 article from the Reich journal Deutschtum im Ausland 
identified the ongoing war as the factor which “forged together” the Yugoslav 
Volksgruppe, making it “a part of the Greater German Reich . . . with all the duties and 
rights” that came with that status.
167
 Almost as an afterthought, the article stated that this 
supposed new Volksdeutsche unity did not preclude the mutual duties between the 
Volksgruppe and its host state, Yugoslavia. It also failed to address the fact that, before 
the April War, the Volksgruppenführung simply lacked the coercive means to integrate 
non-Nazi Volksdeutsche into its ranks.
168
 The Volksdeutsche leadership wanted to see 
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such rigid regimentation become a reality. With the support of a substantial part of the 
Volksgruppe – arguably even non-Nazis within the Volksgruppe felt favorably toward at 
least some aspects of Reich policy – the Volksgruppenführung experienced the gradual 
polarization away from Yugoslavia and toward the Third Reich as the most important 
political factor in their existence.  
 For its part, until the attack on Yugoslavia and Greece in April 1941 the Reich 
government consistently failed to live up to Volksdeutsche expectations that it would 
serve as their unequivocal champion and protector. Berlin saw Yugoslav Volksdeutsche 
as useful tools with which to pressure the Yugoslav government into closer cooperation. 
It did not pass up opportunities to use the Volksdeutsche‟s enthusiasm for all things 
German, but it discouraged any and all Volksdeutsche initiatives which upset the 
precarious status quo in Yugoslavia.  
This attitude first became evident over the issue of resettlement of some ethnic 
German communities into the Reich. Hitler‟s October 6, 1939 speech announcing this as 
the future of all Volksdeutsche caused an uproar among Yugoslav Volksdeutsche. As a 
predominantly peasant population in a fertile region of relative political stability, most 
did not see resettlement as the salvation it may have been to Latvian or Bessarabian 
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Volksdeutsche whose lives were marked by grinding poverty or Soviet oppression,
169
 
although there were exceptions.
170
 The issue was settled quickly: the AA issued 
instructions to the German Embassy in Belgrade
171
 and the Yugoslav Ambassador in 
Berlin, future Nobel Prize winner for literature Ivo Andrić
172
 to the effect that the 
resettlement of Yugoslav Volksdeutsche was not imminent, nor was speculation about it 
desirable. The Reich would have preferred if, for the duration of the war, Volksdeutsche 
were „seen, not heard,‟ obeyed orders and did not to cause agitation among themselves or 
in their vicinity through the percolation of rumors
173
 or action independent of Reich 
policies.  
 The uneasy mixture of theoretical esteem of Volksdeutsche as representatives of 
the Volk and practical distrust of their ability to live up to Reich standards – really to the 
Platonic ideal of what a German person should be disseminated by Reich propaganda – 
permeated relations between Berlin and Yugoslav Volksdeutsche until the very end of 
World War II. It cropped up again and again, first in relations between Berlin and the 
Deutsche Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien, and after April 1941 in those between Berlin and 
the Deutsche Volksgruppe im Banat und in Serbien (German National Group in Serbia 
and the Banat). The first major clash between the mixed attitude the Reich took to 
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Volksdeutsche in general and the twofold loyalties of Yugoslav Volksdeutsche in 
particular took place in the fall of 1940, when ethnic Germans from Soviet Bessarabia 
were resettled to the Reich by river boats sailing up the Danube through Romania and 
Yugoslavia.  
Yugoslav Minister President Dragińa Cvetković needed to strengthen his position 
both inside the government and in relations with the Reich, which was pushing for a 
Yugoslav accession to the Axis. Thus he agreed that the Volksdeutsche being resettled 
would rest en route in two temporary transit camps erected near Prahovo (a village on the 
Danube in eastern Serbia) and at Zemun (Semlin in German), a municipality across the 
Danube from Belgrade.
174
 The erection of the camps started in August 1940, and by the 
time the resettlement ended and the camps were torn down in November, an estimated 
100,000 people had passed through them.
175
 Despite the sheer size of this endeavor, the 
Yugoslav involvement in it was limited by agreement with Berlin.  
The camps were granted special territorial status, and were not considered 
Yugoslav territory for the duration of their existence,
176
 with the flags of the Third Reich, 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Kulturbund flown in them.
177
 The three flags 
reflected the fact that, the top positions in the camps were filled by personnel from the 
VoMi,
178
 the camps were guarded by Serbian gendarmes whose movements were limited 
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to the camps‟ outer perimeter,
179
 while most of the work on the construction, supplying 
and lower-level work inside the camps – construction, repairs, cooking, helping during 
transport ships‟ arrivals and departures, organizing luggage, etc. – was performed by 
Yugoslav Volksdeutsche volunteers under Kulturbund auspices. Indeed, VoMi took it as 
a matter of course that Janko had at his disposal many “younger people ready for action . 
. . who will gladly be at [the VoMi‟s] disposal in this endeavor.”
180
 
The volunteers‟ selfless efforts on behalf of the Bessarabian Germans were 
roundly extolled in reports by Reich Germans employed in the Prahovo and Zemun 
camps. The volunteers‟ primary motives seem to have been youthful enthusiasm, 
affection for an idealized Reich they wished to learn more about, and the opportunity to 
meet both Reich Germans and other ethnic Germans.
181
 For some, these motives were 
undoubtedly tinged by an affinity for Nazi ideology, the desire to work for the 
Volksgemeinschaft of all Germans and contribute to the reshaping of Europe along 
National Socialist lines. In his proclamation summoning his co-nationals to participate in 
the resettlement project, Janko stressed precisely the latter themes: “[The Volksgruppe] 
now has a great opportunity to demonstrate by its völkisch efforts and its [national] 
socialist behavior that it is capable of mastering such tasks.”
182
  




 “jüngeren einsatzbereiten Leuten . . . die sich dem Werk freudig zur Verfügung stellen 
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Likewise, magazine articles and propaganda pieces aimed at a Reich audience as 
well as speeches held to a captive audience of Bessarabian and Yugoslav Volksdeutsche 
in the camps stressed the importance of working for a Volksgemeinschaft which 
transcends its individual parts. These texts portrayed the efforts made on behalf of 
Bessarabian resettlers as “direct participation in the all-German destiny . . . [which 
became] the Volksgruppe‟s strongest experience of Gemeinschaft [italics in the 
original].”
183
 In terms more accessible to the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche participants, 
Volksgemeinschaft was represented by the sound of “[German] dialects from almost all 
the villages from Marburg [Maribor in Slovenia] to Werschetz [Vrńac in the Banat],”
184
 
which could be heard among the volunteers.  
Whatever their motives, the volunteers worked hard to make the transition as 
painless as possible for the Bessarabian Volksdeutsche. No doubt, the volunteers also 
wished to impress their supervisors from the Reich. At least one of the latter remained 
unimpressed by the Volksdeutsche‟s organizational abilities, but was gracious enough to 
account for it by the absence of the Nazi Party‟s marshalling influence in Yugoslavia and 
to applaud the volunteers‟ dedication.
185
 For many Yugoslav Volksdeutsche volunteers, 
their experiences in the transit camps were the first real contact with Germans from 
outside Yugoslavia, and as such must have represented a rude awakening. The Reich 
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personnel tended to rub everyone – Serbs, Bessarabian and Yugoslav Volksdeutsche alike 
– the wrong way. 
Despite explicit instructions to protect the Reich‟s good name in Romania and 
Yugoslavia through exemplary behavior, not to provoke political arguments, and to 
refrain from displaying insignia such as Nazi Party markers and German uniforms,
186
 the 
VoMi personnel in the Prahovo and Zemun camps routinely wore uniforms both inside 
the camps and during drunken excursions outside,
187
 treated Serbian officials with 
excessive and peremptory toughness,
188
 encouraged the singing of Nazi songs and the use 
of the Hitler salute in camp. Such behavior did nothing to allay the suspicion of the 
gendarmes detailed for camp protection,
189
 since at least some of the gendarmes shared 
the fear of Serbian nationalists from whom they were meant to protect the camps: that 
these camps were the first step to Yugoslavia meeting the fate of Czechoslovakia and 
Poland.  
The Reichsdeutsche personnel also failed to leave a good impression on the 
Yugoslav Volksdeutsche, referring contemptuously to the Bessarabian Germans as “fur 
cap-wearers”
190
 to indicate their close resemblance to Russians, refusing to engage in 
                                                 
186
 SS-Sturmbannführer Mulde (Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD Einwandererzentralstelle 
Nord-Ost), “Merkblatt für die in Jugoslawien und Rumänien eingetreten Angehörigen der EWZ,” 
August 27, 1940, NARA, RG 242, T-81 [Records of the Deutsches Ausland-
Institut]/264/2,381,968-969. 
187
 Agent 6625 (German agent in Yugoslavia), “Auftreten der Mitglieder der 
Umsiedlungskommission,” September 18, 1940, NARA, RG 242, T-175/647/no frame number. 
188
 Reiter resettlement report (1940), BA Berlin, R 59, file 375, fiche 1, frame 16. 
189
 Hellermann testimony (1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/151, frame 695. 
190
 “Pelzkappenleute” Hellermann testimony (1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/151, frame 693.  
To be fair, many Yugoslavs of all ethnicities can‟t have had a much better opinion of the 
Bessarabian Volksdeutsche, as illustrated by a tale carried by the Slovenian press. It described a 
group of resettlers passing through Slovenia on its way to the Reich as Russian in appearance and 
dress, Russian in language and even in their understanding of geography. When the locals 
addressed them in Russian, the resettled Bessarabian peasants sheepishly inquired whether 
Russian territory really extended that far west. “Die bessarabischen Deutschen auf der Fahrt 
82 
 
manual labor or share the Volksdeutsche‟s rough living in camp, frequently being drunk 
and disorderly.
191
 They failed to exhibit any empathy for or interest in Volksdeutsche 
problems, or even to recognize the unique challenges facing Volksdeutsche in 
Yugoslavia, appearing instead as “little Adolf Hitlers” in uniform
192
 – ham-fisted, self-
centered and altogether destructive to the Volksdeutsche‟s fond dream of an “infallible 
Reich and its infallible people.”
193
  
Or maybe not, for the Reich as an idealized German fatherland of superior 
culture, race and lifestyle remained alive and well in the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche‟s 
mental landscape long after the departure of the VoMi personnel at the conclusion of the 
Bessarabian resettlement. This is likely a testimony to the human tendency to mentally 
sift through experiences until only those that support a preexisting framework of thought 
remain. As Ian Kershaw demonstrated the average Reichsdeutscher‟s ability to go on 
idealizing Hitler‟s leadership in the face of its repeated failures,
194
 so the average 
Yugoslav Volksdeutscher retained an impression of his own importance as part of a 
Greater German Reich, unsullied by the sorry spectacle of Reich Germans whiling away 
the days in the Zemun camp with alcohol and superior attitudes.  
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One consequence of the Volksdeutsche volunteers‟ participation in this 
resettlement effort, which likely escaped their attention at the time, was the general 
Serbian reaction to the whole endeavor. Stories about campsites turned temporarily into 
alien land, Germans parading around the Serbian countryside in SS uniforms, military 
training (see below) and Nazification efforts in camp percolated among the Serbian 
public. The ability of Reich policy (resettlement) to influence Yugoslav policy, the 
presence of uniformed Reich personnel and the mass participation
195
 of Yugoslav 
Volksdeutsche in the resettlement camps produced a heightened level of suspicion 
regarding the ethnic German community as a whole. After displays of German efficiency 
as well as German arrogance, which accompanied the resettlement of Bessarabian 
Volksdeutsche, their Yugoslav counterparts‟ claims to being staatstreu as well as 
volkstreu rang hollow in late 1940, while the Yugoslav government clung ever more 
tenuously to the notion of neutrality in the face of Reich pressure. Thereafter, every 
action undertaken by the Volksgruppenführung, tinged as it was by pro-Nazi sympathies, 
reflected negatively on individual Volksdeutsche faced with the Yugoslav authorities in 
the form of local administrators and gendarmes. 
Quite apart from tensions evident on the local level, in the six months before the 
April War the Yugoslav government made tangible efforts to appease its German 
minority, seeing in it a potential cat‟s paw of Reich ambition in the Balkans. Seeing the 
Volksdeutsche as a possible pressure point by which Yugoslavia could be levered into 
accession to the Axis was a perception the Reich and Yugoslavia held in common. 
                                                 
195
 One estimate lists the total number of volunteers at over 10,000 over a three-month period. 
The quick turnover was intended to expose as many young Yugoslav German men and women as 




However, demands for minority rights like schooling in the German language were more 
easily granted than demands for political representation or legislation guaranteeing ethnic 
Germans full equality with the Slavic peoples of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. It was 
easier and more politically inconsequential to allow those Volksdeutsche who could 
afford it to send their children to private German-language schools or to give leading 
Volksdeutsche medals in recognition of their (unspecified) services to the Yugoslav 
state
196
 than to address seriously demands for Volksdeutsche political autonomy or self-
administration within the state.  
The demands met most eagerly by the Yugoslav authorities were those for 
separate schools in which classes would take place in the German language,
197
 and in 
which children of German origin – Yugoslav Volksdeutsche as well as the children of 
Reich citizens living in Yugoslavia – could be educated separately from their non-
German peers. A private German Realgymnasium and a private teacher-training college 
(Lehrerbildungsanstalt) for the education of German teachers to staff this and other 
German-language schools
198
 in Yugoslavia were opened in Novi Vrbas (Baĉka) for the 
school year 1940-1941.
199
 The Volksgruppenführung exhorted German-speaking parents 
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Given the geographic spread of Yugoslav Volksdeutsche across Slovenia, Croatia 
and northern Serbia, with smaller numbers in Serbia proper, Bosnia and Macedonia, and 
the fact that in a largely farming population education above the elementary level was 
never at a premium, it would be fair to estimate that likely not even one half of all 
Gymnasium-aged Volksdeutsche youth attended a private German school before the 
April War. Nevertheless, in a multinational state struggling with the issue of balancing 
the demands posed by its various ethnic groups, the very presence of the private German 
schools signified the effective separation of German youth in the pedagogic sphere. 
Separate schools did not contribute to young Volksdeutsche‟s integration into the social 
mainstream.  
On the contrary, the isolation of at least a part of Volksdeutsche youth through 
attendance of German-language schools caused these schoolboys to flirt openly and 
provocatively with National Socialism in a way which left non-German spectators and 
the authorities in no doubt as to where the youths were exposed to these ideas – not only 
in school, but at home and under Volksgruppenführung auspices, too. The 
Volksgruppenführung had sponsored the opening of these schools, so the exposition of 
National Socialist principles by school officials could not fail to be linked to the ideology 
embraced by the Erneurer in the name of all Yugoslav Volksdeutsche. A degree of 
internal opposition to the imposition of Nazism as the guiding principle for all 
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Volksdeutsche was routinely ignored (see below). The Volksgruppenführung‟s official 
statements equated equality with other Yugoslav peoples with the free expression of Nazi 
ideology: “Every Volk in this area [the Balkans] must finally be allowed those rights 
which are its due on the basis of its numbers and importance. We demand the right to 
create a Volksgemeinschaft for ourselves in accordance with the German Volk‟s views. 
Therefore there is only one direction we can take: that of National Socialism.”
201
 
Thus, when upperclassmen at the Novi Vrbas Gymnasium affected tall boots and 
leather coats like those worn by Luftwaffe pilots, aped the goose-step, started classes 
with the Hitler salute, attended pro-Nazi after-class lectures conducted by their teachers, 
and acted disrespectfully to their few Slav teachers and to Yugoslav state insignia,
202
 their 
behavior was not perceived as mere misguided youthful enthusiasm. These Gymnasium 
students were seen by their Slav environment as representative of their entire ethnic 
group. The association was made easier by such Volksgruppenführung orders as the 
obligatory use of the Hitler salute between students and teachers in private German-
language schools.
203
 On occasion, these students were attacked and beaten as easy targets 
on which frustration incurred by Reich pressure on Yugoslavia could focus.
204
  
Physical attacks on Volksdeutsche were never as common or widespread as Reich 
propaganda would make them seem in the days leading up to the April War, as it sought 
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to portray its imminent invasion of Yugoslavia as – among its other goals – a rescue 
mission against the Slavic oppression of Volksdeutsche there. Some attacks did happen. 
Beyond the beating of schoolboys, there are documented instances of fights between 
Serbian and German amateur soccer teams, attacks on Volksdeutsche civilians by 
Yugoslav gendarmes and soldiers, even a few cases of outright murder, as when the 
official in charge of propaganda in the Grossbetschkerek Ortsgruppe (town chapter of the 




German reports of these incidents routinely described the Volksdeutsche as 
innocent victims. While the use of German symbols or language could account for 
provoking Serbian nationalist sentiment – the murder in Grossbetschkerek seems to have 
been more in the nature of a personal quarrel exacerbated by national difference – this 
was hardly justification for murder. Rather than concluding that Serbian-German tension 
in the Vojvodina was a powder keg waiting to blow in late 1940, it seems more 
appropriate to suggest that neither side did as much as it could have done to prevent these 
occasional clashes. If the Volksgruppenführung encouraged its members to express their 
Germanness-cum-Nazi sympathies and risk incurring the wrath of local Serbs, the 
Yugoslav state failed to keep its representatives of law and order in line or to encourage 
tolerance in its Slavic population.  
Dilatoriness alone does not explain why the higher echelons of Yugoslav 
government failed to act more decisively to protect Yugoslavia‟s ethnic German citizens. 
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There was also a high degree of official mistrust directed against a minority group whose 
leaders, for all their avowed staatstreu attitude, leaned perceptibly away from loyalty to 
their host state and toward volkstreu loyalties in the first eighteen months of World War 
II.
206
 Already in late September 1939 the Yugoslav Army and Navy Ministry issued a 
secret order to degrade reserve officers who were “unreliable members of non-Slav 
minorities.” This degradation of rank was to be carried out on pretexts of disciplinary 
action or lack of qualifications for officer status, so as to avoid suspicion that the 
degraded officers‟ nationality was the real reason.
207
 Despite these precautions, the public 
did not fail to notice that this move was directed especially against ethnic Germans and 
ethnic Hungarians, suspected of affinity with Europe‟s most dominant and aggressive 
military power and with Yugoslavia‟s revision-inclined neighbor, respectively.  
Official distrust of Volksdeutsche loyalty to the Yugoslav state found expression 
in routine accusations leveled against Volksdeutsche in positions of even minor local 
prominence (e.g. merchants, employees of companies dealing in raw materials, peasants 
rich enough to attempt large land transactions) of being German spies, receiving money 
from the Reich for unspecified subversive activities, organizing Volksdeutsche youth for 
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military action (likely a legacy of rumored military training volunteers received in the 
camps set up for the Bessarabian Volksdeutsche), etc.
208
  
Just how ineffectual these accusations were in identifying and isolating truly 
dangerous elements in the Volksdeutsche community is demonstrated by Yugoslav Army 
memos from fall 1940 about the possibility that non-Slavs in the Vojvodina were using 
their radios to listen to foreign radio stations (which was punishable by law) or even to 
communicate with foreign intelligence services.
209
 The proposed solution – reviewing 
and, if necessary, revoking all radio permits and apparatuses in the Vojvodina – was 
impractical. The situation remained unchanged as late as February 1941, with non-Slavs 
still suspected of using their private radios for subversive purposes, but practical means 
of policing such actions lacking.
210
 While the authorities shuffled their feet, the 
Kulturbund‟s Novi Sad headquarters, called Habag-Haus, was supplied, most likely in 
November 1940, with a radio transmitter code-named “Nora.”
211
 It became the means for 
the Volksgruppenführung to communicate directly with the Reich‟s military intelligence 
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in Vienna as part of Operation Jupiter.
212
 “Nora” would play a significant role in 
Volksdeutsche actions during the April War, and justifies in retrospect Yugoslav Army 
suspicions. Yet to have targeted all Volksdeutsche radio owners on these grounds would 
only have strengthened the view that German-speakers were being targeted by the 
Yugoslav authorities for no better reason than that they spoke German.  
All these accusations fed the atmosphere of distrust between Germans and Slavs 
in Yugoslavia, but did not lead to actual legal action against the suspected subversives. A 
Yugoslav Volksdeutscher was far more likely to find himself the victim of a random 
beating at the hands of economically frustrated neighbors or gendarmes unwilling to wait 
for hard evidence than to be summoned to account for his actions before a court of law. 
As Lektorat Petrovgrad (Grossbetschkerek), which offered German-language classes, 
reported in October 1940, the growing number of Serbian pupils was a success 
considering the town‟s Serbian population saw in every German-speaker a potential spy 
and regularly denounced them – not only Lektorat staff but also Volksdeutsche resident 
in town – to the police.
213
 Such behavior, more irritating than genuinely threatening to the 
Volksdeutsche affected, was indicative of the government‟s general ineffectuality in 
identifying and combating subversives. 
 This ineffectuality could easily be laid at the door of a weak central government. 
Indeed, the speedy break-up of Yugoslavia in the April War, with the secession of 
Croatia and the massive failure of its defenses, was due in large part to the failure of its 
central command posts. But another, more insidious element was also present in the 
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prewar period: a mixed, even confused attitude regarding the German Reich and 
Yugoslav Volksdeutsche as its unofficial representatives. Yugoslav Minister President 
Dragińa Cvetković‟s primary task as head of the government was to preserve Yugoslav 
neutrality in the face of growing Reich insistence that Yugoslavia choose a side in the 
European conflict. If Berlin sought to use Volksdeutsche as a way of pressuring 
Yugoslavia into the Axis, Yugoslavia found in its Volksdeutsche a convenient means to 
rebuff Berlin‟s urging without seeming to rebuff it.  
Meeting with Sepp Janko on September 5, 1940, Cvetković echoed the 
Volksgruppenführung‟s ambiguous representation of itself as a bridge between the Reich 
and Yugoslavia: “We should be happy to have a German Volksgruppe, which has taken 
on itself the role of go-between during these attempts at reaching an understanding 
[between the two states].”
214
 Whether Cvetković actually believed what he said remains 
open to question. It is likely that he believed that seeming to meet Volksdeutsche political 
demands would impress the Reich favorably vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. At this same meeting, 
Cvetković agreed to remedy the situation regarding the degraded army reserve officers, 
as well as to ensure that the Volksgruppe‟s National Socialist regimentation would not be 
curbed, that administrative areas and municipalities with German majorities would get 
ethnic German administrators and notaries, and that limitations on Volksdeutsche 
purchases of land would be lifted.
215
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Cvetković reiterated these promises in a speech he gave in Novi Sad on October 
7, 1940,
216
 but words proved cheap. Official reports on Yugoslavia from the “Meldungen 
aus dem Reich” (“Dispatches from the Reich”) – a secret monthly news digest put out by 
the SD (Sicherheitsdienst) – for the following months routinely complained that 
Cvetković‟s sweeping promises remained mere words on paper.
217
 Little was done to 
fulfill demands
218
 which would have amounted to greater autonomy for the 
Volksgruppenführung to treat its co-nationals like a small völkisch state within the 
Yugoslav state.  
 “Meldungen aus dem Reich” provide an unexpectedly concise and cogent 
explanation for the Yugoslav government‟s inconsistent attitude. Rather than blaming it 
on the racially prescribed inferiority of a Slavic government, the January 1941 report 
linked the vacillations of Cvetković‟s nationality policy to Yugoslavia‟s uncertain 
position in Europe at the beginning of the war‟s second year.
219
 When the Third Reich 
seemed invincible, as it did in the fall of 1940, kowtowing to it was the most prudent 
course for an internally divided country clinging to neutrality. So the Yugoslav 
government promised the moon to its Volksdeutsche, and then dragged its feet in the 
hope that its geo-political position would be improved from without, as eventually it was. 
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By January 1941, with the Italian defeat in North Africa decreasing the immediate danger 
of an ascendant Axis in Southeast Europe, the Yugoslav Volksgruppenführung‟s hopes 
were dashed as pressure mounted from the authorities as well as from individual 
Yugoslavs, inspired by nationalism, economic envy of the relatively well-to-do 
Volksdeutsche or simple spite. 
The above analysis also contained an implication not considered by the 
“Meldungen aus dem Reich” report: that Yugoslavia‟s overall dependence on external 
forces, and the attendant vacillations of its internal policies, translated also into Yugoslav 
Volksdeutsche dependence on the Third Reich‟s shifting foreign-political interests. As a 
consequence, Berlin often sent the Volksdeutsche mixed signals, which resulted in a 
series of misunderstandings. These, in turn, revolved around the Reich‟s desire for 
Yugoslav Volksdeutsche to remain, at least outwardly, loyal citizens of the Yugoslav 
state, not causing tension between Yugoslavia and the Reich at a time when luring 
Yugoslavia into a closer association with the Axis was paramount. 
One way in which loyalty to one‟s state can be evaluated is the individual‟s 
willingness to fight in said state‟s armed forces. In this, the Reich gave young Yugoslav 
Volksdeutsche more willing to fight for the Reich than for their country of birth all 
possible assistance in the period before the royal coup of March 27, 1941, so long as the 
issue of open defiance to Yugoslav mobilization orders did not arise. Sepp Janko‟s 
September 1940 proposal to form Waffen-SS units inside Yugoslavia was met with 
enthusiastic approval in Himmler‟s office – provided the recruits could be smuggled out 
of the country for training, thus failing to arouse Yugoslav suspicions.
220
 Only the 
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previous month, Waffen-SS chief of staff Gottlob Berger had suggested to Himmler to 
extend to Hungary and Yugoslavia the clandestine recruitment for the Waffen-SS already 
taking place among the Romanian Volksdeutsche.
221
 Acting independently and probably 
in ignorance of these larger plans, Janko nevertheless proved himself a valuable asset to 
the Reich in Southeast Europe. His way of thinking coincided perfectly with Himmler‟s 
own plans to use Volksdeutsche and tie them to himself within the Reich‟s sphere of 
influence. 
The most convenient opportunity for secret Waffen-SS recruitment and 
smuggling of recruits out of Yugoslavia was presented by Volksdeutsche voluntary 
service in the Prahovo and Zemun camps during the resettlement of the Bessarabian 
Germans in fall 1940. Under cover of medical examinations and physical exercises for 
purposes of hygiene and fitness, volunteers were exposed to basic military training and 
selected on the basis of general and racial health.
222
 A total of some 300
223
 Yugoslav 
Volksdeutsche recruits were discreetly
224
 persuaded to volunteer for the Waffen-SS, and 
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smuggled out of the country, mixed in with the Bessarabian Germans.
225
 Some of these 
young men were then assigned to extant Waffen-SS units in various theaters of war. 
Others – like Gustav Halwax (see below) or Jakob Lichtenberger and Michael Reiser, 
Janko‟s first choices for Waffen-SS training – returned to Yugoslavia to aid in the secret 
recruitment, which continued even after the cover provided by the Bessarabian 
resettlement was no longer in place.  
Berlin encouraged Volksdeutsche to choose the side of the Third Reich as long as 
their doing so did not endanger Reich-Yugoslav relations by drawing unwelcome 
attention. Yet the disappearance of several hundred able-bodied young men from the 
Volksdeutsche community did not go unremarked by their surroundings.
226
 Volunteering 
for the Waffen-SS exhibited beyond the shadow of a doubt the extent to which the 
volunteers had tipped the scales away from staatstreu and toward volkstreu. This was 
especially evident – and damning – in the cases of those who joined the Waffen-SS and 
accepted instructions to ignore any forthcoming mobilization or military-service 
summons from the Yugoslav Army,
227
 or those like Lichtenberger and Reiser, both of 
whom were reserve officers in the Yugoslav army when they elected to join the 
Allgemeine SS in fall 1940 before returning to Yugoslavia during the Bessarabian 
resettlement to aid in the later recruits‟ secret transportation out of Yugoslavia.
228
  
While Berlin firmly discouraged open Volksdeutsche defiance of Yugoslav 
sovereignty in late 1940, administrative miscommunication in the German capital 
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actually produced some such initiatives. In December 1940 – barely a month after the 
successful conclusion of the Bessarabian resettlement and its attendant recruitment drive 
– Himmler, acting through the VoMi, ordered another secret recruitment for the Waffen-
SS in Southeast Europe with a projected 200 recruits from Yugoslavia, 500 from 




 a Yugoslav Volksdeutscher and 
Waffen-SS veteran of the Western campaign of 1940, was charged with coordinating the 
recruitment with Janko. The recruitment was to be carried out under the guise of forming 
a sports club for the German Volksgruppe, with the help of an SS doctor passing himself 
off as a sports physician.
231
 This recruitment drive came a cropper due to jurisdictional 
conflict (see below), but that did not end various schemes to provide young 
Volksdeutsche with ideological and military training in the Reich.
232
 
Quite apart from the fact that Himmler had acted in contravention of the AA‟s 
continued attempts to tie Yugoslavia firmly to the Axis,
233
 such actions did not merely 
provoke the Yugoslav authorities. They also inspired the Volksdeutsche to consider 
Yugoslavia less as their host state and country of birth, to which they owed a measure of 
loyalty, and more as a provisional state structure they inhabited until something better 
suited came along. Neither Reich encouragement alone nor Volksdeutsche desires acting 
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on their own could have produced the degree of disenchantment with Yugoslavia evident 
in Volksdeutsche ranks during the April War, when even those who did not dislike 
Yugoslavia per se saw its destruction by the Axis as a foregone conclusion. The two 
acting in tandem, however, could. 
This disenchantment was the result of the interaction between the Volksdeutsche 
perception of themselves as hopelessly persecuted – a view encouraged by the 
Volksgruppenführung and bolstered by isolated incidents like the murder of the 
propaganda chief in Grossbetschkerek
234
 – and of Reich policies and instructions 
regarding Yugoslavia and its Volksdeutsche. Had the latter been more consistent, the 
Yugoslav Volksgruppenführung would likely have been more of a passive receiver of 
orders from Berlin, and less of an active agent in the six months before the April War. 
Paradoxically, the very inconsistency of Reich and Yugoslav policy affecting the 
Volksdeutsche created a mental lacuna in which the Volksgruppenführung could 
conceive of itself as Berlin‟s equal partner in the Balkans. Proven wrong again and again, 
it clung to the notion that it could do more than just execute orders, going so far as to 
suggest foreign and racial policy to Berlin. Examples of the latter include Sepp Janko 
taking the initiative to propose Lichtenberger and Reiser for acceptance into the SS in 
accordance with Himmler and the VoMi‟s view of military training as being of 
“extraordinary importance for the future of all Volksdeutsche,”
235
 and Janko demanding 
weapons for the Volksgruppe in December 1940.  
On the latter occasion, Janko reported an allegedly increased number of attacks on 
Volksdeutsche perpetrated by the Yugoslav army and royalist-nationalist paramilitaries 
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(Ĉetnici). He therefore demanded a substantial delivery of weapons for the protection of 
leading Volksdeutsche. The amount of weaponry requested varied from no fewer than 
1000 handguns, 300 automatics and an unspecified number of machine guns,
236
 to as 
many as 8000 light machine guns, 8000 or more carbines, 8000 pistols, 1200-1400 hand 
grenades, dynamite and bullets.
237
 The great disparity in numbers can be explained by the 
fact that, not for the last time, Janko tried to get his way by applying to more than one 
Reich office for what the Volksgruppenführung needed. He directly exploited the 
competing and overlapping jurisdictions within the Third Reich. In this case, he used the 
competition between the AA and the RSHA for supreme jurisdiction over all Volkstum 
matters.  
Janko‟s multiple requests did not guarantee success. In this period, on the eve of 
the signing of the Hungarian-Yugoslav Friendship Treaty,
238
 while the Reich tried every 
diplomatic means available to entice Yugoslavia into the Axis, supplying Yugoslav 
Volksdeutsche with a large number of weapons would have been detrimental to relations 
between the two states. Janko‟s request was officially refused on the grounds that without 
a clear intention to bring about the “annihilation” of the Volksgruppe on the part of the 
Yugoslav state, the political situation would not suffer such an affront to the Yugoslav 
authorities.
239
 At most a couple hundred handguns and a few submachine guns could 
realistically be smuggled inside the personal luggage of Volksdeutsche – likely including 
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Waffen-SS recruits – returning to Yugoslavia from the Reich,
240
 and divvied up among 
the most reliably Nazified members of the Volksgruppe.
241
 The reticence of this decision 
speaks clearly to the Reich‟s low estimate of the Volksgruppe‟s real potential for forming 
its own paramilitary units at the turn of 1940-1941.  
A German agent in Yugoslavia known as agent 6625 addressed the issue of 
secrecy: the distribution of large numbers of weapons among Volksdeutsche civilians 
could not pass unnoticed. There are indications in the documentary record that not only 
was the Yugoslav gendarmerie in areas bordering the Third Reich on the lookout for 
weapons caches being smuggled into Yugoslavia,
242
 but some prominent Volksdeutsche 
also displayed little caution in offering to procure weapons for acquaintances.
243
  
Moreover, on January 13, 1941 the AA exerted pressure at a meeting between 
Ribbentrop, Lorenz and Lorenz‟s subordinate Hermann Behrends, which concluded with 
a ban on all recruitment for or creation of any sort of SS-style unit in Yugoslavia.
244
 This 
intervention had less to do with the position of the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche than with the 
continued necessity for friendly relations between Germany and Yugoslavia, as well as 
the internal power struggle between the AA on one side, Himmler and the VoMi on the 
other. The latter was quickly – if only temporarily – laid to rest with a jurisdictional 
agreement between Ribbentrop and Himmler establishing the AA‟s supreme jurisdiction 
over all matters touching on foreign policy, even when it involved Volksdeutsche (see 
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below). Lorenz informed Halwax by telegram that, despite the fact that Halwax‟s 
activities in Yugoslavia had been agreed on between the AA and the VoMi,
245
 said 
activities had to stop at once. Lorenz confirmed the AA‟s supremacy by forwarding the 
telegram through the AA main office in Berlin and the German Embassy in Belgrade.
246
 
Despite the good will displayed by the likes of Halwax and Lichtenberger to 
create secret paramilitary units from Yugoslav Volksdeutsche, the constraints of Reich 
foreign policy imposed limits on their ability to recruit, equip and train any such units. 
Moreover, even with the best will in the world, the Volksgruppenführung had to 
recognize the fact that the average Volksdeutscher led too staid an existence to fit into the 
ideal of the secretive paramilitary fighter. As an unnamed informer commented, “[w]ith a 
wink,” woe betide the Volksdeutsche paramilitary who fell into Ĉetnik hands.
247
 Any 
attempt at efficient recruitment and training of Volksdeutsche could only take place under 
Reich occupation – not in a Yugoslav state, even one allied with the Axis.  
Despite the Reich‟s measured assessment of the Volksgruppenführung‟s standing, 
the latter‟s demand for weapons suggests it considered the Volksgruppe‟s position 
sufficiently precarious to demand fairly radical breaches of diplomatic etiquette, not to 
mention Yugoslav sovereignty. Whereas the average Volksdeutscher‟s feelings on the 
matter remained mixed in this period, it can be concluded that the Volksdeutsche 
leadership aligned itself with what it perceived as the Reich‟s primary interest in 
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Yugoslavia (the protection of Volksdeutsche irrespective of consequences to state 
relations) some three and a half months before the final deterioration of German-
Yugoslav relations between March 27 and April 6, 1941. However, Volksdeutsche 
officials continued to show a willingness to work within the Yugoslav system in order to 
ensure the safety of their co-nationals. Their good will increasingly became mere lip-
service to a state the Nazified Volksgruppenführung under Sepp Janko ceased to 
recognize as its own.  
Despite their disenchantment with the Yugoslav state, the Volksgruppenführung 
in Yugoslavia could not ignore its existence completely before the April War. The 
necessity for Volksdeutsche not to trespass against the laws of their host state was echoed 
by attempts made in Berlin in early 1941 to straighten out jurisdiction over Volkstum-
related issues. The increased political activity of Volksdeutsche in Southeast-European 
states
248
 – such as the creation of a Nazi Party in Romania or that of a German labor front 
in Slovakia
249
 – was a sufficiently significant element in the Reich‟s diplomatic relations 
with these countries to necessitate specific guidelines. In January 1941, the AA issued 
secret guidelines which stated unambiguously the following: 1) Volksdeutsche were to be 
considered primarily citizens of their host countries, to which they owed the loyal 
fulfillment of duties expected of all citizens; 2) any organized and self-aware ethnic 
German community (i.e. deutsche Volksgruppe) had to align its activities with the 
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Reich‟s policies vis-à-vis its host country; and 3) all VoMi activities had to be 
coordinated with the interests of Reich foreign policy.
250
  
This temporary supremacy of the AA over the VoMi and, by extension, over 
Heinrich Himmler – of political over racial and Volkstum interests – was confirmed 
when Ribbentrop sent the same guidelines to VoMi‟s director SS-Obergruppenführer 
Werner Lorenz in the days when the decision was made to invade Yugoslavia and 
Greece.
251
 In these days of foreign-political tension, Ribbentrop also easily reached an 
agreement with Lorenz‟s superior Himmler, securing for the AA the “right to issue 
directives in all nationality matters [Volkstumsfragen] of a foreign-political nature.”
252
  
Throughout this jurisdictional power-struggle, the AA and the VoMi remained 
ideological institutions, but they approached their common ideological goals in different 
ways. As in other instances during World War II (e.g. the partitioning of Poland in 1939), 
especially before the explicitly racial warfare unleashed during Operation Barbarossa 
melded ideology and foreign policy into one more-or-less indelible whole, preparations to 
tie Yugoslavia to the Axis whether peacefully or forcefully gave foreign political matters 
greater weight. The Ribbentrop-Himmler agreement was therefore an expedient measure 
rather than long-term policy, and it placed the interests of Hitler‟s special brand of 
Realpolitik ahead of the desire to reshuffle Balkan populations along National Socialist 
lines. It meant that in early 1941 Sepp Janko and his cohorts had to step lightly lest they 
infringed too obviously on the prerogatives of the Yugoslav state – a state that scarcely 
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mattered any more in their mental landscape and Weltanschauung, but which remained 
very much a practical and political reality.  
In line with this temporary supremacy of foreign policy, in early February 1941 
the AA refused suggestions submitted to it by two avowed mavericks within the 
Volksgruppe. Johann Wüscht, head of the Volksgruppe‟s Statistics Main Office 
(Hauptamt für Statistik) – characterized by the VoMi as an “eccentric,”
253
 that most 
damning moniker in a highly regimented society – and Janko‟s acting deputy Fritz 
Metzger proposed the creation of a separate Volksdeutsche legal statute or a German-
Yugoslav agreement ensuring legal protection for Yugoslav Volksdeutsche. Potentially 
extending also to cover the ethnic German communities in Hungary, Romania and 
Slovakia,
254
 this proposal was most likely intended as a prelude to the creation of some 
kind of great Danube Volksdeutsche protectorate (in its literal meaning of protecting its 
residents), not unlike that seen to have been extended over the Czech lands. 
The proposed statute was an ideological document par excellence. It built upon 
unfulfilled promises extended by Minister President Cvetković in September, and 
extended these to include issues not touched upon previously. If adopted, the statute 
would have meant the virtual creation of a racial Volksdeutsche state within the material 
Yugoslav state. It included the recognition of the Volksgruppe as a legal body called the 
Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft, organized on National Socialist principle. Membership 
would have been determined by belonging to a national registry from which, once a 
person was inscribed in it at the age of 18, one could never be removed. Since applying 
for inclusion in the registry was left to the individual conscience of the applicant, this was 
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not quite as radical as the principle adopted in the Reich that racial belonging was an 
objective fact which could be ascribed to one from without. However, it did imply that 
each applicant‟s racial eligibility would be evaluated according to some kind of objective 
criteria. Furthermore, the Volksgruppenführung would have been given absolute 
authority over Volksdeutsche in matters of taxation, schooling, public and private 
language use, and administration (in this, the proposed statute repeated the demands 
made by Janko and approved by Cvetković a few months earlier). It would have also 
ensured Volksdeutsche legal protection and equality vis-à-vis the Yugoslav state and its 
non-German citizens. In effect, the Volksgruppe would have been able to exist as a small 
ersatz German state not infringed upon by the Yugoslav state, yet enjoying some of the 
benefits of existing within it, such as a portion of the state tax revenue.
255
 Volksdeutsche 
would have ceased to be citizens with rights and obligations, and become wards of the 
Yugoslav state with rights but no duties. Their privileged position would have been 
guaranteed from within by this statute, from without by the formidable economic and 
political presence of the Third Reich. 
The statute outline was originally submitted in December 1940 – heady days 
following the closing of the resettlement camps on the Danube and the departure of 
several hundred young men for military training in the Reich. The sky must have seemed 
the limit to the Volksgruppenführung‟s political ambition. This was also the period when 
Sepp Janko brusquely demanded weapons from the Reich, a demand which met with as 
little understanding as did the suggested legal document.  
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Wüscht and Metzger broke the chain of command and contradicted the 
Führerprinzip by deigning to address the AA without consulting their 
Volksgruppenführer first – and were thus automatically not taken very seriously in 
Berlin. Moreover, the practical ability of the Yugoslav government, seen by Reich and 
Volksdeutsche alike as very weak and no match for opposition elements within its own 
administration, to force through a special law protecting the Volksdeutsche was deemed 
woefully insufficient. Finally, in line with the subordination of Volksdeutsche interests to 
Reich foreign policy, the Reich had no intention of ruining its chances of drawing 
Yugoslavia into the Axis by strong-arming Yugoslavia into giving one group of its 
citizens special rights, even if those citizens happened to be ethnic Germans. Any such 
move was explicitly recognized as leading only to a worsening of German-Yugoslav 
relations, and was therefore expressly forbidden by the exigencies of Reich foreign 
policy.
256
 Bluntly put, “the conclusion of an agreement between Germany and 
Yugoslavia on the protection of the German Volksgruppe is at present out of the 
question.”
257
 The Yugoslav Volksdeutsche‟s divided loyalties were not shored up by 
explicit assurances from the Reich. 
Yugoslav Volksdeutsche were thus presented with the thorny issue of how much 
– and how far – they could test the loyalty they owed the Yugoslav state in favor of their 
desire for closer political ties between the Volksgruppe and the Reich. This became 
especially evident in the first three months of 1941, when the prevailing mood among the 
general Yugoslav population (including lower-level administrators and gendarmes) 
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clashed with the overtly Germanophile attitude adopted by the government, which still 
clung to neutrality.  
“Meldungen aus dem Reich” reported that, in the case of a German-Yugoslav 
conflict, “excessively jumped-up nationalist gangs” would slaughter the Volksdeutsche of 
Yugoslavia, as had happened previously to the Volksdeutsche in Poland (a mainstay of 
Reich propaganda in the days leading up to the invasion of Poland in September 1939).
258
 
These fears may have owed the most to the success of Reich propaganda, but they were 
fed by such individual acts of ethnic enmity as the remark made to a Volksdeutsche 
doctor in Grossbetschkerek by a Serbian administrator, “There are not enough trees in the 
Banat to hang all you Germans upon,”
259
 or the attack on a Volksdeutscher who nearly 
had a swastika carved into his cheek with a knife and was told by his attackers “Now the 
swastika will look good on you!”
260
 True or not, such stories increased the average 
Volksdeutscher‟s sense of persecution by and alienation from the Yugoslav state and 
society.  
“Meldungen” for the period January-March 1941 contain a litany of complaints of 
beatings, insults, broken windows, etc. directed against Yugoslav Volksdeutsche. More 
sinister than these were indications that in these months the Yugoslav Interior Ministry 
stepped up its surveillance of Volksdeutsche, and even compiled lists of people to be 
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taken hostage in case war broke out between the Reich and Yugoslavia.
261
 This plan was 
a sign that the Yugoslav authorities had badly miscalculated the Volksdeutsche‟s 
importance for or influence on Reich policy. More than before, overtly non-political 
Volksdeutsche activities like participation in sports clubs, choice of clothing
262
 or having 
volunteered in the two camps for Bessarabian Volksdeutsche
263
 drew the authorities‟ 
unwelcome attention, but this did not mean that the criteria on which one was deemed 
suspicious had become any clearer.
264
 As the likelihood of Yugoslavia joining the Axis 
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mu se stalno nalazi u Nemaĉkoj.”), “has a lot of influence as former municipal president” (Kao 
bivńi pretsednik opńtine, dosta uticajan.”), “as former teacher of long standing has much influence 
with the middle class” (“Kao bivńi dugogodińnji uĉitelj uticajan je kod srednjeg staleņa.”), 
“aggressive and very influential with the middle class – especially youth” (“Nasrtljiv i od velikog 
uticaja kod srednjeg staleņa – naroĉito kod omladine.”), “used to work in Germany and is a dyed-
in-the-wool National Socialist” (“Kao nekadańnji radnik u Nemaĉkoj zadojen 
nacionalsocijalizmom.”), “spiritual leader of the youth who are against our state and work in 
favor of a foreign state” (“duhovni voĊa omladine, koji su raspoloņeni protiv nańe drņave a rade u 
korist strane drņave.”), “caught with compromising documents, fined and jailed for them but 
received amnesty” (“Uhvaćen je bio sa kompromitujućim aktima usled ĉega je bio kaņnjen, 
zatvaran ali je amnestiran”), “non-Slavic lower orders gather in his house to listen to the radio” 
(“Skuplja u svoju kuću niņi staleņ /neslovene/ radi sluńanja radio vesti.”), etc. “Spisak graĊana 
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increased, so it became more difficult for ethnic Germans to convincingly demonstrate 
even feigned loyalty to Yugoslavia. That being said, official suspicions remained limited 
to observation and report-writing right until April 6, 1941. There is no evidence that the 
Yugoslav government prepared to „slaughter‟ its Volksdeutsche, whatever their non-
German neighbors may have threatened in fits of pique.  
 
The Coming of War 
The problem of divided loyalty became even more acute in the period between the royal 
coup in Belgrade and the beginning of the April War, when feverish uncertainty in 
Belgrade government circles required the Volksdeutsche – individuals as well as the 
Volksgruppenführung as their representatives – to strike an even finer balance between 
Yugoslavia and Germany. For his part, Volksgruppenführer Janko chose to err on the 
side of caution. He visited the president of the Danube Banovina
265
 on March 27, the day 
of the coup, and assured this representative of the Yugoslav government of the 
Volksdeutsche‟s continued loyalty to the state and its new king, Petar II,
266
 who had 
ascended the throne while still a minor at the behest of a new Yugoslav government 
opposed to Yugoslavia‟s membership in the Axis. On the same day Janko sent the 
following open telegram to the king:  
To our ruler, His Majesty King Petar II, the German Volksgruppe of the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia, filled with loyalty, devotion and faithfulness, wishes from the 
bottom of its heart, on this historic day, a long and happy reign crowned by peace 
and blessed by God. 
                                                                                                                                                 
koji su neprijateljski raspoloņeni naspram nańe zemlje te bi ih trebalo konfinirati ili uzeti za 
taoce,” June 15, 1940, Muzej Vojvodine, document 19741/3. 
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In the March 28 edition of the Deutsches Volksblatt, the main Volksdeutsche newspaper 
in interwar Yugoslavia (published in Novi Sad), Janko also ordered that all activities of 
the Volksgruppe be suspended for an indefinite period so as to avoid provoking an anti-
German reaction.
268
 Seemingly straightforward, the concluding lines of the order were 
more ambiguous: “We have always displayed great discipline and done our duty. This 
time, too, we will show that we know how to maintain discipline and do our duty.”
269
 The 
emphasis on discipline suggests that Janko was expecting violence against the 
Volksdeutsche. The emphasis on duty fails to specify duty to whom: Yugoslavia or the 
Third Reich?  
 The same ambiguity is evident in an article which appeared in the Munich edition 
of the Völkischer Beobachter on April 4, in which an anonymous, supposedly 
Volksdeutsche author from the Baĉka commented: “We [i.e. Yugoslav Volksdeutsche] 
must find a balance between staatstreu and volkstreu, even when the chips are down. 
Even if we bear the scars of this effort, we must try again and again until we succeed in 
striking this balance!”
270
 This article suggests that Yugoslav Volksdeutsche were in an 
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undeservedly difficult position, given their fine record of loyalty to both state and Volk. 
As in Janko‟s order to the Volksgruppe, the last statement is more ambiguous: one way of 
striking the balance between the two would be the elimination of multinational 
Yugoslavia in favor of a more German-friendly form of government.  
 This ambiguity did not escape the leader of the new Yugoslav government, 
General Duńan Simović. The Volksgruppenführung reported, via “Nora,” that on March 
31 Simović expressed a fervent desire for Sepp Janko to act as a go-between for the new 
government, and assure Berlin of Yugoslavia‟s continued loyalty, undiminished by the 
change of government.
271
 Between March 28 and April 5 the new Yugoslav government 
also sent a string of increasingly frantic (and futile) oral and written messages to the 
German Embassy in Belgrade in order to stave off a Reich attack on the country.
272
 On 
April 2, in a meeting with Christian Brücker, the Belgrade Kreisleiter (county chief) of 
the German Volksgruppe, and a Volksdeutsche lawyer, Dr. Moser, Simović was still 
trying desperately to use any means available to prevent war with Germany, even 
suggesting that Janko might be persuaded to travel to Berlin in order to present the 
Yugoslav government‟s position to Reich authorities.
273
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Instead, Janko was summoned to the German Embassy in Belgrade on April 2, 
and instructed to adopt an evasive attitude in his meeting with Simović,
274
 since at that 
point the attack on Yugoslavia had already been decided on in Berlin. Also on April 2, all 
German consulates in Yugoslavia received encrypted instructions to prepare for 
evacuation and recommend the same to the personnel of other Axis countries‟ 
embassies.
275
 On April 3, most of the staff of the German Embassy in Belgrade took the 
night train to Budapest,
276
 following the departure of Ambassador Viktor von Heeren, 
who had been summoned urgently by Ribbentrop. Heeren had incurred Ribbentrop‟s 
displeasure with his friendly attitude to Yugoslav authorities old and new, and his efforts 
to dissuade Berlin from making war on Yugoslavia,
277
 even at the perceived expense of 
Yugoslav Volksdeutsche.
278
 Leaving the embassy‟s First Secretary Gerhart Feine in 
charge,
279
 the main line of diplomatic communication between Belgrade and Berlin was 
thus severed. Even without knowing all of these details, Simović must have realized the 
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 and the concomitant unlikelihood of the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche 
influencing Reich policy. His meeting with Janko was a failure: it lasted barely five 




 Despite his dismissive attitude toward Janko, Simović did not risk openly 
antagonizing the Volksdeutsche, since the Reich government made no secret of the fact 
that attacks on Reichs- or Volksdeutsche would be deemed sufficient excuse for a Reich 
attack on Yugoslavia.
282
 In a display of continuing tensions over jurisdiction, both the 
VoMi and Ribbentrop instructed their offices to “organize [i.e. fabricate] cries for help” 
from Yugoslav Volksdeutsche, Croats, Macedonians and Slovenes, which would be 
reproduced in the Reich press and lend moral justification to the impending invasion.
283
 
The violent repression of Volksdeutsche was retroactively dated back to the very creation 
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of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918.
284
 Reports of the supposed 
mistreatment of Volksdeutsche in Belgrade, Slovenia, the Banat and even Macedonia 
were duly supplied, especially by the German Embassy in Bucharest, the 




These diplomatic reports dutifully listed individual instances of fights, verbal 
abuse, broken windows, straw set on fire, bodily harm, the harassment of Volksdeutsche 
women by Ĉetnici and similar incidents. The combined effect of these reports was deeply 
unsettling for the Volksdeutsche – and made clear the Yugoslav government‟s weakness 
in failing to prevent such outbursts against its own citizens – but hardly fulfilled Serbian 
nationalist promises-cum-threats to “wade knee-high in German blood”
286




The most serious were reports of Volksdeutsche illegally crossing the borders into 
Romania (a few hundred) and Ostmark (nearly three thousand in total), but even this did 
not amount to a planned genocidal attack on the Volksdeutsche minority of northern 
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Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, these reports were eagerly picked up by the Reich press and 
embellished to describe a landscape of burning villages, in which Volksdeutsche were 
systematically hunted down, assaulted, murdered or forced to flee by Jews and 
bloodthirsty Ĉetnici backed and equipped by the Yugoslav government.
288
  
On the Yugoslav side, the allegations made by the Reich press were roundly 
denied.
289
 The same was done in private meetings between representatives of the 
Yugoslav government and German Embassy staff.
290
 The government press office even 
organized a tour of the Volksdeutsche areas of settlement for foreign journalists in 
Yugoslavia in order to counter reports of mistreatment.
291
 Moreover, Janko personally 
denied any major excesses against the Volksdeutsche,
292
 but Yugoslavia‟s fate was never 
dependent on the treatment meted out to its Volksdeutsche. Although no worse than 
“some broken Volksdeutsche [italics in the original] noses and windows, and only few 
cases of severe injuries”
293
 can be proven, these were sufficient to feed the Reich 
propaganda machine and provide a convenient excuse for invasion.  
 The Reich‟s sudden about-face regarding the living conditions and rumored 
dangers the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche labored under did not fail to affect the already 
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contentious issue of Volksdeutsche loyalty to Yugoslavia. Whereas in the period 
December 1940-March 1941 their loyalties had to remain, at least outwardly, with the 
Yugoslav state so as to dovetail with Reich foreign policy, the general attitude of the 
Volksdeutsche underwent a final polarization in the days between the royal coup and the 
start of the April War. It was then that their perceived loyalty to the Reich superseded 
that to Yugoslavia, its king and institutions. This is nowhere clearer than in the case of 
the mobilization orders issued by the Yugoslav government and how Volksdeutsche of an 
age to be called up responded to it.  
 At the same time as he decided to destroy Yugoslavia, Hitler decreed that, if 
called up for military service as part of a general mobilization drive, Yugoslav 
Volksdeutsche ought to avoid responding and go into hiding. This was justified on the 
pretext that Volksdeutsche recruits might be attacked or even killed by other soldiers.
294
 
This order was expanded to cover both ongoing and imminent mobilization, and specified 
that both current and potential Volksdeutsche recruits should try to reach the Reich rather 
than be drafted into the Yugoslav army, if necessary passing through Hungary on their 
way to Germany. It is unclear why this matter was not handled by the AA, in accordance 
with its hard-won supremacy in foreign-political and foreign-national matters. It seems 
likely that the imminence of war rendered diplomats obsolete in German-Yugoslav 
relations. In the event, the German Interior Ministry informed the VoMi,
295
 and the two 
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requesting that Volksdeutsche refugees from Yugoslavia be allowed to cross the 
respective states‟ borders, given help and protection in their efforts to reach the Reich.  
With the deterioration of diplomatic relations between the Reich and Yugoslavia, 
the question of military service for Volksdeutsche went from one of preference for 
service in the Waffen-SS if the recruits could leave Yugoslavia in secrecy, without 
upsetting relations between the two states, to that of absolute rejection of service in the 
Yugoslav army and, with it, residence in Yugoslavia. (Those who chose to border-jump 
had no means of knowing how long they might be away, though it is clear that most 
returned, still civilians, with the Reichsdeutsche troops entering the Banat from 
Romania,
298
 while some may have been inducted into extant Waffen-SS divisions and 
sent to other theaters of war.)  
Ordered by the Reich, such a radical breach with the state of one‟s birth and 
residence still required potential recruits to make the mental leap away from the 
Yugoslav context of their lives and toward an unquestioningly Reich-centric context. In 
the process, they committed treason against the Yugoslav state. This presented each 
Volksdeutsche of recruitment age with a dilemma he had to resolve on his own. It gives 
the lie to the facile interpretation of Volksdeutsche actions in this period as those of a 
unified – and uniform – treasonous fifth column unperturbed by considerations other than 
National Socialist ideology, which was the mainstay of postwar Yugoslav 
historiography.
299
 While it remains impossible to estimate how many chose to border 
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jump, the material record suggests that some chose this option, while others allowed 
themselves to be drafted, whether out of slowness to react, fear of the unknown or a 
lingering sense of duty to their host state.  
Reports compiled from Volksdeutsche expellees and refugees in West Germany 
after the war demonstrate the choices Volksdeutsche recruits could, and did, make in 
these fateful days. Most former Banat residents‟ reports on the April War stress – 
possibly with some embellishment after the fact in view of figures reported by the 
authorities in Romania (see below) – that there was no draft-dodging among their co-
nationals.
300
 A message transmitted through “Nora” suggested that the order to dodge 
mobilization had reached the Vojvodina Volksdeutsche too late, at a point when 90% of 
eligible men were already drafted in the Srem, and 70% in the Banat and the Baĉka.
301
  
A handful of postwar reports reveal more complex motives behind such a large 
number of Volksdeutsche men being drafted. Thus, whereas in the village of Kudritz near 
Werschetz some of those called up were mobilized while others fled to Romania
302
 and in 
Modosch escape across the border supposedly stopped after the district president (sreski 
naĉelnik) assured the town‟s leading Volksdeutsche that their co-nationals had nothing to 
                                                                                                                                                 
ńpijunsko-podrivaĉka aktivnost domaćih Nemaca.”) At once sweeping and dismissive, 
Momĉilović manages to pass judgment and reject the need for any deeper analysis in a few lines 
of text. 
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fear from the non-German population,
303
 all save one youth called up in the village of 
Sankt-Hubert, which is near Grosskikinda and within walking distance of the Romanian 
border, literally chose the easy way out and border-jumped.
304
 One interviewee from the 
village of Charleville near Modosch claimed that all those called up in his village were 
duly mobilized, but as he himself chose to border-jump already in February 1941 and trek 
across Romania, Hungary and Slovakia to Vienna in order to join the Waffen-SS, his 
testimony is especially dubious.
305
 Finally, a woman from Glogau near Pantschowa, 
reported that there the mobilization was never even carried out as the invasion of the 
Banat happened too quickly, and Pantschowa being very close to Belgrade was likely 
deemed unworthy of separate defenses.
306
 Clearly the choice whether or not to respond to 
mobilization orders depended in equal measure on the proximity of the border, an 
individual‟s ideological inclination, and the low degree of organization displayed by the 
Yugoslav Army in the Vojvodina (see below).  
 Those who chose to do so, border-jumped across the nearest border – into the 
Romanian Banat. The German Consul in Timişoara estimated the Yugoslav 
Volksdeutsche in his town at 800 recruits and recruits‟ family members, whereas the 
German Volksgruppenführer in Romania suggested that a total of some 2,000 
Volksdeutsche had crossed the border from the Serbian Banat into Romania. This bears 
up the estimate transmitted by “Nora” about the high success rate of mobilization among 
Vojvodina Volksdeutsche. These official reports failed to provide first-hand reports of 
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any major outrages committed against the Volksdeutsche in Serbia.
307
 These border-
jumpers‟ primary reason for flight seems to have been the desire to avoid serving in the 
Yugoslav army. Either way, these Volksdeutsche had clearly resolved the problem of 
divided loyalty by abandoning their duty to the state whose citizens they were. Even 
though such a choice constituted treason against the Yugoslav state, it hardly made a 
large contribution to the failure of Yugoslav defenses in the April War. The ethnic 
German „fifth column‟ did not bring about Yugoslavia‟s military defeat,
308
 but those 
Volksdeutsche who chose to escape to Romania for the duration of the hostilities did 
make a clear choice between Yugoslavia and the Reich in the days preceding the actual 
Axis attack on the Balkans.  
For the others – the majority of Vojvodina Volksdeutsche who for whatever 
reason did not choose to border-jump – the period March 27-April 6 was also a time of 
polarization. Their behavior during the April War was determined in equal parts by the 
clear imminence of war (and the degree to which they responded to it from a standpoint 
of Nazi ideology), the attitude of authorities and non-German neighbors, and their 
geographic location (i.e. whether they lived in the Banat or the Baĉka).  
In his local history-cum-postwar apologia, Josef Beer describes the mood of the 
Banat Volksdeutsche in the first days of April 1941: “In this hour of peril, all 
Volksdeutsche recognized their fateful bond [Schicksalsverbundenheit] with the whole 
German Volk; the plain likelihood of the desire to annihilate them in the near future 
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impelled them into a defensive position. Their sole hope lay in a German victory.”
309
 No 
less clear-cut and sweeping than statements about a Volksdeutsche fifth column made by 
Yugoslav historians of the postwar period, this assessment after the fact presumes that all 
Volksdeutsche shared the same level of identification with the Reich and its ideology in 
April 1941.  
Most of the material record for the behavior of Vojvodina Volksdeutsche in the 
period March 27-April 18, 1941 is not contemporary. Apart from “Nora” transmissions 
and a handful of others, most documents date from immediately after the April War or 
from the postwar period. Even so, the image that emerges of Volksdeutsche behavior in 
this period suggests some ethnic tensions which exploded into serious violence on only 
one or two occasions, contrary to Reich propaganda. Most Volksdeutsche adopted a wait-
and-see attitude, while the Yugoslav Army conducted the war in a generally desultory 
fashion, creating a power vacuum into which the organizational strengths of the 
Volksgruppe could step, backed by the armed power of the invading Reich troops.  
Expellees‟ reports are almost unanimous in stressing that there had been no ethnic 
conflict, or even tension, between ethnic Germans and non-Germans in the Banat or 
between the ethnic Germans and the authorities.
310
 The exceptions mention Serbian 
youths‟ susceptibility to nationalist authority figures, such as priests (including the 
Russophile Slovak Lutheran pastor in the village of Haideschütz
311
) and local 
administrators, who frowned upon “everyone who wouldn‟t dance the kolo [Serbian folk 
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 Even so, the worst outrages mentioned were limited to minor damage to 
property – broken windows, excrement smeared on door posts and swastikas daubed on 
walls
313
 – the rather haphazard requisitioning of horses, radios, hunting rifles, bicycles, 
motorcycles and food by the Yugoslav Army and Ĉetnici,
314
 and verbal threats, as when a 
few dozen Serbs drove through Volksdeutsche villages near Grosskikinda on March 27, 




As for the Volksgruppenführung, it spent the period from the royal coup until the 
Yugoslav surrender isolated in its Novi Sad (Baĉka) headquarters, Habag-Haus. On 
March 27, Janko and other members of the Volksgruppenführung were placed under 
house arrest. However, already on March 29, after Janko issued – in agreement with Novi 
Sad‟s police chief – the telegram congratulating King Petar II on his accession and 
suspended Kulturbund activities, he was released and, even, assigned plainclothes 
policemen as a protective escort. A cordon of police was formed around Habag-Haus in 
order to protect it from attacks by Ĉetnici. Even Volksdeutsche memoirists acknowledge 
that this police presence averted violence against leading Volksdeutsche.
316
 This was 
clearly another attempt by General Simović‟s government to mollify the Reich by 
treating the Volksgruppenführung with every courtesy, and was recognized as such by 
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the German Embassy in Belgrade,
317
 contrary to the Reich press‟ descriptions of police 
menace and policemen forcing their way into Janko‟s residence.
318
  
Despite the failure of this scheme, it did succeed in keeping the 
Volksgruppenführung gathered in one place and relatively free to move around, although 
this did not give it any special organizational advantage. Until April 6, its initiatives were 
limited to following developments on the radio, sandbagging the building and bringing in 
a smaller quantity of firearms in case the building was besieged.
319
 A general breakdown 
of communications left the Volksgruppenführung out of the loop regarding troop 
movements and the Reich‟s war plans. It demanded to be informed of war plans through 
“Nora” in order to make preparations, but was ignored and left to coin elaborate – and 
useless – schemes about using white sheets to mark landing spots for Luftwaffe airplanes 
and paratroopers.
320
 The lack of clear communication also left Volksdeutsche in villages 
and towns outside Novi Sad to their own devices even before hostilities broke out.  
This goes a long way toward explaining the fact that such disparate reactions to 
Yugoslav mobilization and the dodging thereof are evident in so small a geographic 
region as the Banat. The most decisive move Janko made in this regard was not to place 
objections to recruits living near the Romanian border fleeing across it. He was not the 
only less than efficient German authority figure in the northern Balkans at this time: the 
Abwehr (German military intelligence) attempted to smuggle weapons to Yugoslav 
Volksdeutsche starting on April 1, but the personnel in charge was fired upon by 
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Romanian troops and had its weapons caches seized by Hungarian border patrols.
321
 
Either way, the lack of communication meant that no uniform order was issued to the 
Vojvodina Volksdeutsche from Habag-Haus either before or after the April War started, 
without a formal declaration, by the Luftwaffe‟s early-morning bombing of Belgrade on 
Orthodox Easter Sunday, April 6, 1941.
322
  
The manner in which the April War began – without announcement beforehand 
and by the bombing of civilian targets – came as a shock, but not as a surprise. The 
likelihood of war had become generally accepted since March 27, but its outbreak left the 
already nervous and temporarily disorganized Volksgruppe groping for a plan of action. 
None was forthcoming. In Novi Sad, the Volksgruppenführung was limited even more 
than before April 6 by the police guard still protecting Habag-Haus, and the agreement 
they reached with the city‟s police chief that the ethnic Germans and the Serbs shared a 
cause: their common fear of a Hungarian invasion. Once the police guard and the army 
abandoned the city on April 10 or 11, blowing up the Danube bridge behind them in 
order to cut off access to Belgrade, the Volksdeutsche in the city were left to their own 
devices. They used boats to cross the Danube to the Peterwaradein fortress, where they 
easily liberated the several hundred Volksdeutsche hostages from all over the Vojvodina 




The withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from all of the Vojvodina meant that for 
some 72 hours a power vacuum existed in Novi Sad before the Hungarian army marched 
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into the city on April 13, one week after hostilities broke out. The Volksgruppenführung 
filled this vacuum by disarming the few remaining Yugoslav soldiers, organizing a 
citizens‟ militia to keep the peace, composed of Volksdeutsche, Serbian and ethnic 
Hungarian civilians as well as a handful remaining gendarmes, and seizing stores of 
weapons and food in order to feed the released hostages and prevent Serbian or 
Hungarian nationalists from getting them.
324
 Sepp Janko even organized a public 
celebration of the hoped-for imminent arrival of the Wehrmacht, complete with hastily 
sewn swastika flags, a Romany orchestra playing the Deutschland-Lied, and the potent 
living symbol of a single Reichsdeutsche soldier, who had, along with one other, lost his 
way and been literally seized by the Volksdeutsche of Baĉka Palanka after his motorcycle 




These first acts of the Volksgruppenführung in de facto, if not de jure power 
suggest that Janko and his cohorts still relied exclusively on the arrival of Reich armed 
forces to justify and confirm their actions. All the measures undertaken were of a 
practical and stop-gap nature, rather than long-term moves intended to secure control of 
administrative posts and resources such as land or factories. The Volksdeutsche of Novi 
Sad cannot have been thinking of establishing their own state. If anything, they hoped 
that with the Wehrmacht‟s indisputable presence a state might be given to them. The 
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slightly grotesque, even carnivalesque atmosphere of the victory celebration described 
bears this out: the old order was gone, but instead of establishing a new one, the 
Volksdeutsche of Novi Sad threw a liberating party, a celebration in limbo. A return to 
normalcy hinged on the arrival of an outside force in the shape of an invading army.  
The Hungarian invasion of the Baĉka had a devastating effect on the 
Volksgruppenführung and the mass of resident Volksdeutsche alike. Partly this was due 
to the Hungarian soldiers‟ violent behavior, in contravention of orders, in the course of 
which they especially targeted ethnic Germans. Besides the usual litany of broken 
windows, swastika flags torn down and verbal insults, several Volksdeutsche civilians 
were shot. Honvéd soldiers – inspired by equal parts chauvinism, the euphoria of an easy 
victory, and nervousness over a handful of snipers concealed in the rooftops
326
 – fired 
indiscriminately, engaged in robbery and inflicted wanton damage on Volksdeutsche 
property in Baĉka villages and Novi Sad, under the pretext that everything there was now 
Hungarian.
327
 More than the loss of life and property, Hungarian occupation had a 
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disastrous effect on Volksdeutsche morale. Janko had repeated messages transmitted by 
“Nora,” expressing the Volksgruppe‟s sense of betrayal by the Reich it idealized: 
We are disappointed, embittered and outraged. What are the Hungarians doing 
here? We would rather spend the rest of our lives under the Hottentots, than live 





700.000 Volksdeutsche are waiting in vain for an answer why the Reich has left 
us in the lurch. We call and call for help, but receive not the shadow of a 




We urge once again that occupation by German troops [take place], as they have 








The Volksgruppe despairs because of its delivery to the Asiatics. Our position 





Despite previous disappointments, such as the negative impression left by Reich 
personnel engaged in the resettlement of the Bessarabian Volksdeutsche, nothing had 
previously shaken the average Vojvodina Volksdeutscher‟s idealized view of the Reich, 
its policies and people to such an extent. Hungarian-German rivalry in Southeast Europe 
aside, the behavior of the invading Hungarians and Berlin‟s failure to soothe Baĉka 
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Volksdeutsche pride with a few words of consolation was a very hard come-down from 
the heady atmosphere of the previous few days.  
 The April War in the Banat lacked the initial euphoria evident in Novi Sad, but it 
also lacked the final, crushing disappointment. The most traumatic aspect was the taking 
of Volksdeutsche hostages by the Yugoslav army and gendarmerie in the first days of the 
hostilities. Mostly transported to Belgrade or Peterwaradein, these men returned safely, 
often even before the Yugoslav army demanded an armistice.
333
 There is only one 
documented case of hostages coming to harm: nine men from Pantschowa were taken 
south of the Danube, abused, stabbed to death and buried in an unmarked grave by a 
small group of Yugoslav soldiers. The Reich press augmented this into a tale of German 
heroes dying with „Heil Hitler‟ as their last words, and the bodies were reburied with 
great pomp in Pantschowa town square on April 22.
334
  
However, this gruesome incident ran counter to several cases in which non-
Germans protected their Volksdeutsche neighbors, and were aided in this by hostage-
taking clearly being a low priority for the soldiers and gendarmes in the Banat. On 
several occasions Volksdeutsche hid or escaped to Romania with the (at least tacit) help 
of their Serbian neighbors.
335
 One sergeant in charge of some ninety hostages, clearly 
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realizing the futility of the endeavor and the overwhelming odds in favor of an Axis 
victory, made the choice much like that made by Volksdeutsche draft-dodgers and took 
his charges not to Belgrade, but to an isolated landholding, where they all waited for the 
Reich troops‟ arrival together.
336
 When a train carrying three hundred hostages from 
several villages was simply abandoned at the railway station in Deutsch-Zerne near 
Grosskikinda, the village‟s Serbian notary, Orthodox priest and head of the village 
council let the hostages go.
337
 In Kubin the priest and several hundred Serbs invoked the 
precedent set in 1914, when the town‟s Serbian hostages were released after the outbreak 
of World War I.
338
 And in Modosch the Serbian peasant who was also acting mayor 
persuaded the gendarmerie sergeant in charge that different ethnicities had lived in peace 
for hundreds of years, and would need to live together in the future as well: the hostages 
were released already on April 6.
339
 
The most touching example of mutual respect between ethnicities happened in 
Perlas, where on April 7, one day after the outbreak of war, the most prominent Serbs, 
ethnic Croats and Volksdeutsche drafted and signed a bilingual statement in which they 
vouched for each other‟s loyalty to the state, correct behavior, and safety.
340
 Not even 
presuming to influence the course of the war, this level-headed document remained 
focused on village matters in the hope of preventing unnecessary destruction and 
suffering, whatever the outcome of the April War in the Banat. Like most such 
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documents, it was more successful as a moral victory than as an influence on policy in 
the occupied Banat. The decision taken by several groups of Serbs and other non-
Germans to aid their Volksdeutsche neighbors should not be taken as an indication of a 
general loss of loyalty to Yugoslavia. Rather as the Vojvodina‟s civilian population was 
abandoned by the army supposed to protect it in those few April days, the inevitability of 
foreign occupation narrowed at least some people‟s focus from the national to the local 
and personal – and that included safeguarding not only one‟s family and property, but 
one‟s village and all its residents as well.  
The actual course of the April War in the Banat was swift and mostly uneventful. 
The Yugoslav army withdrew, along with most Serbian administrators and notaries, from 
all the villages and towns of the Banat between April 6 and 11, falling back toward 
Belgrade, blowing up bridges behind it, as it was doing in the Baĉka. The Wehrmacht‟s 
Infanterie-Regiment “Grossdeutschland” (Infantry Regiment “Grossdeutschland”) and 
the 2. SS-Panzer-Division “Das Reich” (2
nd
 SS Armored Division “Das Reich”) 
succeeded it, sometimes in a matter of hours,
341
 arriving mostly on foot because the 
heavy rains of the previous days and the poor condition of the roads necessitated that 
tanks be left behind in Romania.
342
 The Yugoslav retreat was so quick that there was less 
opportunity for Banat Volksdeutsche to disarm soldiers, as mostly anecdotal evidence – 
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picked up on and augmented in postwar Yugoslav historiography – suggests happened 
often in the Baĉka.
343
  
Even so, Operation Jupiter transmissions suggest that Volksdeutsche living in 
villages along the Romanian border were already partially armed when Jupiter personnel, 
having failed to smuggle weapons into Yugoslavia in the first days of April, finally 
managed to deliver weapons caches on April 7-8.
344
 These were then used in the villages 
of Mastort and Heufeld to repel attempts by lone gendarmes to take hostages, and later to 
repel an attempt at retaliation for the killing of said gendarmes.
345
 Records do not, 
however, mention whether the Volksdeutsche were originally armed with hunting rifles 
or guns taken from hastily departing Yugoslav soldiers, though the former seems more 
likely as the villagers took the defense of their village into their own hands before the 
Yugoslav army was ordered to retreat. In any case, the battle of Heufeld and Mastort is 
about the most that a Volksdeutsche „fifth column‟ had the means, opportunity and time 
to do before Reich forces entered the Serbian Banat. 
 
Liberation/Occupation 
It would be fair to conclude that a large number of Banat Volksdeutsche greeted the 
occupation of the Banat by German forces as true liberation and virtual union with their 
ancestral and racial homeland, the Third Reich. Articles in the Deutsches Volksblatt, 
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although an example of the controlled press and not entirely reliable – not least due to its 
being published in Novi Sad in the Baĉka (newly occupied by the Hungarian army) and 
therefore lacking first-hand information from the Banat – nonetheless conveys a clear 
message of liberation and joy emanating from the Banat Volksdeutsche. They describe a 
sense of destiny fulfilled, the Banat reclaimed as a truly German land, thus effectively 
united with the Reich.
346
 In a report prepared in 1958, Josef Beer insists that it was a 
matter of local pride for each Volksdeutsche village in the Banat to feast at least one or 
two Reichsdeutsche soldiers, “almost drag[ging] them out of their tanks for joy.”
347
 
The new Reichsdeutsche military commanders encouraged Volksdeutsche to 
display the swastika flag.
348
 Some of those who responded had never shown Nazi or 
Erneurer sympathies before,
349
 suggesting that for many ordinary Volksdeutsche the path 
to collaboration was paved by perceived kinship with the German Reich, regardless of 
ideological conviction or lack thereof. Repeated references in the Volksdeutsche press to 
this abundance of swastika flags as a visible sign of the Banat‟s liberation from Yugoslav 
rule
350
 are confirmed by photographs from the dual celebrations of the Wehrmacht‟s 
arrival and Hitler‟s birthday.
351
 For the latter occasion and the Mayday celebrations 
following it, the municipal building in Grossbetschkerek was decorated with a banner 
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declaring “This land was and remains German,”
352
 a pointed gesture directed at 
Hungarian territorial ambition and the more reticent Volksdeutsche alike.  
 These celebrations were organized by the Volksgruppe leaders in the Banat, men 
of Janko‟s generation and ideas. As such, these celebrations certainly did not represent 
the sentiments of all Volksdeutsche, some of whom made postwar statements hinting at a 
measure of skepticism toward the Reich German presence. An expellee from the village 
of Franzfeld made the plausible argument that a generation gap dictated reactions to the 
Wehrmacht‟s arrival: whereas the younger members of the Volksdeutsche community 
greeted the Wehrmacht with enthusiasm, the older generation (whose members had 
probably supported the older, pre-Janko leadership of the Kulturbund) was more skeptical 
and advised caution in relations with non-German neighbors, but their voices were 
drowned out by the euphoria and enthusiasm of the younger Volksdeutsche.
353
 
Ideological agreement between the Reich forces occupying the Banat and the nascent 
Volksdeutsche administration there ensured that the voices of the local Nazified core 
group were the only ones allowed to speak for the Banat Volksdeutsche community. 
In any case, Nazi and non-Nazi Volksdeutsche shared one sentiment: relief at not 
being occupied by the Hungarians – hated masters in the Habsburg era, whose 
revisionism remained a sore point in northern Yugoslavia throughout the interwar period, 
and whose “feudal system” was a bad memory even for ethnic Hungarian peasants
354
 – or 
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even by the Romanians. This relief was likely felt not just by the Volksdeutsche, but by 
other residents of the Banat as well
355
 – except, of course, the Banat Jews.  
The opposite was true of Volksdeutsche in the Baĉka, where in the weeks 
following the Hungarian invasion the accusations leveled against them revolved around 
their refusal to accept the need to „become Hungarian‟ overnight. The Volksdeutsche 
flaunted Hungarian regulations by displaying swastika flags, calling Hitler rather than 
Horthy their Führer, insisting on special status or even a separate territory, speaking 
German in public, etc.
356
 Some of this was sheer stubbornness and desperation, but some 
of it was also a reaction to legitimate concerns shared by Serbs and ethnic Croats who 
also could not speak Hungarian and suddenly found themselves out of work or unable to 
attend school in the Baĉka. Real ethnic tension was the result, intensifying the 
Volksgruppenführung‟s desire for a separate solution to its problems. 
The creation of a separate territorial unit for the Volksdeutsche of the Danube 
Basin – whether a separate Gau of an expanded Reich or an independent state of the 
Donauschwaben (Danube Swabians) – tied economically, racially and administratively to 
Belgrade as a Reich fortress (Reichsfestung), is a mainstay of postwar Yugoslav 
historiography on the subject. It is premised on notions of plans to Germanize the Danube 
Basin dating back to the time of Eugene of Savoy, the presence of a highly organized 
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fifth column, its absolute concord and complicity with the Reich, and the 
Volksgruppenführung‟s rejection of Yugoslavia as a viable state as early as 1939.
357
 
Ironically, this interpretation by historians working within a communist interpretative 
framework echoes exactly ideological tropes about Prince Eugene as the father of a 
German Banat and the Volksdeutsche peasants‟ role in purifying and fortifying it, 
developed by the Volksdeutsche of the Serbian Banat in the period 1941-1944 (see 
Chapter 6).  
In truth, there was some historical precedent for the idea of a Volksdeutsche state 
in the Vojvodina. At the turn of 1918-1919, in the process of the creation of post-World 
War I Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Volksdeutsche 
Nationalräte (national councils) existed briefly in Grossbetschkerek and Timişoara, but 
came to naught as the Banat was split between the two new states.
358
 The Volksdeutsche 
in the Romanian Banat agitated for the reunification of a German Banat in 1940, to no 
avail.
359
 On the heels of the Reichsdeutsche invasion of the Serbian Banat, Andreas 
Schmidt, Volksgruppenführer in Romania, drafted his own proposal for a 
Donauprotektorat comprising all the territories inhabited by Volksdeutsche along the 
lower Danube (including parts of Hungary and Romania), so as to ensure the “re-
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 of these areas and prevent their being “delivered any longer into 
slavery in less worthy armies with half-Asiatic sergeants.”
361
  
Apart from the revelation that Schmidt had clearly had bad experiences serving in 
the Romanian army, this document aped Heinrich Himmler‟s own schemes for the 
Germanization of the East, and referred the proposed Protectorate directly to securing the 
flank of the German conquest of the East. Berger passed it to Himmler on April 17, while 
the future organization of the Danube Basin was being ironed out within the Reich 
government.  
Two meetings took place in Vienna on April 17 and 18, under the chairmanship 
of the AA representative Karl Ritter and State Secretary Wilhelm Stuckart representing 
the Reich Interior Ministry. Whereas the official AA line remained the territorial division 
of Yugoslavia as it was at the end of the April War, Ribbentrop‟s other representative 
Helmut Triska (head of the Volkstumsreferat, the AA office for Volkstum issues) – and, 
at the second meeting, Stuckart himself – objected that this division paid more attention 
to territory than to the ethnic composition of Yugoslavia. Proving beyond the shadow of a 
doubt that the Third Reich‟s diplomatic core was as ideological as any other Reich 
institution, the AA took the stance that Volkstum ought to be the yardstick of the Reich‟s 
territorial policy in Southeast Europe. Both Triska and Stuckart objected to the fact that 
the extant demarcation lines separated the Vojvodina Volksdeutsche community from 
that of the Volksdeutsche living in the rest of Danube Basin.
362
  
                                                 
360
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In the spirit of hammering out practical guidelines without abandoning long-term 
ideological plans, Stuckart accepted the necessity of maintaining extant zones of 
occupation in Yugoslavia. However, he also proposed four theses on the general 
treatment of Volksdeutsche living in former Yugoslavia, which show how he reconciled 
the current territorial settlement with Nazi ideology. These theses were: the creation of 
autonomous administrative areas everywhere where the Volksdeutsche had a relative or 
absolute majority (achieved, if need be, through resettlement); full cultural, linguistic, 
educational, economic and organizational rights for these separate Volksdeutsche 
communities; the possibility of dual – Reich as well as host-country – citizenship to 
ensure their long-term protection inside the host countries; and, again, the possibility of 
resettlement, either of Volksdeutsche to the Reich or of non-Germans from the areas 
where Volksdeutsche resided.
363
 This was rather more grandiose – and nebulous – than 
Schmidt‟s proposal. (It is more likely that Schmidt demonstrated in his document a firm 
grasp of National Socialism, than that his proposal influenced Himmler, Stuckart and the 
AA to consider the future possibility of a Volksdeutsche-centric Danube Basin.) 
Stuckart‟s were general, long-term proposals. In the short run, the Baĉka 
remained under Hungarian occupation, while the Banat was appended to Reichsdeutsche-
occupied Serbia proper, in violation of the Volkstum principle but in line with the 
exigencies of power politics inside the Axis Pact. The Volksdeutsche in the Independent 
State of Croatia and in partitioned Slovenia
364
 were cared for separately. This did not 
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resolve the issue of leadership: the Vojvodina Volksdeutsche, split now between three 
zones (the Srem fell to Croatia), only had one Volksgruppenführer, Sepp Janko.  
Shortly after the Honvéd occupied Novi Sad, Janko was summoned to attend on 
Ribbentrop and Himmler in Berlin, and remained there for nearly a month, leaving the 
Volksgruppe not only territorially divided, but also leaderless. The Volksgruppenführer 
in Hungary, Franz Basch, arrived in Novi Sad in Janko‟s absence and peremptorily 
announced his jurisdiction over the Volksdeutsche living in the Baĉka, the Baranja, and 
even the Banat.
365
 The leading Volksdeutsche in the Banat were the only ones of the three 
who could give the lie to Basch‟s ambition, since they were not under Hungarian 
occupation. They had the backing of the regiment “Grossdeutschland,” which supported 
the Banat Volksdeutsche in filling the key administrative positions in railways, 
communications, local administration and police, left vacant by the fleeing Serbian 
officials.  
This suggests two things: that, even lacking a real Volksgruppenführung of their 
own, there were enough skilled Volksdeutsche to fill the most necessary posts, and that 
the main reason why this grassroots initiative succeeded was an absence of Reich 
directives regarding the territorial disposition of the Banat. This absence of clear orders 
allowed “Grossdeutschland” officers to play out a fantasy of state-building in miniature 
in the Banat in mid-April 1941, going so far as to have one of their own accompany two 
Volksdeutsche administrators on a trip to Novi Sad on April 29. These three met with the 
Volksgruppenführung (minus Janko), and proposed that the Volksgruppenführung should 
move to the Banat and help create a Danube German state there.
366
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It may never be known for certain whether the idea of proclaiming a separate 
German state in the Serbian Banat came from an order-less “Grossdeutschland” officer or 
from a Banat Volksdeutscher euphoric with relief at not being occupied by the Honvéd, 
the memory of the 1918-1919 Nationalrat and semi-legendary stories of Prince Eugene of 
Savoy.
367
 The overall picture of the weeks immediately following the April War in the 
Banat is that of a civilian power vacuum, with some Volksdeutsche trying to preserve a 
semblance of order by resurrecting day-to-day administration, while others indulged in 
plunder – especially of Jewish property – and wild political demands. The Reich 




From a practical standpoint, the Volksgruppenführung was starting to realize that 
it was hardly going to get a better deal from the Hungarians. They agreed to send Janko‟s 
deputy Josef Beer to the Banat to initiate the process of creating a separate Volksdeutsche 
state. It is possible that they were spurred on by the desire to get out from under Basch‟s 
thumb even more than faith in the success of a Freistaat Banat. In his 1958 report, Beer 
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The Reich would likely have heard of the preparations for the proclamation of a 
Freistaat Banat even without local informers, but informers did not fail to materialize. 
Gustav Halwax contacted Reinhard Heydrich, who ordered the plans to be “nipped in the 
bud.”
370
 Janko was called to task by Ribbentrop for his Volksgruppe‟s failure to accept its 
position as receiver of Reich orders, not initiator of policies.
371
 On May 16, 1941 
Ribbentrop followed this up by ratifying the decision for Janko and the rest of the 
Volksgruppenführung to relocate from the Baĉka to the Banat. Janko would take over as 
Volksgruppenführer of a diminished Volksgruppe in the Reich‟s zone of occupation in 
Serbia-Banat, whereas Basch‟s authority over the Volksdeutsche in the newly expanded 
Hungary was confirmed.
372
 This decision was passed off to the Volksdeutsche of former 
Yugoslavia as one made jointly by Janko, Basch and Branimir Altgayer, the new 
Volksgruppenführer in the Independent State of Croatia,
373
 but was very clearly a result 
of the Reich‟s territorial settlement with Hungary in former Yugoslavia.  
Accordingly, Janko and the Volksgruppenführung moved to Grossbetschkerek in 
the second half of May 1941, and were greeted with jubilation by the Nazified strata of 
the Banat Volksdeutsche.
374
 The members of the new Banat Volksgruppenführung did 
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not mind much: by moving to the “little Banat”
375
 they could act as masters in their own 
administrative fiefdom, answering to no greater Volksdeutsche authority. The Third 
Reich alone stood above them, and would determine the policies they enacted. 
 
Conclusion 
In the Third Reich, Volksdeutsche affairs fell within two jurisdictions: that of the 
diplomatic corps under Joachim von Ribbentrop, and that of the ideological elite under 
Heinrich Himmler. These two would compete for the right to make major Volkstum-
related decisions until the very end of World War II. In January 1941, Ribbentrop 
temporarily won the upper hand. This merely confirmed a state of affairs current since 
the war began fifteen months earlier: Reich diplomacy dictated relations between Berlin, 
various Volksdeutsche communities and the host states in which the Volksdeutsche 
resided. The Volksdeutsche in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia depended on the balance of 
power between the Reich, its allies Hungary and Romania, and Yugoslavia as a coveted 
ally. Hitler‟s desire to entice the latter into joining the Axis Pact meant that Yugoslav 
Volksdeutsche could only be supported in their new, Nazified leadership‟s desire for 
closer ties with the Reich by unofficial or clandestine methods which would not upset the 
precarious ethnic and political status quo inside Yugoslavia. Once war with Yugoslavia 
became imminent, the very real need to prevent Hungary and Romania from starting a 
localized war over territory determined that the Serbian Banat was occupied by Reich 
forces.  
Throughout the last months of 1940 and the first months of 1941, minute shifts of 
the Reich‟s foreign policy in Southeast Europe and the continued challenge Himmler 
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posed for mastery of Volksdeutsche affairs meant that the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche 
leadership received mixed signals from Berlin. To a certain extent, Volksdeutsche leaders 
used the mercurial nature of their situation to propose policies to the Reich. The 
Volksgruppe did not have real freedom of action, either in Yugoslavia or later, under 
Reich occupation. Its status and the extent of its autonomy ultimately depended on 
external factors. This dependence became crystallized as the issue of whether the 
Volksdeutsche‟s primary loyalty should lie with Yugoslavia or with the Reich tipped 
gradually toward the latter. As demonstrated by such experiences as the clandestine 
recruitment for the Waffen-SS, the arming of the Volksgruppe, and the opening of 
German-language schools, the Volksgruppenführung certainly chose the Third Reich 
over Yugoslavia as early as December 1940-January 1941.  
As for individual Volksdeutsche, they expressed a range of opinions based on 
individual, ideological as well as material reasons. In the period March 27-April 6, 1941 
they overwhelmingly came to see the Reich as their protector and savior. This final 
polarization was also due to external factors, especially the inevitability of a war between 
the Reich and Yugoslavia. In the period immediately following the end of the April War 
in 1941, the Volksgruppe leaders in the occupied Banat attempted again to implement 
policy – a proclamation of a Freistaat Banat – but were foiled by Reich interest. Their 
dependence on the Reich was merely confirmed when Sepp Janko and other members of 
the Volksgruppenführung relocated from Hungarian-occupied Baĉka to the Banat in May 
1941. 
This is the point at which focus moves away from Volksdeutsche experiences in 
interwar Yugoslavia or even in the Vojvodina, and centers on the Serbian Banat. The 
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relatively unified German Volksgruppe in interwar Yugoslavia was divided into several 
territorial sections, all of which continued to enjoy the nominal prestige of being 
ethnically German in Hitler‟s Europe. Their status was determined even more by the 
practical exigencies of Reich policy toward the regimes they lived under. The Banat 
Volksdeutsche failed to secure their own state, but they also escaped living in Hungary or 
a Greater Banat as envisioned by Romanian Volksdeutsche. The Serbian Banat became a 
part of Reichsdeutsche-occupied Serbia-Banat. Its Volksdeutsche no longer had to 
contend with the thorny problem of balancing loyalty expected by the host state with that 
owed to one‟s ethnic group, culture and sense of self.  
This new arrangement did, however, present a new set of challenges for the 
diminished Volksgruppe, not the least of which was its continued and, even, increased 
dependence on the Third Reich for material support and moral and ideological 
justification. The Volksgruppe also had some strengths: Janko had been confirmed as 
Volksgruppenführer, ensuring continuity of leadership; Volksdeutsche occupied key 
positions in the Banat‟s administration; despite continued Hungarian territorial ambition, 
the Banat was useful to the Third Reich as a wedge separating Hungary from Romania; 
finally, the Banat could offer the understaffed German administration in Belgrade, soon 
to be stretched even thinner by the needs of anti-guerrilla warfare, precious material and 











CHAPTER III THE DAWN OF THE „BANAT ERA‟: 
THE VOLKSDEUTSCHE ADMINISTRATION COMES OF AGE, 1941-1942 
 
The Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) of the Serbian Banat found themselves in a unique 
position vis-à-vis other ethnic German communities of East and Southeast Europe. Their 
area of residence was occupied by Nazi Germany in April 1941 due to exigencies of the 
Third Reich‟s foreign policy and military plans in the East rather than any burning desire 
to succor these Volksdeutsche. Yet the fact that Reich diplomacy was never free of the 
influence of National Socialist ideology laid the groundwork for an unprecedented 
arrangement: a territory occupied by Reich forces, but administered and predominantly 
secured
376
 by a local Volksdeutsche minority. In no other part of the German sphere of 
influence was a Volksdeutsche community entrusted with as many administrative tasks, 
or given as much local power, as the Banat Volksdeutsche. Nevertheless, the elevation in 
their local standing was due to the Reich‟s practical needs and concerns more than the 
Volksdeutsche‟s recognized value as a racial asset. Several factors had to come together 
before a Volksdeutsche administration in the Serbian Banat came to seem logical.  
The Banat Volksdeutsche‟s precarious geographic position between Hungary and 
Romania placed them in constant danger of annexation, and contributed to the Third 
Reich‟s decision to have its forces occupy the Banat. Paradoxically, the fact that the 
Banat – and Southeast Europe in general – were a secondary theater of war in Hitler‟s 
worldview, and that occupied Serbia labored under overlapping and mutually competing 
jurisdictions, created lacunae within which the Volksdeutsche leadership could put forth 
                                                 
376
 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of Volksdeutsche police and security operations. 
144 
 
the argument that they were best suited to administering the Banat. The Volksdeutsche‟s 
reputation for producing massive agricultural surpluses, the basic institutional framework 
they had developed before the April War, and their abiding sense of belonging to the 
German Volk gave them practical as well as ideological bargaining chips when their 
leadership argued in favor of a Volksdeutsche-administered Banat in the spring and 
summer of 1941.  
Nevertheless, the Volksgruppenführung (Volksdeutsche leadership) never 
managed to wrest more from Berlin or the Reich military administration in Belgrade than 
these were willing to cede. The process by which the Volksdeutsche of the Serbian Banat 
achieved partial autonomy and ascendancy in their home region reflected the 
fundamentally impermanent nature of their position as well as their continued 
dependence on the Reich. The Reichsdeutsche (Reich German) authorities in Belgrade 
and Berlin were willing to support the Volksdeutsche‟s desire for group rights in 
exchange for the services the Volksdeutsche could render to the chronically understaffed 
occupation forces. Furthermore, by using the Volksdeutsche administration as a means of 
repelling Hungarian claims on the Banat, the German military commander in Serbia 
could indirectly bolster the Third Reich‟s foothold in Southeast Europe. This reciprocal 
relationship did not, however, guarantee either the Volksdeutsche‟s long-term dominance 
of the Banat or even their continued residence there after the planned German victory in 
Europe. The Reich was not interested in granting the Banat Volksdeutsche Reich 
citizenship or in admitting them to the Nazi Party, due to a fundamental suspicion of 
Volksdeutsche as not quite German enough. Underlying all this was the Reich‟s desire to 
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keep these Volksdeutsche in the Reich‟s debt but without the rights accorded to Reich 
citizens and Nazi Party members.  
The fact that the Volksdeutsche of the Serbian Banat secured for themselves as 
much autonomy as they did is all the more astonishing, given the distaste for independent 
Volksdeutsche action displayed by the Reich authorities. This accomplishment had less to 
do with any special regard in which Berlin may have held the Banat Volksdeutsche, and 
more with the sequence of events which led to the Reich‟s occupation of Serbia-Banat in 
April 1941. As discussed in the previous chapter, the external threat posed by Hungarian 
and (to a far lesser extent) Romanian ambition to annex the Serbian Banat was a major 
cause behind the Reich‟s decision to occupy this region. Especially Hungarian territorial 
revisionism would go on to be a factor in the legalization of an already extant 
Volksdeutsche shadow administration in the Banat after the April War. Other significant 
factors were the chronic shortage of personnel with which the Reichsdeutsche military 
administration in occupied Serbia-Banat had to cope, especially after the start of the 
communist uprising in summer 1941, and the concomitant need for reliable collaborators. 
Such material circumstances made a Volksdeutsche administration in the Serbian Banat 
expedient for the Reich.  
The esteem accorded to Volksdeutsche in National Socialist ideology lent this 
expediency a gloss of legitimacy, but was not the primary impetus behind it. Instead of 
possessing special leverage vis-à-vis the Reich, the Banat Volksdeutsche were convenient 
collaborators by dint of perceived racial affinity with the Reichsdeutsche as well as the 
material circumstances under which they lived and had been occupied by the Reich.  
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Josef Beer rather overstated the case in one of his exculpatory postwar works: 
“Starting in 1941, the Germans in the Western [Serbian] Banat had the unique historic 
chance to break out of the vicious circle of state paternalism, and to arrange their lives 
according to their own ideas.”
377
 He also called the period 1941-1944 a “Banat era,”
378
 
overemphasizing the Deutsche Volksgruppe‟s (organized ethnic German community) 
ability to exert leverage on the Reich authorities and determine its destiny independently 
of external factors like war, occupation and Reich diplomacy. Typically of exculpatory 
narratives, Beer promptly contradicted himself in describing the Banat as “merely . . . an 
appendage to defeated Serbia,”
379
 thus relieving its Volksdeutsche administration and 
leadership of any responsibility for wartime events. In fact, it was convenient for the 
Reich to use the Volksgruppenführung in large part because the Volksgruppenführung 
displayed great ideological verve and enthusiasm for collaboration. 
 
Volksdeutsche Administration: Preconditions  
The general guidelines for the conduct of Operation 25 (the Axis attack on Yugoslavia) 
stated: “The military administration will limit itself to military and economic necessities. 
Systematic administration and exploitation can be taken care of later. It is not the army‟s 
task.”
380
 The first of a succession of Reich generals was installed as Military Commander 
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in Serbia (Militärbefehlshaber in Serbien
381
) a few days after the conclusion of the April 
War. He was supposed to be the authority figure with unlimited command powers over 
Reich troops and all civilians in Serbia.
382
 However, his role was complicated by the 
presence of two parallel Reich German administrations under his command (a civilian 
one and one in charge of security), as well as the representatives of the Four-Year Plan
383
 
and the AA (Auswärtiges Amt, the German Foreign Ministry).
384
 The latter two were 
nominally within the jurisdiction of the German commanding general in Serbia, but 
operated almost independently.
385
 In this, occupied Serbia fit perfectly into what historian 
Stevan K. Pawlovitch termed „Hitler‟s New Disorder.‟
386
 
The AA representative Felix Benzler was in an especially good position to 
undermine the Military Commander‟s policymaking prerogative, since Benzler had to be 
consulted in all matters, including military operations, with potentially “foreign-political 
                                                                                                                                                 
erst eine spätere Sorge sein. Sie ist nicht Aufgabe des Heeres.” Wagner (with Oberkommando des 
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 This vague phrasing gave Benzler the right to interfere in just about 
every aspect of the Military Commander‟s activities. Since the Ribbentrop-Himmler 
agreement of March 31, 1941 gave the AA the upper hand in all Volkstum affairs, 
Benzler was effectively the person to contact regarding Banat Volksdeutsche demands 
and grievances. He was also the Reich official with arguably greatest clout in determining 
how the Banat should be administered, since diplomatic concerns regarding Hungary and 
Romania remained paramount until late 1941 (see below).  
The Volksdeutsche in the Serbian Banat had several factors working in their 
favor: their racial affinity with Reich Germans; their home region‟s economic potential 
and remoteness from the central theater of war; their geographic position between two of 
the Reich‟s most fractious allies; and the Reich occupation forces‟ need for reliable 
collaborators. 
The order to create the position of Military Commander explicitly excluded the 
Italian and Bulgarian occupation zones in Serbia and the Serbian Banat from the 
administrative jurisdiction of the Military Commander.
388
 The Banat was therefore 
occupied by Reich forces, and the AA office in Belgrade was intended to be its main line 
of communication with Berlin, yet the Banat would not be administered directly by Reich 
German personnel. There was, as yet, no explicit mention of a Volksdeutsche 
administration there but, unlike the abortive attempt to create a separate Volksdeutsche 
state, this remained a viable option.  
                                                 
387
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 The Reichsdeutsche military in the Banat (Wehrmacht regiment 
“Grossdeutschland” and SS division “Das Reich”) received its orders from the military 
commander in Belgrade. His freedom of action was in turn limited by the need to report 
to Felix Benzler and the German commander for the entire occupied Balkan Peninsula, 
Field Marshall Wilhelm List in Greece.
389
 This extended chain of command – in addition 
to the existence on all levels of the Reichsdeutsche administration of Serbia of rival 
civilian and military administrative staffs
390
 – left the field open to much administrative 
confusion and delay. It also created a space in which reliable local collaborators could 
more easily be used for a kind of administration by improvisation. The sheer complexity 
of the administrative apparatus in occupied Serbia was therefore one of the factors which 
allowed for the eventual installing of a Volksdeutsche administration in the Banat. 
However, overlapping jurisdictions alone do not suffice to account for the 
establishment of a Volksdeutsche administration in the Serbian Banat. Similar 
jurisdictional conflict existed in other parts of Hitler‟s Europe, yet nowhere else did local 
Volksdeutsche gain as much influence in local affairs as they did in the occupied Banat. 
In addition to the fact that the administrative status and future possession of the Serbian 
Banat was still unresolved in early May 1941, the Banat‟s relative standing in the Nazi 
worldview, the Reich‟s economic requirements, its need for reliable collaborators and the 
respect accorded (at least nominally) to the Banat and its Volksdeutsche in the Nazi 
worldview set the stage for the Deutsche Volksgruppe to take administrative control of 
the Banat under Reich auspices.  
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The German commanding general in Serbia had three main areas of concern: 
general security (maintaining peace and order among the civilian population); the 
securing of major transportation and communication lines, including the Danube River; 
and ensuring the smooth economic exploitation of Serbia‟s agricultural and mineral 
resources.
391
 In this context, the Banat‟s roads were explicitly deemed secondary to the 
major communication line Belgrade-Sofia-Thessaloniki.
392
 Its agricultural potential was 
seen primarily in terms of supplying the Reich troops stationed in Serbia.
393
 While these 
were major local concerns, in the grand scheme of the German occupation of much of 
Europe they mattered only insofar as they made it possible for a small number of Reich 
soldiers to control a large section of the Balkans i.e. a flank of the future campaign in the 
Soviet Union, which was entering its last preparatory stages in late spring 1941, just as 
the details of the occupation system in Serbia were hammered out.  
 It is entirely plausible that the fact that the Banat was a part of a secondary theater 
of war made it easier for the Banat ethnic Germans to gain more power locally, precisely 
because they and their home region were not viewed by Berlin as central to the greater 
German war-effort. By contrast, during the campaign in the Soviet Union – which was 
the crux of Hitler‟s war plans – the Volksdeutsche in the Zhytomyr region in Ukraine 
collaborated with and performed administrative tasks for the invading Reichsdeutsche, 
but never gained any degree of administrative autonomy in their home regions.
394
 The 
closest parallel to the Banat case was that of the Sudet, whose relatively low standing as a 
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recent and ethnically mixed Gau (administrative unit) of the Third Reich actually allowed 
the local Volksdeutsche leader Konrad Henlein to wrest some local autonomy for his co-
nationals.
395
 However, precisely because the Sudet was directly annexed by the Third 
Reich in 1938 and its ethnic German residents became Reich citizens, their experiences 
differed crucially from those of ethnic Germans in areas occupied by Reich forces. 
 Despite its secondary importance as a military conquest or theater of war, the 
Serbian Banat was of primary importance to a Third Reich chronically short on 
foodstuffs (see Chapter 4 for more on this). Echoing economic historian Adam Tooze, 
Stevan K. Pavlowitch suggests that Nazi dominion over Europe made no long-terms 
plans for a victorious postwar future. The Reich‟s economic unpreparedness for the war it 
started, combined with the racial deprecation of Slavs, allowed only for wartime 
economic exploitation without long-term investment or husbanding of resources.
396
 
While a steady food supply was crucial for a successful campaign, National Socialism 
with its exaltation of direct aggressive action always placed the actual conquest and 
reshaping of the East ahead of the necessary prerequisites for said conquest. This did not 
mean that an area feeding the Reich war machine was left to its own affairs. It did mean 
that a local group prepared to collaborate actively with the Reich could wrest some local 
power and influence for itself, if it were well-organized and held a sufficiently high 
position in the Nazi racial hierarchy.  
 The Reich‟s occupation of Serbia-Banat suffered from a lack of manpower. After 
the successful conclusion of the April War and the setting up of the occupation apparatus, 
only three Wehrmacht divisions were left to secure all of Serbia-Banat by the end of 
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 On June 22, 1941 a single Reserve Police Battalion was ordered to transfer from 
Essen to Serbia,
398
 but was hardly sufficient to secure all of rural Serbia against the threat 
of a communist uprising in reaction to the start of Operation Barbarossa.
399
 This lack of 
manpower – and the correct assumption that many Serbs would be openly or covertly 
hostile to the occupying forces
400
 – necessitated the search for reliable collaborators, who 
would take on a portion of the administrative and security burden.  
Accordingly, Harald Turner, head of civilian administration under the Military 
Commander in Serbia, was put in charge of ensuring that as few Reich personnel as 
possible were tied down in this occupied territory. Turner set up a Serbian 
collaborationist government,
401
 first under Milan Aćimović, then (in late August) under 
former Yugoslav Minister of Army and Navy, General Milan Nedić. This Serbian 
collaborationist government was officially „supervised‟
402
 i.e. dictated to by the Reich in 
the person of the Military Commander. It contributed to the multiplicity of jurisdictions 
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in occupied Serbia, although Nedić never gave up on the idea of streamlining the chain of 
command in a way which would allow him to become an equal partner to the occupying 
Germans.
403
 Despite its subordinate status, the creation of a Serbian collaborationist 
government set a precedent for the use of other local groups for collaboration. 




 especially considering 
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the Serbian government‟s steadily declining influence in the Banat beginning in summer 
1941 (see below). 
In addition, the regionalization of occupied Serbia-Banat facilitated partial 
autonomy for the Banat. As a territory under military occupation, the country was divided 
into Feldkommandanturen (FKs) containing one or more Ortskommandanturen (OKs). 
The Banat was a unique case from the start, since it had its own OK (OK I/823 or OK 
823), which was directly subsumed to the Military Commander.
406
 OK 823 was fully 
operational, headquartered in the Banat‟s unofficial capital Grossbetschkerek, by April 
28, 1941.
407
 Already on April 15, the day Reich German forces entered the town, posters 
were put up calling the population to maintain order, turn in weapons, and obey the new 
authorities, proclaiming a German „protectorate‟ over the region.
408
  
OK 823 was revamped into a Kreiskommandantur (KK 823) in May 1941, 
remaining directly under the Military Commander.
409
 This made all the more sense when 
the parallel civilian organization of the Serbian territory was also revamped in December 
1941 in the direction of even more regionalization. The new administrative organization 
replaced the old Yugoslav division of Serbia into four administrative units called 
banovine with fourteen Kreise (counties, Serbian okruzi, sing. okrug), one of which was 
the Banat.
410
 Thus, although the Banat had a degree of autonomy even before December 
1941, after this administrative reshuffling its civilian administrative borders coincided 
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with military-administrative ones i.e. the administrative borders of Kreiskommandantur 
823, which came directly under the Military Commander.
411
 
On the local level, the lack of manpower was especially acute. Ortskommandantur 
823 commander, Hauptmann (Captain) Rentsch, complained barely a week after arrival 
in the Banat that once regiment “Grossdeutschland” departed in short order, he would 
have less than three dozen men left to secure the entire Serbian Banat.
412
 This was 
compounded by excessive demands placed on the soldiers‟ time and energy. In early June 
Rentsch had to cover for the commander of the neighboring Feldkommandantur 610 (seat 
in Smederevo), due to the latter‟s illness.
413
 The need to secure communication lines was 
left up to the Reich military personnel on the ground, since the occupation forces in 
Belgrade could spare no men for the upkeep of communication and supply lines.
414
 And 
when the Axis forces invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the 
Ortskommandanturen and Feldkommandanturen in Serbia had to step up security in 
anticipation of guerrilla activity by Yugoslav communists and their sympathizers.
415
  
These relentless demands left the German occupation forces on all levels open to 
using collaborators. In the Banat, described by Rentsch as a Reich “Protectorate” 
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) not unlike that established over the Bohemian lands in 1939, the 
military administration could rely on the already established Volksdeutsche 
administrative structure. This inchoate administrative apparatus was bolstered by the 
move of the Volksgruppenführung (Volksdeutsche leadership under Sepp Janko) from 
Hungarian-occupied Novi Sad to the Banat in May 1941.  
The rise of the ethnic German minority to a leading position in the Banat was 
concomitant with the decline of the Serbian collaborationist government‟s influence there 
and the continued fear, not limited to Banat Volksdeutsche, of an imminent Hungarian or 
Romanian takeover of the Serbian Banat. On April 24, 1941, midway through the week 
separating the creation of a Reichsdeutsche military administrative structure in occupied 
Serbia from the creation of the Serbian collaborationist government, a meeting was held 
in Vienna between Adolf Hitler, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and 
Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano. At this meeting, the Reich representatives 
informed their Italian counterpart of the territorial disposition of the northern Balkans, 
confirming both Italy‟s inferior status and exclusion from affairs in the region, and the 
unsettled conditions there. The promise to hand over both the Baĉka and the Banat to 
Hungary was reiterated, as was the decision to keep the latter under Reich occupation for 
the time being in order to prevent a Romanian-Hungarian clash.
417
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Even so, Romanian hopes gained a new lease on life because of the statement that 
Romania would have to be compensated, although a suitable territory was not available at 
the moment.
418
 From the Romanian perspective, a suitable territory was very much 
available between the Danube, the Tisa and the Romanian-Serbian border, if only the 
government of Romanian Minister President Ion Antonescu could persuade the Reich to 
accept its view. It expended great efforts both before and after the April 24 meeting in 
Vienna, hoping to persuade the Reich authorities to allow a Romanian annexation of the 
Serbian Banat.  
On April 21, while the Reichsdeutsche military administration in Serbia-Banat 
was finding its feet, the AA sent the German Embassy in Bucharest a stern reminder not 
to let its members get dragged into any discussion about Romanian claims on the Serbian 
Banat. The AA reiterated its official line from before the April War that giving the 
Serbian half of the Banat to Romania was at present out of the question. Romanian 
agitation, fed by casual or inadvertent remarks dropped by Reichsdeutsche officials, 
could only prolong an issue which the Romanian government saw as paramount, but the 
AA clearly perceived as, at best, a minor irritant.
419
 Despite this, the Romanian press 
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continued to wax hopeful for a favorable outcome to the April 24 meeting,
420
 which was 
really more in the nature of a briefing for Ciano than a consultation between equals. 
Finding no encouragement in the German Embassy in Bucharest,
421
 the 
Romanians then attempted a two-pronged diplomatic „attac.‟ They secured semi-official 
encouragement from representatives of the Italian armed forces and press, and solicited 
information from the German Ambassador in Bulgaria on Romania‟s chances for getting 
a piece of the Yugoslav pie. The German Ambassador in Bucharest Manfred von 
Killinger was quick to identify this encouragement as part of an attempt to strengthen 
Italy‟s weak position in the northern Balkans (Italians in Budapest were apparently also 
busy agitating) which may not even have had Rome‟s official support.
422
 Ribbentrop 
extended his advice not to get involved in discussions about Yugoslav territory to AA 
personnel in Sofia.
423
 Within a matter of days, Antonescu realized that the ally whose 
support he could not afford to lose was Nazi Germany, and the Italian connection with 
relation to the question of the Banat was hastily dropped.
424
  
At the same time, Antonescu and his subordinates presented a list of political and 
racial arguments in favor of a union of both halves of the Banat under the Romanian flag. 
They emphasized the historical and cultural unity and „Romanianness‟ of the whole 
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Banat region, as well as the long-term benefits to both Germany and Romania
425
 of 
weakening the Hungarian and Slavic influence in the Balkans.
426
 This proposal got 
shuffled around various Berlin offices for a whole month before being brushed off as ill-
suited to the current situation in the northern Balkans in late May.
427
 By the time 
Antonescu got a chance to discuss it with Hitler and Ribbentrop on a visit to Berlin in 
June, the ratification of a Volksdeutsche administration in the Serbian Banat (see below) 
– and the continued presence there of Reich forces – had already taken place, rendering 
Antonescu‟s proposal a doubly moot point.
428
 
Killinger correctly identified the arguments in favor of a unified Romanian Banat 
as Antonescu‟s attempts to demonstrate his political clout and consolidate his position as 
leader of the Romanian state.
429
 The Serbian Banat was for Antonescu predominantly a 
means to strengthen his position in domestic politics. As shown in Chapter 2, this 
association of ownership of the Banat with power in Antonescu‟s mind predated the April 
War, and was bolstered by the fact that the Hungarians were making repeated threats to 
annex the Serbian Banat. Unlike the Romanians, they were in a fairly good position to do 
so, since they actually had troops stationed in the Baĉka, had been asked to participate in 
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the occupation of Yugoslavia by Nazi Germany, and had been promised the Serbian 
Banat as part of their war booty.  
Hungarian wishes were simple: that a Hungarian military occupation of the Banat 
should happen as soon as possible – in line with Hitler‟s original promise – and be 
preceded by the introduction of Hungarian administrators into the Banat, ostensibly to 
ease the transition. Like his Romanian counterpart, in vain did Regent Horthy present 
Hitler with a none-too-subtle case that both halves of the Banat should be united under 
Hungarian auspices. Horthy claimed that this would not only rectify the Treaty of 
Trianon, but would also work in the Volksdeutsche‟s best interests.
430
 Unlike the 
Romanians, who could do little but accept the Reich‟s evasions, the Reich‟s ban on 
Hungarians crossing the River Tisa into the Banat made Hungarian officialdom 
impatient, and inspired it to more aggressive attempts at tipping the Reich‟s hand.  
This impatience manifested itself in three major ways. Firstly, the Hungarians 
made repeated threats of imminent invasion and annexation of the Banat which, 
spreading through the Banat as rumors, caused great unrest. The date of the supposed 
Hungarian takeover was June 2, prompting the displaying of weapons (in contravention 
of the command passed by the Reich military commander in Grossbetschkerek on April 
15
431
) and Hungarian flags by ethnic Hungarians in Neu-Kanischa.
432
 Some 
Volksdeutsche told Reich German soldiers that ethnic Hungarians threatened to “finish 
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 the Germans, and stated that, should Reich forces ever withdraw from the Banat, 
Volksdeutsche would have to accompany them.
434
  Kreiskommandantur 823 chief 
Rentsch reported open clashes between the Volksdeutsche and ethnic Hungarian citizens‟ 
militias in late May,
435
 leaving Volksgruppenführer (Volksgruppe leader) Sepp Janko and 
AA representative Felix Benzler to curb passions on both sides.
436
  
Secondly, following the departure of the regiment “Grossdeutschland” from the 
Banat in late May 1941, Hungarian soldiers from the Baĉka made a show of 
independence from Reich policy directives through repeated provocations against the 
non-Hungarian population of the Banat. Although Hungarian officers were warned 
against crossing the Tisa as early as April 12,
437
 small groups repeatedly visited Banat 
villages and towns with substantial ethnic Hungarian populations near the river. In the 
course of these visits, they wore Hungarian uniforms, broke the bans on the carrying of 
firearms and consumption of alcohol, mistreated civilians, and proclaimed an imminent 
Hungarian invasion. The Banat ethnic Hungarians responded by displaying Hungarian 
national colors, flags and Regent Horthy‟s pictures, visiting the Baĉka in their turn, and 
bringing back “magazines, books and fresh courage.”
438
 All this prompted at least some 
Banat Volksdeutsche and Serbs to pack their bags in preparation for flight as a preferable 
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alternative to life under Hungarian occupation.
439
 Yet this kind of behavior was all low-
scale provocation and macho display by the Hungarians, rather than a show of real 
preparedness for the inevitable clash with both Germany and Romania in the case of a 
Hungarian advance across the Tisa without the Reich‟s permission.
440
  
Finally, Benzler reported a list of Hungarian complaints centering on the 
supposed preferential treatment of Volksdeutsche and Serbs over ethnic Hungarians as 
administrators, railway workers and police auxiliaries in the Banat. Benzler countered by 
pointing out the Hungarians‟ failure to comply with the agreement not to expel Serbs 
from the Baĉka. Under the circumstances, the staff of the Military Commander in Serbia 
was justifiably angry and resistant to demands for Hungarian administrative personnel to 
be allowed into the Banat.
441
 For once, the military administration and the Reich‟s 
diplomatic representative in occupied Serbia were in perfect agreement.  
The pattern of Hungarian provocation would continue throughout the rest of 1941, 
and intermittently even later. For the time being, it rendered the Reich German 
administration in Serbia especially unwilling to allow any Hungarian interference in 
Banat affairs. Since Romanian offers of „assistance‟ in the Banat were frankly ludicrous, 
and the Aćimović government had only nominal executive powers even in Serbia proper, 
this left the Banat Volksdeutsche as the best candidates for the role of Reich‟s cat‟s paw 
in the Serbian Banat.  
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Volksdeutsche Administration: Establishment and Consolidation 
After the destruction of Yugoslavia, the dependence of its Volksdeutsche on the 
exigencies of Reich foreign policy became even stronger than before. No state requiring 
lip-service paid to its sovereignty interfered between the Reich and the ethnic Germans 
any longer. Whatever privileges and rights the Volksdeutsche gained after April 1941, 
they gained at the Reich‟s discretion. The threat of Hungarian annexation loomed large 
for them, but for the Reich this prospect remained inconvenient, not so much because it 
would put out Volksdeutsche. (It would, paradoxically, have united the Baĉka and the 
Banat Volksdeutsche in a vindication of the Volkstum principle.) The Serbian Banat 
remained under Reich occupation primarily so as to prevent the possibility of a 
Hungarian-Romanian conflict, which might spread and ignite tensions between these two 
unlikely allies on the Eastern Front.
442
 The presence of a Banat Volksdeutsche 
administration eased the demands placed on the thinly spread Reich administrative 
personnel in Serbia-Banat, and had practical uses which just happened to coincide with 
Nazi racial ideology. There had been no long-term plan to elevate the Banat 
Volksdeutsche to local leadership, but circumstances accomplished what ideology alone 
may not have.  
The Kulturbund, the Volksdeutsche organization in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 
had had a network of administrative facilities providing diverse services to the 
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Volksdeutsche community already before the April War. Its activities had been 
suspended after the royal coup of March 27, 1941. Once a large number of Yugoslav 
officials withdrew before the advancing Reich forces,
443
 however, the gap they left in the 
daily running of the Banat was filled by educated Volksdeutsche (lawyers, notaries, 
teachers, Kulturbund officials) as provisional administrators. Their activities were 
authorized on April 24 by Sepp Janko‟s acting second-in-command Josef Beer,
444
 
undoubtedly with the knowledge and approval of Ortskommandantur 823. Thus even 
before the Volksgruppenführung moved permanently to the Banat in May, the Banat 
Volksdeutsche were in a position to provide the undermanned Reich German 
administration with invaluable services. At the same time, the Volksdeutsche 
administrative network had to be integrated into the occupation system‟s chain of 
command.
445
 Felix Benzler played a crucial role in this integration, in cooperation with 
the military authorities and the civilian administration under Harald Turner.  
 After the Volksgruppenführung‟s arrival in the Banat, the rest of the month of 
May 1941 was devoted to reining in the independent economic and political ventures of 
individual Volksdeutsche. Volksgruppenführer Sepp Janko proved equal to the challenge, 
despite a lack of skilled coworkers. Josef Beer and the future chief of Banat 
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administration Sepp Lapp were the most noteworthy exceptions.
446
 Janko‟s situation thus 
paralleled that of the occupying Reich Germans, and lent sympathy to Janko‟s future 
proposals for special rights to be granted to the Volksdeutsche. Janko managed to “take 
the Volksgruppe in hand again”
447
 in barely three weeks‟ time. This won him the respect 
of Harald Turner, who labored under a permanent personnel shortage and was on the 
prowl for reliable collaborators. Turner accordingly instructed Janko to select his best 
people for the “creation of a solid and firm [civilian] administrative apparatus”
448
 in the 
Banat. 
There was no official recruitment of Nazi Party members in the Banat,
449
 most 
likely because this would have posed a dangerous precedent for all kinds of racial 
„undesirables‟ to apply for membership in this and other occupied lands. The Banat 
Volksgruppenführung stood in for the Nazi Party within the Banat insofar as it was in 
charge of both ideology and practical affairs. In the first issue of the Verordnungsblatt 
der Volksgruppenführung der deutschen Volksgruppe im Banat und Serbien, the 
Volksgruppe‟s official administrative publication, the Volksgruppenführung appealed to 
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its co-nationals to accept their current situation, and show obedience and discipline. 
Without explicitly referencing the Nazi Party‟s dual role in the Reich, the 
Volksgruppenführung stressed the need for continued ideological as well as 
administrative exertion within the Volksgruppe as its raison d‟être. It mentioned the fact 
that in the weeks since the Yugoslav defeat individual Volksdeutsche administrators were 
often left to their own devices, but emphasized that the future would bring uniform rules 
and expectations.
450
 Strict regimentation and centralization of the administrative 
apparatus would be the norm in the Banat. This reassured the Reich Germans in Belgrade 
and Berlin of the Banat Volksgruppe‟s reliability, and gave the individual administrators 
in the Banat the impression that their leadership was in full control of their destiny.  
The same issue of the Verordnungsblatt der Volksgruppenführung carried an 
official description of the Volksgruppe‟s administrative structure: a hierarchy of offices 
under the Volksgruppenführer, which provided for every aspect of a Volksdeutscher‟s 
life.
451
 It confirmed the extant organization of the Volksgruppe in county and town or 
village chapters (Kreis- and Ortsgruppen, the latter further divided into „neighborhoods‟ 
and „companies,‟ Nachbarschaften and Kameradschaften).
452
 It also provided for the 
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existence of subordinate organizations for men (Deutsche Mannschaft), women 
(Deutsche Frauenschaft) and youth (Deutsche Jugend),
453
 modeled respectively on the 
SA, the NS-Frauenschaft and the Hitlerjugend. 
This proclamation testified to the Volksgruppenführung‟s readiness to accept the 
Banat Volksdeutsche‟s separation from the Volksdeutsche of other Yugoslav lands and 
their organization on the social model of the Third Reich. As such, it amounted to a 
Gleichschaltung (cooptation or coordination) of the Banat Volksgruppe to a degree which 
had not been possible before the April War. However, it did not mean that all 
Volksdeutsche automatically fell in with the Volksgruppenführung‟s decisions.  
Moreover, this proclamation had been passed by the Volksgruppenführer, and did 
not carry the weight of an official proclamation from the Reich. To remedy the situation, 
a series of laws was passed by the Serbian collaborationist government, acting on orders 
from the Reich, which provided legal protection and special privileges for the Banat 
Volksdeutsche. These served a dual purpose: they cemented the Volksgruppenführung‟s 
loyalty to and dependence on the Reich, and gave the nervous Banat Volksdeutsche 
looking across the River Tisa some peace of mind regarding Hungarian threats. These 
laws also effectively committed ordinary Volksdeutsche to practical and ideological 
service to the interests of the Third Reich, whatever their private opinions of the Nazi 
regime.  
Not surprisingly, most high-ranking Volksdeutsche had legal training: Sepp 
Janko, Sepp Lapp, head of the Grossbetschkerek Court of Appeals Wilhelm Neuner, and 
Banat Police Prefect Franz Reith were all lawyers and laid their faith in legal documents. 
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The first of these – guidelines for the Volksdeutsche administration in the Banat – served 
a similar role as did the creation of a separate Kreiskommandantur for the Banat. Both 
were meant to protect Volksdeutsche interests
454
 by setting down a legal and 
administrative framework, which would protect the Volksdeutsche whether the Banat 
stayed a Reich-occupied territory or was eventually annexed by either Hungary or 
Romania.
455
 In his postwar writings, Josef Beer comments that the Volksdeutsche 
administrators “made up [their] minds to act as though [they] would forever remain the 
rulers [of the Banat],” regardless of the future possibility of a Hungarian takeover.
456
  
 The parameters of the Banat Volksdeutsche administration were set down at a 
meeting in Belgrade on June 5, 1941, attended by representatives of the Reich German 
civilian administration (Turner‟s staff), the Military Commander in Serbia, 
Feldkommandantur 610 in Smederevo (which shared the administrative border with the 
Banat), Banat Volksdeutsche, and the Serbian collaborationist government. The latter 
were there only pro forma, and readily voiced their willingness to meet all Volksdeutsche 
demands supported by Turner and the Military Commander.
457
  
The new Banat administration got its legal framework in the “Verordnung über 
die innere Verwaltung des Banates” (“Decree on the Inner Administration of the Banat”). 
Since in June 1941 Serbia was still divided into banovine, Sepp Lapp was named the 
Banat‟s Vizebanus (deputy to the Serbian ban appointed by the Aćimović government). 
He officially acted as a representative of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior. Likewise, 
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various Serbian ministries officially employed personnel in charge of protecting their 
ministries‟ interests in the Banat,
458
 but this personnel consisted of Volksdeutsche 
recommended to the ministries by Lapp and the Volksgruppenführung.
459
  
This went much further than merely confirming the Volksgruppe‟s organization 
as delineated in the Verordnungsblatt der Volksgruppenführung. It meant that, within the 
Banat, the Volksdeutsche administration acted as a stand-in for the Serbian ministries and 
Turner by supervising police and legal matters,
460
 German schools, postal services, 
railways, border control and Banat finances.
461
 None of these were official separated 
from the relevant Serbian ministries, but whereas Turner remained in charge in Serbia 
proper, in the Banat he depended on Lapp‟s subordinates for the provision of basic 
services vital for the smooth running of the occupation and the extraction of the Banat‟s 
agricultural surplus.  
Moreover, this arrangement allowed the military administration to get around the 
technical superiority of the Aćimović government over the Banat‟s Volksdeutsche 
administration by placing the latter directly under Turner and the Military Commander in 
Serbia. Kreiskommandantur 823 had already been subsumed directly to the Military 
Commander. With the June 5 agreement, both the military (Reich German) and the 
civilian (Banat German) chains of command in the Banat led straight to the Military 
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Commander. Nevertheless, since jurisdiction over Volksdeutsche affairs was a source of 
permanent tug-of-war between the AA and Heinrich Himmler, the Banat Volksdeutsche 
really answered to all three. Because all three were of the Reich, this caused some 
administrative confusion, but did not amount to a division of Volksdeutsche loyalties, as 
had been the case before the April War. In 1941 (before Himmler‟s influence over the 
Banat Volksdeutsche increased with the idea to use them as Waffen-SS recruits in early 
1942), the Military Commander in Serbia and Benzler cooperated fairly well in enabling 
the Banat administration to find its feet. 
 While the June 5 agreement gave the Banat Volksdeutsche a degree of power in 
local affairs without precedent in any other territory occupied by the Third Reich,
462
 this 
did not amount to real autonomy or self-government. In its relations with the Serbian 
collaborationist government, and especially in comparison to the position of the 
Volksdeutsche in the Baĉka and the Independent State of Croatia, the Banat 
Volksdeutsche wielded great power over the mixed Banat population. German historian 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler sums it up well in describing the Volksgruppenführung as “in part 
an executive body of the military administration, in part the bearers of local rule in the 
Banat, which had received some clear tasks [usually performed by] the state . . . [The 
Volksgruppenführung] possessed a freedom of action barely restricted by the [Serbian 
government], derived entirely from wartime circumstance.”
463
 Yet the Banat 
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Volksdeutsche remained tied to Reich interests by carrying out policies preapproved in 
the Reich, aiding in the economic exploitation of their home region, later in providing the 
Reich with soldiers, and playing a subordinate role in the diplomatic battle of wills 
between the Reich and Hungary.  
 The continued threat of annexation by Hungary, compounded by the 
Volksdeutsche‟s minority status in the Banat and their role as executors of Reich policy 
rather than policy makers in their own right, meant that the Volksdeutsche administration 
could never implement the kind of radical population policies the Reich was developing 
for the East in the summer of 1941. Indeed, since plans for the resettlement of the Banat 
Germans had been postponed till war‟s end, the Volksgruppenführung and Reich 
representatives in Serbia were left with the continued need to placate the Banat‟s ethnic 
Hungarians as representatives of the neighboring Kingdom of Hungary. This is illustrated 
by a proviso of the June 5 agreement, which determined that municipal presidents in the 
Banat would be recruited depending on the relative size of the three major ethnic groups 
in each municipality. For example, the municipal representative for Grosskikinda was to 
be a Volksdeutscher, his first deputy a Serb, and his second deputy an ethnic 
Hungarian.
464
 Of the eleven municipalities
465
 and five major towns
466
 of the Banat, ten 
had a Volksdeutscher as municipal president, five had a Serb, and only one an ethnic 
Hungarian.  
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Despite this show of ethnic solidarity, the Volksdeutsche accounted for only one 
fifth of the Banat population, so the division of administrative power clearly favored 
ethnic Germans. In addition, the chiefs of police for all five major Banat towns were 
Volksdeutsche,
467





 and by 1943 all five major Banat towns had Volksdeutsche mayors.
470
 Local 
power and authority were de facto concentrated in Volksdeutsche hands. At the same 
time, at least a modicum of local power was ceded to the other ethnic groups.
471
 The 
reason for this was the Reich‟s continued need for an alliance with Hungary rather than a 
departure from the Volkstum principle toward true ethnic plurality. 
The ethnic Hungarians desired more, and had on their side the continued threat 
that the Banat would be handed over to Hungary sooner rather than later,
472
 although the 
transfer of the Novi Sad Court of Appeals to Grossbetschkerek alone indicated that the 
Baĉka and the Banat would not be reunited under Axis auspices any time soon. The 
position of the Reich Germans in Belgrade vis-à-vis the Banat ethnic Hungarians in 
summer and fall 1941 was not unlike that of the Yugoslav government on the eve of the 
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April War vis-à-vis the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche. The Reichsdeutsche made small 
concessions and promises to the Banat ethnic Hungarians, with the ulterior motive of 
preserving the status quo. In the period immediately following the April War, the status 
quo meant continued Reich occupation of the Banat and resistance to Hungarian and 
Romanian demands for it. The ratification of a Banat Volksdeutsche administration was a 
way of consolidating the Reich‟s hold on the Serbian Banat.  
Despite the June 5 agreement, Hitler‟s original promise continued to stir up 
Hungarian revisionism. It, in turn, continued to take the form of small-scale agitation and 
minor incidents, diplomatic complaints to the AA, and official demands to have the 
earliest possible date for a Hungarian takeover of the Banat firmly established. Incidents 
in towns and villages on the east side of the Banat-Baĉka border represented by the River 
Tisa, such as Neu-Betsche, Neu-Kanischa and Torda, were mostly on the order of verbal 
clashes and fistfights. Volksdeutsche and Serbian border guards fought individual 
Hungarian soldiers and officers as well as Banat ethnic Hungarians.
473
 In the same spirit 
of petty provocation, the Hungarians in the Baĉka restricted Banat peasants‟ access to 




These incidents were pure provocation, fed by instances of Wehrmacht members 
crossing into the Baĉka and stirring up trouble as payback for Hungarian infractions.
475
 
Not only did these incidents undermine combined Reichsdeutsche, Serbian and 
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Volksdeutsche efforts to preserve peace and order, they also allowed rumors of imminent 
Hungarian takeover – the supposed date of which had moved to June 20 – to maintain 
their potential for causing mass unrest.
476
 So widespread were these rumors that the 
Military Commander requested specific information from Berlin regarding their 
truthfulness.
477
 Yet after the Banat Volksdeutsche and the Reichsdeutsche stationed in 
Serbia got sufficiently riled up by threats of imminent invasion, the worst Hungarian 
Ambassador in Berlin Döme Sztójay did was to accost the Reich government on June 20 
with yet another plea for a final territorial settlement in the Balkans. He received an 
evasive reply from the exasperated State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker, which boiled 
down to a message to Budapest to stay out of Banat affairs and trust in Hitler to keep his 
word in his own good time.
478
 As before, revisionism may have been a central element of 
Hungarian state policy, but it did not warrant open conflict with the Third Reich. 
In a combined effort to curb Hungarian agitation during summer 1941, 
Weizsäkcer rebuffed Hungarian representatives in Berlin while the border separating the 
German from the Hungarian occupation zone in the Vojvodina became more solid. 
Hungarian army officers who wanted to visit the Banat became required to obtain 
entrance visas from the German Embassy in Budapest.
479
 In addition, a liaison officer of 
the Hungarian army was assigned to the Reichsdeutsche military staff in Belgrade in late 
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 He was meant to present the conquered populace with a semblance of unity and 
joint decision-making within the Axis, as well as to quell persistent rumors that the 
Hungarians planned to overrun the Banat and murder or expel all Serbs living north of 
the Danube to Serbia proper,
481
 in line with their already established practice in the 
Baĉka.
482
 The Reich Germans in Serbia feared these rumors not because they believed 
Hungary would dare make a move without Berlin‟s assent,
483
 but because said rumors 
“destroyed the morale of the Serbs[,] undermined the will to action and authority of the 
Government of Commissars [Serbian collaborationist government], and strengthened the 
exodus into communism”
484
 among Serbian refugees. Hungarian revisionism indirectly 
strengthened the Partisan movement, and made the Axis goal of securing Southeast 
Europe more difficult.  
Hungarian revisionism also had a side-effect the Hungarian authorities were not 
in a position to exploit sufficiently. This was the continued unsettling effect Hungarian 
threats had on the Banat Volksdeutsche even after they were officially established as the 
privileged ethnic group in their home region. “Meldungen aus dem Reich” for early 
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August 1941 commented on the Volksdeutsche‟s “extremely indifferent attitude” and 
lack of faith in their ability to be masters of their own destiny, now that both Yugoslav 
rule and the specter of Hungarian domination were averted.
485
 Sepp Lapp‟s official 
installation as Vizebanus on July 7 provided an opportunity for Turner to admonish the 
Volksdeutsche for their dereliction of duty after the devotion so many had showed to 
Kulturbund activities before the April War.
486
 Looking back on the past few months, 
contributors to the Verordnungsblatt der Volksgruppenführung showed a keen 
understanding of psychology in identifying the sudden removal of external pressure in the 
form of Yugoslav authorities as the key factor in the Volksdeutsche‟s lassitude and 
turning away from communal identity in favor of pursuing material self-interest.
487
 They 
also, somewhat less charitably, accused their co-nationals of a stubborn refusal to obey 
orders issued by Volksdeutsche administrators, “when earlier any foreign [i.e. Serbian] 
notary or policeman had only to say the word, and everyone hopped to it.”
488
  
While for the Reichsdeutsche administration in Serbia and the Volksdeutsche 
administration in the Banat the summer months of 1941 represented a period of 
consolidation, for many individual Banat Volksdeutsche it must have been a comedown 
from the adrenaline-fueled days of April. Once the initial euphoria of Reich occupation-
qua-liberation had waned, the Volksdeutsche were faced with new, often inexperienced 
administrators and uncertainty about law, land ownership and the possibility of 
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Hungarian invasion. It is understandable that many turned away from matters of 
government and Volk in favor of bringing in the harvest, something tangible and 
necessary, whatever the future held for the Banat.  
This only made the Volksgruppenführung‟s task of reorganizing the Volksgruppe 
along explicitly National Socialist lines more difficult. Before the average Volksdeutsche 
peasant could be enticed to give his time and money to the Volksgruppe again, he had to 
be offered at least the semblance of long-term security for his family and property. Legal 
protection for Volksdeutsche in the case of future Banat independence and, even more so, 
in the case of a Hungarian takeover, was paramount.  
Harald Turner welcomed the results of the June 5 meeting in Belgrade, since they 
officially incorporated the Banat Volksdeutsche administration into the Reichsdeutsche 
administrative structure in occupied Serbia. They also accorded with the Reich-
Hungarian agreement on minority protection.
489
 The June 5 agreement did not, however, 
explicitly guarantee Banat Volksdeutsche rights under future Hungarian rule.
490
 For this, 
an additional law was needed. Since no decision taken by members of the Reich German 
administration in Serbia could be made without consulting relevant offices in Berlin, this 
gave State Secretary Wilhelm Stuckart, one of the Third Reich‟s premier legal minds, a 
chance to weigh in.  
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In a long speculative report dated July 15, 1941, Stuckart laid out his view of 
Southeast Europe as integral to the reordering of a Germanic East, and the strengthening 
of Southeast-European Volksdeutsche as central to this long-term project.
491
 This was the 
conventional Nazi view of the connection between ethnic Germans and the East. 
However, unlike many, who ignored Southeast Europe in favor of waxing lyrical about 
Russia as the place where the German could prove his mettle as both warrior and worker, 
Stuckart built on his proposals from the April 17-18 meetings on the division of Yugoslav 
lands
492
 to posit the Southeast as crucial to the Reich‟s racial regeneration through 
conquest and the settlement of desirable populations in a fertile landscape.  
Though he used the kind of grandiose and unspecific language typical of Nazi 
utopias,
493
 Stuckart remained true to his training as a lawyer, concerned with 
practicalities and specific details,
494
 and proposed a practical solution to the problems of 
the Banat Volksdeutsche in the face of their likely future under Hungarian rule. He 
implied a debt of honor owed by the Reich to the Volksdeutsche of the Vojvodina for 
their “practically proverbial”
495
 loyalty to the Reich. He proposed that dual Reich and 
Hungarian citizenship be given to the entire Banat Volksgruppe, and extended to all 
Volksdeutsche living in Hungary with its newly gained territories, thus making any 
Hungarian assault on Volksdeutsche rights a direct attack on the Reich.
496
 This proved 
impractical for three reasons: the Hungarian government would not have agreed to such a 
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sweeping move; conferring citizenship on an entire Volksgruppe would have been 
problematic at a time when the parameters of who could belong to the German Volk were 
still being hammered out in the course of individual screenings of resettlers as well as in 
the Banat Volksgruppe itself (see Chapter 4); and it would have set a dangerous 
precedent for the granting of Reich citizenship, rendering the very category of 
„Volksdeutscher‟ – beloved of Nazi plans for a racial paradise in the East – null and void. 
Stuckart‟s proposal, laudable in its ideological justification and intent, was therefore 
never seriously considered.  
Stuckart‟s proposal was premised on a future development which was never 
explicitly stated in the text: the erosion of state borders and of the very concept of 
sovereignty among the Reich‟s Balkan allies. In a postwar Europe united under Nazi 
auspices, the movement of populations and their legal status would be a pure formality. 
In the context of wartime realities, however, the Third Reich remained very much 
hobbled by diplomatic agreements with its allies. This was evident in the Reich‟s 
continued treatment of the simmering Hungarian-Romanian rivalry with kid gloves, and 
its failure to treat Hungarian Jews the same as Polish or Ukrainian Jews as long as 
Hungary retained, as a sovereign state, the last word on the treatment of all its citizens. 
Therefore any decision on a single ethnic group‟s legal status, rights and obligations was 
constrained by the borders within which said group resided.
497
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The ruling on the Banat Volksdeutsche‟s legal status which did come about, 
rested on the unspoken assumption that the borders of occupied Serbia-Banat would not 
change in the foreseeable future. As an occupied zone, Serbia-Banat was not a sovereign 
state, yet was represented as such, with a (collaborationist) Serbian government and a 
(nominally) autonomous Banat. Therefore the “Verordnung über die Rechtsstellung der 
Deutschen Volksgruppe in Serbien” (“Decree on the Legal Status of the German National 
Group in Serbia”) was published in Službene novine, the official mouthpiece of the 
Serbian government, on July 23, 1941. It had all the hallmarks of a legal document 
passed by a supposedly sovereign government,
498
 though it was dictated by Reich 
interests, and its contents would have been unacceptable to even the most pro-German 
interwar Yugoslav government.  
In many ways, this decree fulfilled all the goals that the Kulturbund had been 
striving for since Janko‟s appointment as its leader: the recognition of a special status for 
the Volksdeutsche in Serbia, the guarantee that they could share the Reich‟s policy and 
ideology, and their full equality with Serbs within Serbia-Banat. The defunct Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, which had existed in a precarious balance between its multiethnic reality and 
its self-identification as a South-Slavic state, could not tolerate for any one of its ethnic 
groups to have its cake and eat it too by being both integrated (equality) and special 
(separate legal standing), both domestic and „alien.‟  
Under Reich occupation and in a Serbian state whose sovereignty existed only on 
paper, these contradictions were relatively easy to reconcile. The decree gave the 
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Volksgruppe “full right to be active in politics, culture, economy and social issues,” and 
defined it as a “legal person of a public-legal character,” a group legal entity called the 
“Deutsche Volksgruppe in Serbien.”
499
 Its interests were represented by the 
Volksgruppenführer‟s appointees on the level of municipality, county and banovina, and 
its members guaranteed full equality with Serbs.
500
 Furthermore, “members of the 
German Volksgruppe are guaranteed the full protection of their German Volkstum, 
compliance with the National Socialist view of life, the free development of their natural 




Yet this decree did not give the Serbian Volksdeutsche grounds to make any 
claims which overreached their status in Hitler‟s Europe. The text defined the 
Volksgruppe as comprising “all Germans who live in this area [Serbia-Banat], are not 
citizens of the German Reich, and are led by the Volksgruppenführer.”
502
 While not the 
clearest definition of Volksdeutsche ever produced, it did confirm that Volksdeutsche 
were not equal to Reichsdeutsche and that, in addition to their Germanness, they were 
defined by their area of residence. In calling them the Deutsche Volksgruppe in Serbien, 
the text denied any special status to the Banat, Volksdeutsche administration 
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notwithstanding. Finally, the Volksdeutsche‟s individual interests and wishes were 
subsumed to the interests of the group, as articulated by the Volksgruppenführer. The 
latter proviso gave a legal basis for the Volksgruppenführung to exhort its co-nationals to 
greater obedience than it could have done before the April War (see Chapter 4). 
The Volksdeutsche of Serbia-Banat retained their Serbian citizenship because it 
did not make practical sense for the Reich to offer them a separate legal status in any 
context other than that of their host state any more than it had made sense before the 
April War. For their daily lives and the administration they had erected in the Banat, 
however, their ideological and material ties to the Reich carried far more weight. 
Accordingly it received more attention in the text, effectively proclaiming the Deutsche 
Volksgruppe in Serbia-Banat to be an extension of the Third Reich in the Balkans. This 
was bolstered by the decision, suggested by Janko and approved by the Serbian 
government (and, by extension, the Reich), to make German and Serbian the official 
languages in the Banat.
503
 
Despite Nazi rhetoric which extolled their kinship with the Reichsdeutsche, the 
Volksdeutsche could only count on special (better) treatment vis-à-vis the non-German 
residents of Serbia. They could hope for no special accommodation from the Reich, and 
they knew it. The publication of the “Verordnung über die Rechtsstellung der Deutschen 
Volksgruppe in Serbien” was greeted within the Volksgruppe by the general criticism 
that the Volksgruppenführung had not gotten as much freedom for the Banat as it could 
have, and had “flogged the Banat away to Serbia.”
504
 The level of popular discontent 
within the Volksgruppe prompted Sepp Janko to publish an article in the Banat press, in 
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which he stressed that the Volksgruppe‟s local autonomy could not be divorced from its 
ties to Germany and the Volk, and that neither the Serbian government nor the 




Such proclamations proved to his overseers in the Reich and Belgrade that Janko 
was a good National Socialist. They also proved that, consciously or not, Janko was 
aware of his dependence on the Reich. As for ordinary Volksdeutsche, whatever personal 
resentment they may have nursed against their leadership and the Reich in summer 1941, 
they failed to react to the increasing regimentation of their society by the 
Volksgruppenführung. This trend is evident already in the proclamation of the 
Volksgruppe‟s organization along National Socialist lines (i.e. its effective 
Gleichschaltung) in May 1941. It became even more pronounced with the granting of a 
separate legal status to Volksdeutsche as a group (a legal body) in July. This solidified 
the chain of command, and confirmed the Volksgruppenführer‟s position as sole 
representative of the Volksgruppe in the relations between ethnic Germans and Reich 
Germans in Serbia.  
Dependence on group identity gave the group‟s leaders power. In the case of the 
Banat Volksgruppenführung, the removal of the constraints imposed by the Yugoslav 
authorities was compounded by the legal establishment of the ethnic Germans as a group. 
Ironically, while this gave the ethnic Germans more power, it also reinforced their 
dependence on the Third Reich as the agent of their elevation. It was in order to accord 
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with Reich interests that the Volksgruppenführung proceeded to tighten the reins on the 
Volksgruppe in summer and fall 1941.  
A major prerequisite for the successful Gleichschaltung of the Banat 
Volksdeutsche, without their physically joining the Reich either through resettlement or 
through annexation, was the guarantee that they would remain an entity separate from 
both the Serbian collaborationist administration and the Hungarian state. For all that 
Turner hailed the integration of the Volksdeutsche administration into the Serbian state 
structure and that the establishment of their legal position stressed their equality with 
Serbs, the very creation of a legal and administrative framework favoring the Banat 
Volksdeutsche meant that their integration into occupied Serbia existed primarily on 
paper.  
The specter of Hungarian occupation was a different matter. While fear of it 
arguably helped close Volksdeutsche ranks and eased their Gleichschaltung, the prospect 
of a Hungarian Banat also needed legal address. The ostensible reason for the passing of 
the July law on the Volksdeutsche‟s legal status had been to guarantee their rights within 
occupied Serbia. In the case of a Hungarian takeover, it would have been naïve to expect 
the Hungarians to respect this arrangement.
506
 Speaking to Helmut Triska of the AA‟s 
Volkstumsreferat on July 31, Turner suggested that the Banat might plausibly become 
Hungarian around October 1, 1941, provided two preconditions were satisfied: the 
harvest was secured for the provisioning of Reichsdeutsche troops, and the rights of the 
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German Volksgruppe in the Banat were protected against the repressive methods already 
displayed by the Hungarians in the Baĉka.
507
  
Ostensibly in order to debate this proposal, the AA convened a conference in 
Budapest on August 6, attended by representatives of the AA, the VoMi (Volksdeutsche 
Mittelstelle), the Reichsdeutsche administration in Belgrade, and Volksdeutsche of the 
Banat and Hungary. At this meeting, any possibility of handing the Banat over to 
Hungary was predicated on the Hungarians‟ willingness to guarantee Volksdeutsche 
rights.
508
 Although the demonstrable cause for this meeting was to discuss the best way to 
fulfill Hungary‟s territorial wishes, no representatives of the Hungarian government were 
included in the deliberations. This not only confirmed Hungary‟s subordinate position in 
the Axis Pact, but also suggested that the meeting was mere window dressing intended to 
fob off the Hungarians yet again.  
The participants in the meeting were not shy about expressing their misgivings 
regarding Hungarian behavior and its likelihood for improvement. Luftwaffe General 
Heinrich Danckelmann, German military commander in Serbia at the time, requested that 
his superior Field Marshall List convince Hitler not to allow this transfer of territory to 
take place at all. Danckelmann's reasons were not ideological, but purely practical, and 
ones that had been put forth by Reich personnel in Serbia before. Paramount among these 
was the Hungarian practice of expelling Serbs from their zone of occupation, which 
would in turn cause a refugee problem for Danckelmann. An influx of refugees would 
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make Danckelmann and the Serbian government‟s efforts to combat the communist 
resistance all the more difficult, since even the royalist Ĉetnici might unite with the 
communist Partisans if the Reich allowed yet another part of Serbian territory to fall the 
Serbs‟ traditional enemy, the Hungarians.
509
 
In addition, the living conditions of Volksdeutsche in the Banat were far better 
than those in the Baĉka. Echoing Stuckart‟s utopian proposal, it was even suggested that 
the kind of rights held by the Banat Volksdeutsche should be extended to all the 
Volksdeutsche in Hungary proper and in the Baĉka before a Hungarian takeover of the 
Banat could succeed.
510
 The unlikelihood of this happening in the foreseeable future was 
not lost on the participants of the Budapest meeting. Racial ideology and the desire to 
ensure the continued survival of the ethnic German community in the Banat served as a 
means to a practical end – that of preventing an immediate Hungarian takeover of the 
Banat and a Hungarian clash with the Romanians in the first, crucial weeks of Operation 
Barbarossa.  
A later, internal AA memo not intended for Hungarian eyes confirmed that the 
August 6 meeting had not really dealt with the question of a Hungarian takeover of the 
Banat, rather with the way in which Banat Volksdeutsche would be handled and 
protected “with regards to a later Hungarian takeover of the Banat.”
511
 The distinction is 
a fine but crucial one: the Banat would be Hungarian eventually, the operative word 
being „eventually.‟ In the meantime, Banat Volksdeutsche needed to be protected and 
bolstered in their Volkstum if they were to remain a valuable racial, ideological as well as 
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practical asset for the Reich. One way to do this was to guarantee their legal rights as a 
group, which is what the July 23 decree did.  
While the August 6 meeting failed to give the Hungarian side the answer it 
desired, it did confirm a trend established in the interwar period: every Hungarian-related 
action had an equal or greater Romanian reaction. Hot on the heels of the meeting in 
Budapest, the Romanian government and Romanian diplomats in Berlin concluded that a 
Hungarian invasion of the Serbian Banat would ensue on August 16. This sparked yet 
another flurry of missives to Berlin and the German Embassy in Bucharest, none of 
which received more than the customary evasive response.
512
 Ribbentrop issued (another) 
unequivocal circular to the effect that German diplomatic representatives in Bucharest 
and Budapest, as well as officials dealing with the Hungarian and Romanian diplomatic 
representatives in Berlin, should continue to appear receptive to the concerns of 
Germany‟s allies, but remain completely noncommittal until war‟s end.
513
  
Where diplomacy failed, strength of arms could be applied instead, although in 
the unequal power relationship between Nazi Germany on one side, Hungary and 
Romania on the other, force of arms was not used this early in the war. This was not for 
lack of saber-rattling on the Hungary and Romania‟s part. In early September 1941, the 
Reich brusquely rejected Romanian suggestions that companies of Romanian soldiers be 
deployed on the Serbian side of the Danube in order to secure the Iron Gates (Đerdap in 
Serbian), a section of the river east of Belgrade, where it forms the natural border 
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between Serbia and Romania and is as vulnerable to attack as it is vital to 
transportation.
514
 Reich occupation forces in Serbia and Romanian troops in Romania 
remained limited to their respective shores, but were expected to collaborate in securing 
the river against Partisan and Ĉetnik attack.  
Following the system developed for deploying Hungarian and Romanian troops in 
the Soviet Union, Hungarian, Romanian and Reichsdeutsche river ships divided the task 
of securing the Serbian stretch of the Danube Basin, with Romanian shipping deployed 
east of Belgrade,
515
 the Hungarian flotilla deployed west of Belgrade along the River 
Sava (which flows into the Danube at Belgrade),
516
 and the single German ship ensuring 
the two never met.
517
 The Hungarians, in turn, seized upon the rumor that Romanian land 
troops had crossed the Danube into Serbia to demand either a Hungarian military 
occupation of the Banat or at least the introduction of Hungarian administrators there. 
Both suggestions were rebuffed in no uncertain terms.
518
  
While the Reich kept Hungarian ambition in check by diplomatic means, the 
Nedić government passed the “Verordnung über die Teilnahme der Ungarn an der 
Verwaltung des Banats” (“Decree on the [Ethnic] Hungarian Participation in the Banat 
Administration”
519
) on October 23. This was a peaceful, legal means of neutralizing the 
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ethnic Hungarian element inside the Banat. It provided for the use of Hungarian as third 
official language in those Banat municipalities where ethnic Hungarians accounted for at 
least one third of the population, and for the limited participation of ethnic Hungarians in 
the Banat administration.  
Ethnic Hungarians were appointed to chief administrative positions in two 
districts (Serbian srez, a subunit of a municipality)
520
 as well as high-ranking positions in 
several Banat towns with large ethnic Hungarian populations.
521
 Ethnic Hungarian public 
notaries and judges were installed in the very few districts with ethnic Hungarian 
majorities, and ethnic Hungarian postal workers were appointed “commensurate with 
their [ethnic Hungarian] numbers.” Ethnic Hungarian teachers would teach separate 
Hungarian-language classes, but only if a sufficient number of children “proven to belong 
to the Hungarian people” registered.
522
 The phrases used suggest that much was left to 
the interpretation of individual administrators in charge of different Banat administrative 
offices, and as these were mostly Volksdeutsche, this decree hardly amounted to a fairer 
division of power. Instead, it effectively isolated Banat ethnic Hungarians in the few 
districts where they were a substantial presence, demonstrating to the Hungarian 
government that unfair treatment of minorities was a game two could play.  
The last occasion on which the Reich even contemplated a Hungarian armed 
presence in the Banat occurred in December 1941, when Reich officials in both Berlin 
and Belgrade tried frantically to devise an efficient means of combating the Partisans in 
Serbia proper the following spring. In this context, a Hungarian Banat made even less 
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sense than earlier, since Partisan activity in the Banat was minimal (see Chapter 5), and 
could only increase as anti-Hungarian popular unrest set in. Moreover, Ernst Woermann 
of the AA pointed out the risk inherent in the Third Reich showing any weakness by 
“calling for help [from the Hungarians]” instead of making a Hungarian occupation of the 
Serbian Banat seem like the stronger partner‟s concession, a “grand political gesture” on 
the Reich‟s part.
523
 As usual when dealing with its Southeast-European allies, the Third 
Reich erred on the side of acting in a clear but non-committal fashion, which left any and 
all future territorial settlements possible but closed to debate. For the time being, 




In customary, almost ritualized protest, Antonescu‟s government complained that 
the rumored extension of the Hungarian occupation zone in former Yugoslavia would 
“hurt the feelings of the Romanian people” at a time when Germany required Romania to 
make great sacrifices
525
 in manpower and resources for the war in the East. Ribbentrop‟s 
response was an exasperated negation of these repetitive rumors.
526
 Instead of becoming 
embroiled in a localized war in the Banat, the Reich authorities found an elegant solution: 
they ordered that the Bulgarian zone of occupation in south Serbia be extended to include 
more of central and southeast Serbia,
527
 which were hotbeds of resistance activity. This 
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made more sense strategically, since Bulgaria did not participate in the Soviet campaign, 
and laid no claim to parts of Serbian territory contested by Hungary and Romania.
528
  
As before, ownership of the Banat remained a major issue for both Romania and 
Hungary, a constant irritant for the Reich Germans in Belgrade, but a relatively minor 
annoyance for Berlin. Unlike earlier occasions, when a Romanian or Hungarian 
intervention without Reich approval was unlikely but not impossible, in fall 1941 these 
threats lost all of their persuasive power, since they were thwarted again and again by 
said countries‟ unwillingness to challenge the Third Reich openly. As the Axis troops got 
bogged down on the Eastern Front and the Eastern campaign entered its first Russian 
winter, the Reich decided not to use Hungarian troops to fight the resistance in Yugoslav 
lands outside the Baĉka and the Baranja, not least because it needed those troops in the 
East more than ever. With these events, the likelihood of a localized conflict between 
Hungary and Romania diminished exponentially. Even the rumors and mutual 
accusations of a Hungarian or Romanian takeover fell off sharply after December 1941, 
and when they did recur they had clearly lost their bite.
529
  
Perhaps the most important factor in the waning of the Hungarian threat was the 
fact that in late summer and fall 1941 the Volksdeutsche administration found its feet, 
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proved itself competent and capable of enforcing its (and the Reich‟s) will over the 
Banat‟s mixed population. The Volksgruppenführung felt its position to be strong enough 
to proclaim in September 1941 that, although its administration was officially a part of 
the Serbian state, the Volksdeutsche were guaranteed supremacy in the Banat.
530
 Turner 
echoed this perception in his monthly reports, though he also pointed out that the 
Volksgruppe continued to labor under a lack of trained personnel,
531
 which caused 
administrative work to be done very slowly, despite all the good will shown by the 
administrators.
532
 Even so, already in early October Vizebanus Sepp Lapp drew on the 
June “Verordnung über die innere Verwaltung des Banates” to proclaim that all 
representatives of the Serbian collaborationist government in the Banat would cease work 
on October 25,
533
 their tasks to be taken over by administrators appointed by Sepp Lapp. 
Such an order could not have been passed without the approval of the German 
commander in Belgrade, and suggests that for all its growing pains, the Volksdeutsche 
administration was rapidly gaining the Reichsdeutsche‟s trust to be a reliable 
collaborator. Administrators were learning on the job, and learning fast.  
Lapp kept the administrative chain of command unified by reminding his 
subordinates that all items of business had to pass through the his office, not be passed by 
subordinate offices directly to the Reich German military authorities in Grossbetschkerek 
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 and that communicating in writing was safer than passing on orders 
orally.
535
 In addition to security measures needed at a time when the communist uprising 
in Serbia posed a serious threat to all representatives of the Third Reich, the emphasis on 
written communication helped keep both author and recipient of orders accountable.  
It also suggests that, for all the personal prestige in which Sepp Janko was held, 
his subordinates in the Banat administration no more shared in it than Hitler‟s 
subordinates shared in the adulation accorded to the Führer in the Third Reich. Personal 
contact remained important in a relatively small and tightly knit community like that of 
the Banat Volksdeutsche, but bureaucratic rationalization ensured that everyday tasks 
were performed in an orderly and relatively timely fashion. Though peer pressure and 
personal contact played a large role in ensuring ordinary Volksdeutsche‟s complicity with 
their leadership (see Chapters 4, 5 and 7), the Banat administration was far from the 




The Reichsdeutsche military administration in Belgrade kept the Banat 
Volksgruppenführung tied firmly to the Reich‟s agenda and prevented the development 
of independent policies which might have led to an inchoate Banat free state.
537
 The 
Volksgruppenführung, in turn, kept a close watch over its members, especially those in 
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official positions. This was especially true after the December 1941 administrative reform 
made the Banat a separate county (Kreis) within Serbia, with Lapp‟s title of Vizebanus 
replaced by that of Kreischef (county chief).
538
 The deputy ban becoming Kreis leader 
was a symbolic sign that the Banat had got about as much autonomy as its Volksdeutsche 
could hope for – autonomy from the Serbian collaborationist government, that is, not 
from the Reich and its representatives in Belgrade. In relation to the latter, the December 
1941 administrative reform made the Volksgruppenführung “more or less an executive 
organ of the [Reichsdeutsche] military administration” in Serbia.
539
  
Thereafter, the Volksgruppenführung occasionally implemented decisions without 
waiting for the approval of the Nedić government, yet always with the tacit approval of 
the Reich Germans in Serbia (and Berlin), especially if these decisions led to even more 
centralization of power in German hands. Such was the case when Lapp ordered that 
town councils in the Banat be dissolved on April 15, 1942, their powers of deliberation 
and decision-making devolving to mayors, who were often Volksdeutsche (certainly in 
the Banat‟s major towns
540
) and were directly supervised by the Volksgruppenführung.
541
 




Other decisions were, as before, suggested by the Volksgruppenführung, 
approved by the German commander in Belgrade after consultation with the Reich, then 
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rubberstamped and publicized by the Serbian government. This was the case with the 
decision to officially change many Serbian place names in the Banat to German ones.
543
 
This particular decision was made relatively late, in 1943. The perceived need to make 
the landscape German by renaming it was not as serious in the Banat,
544
 since the 
Volksdeutsche there identified deeply with the soil they worked and the landscape they 
inhabited (see Chapter 6), and German place names had been a matter of common usage 
among German-speakers even before the April War. 
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For all its shortcomings, Turner could not fault the Volksgruppenführung with 
lack of zeal.
545
 At the turn of 1941-1942 he proclaimed the Volksgruppe completely 
organized and regimented (i.e. gleichgeschaltet), with 84 town and village chapter 
(Ortsgruppen) divided among five Serbian counties, the majority located in the Banat.
546
 
The Volksdeutsche administrators‟ motives must have ranged from desire for steady 
employment, to the wish to serve the Volk and the local community, to purely ideological 
zeal. Be that as it may, even the most apolitical administrator could hardly escape the 
increasing regimentation of Volksdeutsche life.  
Administration and ideology permeated each other in the Banat, as they did in the 
Third Reich itself. Throughout the second half of 1941, the Volksgruppenführung 
exhorted its co-nationals to aid their local administrators instead of just criticizing their 
work,
547
 and the administrators to help make the Volksgruppe into an elite 
organization.
548
 At the conclusion of the 1941 harvest, more time and energy was 
invested into regular and frequent propaganda activities in Ortsgruppen.
549
 All 
Volksdeutsche were urged to participate actively on the grassroots level (in 
Nachbarschaften and Kameradschaften) in order to strengthen the Volksgemeinschaft by 
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literally “envelop[ing] the whole Volksgruppe like a web.”
550
 They were also reminded 
that the Banat was too small to play a leading role in European affairs, so that they should 
place their faith (and fate) in Hitler‟s hands as into those of a benevolent god, who 
protected the Volksdeutsche, not least from the specter of Hungarian domination.
551
  
The image of a helpless creature in need of protection, ensnared, at the mercy of 
superior forces, reinforced real dependence of the Volksgruppe on the Reich as well as 
the perceived necessity to keep the Volksgruppe‟s ranks closed against both internal and 
external enemies. While individual Volksdeutsche may have objected to some of their 
leaders‟ policies, or even relished the opportunity to bring a neighbor-turned-
administrator down a notch, the continued Hungarian threat and reliance on the Third 
Reich‟s protection, the flurry of decrees granting Volksdeutsche more rights than before, 
and the new opportunities for enrichment in the second half of 1941 (see Chapters 4 and 
5) conspired to prevent most overt expressions of disapproval.  
The consolidation of the Volksdeutsche administration meant that some of the 
pressure was lifted from the Banat Volksdeutsche, leaving them time to pursue individual 
interests and to object to policies which limited such pursuits. The Volksgruppenführung 
therefore took it upon itself to secure the Banat Volksgruppe as a unified body, to 
regenerate it in line with its leaders‟ moniker „Erneurer‟ (Renewers): 
Our highest ambition [is] to nourish communal values in our Volk, to strengthen a 
[völkisch] ethos and, through a process of moral and spiritual renewal 
[Erneuerung], forge a new, fierce, politically mature Swabian. Yet we must 
recognize the fact that our Volksgruppe as a whole does not yet think and live in a 
National Socialist manner. Our mortal enemy, materialism, keeps breaking 
through. . . .  Many arrivistes have tried to exploit the reversal [i.e. Yugoslav 
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defeat and Reich German rule] for personal gain; many petty grumblers can only 
find things to criticize; many senseless rumors have been fabricated and spread by 
gullible people. We still have a long way to go to educate our Volk. We already 
have a good, healthy core [Kern]. But everything that happened recently due to 
outside pressure or as an idea must be consolidated. Here lies the organization‟s 




On the institutional level, the legalization of the Banat Volksdeutsche‟s group identity 
meant that the individual member of the Volksgruppe became more liable than before to 
orders passed by the Volksgruppenführung. The Volksgruppenführung had earlier been a 
guiding, advisory body. Now its decrees carried the weight and power of the law to 
ensure compliance from Volksgruppe members. The fact that the Serbian state was no 
real state, deprived of legitimacy and sovereignty by its status as a Reich German puppet, 
meant that, with the Reich‟s backing, the Volksgruppenführung could wield all the more 
power in the Banat in its dual role as a legally recognized social body and as an 
administrative structure. Even so, as will be discussed in the following chapter, its ability 
to coerce its co-nationals into obedience remained limited. Its success depended more on 
the complicity of ordinary Volksdeutsche than on its coercive power. 
Some historians as well as some Volksdeutsche apologists have exaggerated in 
describing the Deutsche Volksgruppe im Banat und in Serbien after April 1941 as 
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tantamount to a state within the state
553
 or as a true “people with its own state 
[Staatsvolk].”
554
 After the administrative reform of December 1941 the Serbian 
collaborationist government did effectively lose all influence on Banat affairs, as did the 
specter of Hungarian invasion. By that point, the Volksgruppenführung had a sufficiently 
firm grip on power relations inside the Banat to prevent any major internal challenges to 
its authority. However, its Reich German overseers‟ ability to exert pressure on the 
Volksgruppenführung increased in direct proportion to how many legal and material 
privileges Volksdeutsche were granted inside the Banat. The following chapter will deal 
with the material privileges Volksdeutsche enjoyed against Banat non-Germans, and the 
price the Reich expected them to pay.  
 
Conclusion 
Even after the Third Reich decided, for diplomatic and military reasons, to occupy the 
Serbian Banat in April 1941, the establishment of a Volksdeutsche administration there 
was not an automatic outcome. The conditions which came together to make such an 
administration the best option for a Reich gearing for the invasion of the Soviet Union 
were: the necessity for a peaceful solution to the continued rivalry between Hungary and 
Romania over ownership of the Serbian Banat; the administrative complexity and 
overlapping jurisdictions in occupied Serbia, which created a space in which the 
Volksgruppenführung could present itself and its co-nationals as reliable, efficient 
collaborators; the Reich‟s need for the successful extraction of the Banat‟s agricultural 
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surplus; the fact that the Banat was a secondary theater of operations, so the Reich was 
more open to improvised solutions there than in the coveted prize that was the conquered 
East; finally, the perceived racial affinity between Reich and ethnic Germans, especially 
in a multiethnic area where all other ethnicities were deemed by the Nazis as more or less 
inferior.  
 Only the fortuitous coming together of all these conditions allowed the Banat 
Volksdeutsche to attain a degree of administrative control in their home region 
unparalleled by other Volksdeutsche communities in the German sphere of influence. 
Nevertheless, as much power as the Volksgruppenführung in the Banat wielded over the 
ethnically mixed population, it never had true totalitarian control, not least due to its 
avowed and increased dependence on the Third Reich. The Serbian Banat had a degree of 
autonomy from Serbia proper and the Serbian collaborationist government, but was never 
fully independent. The very weakness of the Serbian government meant that the Reich 
wielded power over the Serbian Banat – and its Volksdeutsche – unchecked by a true 
sovereign state, as had been the case during the existence of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
The Volksdeutsche, in turn, no longer labored under the burden of divided loyalties, as all 
the institutions they worked with (the AA, the VoMi, the Reich Ministry of the Four-Year 
Plan, etc.) represented aspects of the Nazi regime.  
 This dependence on the Reich meant that the Banat Volksdeutsche never really 
bargained with Berlin. Instead, they offered services and allegiance, and were allowed 
privileges and perks in exchange. Examples of these privileges were the laws 
guaranteeing the Volksdeutsche‟s legal standing and predominance in the Banat 
administration, which were passed in the second half of 1941. At the same time as they 
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consolidated the Volksdeutsche‟s position in their home region, these laws prescribed and 
limited the Volksgruppenführung‟s sphere of influence to Southeast Europe by denying 
Banat Volksdeutsche access to Reich citizenship and Nazi Party membership.  
The essential ambivalence of the Volksdeutsche position – German but not quite 
German enough – remained undiminished even after their administration was 
consolidated and the immediate threat of Hungarian and Romanian territorial revisionism 
removed in late 1941. This ambivalence was evident in the Volksgruppenführung‟s 
increased, but by no means absolute ability to enforce its decrees, and in the Third 
Reich‟s approach to various Volkstum matters in the Banat, including Volksdeutsche 
economy, education and living standard. The fact that the Reich levied a real material and 
human cost for the privileges it allowed the Banat Volksdeutsche provides insight into 
the motivation behind Volksdeutsche leaders‟ as well as ordinary Volksdeutsche‟s 
















CHAPTER IV „SWEETMEATS . . .‟
555
:  
VOLKSDEUTSCHE DUTIES AND  PRIVILEGES 
 
The establishment of a Banat Volksdeutsche administration separate from the 
collaborationist government in occupied Serbia proper was the result of the Third Reich‟s 
practical, political and military needs more than racial ideology. Hitler‟s desire to keep as 
few military and administrative personnel from the Reich tied down in Southeast Europe 
in the run-up to the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, and to prevent his allies 
Hungary and Romania from going to war with each other over their mutually exclusive 
claims on the Serbian Banat, made the establishment of an ethnic German administration 
in the Banat convenient. The Reich continued to have the last word in all Banat affairs, 
rendering the Banat Volksgruppenführung (ethnic German leadership) an executive 
power more in the sense that it executed Berlin‟s wishes and orders than in the sense that 
it could implement independent policy. Once the Banat Volksdeutsche administration 
was established in the Banat, its leadership implemented a range of ideological and 
material policies which elevated Volksdeutsche over other Banat ethnicities, confirmed 
extant perceptions of Volksdeutsche cultural and racial superiority, but also increased the 
Volksdeutsche‟s dependence on and perceived debts to the Third Reich.  
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As racial desirables, the Volksdeutsche administration as well as individual 
Volksdeutsche received a range of official and unofficial perks and privileges vis-à-vis 
the other Banat ethnic groups, such as access to German-language schools and 
administrative posts, better food rations, and land and other property expropriated 
(sometimes openly stolen) from Banat Jews and some Serbs. But, as elsewhere in Europe 
where ethnic Germans lived, the Third Reich benefited from every privilege it accorded 
to Volksdeutsche by strengthening their economic potential as well as their standing in 
the Nazi racial hierarchy. Banat Volksdeutsche were expected to make regular and 
abundant food deliveries for the Wehrmacht, pay high taxes, and serve the Reich as 
policemen and soldiers. The Reich‟s practical need for food and recruits met fortuitously 
with its ideological desire to elevate Volksdeutsche over other ethnic groups in the 
Balkans. It resulted in a marked change of the Volksdeutsche‟s living standard under 
occupation. They were treated far better than non-Germans, but also had greater 
expectations imposed on them if they wished to prove themselves worthy members of the 
Volk.  
Underlying the promotion of Banat Volksdeutsche in their home region was the 
Reich‟s racial ideology. In an occupied territory such as the Banat, the Third Reich could 
implement its racial hierarchy with impunity. Being officially recognized as a 
Volksdeutscher became central to an individual ethnic German‟s daily existence, status in 
the community, economic viability, military obligations, etc. Belonging to the 
Volksgruppe (German ethnic group), in turn, solidified and, even, ossified social relations 
which preceded the April War. Thus minor personal conflicts became insurmountable 
ethnic (or racial) differences. Even though Heinrich Himmler did not officially decide on 
204 
 
racial criteria for belonging to a Volksdeutsche community until summer 1942,
556
 the 
Banat Volksgruppenführung followed the Reich‟s established racial policy in deciding 
who could and should belong to the Volksgruppe already in the second half of 1941 (see 
below).  
However arbitrary Nazi racial categories may have been, once accepted as the 
guiding principle for ethnic relations they simplified individual people‟s social identities, 
became rigid and seemed immutable. Once officially recognized as a member of the 
Banat Volksgruppe, an individual became embroiled in the Reich‟s policies because he or 
she accepted the privileges attendant on being a Volksdeutsche or embraced Nazi 
ideology, but also because social pressure within the Volksgruppe ensured the Reich 
received the Volksdeutsche‟s loyalty, service and material resources. A range of both 
positive and negative incentives was evident in the Banat Volksgruppe, and conspired to 
ensure Volksdeutsche compliance with – if not always enthusiasm for – policies passed 
down from Berlin. As for the Volksgruppenführung, its affinity for National Socialism 
ensured it collaborated enthusiastically, but not even these Volksdeutsche leaders were 
exempt from enjoying the material perks of their new position.  
While the Volksgruppenführung could not formulate policy independently from 
Berlin, policies pre-approved by the Reich government were implemented without 
question in the Banat. It remains highly doubtful that Volksgruppenführer (Volksgruppe 
leader) Sepp Janko and his closest coworkers wielded much influence in inspiring Reich 
policy toward occupied Serbia-Banat, but there can be no doubt as to their efficiency and 
enthusiasm. However much the Volksgruppenführung strove to reshape the Banat in the 
Reich‟s image by changing place and street names and making German an official 
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language, the fact of residence in a multiethnic, multilingual environment continued to 
loom large in Banat affairs until the very end of the Volksdeutsche administration. The 
Reich‟s foreign policy required that, while ethnic Hungarians, ethnic Romanians and 
ethnic Slovaks may not have always prospered in wartime Banat, they certainly did not 
suffer any great privations. The former even benefitted on occasion from Hitler‟s 
continued desire to retain Admiral Horthy‟s friendship, at least until the Reich occupied 
Hungary in March 1944.  
The situation was considerably worse for Banat Jews, as it was for all Jews in the 
German sphere of influence, and for those Banat Serbs on whom fell the shadow of 
suspicion that they participated in or sympathized with the communist resistance. For 
Serbs free of the communist taint – or clever enough to conceal it – the occupation years 
may not have been prosperous ones. The period 1941-1944 was punctuated by individual 
acts of cruelty and rapacity inflicted on Banat Serbs by the Volksdeutsche, but they were 
not a time of relentless oppression.  
Though the Volksgruppenführung talked the talk of racial superiority and 
ideological struggle, the participation of most other Banat ethnicities in everyday 
administrative and economic affairs remained very much par for the course. This 
suggests a somewhat less than complete break with prewar ethnic power relations than 
the Volksdeutsche leadership would have liked to admit. The same is true of the 
Volksgruppenführung‟s relations with Berlin. Before April 1941 as well as after it, the 
former were junior partners and executors of orders from above, and received perks 
rather than real promotion, first from the Yugoslav state pressured by Hitler‟s Germany, 
and then directly from the latter. One decisive change did take place, however: the 
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elevation of the Volksdeutsche minority to the leading position within the Banat. In 
internal Banat matters, the Volksgruppenführung wielded quite a lot of power over the 
lives of individual Banat residents of all ethnicities, not least its co-nationals, but it lacked 
the strength and legitimacy required for full totalitarian control. 
The Third Reich exerted a mixture of persuasion and coercion in its relations with 
the Banat Volksgruppenführung. Over time, this uneasy balance tipped increasingly 
toward coercion, but was never fully lost in civilian Banat affairs. (Military affairs were a 
different matter entirely, and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.) Even in the last 
days of the Banat Volksdeutsche administration in October 1944, the Reich never 
unleashed its full potential for violence against the Banat Volksdeutsche, partly because 
of their continued value as a racial, strategic and economic resource, and partly because 
of their malleability and willingness to collaborate.  
The same uneasy balance of persuasion and coercion was evident in relations 
between the Volksgruppenführung and ordinary Volksdeutsche. For all the dissatisfaction 
individual Volksdeutsche felt regarding individual policies passed by the 
Volksgruppenführung, large-scale open resistance or rebellion was no more in evidence 
in the Banat than in the Third Reich itself. This was due in part to the (real or promised) 
material recompense Volksdeutsche could expect in exchange for obedience, partly to 
ideological agreement, partly to apathy, and partly to undesirable alternatives: 
government by the Serbian Council of Ministers or by Hungary. The social structure of 
the Volksdeutsche community also affected its members‟ overall disposition to be 
obedient, if not always satisfied with their lot. In a relatively small, predominantly rural, 
tightly knit community whose sense of self was shaped by a historical exposure to a non-
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German environment, the Volksgruppenführung ruled more by the skilful use of social 
and peer pressure than by strength of arms or the unshakable legitimacy of sovereign 
statehood, both of which it lacked.  
 
Volksdeutsche among Themselves 
Postwar testimonies Banat Volksdeutsche expellees in West Germany gave to the Federal 
Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and Persons Damaged by War vacillated between bold 
assertions of the Volksgruppenführung‟s past independence of decision and action, and 
exculpation after the fact. Thus Janko‟s deputy Josef Beer made the patently false claim 
that the Volksgruppenführung used the pretense of obedience to Reich orders as a 
“necessary lie” to goad reluctant co-nationals into obeying unpopular orders.
557
 By 
contrast, former head of the Pantschowa police‟s political section Oskar Krewetsch 
blamed Reichsdeutsche (Reich German) greed, corruption and lack of sympathy for 
supposedly more moderate Volksdeutsche wishes – their “arrogance, presumption, and 
impudent vaingloriousness”
558
 in Krewetsch‟s damning yet vague purple prose – for the 
Banat residents‟ supposed resistance to orders.  
In truth, resistance almost never went beyond the phenomenon of grumbling i.e. 
complaints without real action, which has been well-documented among vocal but 
ineffectual „opponents‟ of the regime in the Third Reich by historians such as Ian 
Kershaw. Even these complaints were limited to objecting to individual policies of the 
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Volksgruppenführung, not to its presence or to the Banat‟s occupation by Reich forces. In 
a rare moment of clarity, Beer acknowledged that, lacking the ability to enforce policy, 
the Volksgruppenführung ruled by persuasion and social pressure,
559
 at least over its co-
nationals. As will be seen later in this and the following chapter, other ethnicities met 
with varying degrees of persuasion and coercion, depending on their standing in the Nazi 
racial hierarchy, and their corresponding value as a diplomatic or security factor. 
 Tensions between Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche were hardly new, whether 
they were as obvious as Banat civilians – albeit of unspecified ethnicity, but implied to be 
so many as to include Volksdeutsche – acting “fresh” to Wehrmacht soldiers in the 
street,
560
 or less tangible yet arguably more rancorous as disputes between the two sets of 
administrators in occupied Serbia-Banat. As late as July 1943, a Reich report remarked 
on accusations – leveled by Reichsdeutsche and Banat Volksdeutsche respectively – of 
enrichment through Aryanized property under the guise of promoting Volk interests and 
favoring ethnic Hungarians at the expense of Volksdeutsche.
561
 This report expressed 
cautious optimism about ongoing improvement of attitudes and relations,
562
 yet the 
Reichsdeutsche-Volksdeutsche tension remained at a quiet simmer throughout the war 
years, never flaring into open disagreement or disaffection. 
 More damaging to stability within the Banat than this low-level conflict of wills 
between Reichs- and Volksdeutsche were tensions within the Banat Volksgruppe, which 
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revolved primarily around class and generational difference. Already in fall 1941, 
confidential reports of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) remarked on the 
widespread perception of leading Volksdeutsche by their co-nationals as “nouveau 
riches”
563
 more interested in gain through corruption than in administration. That this 
impression had some grounds in reality is borne out by the small print in official 
publications, listing new board members for some of the Banat‟s most profitable 
economic enterprises. For example, the edible oil factory in Grossbetschkerek (Erste 
Banater Ölfabrik) had on its board of directors the head of the Volksgruppe‟s economic 
office (Hauptamt für Volkswirtschaft) Jakob Awender and chief of the Banat 
administration Sepp Lapp.
564
 Likewise, among the directors of the newly founded 
company Banat-Film, licensed to import and show German films and operate mobile 
cinemas, were chief of the Volksgruppe‟s organization for German schools 
(Schulstiftung) Adam Maurus, Josef Beer and Grossbetschkerek mayor Josef Gion.
565
 
It took Sepp Janko nearly a year after the April War to take official steps toward 
regulating – really approving after the fact rather than preventing – this private 
enrichment under the guise of official business and ideological endeavor, at the same 
time as he was trying to put a stop to „wild‟ Aryanization (see Chapter 5).
566
 By then, the 
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widespread perception of corruption at the highest level of the Volksgruppenführung had 
already had a negative effect on Volksdeutsche morale.
567
 This was made manifest in 
failure to attend rallies in sufficiently large numbers
568
 or the opinion – expressed 
especially by the older generation of Volksdeutsche, who had experienced life in the 
Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy – that Hungarian occupation could not be any 
worse than the German one,
569
 with its relentless demands for agricultural deliveries and 
other sacrifices.  
Middle-class resentment with more than a hint of trying to wash the 
Volksdeutsche clean of the Nazi taint is evident in some expellees‟ postwar testimonies, 





 who embraced Nazism as a cynical means to personal enrichment and 
empowerment of the crassest sort. This perception endured despite the fact that the 
Volksgruppenführung consisted of university-educated, middle-class men.
572
  
What really damned the Volksgruppenführung in the eyes of some older 
Volksdeutsche was its youth and perceived lack of respect for its elders, whose more 
conservative and traditional political views predated the Nazi period. In August 1942 
Sepp Janko issued a circular to the heads of all the major Banat administrative offices 
                                                                                                                                                 
March 1, 1942, p. 8.) As an attempt to move from a system of rule by personal acquaintance 
toward a more impersonal, bureaucratic one, this arrangement rather lacked teeth. 
567
 It bears noting that Janko does not seem to have lined his own pockets egregiously, whether 
from an excess of zeal as Volksgruppenführer and representative of the Greater Reich among his 
co-nationals or because he was more subtle than some of his greedier coworkers.  
568
 “Meldungen,” September 1941, BA Berlin, R 58, file 164, fiche 1, frame 83.  
569
 Gemeindeamt Soltur to Landratsamt Gross-Kikinda, February 9, 1942, Istorijski arhiv 
Kikinda, fund 84 Sresko naĉelstvo Kikinda, 1941-1944, box 1, p. 467; Geissler, “Über die soziale 
Lage der Volksdeutschen im serbischen Banat” (1943), BA Berlin, NS 5 VI, file 29277/a, p. 143. 
570
 “diesen üblen Kerlen bei der Volksgruppenführung” Testimony of Wilma Slavik (1958), 
LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/153, frame 779. 
571
 “neradni[ci]” Testimony of Terezija Andrejević from Zichydorf in Radović, SinĊelić-Ibrajter 
and Weiss, p. 183.  
572
 See p. 167. 
211 
 
directing them to compile detailed reports of their activities as a way of stopping once 
and for all the mouths of the older Kulturbund (Volksdeutsche organization in the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia) members. The latter were fond of claiming that all the hard 
work of building and consolidating the Volksdeutsche administration had been done by 
them during the 1930s, allowing the “youths” who came later to reap the fruits of 
another‟s labor and idle away their days in power.
573
 Janko‟s barely concealed irritation is 
evidence of the Nazis‟ failure to elide preexisting social and generational tensions within 
an all-embracing Volksgemeinschaft.  
Whatever its ideological basis and the corruption of some of its members, there 
can be no doubt that the Banat Volksdeutsche administration worked very hard to keep its 
home region‟s daily affairs running smoothly despite a constant shortage of trained staff. 
Though the Volksgruppenführung attempted at first to present the huge demands placed 
on its administrators as an honor and a duty expected of an ethnic German elite,
574
 after 
Waffen-SS recruitment took the majority of adult men away from the Banat in fall 1942 
it was not uncommon for high-ranking administrators to hold two or three positions at 
once.
575
 This constant manpower shortage allowed some much-needed administrators on 
all levels from the village up, as well as technocrats (economic experts, bankers, court 
officials and pharmacists) to be released from their Waffen-SS
576
 or labor service 
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 Undoubtedly some pulled strings to secure such a release even if they were not 
really essential personnel. Even so, it quickly became necessary to train Banat 
Volksdeutsche women to fill some administrative positions and perform lighter tasks in 
workshops, industry and artisans‟ shops,
578
 as well as to continue to employ non-German 
administrators, especially in municipalities with few or no Volksdeutsche.
579
  
While the Third Reich was no stranger to ideological compromise needed to 
justify such reliance on perceived racial or gender inferiors, the Banat Volksdeutsche 
remained essentially narrow-minded in focus. In the words of a Reich commentator 
writing a few weeks before Italy was invaded by Anglo-American forces and knocked 
out of the war, the Banat Volksdeutsche‟s “mood [was] fundamentally shaped by purely 
local events.”
580
 However long the hours kept by many Volksdeutsche in administration, 
the presence alongside them of opportunists, women and non-Germans perpetuated the 
perception held by at least some older Volksdeutsche of a corrupt, cynical 
Volksgruppenführung with little regard for gender proprieties or perceived German 
exclusivity and superiority.  
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It would be overly simplistic to represent the older generations of Volksdeutsche 
as resolutely – if ineffectually – opposed to their Nazified leaders. Though some loved to 
complain of those upstart youngsters, others shared the Volksgruppenführung‟s 
ideological convictions. This is demonstrated by the case of a Volksdeutsche Catholic 
priest from Stefansfeld, who in 1943 had a swastika removed from the village cemetery, 
where it was blocking the central chapel‟s cross. Ordered to report to the 
Sicherheitsdienst (SD) office in Modosch, he found out that the swastika had been put up 
by the mother of a local man killed fighting in the East (most likely in the Waffen-SS). 
This incident, and the priest‟s habit of making thinly veiled references to religion‟s 
preeminence over ideology, led to his arrest, internment in the Banjica concentration 
camp in Belgrade, and deportation to the Reich. Not even the fact that he was related to 
the head of the Volksgruppenführung‟s office for social care saved him – or possibly his 
influential cousin preferred to be rid of this ideologically unsuitable family member. The 
priest left behind a village deeply divided between the more traditional, religious 
Volksdeutsche – those Himmler‟s future representative in Serbia Hermann Behrends 
meant when he wrote as late as 1944 about the “uptight, anti-Reichsdeutsche, 
Betschkerek churchy mindset”
581
 – and those who had accepted National Socialism and 
Hitler‟s war as their own.
582
  
The mother of the fallen soldier from Stefansfeld may have been motivated more 
by grief than by ideology in her opposition to the village priest. Even so, quite apart from 
Hitler‟s anti-Bolshevik crusade against the Soviet Union – and its Balkan offshoot, the 
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struggle with Tito‟s Partisans – and in spite of all their grumbling, Banat Volksdeutsche 
of all ages welcomed Reich occupation and the Volksdeutsche administration. What they 
really objected to in late 1941 and early 1942 was the continued presence of Serbian and 
ethnic Hungarian administrators on the village level (since at the top Volksdeutsche held 
all the key positions) and continued ties to Belgrade, however tenuous,
583
 not to the new 
administration per se.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, some ethnic tension existed in the Banat before the 
April War, but only the Reich occupation of the Banat inspired open displays of enmity 
between the Volksdeutsche and other Banat residents. The Reich occupation made the 
Nazi racial hierarchy a living reality for the Banat population, elevating the 
Volksdeutsche and engendering animosity and suspicion between them and others. Yet 
even after the April War, the racial and ideological warfare in the occupied East had no 
counterpart in the Serbian Banat. Partly this was due to the relative absence of armed 
action by resistance movements in the Banat (see Chapter 5), and partly to the fact that 
Volksdeutsche as well as most other Banat ethnic groups received positive as well as 
negative incentives to accept the Volksdeutsche administration.  
It seems that the majority of Banat Volksdeutsche continued to support the 
Nazified Volksgruppenführung and the Third Reich until war‟s end. Either a significant 
decrease of their Nazi sympathies failed to occur as the war turned against Germany or 
evidence of it is lacking from the admittedly incomplete documentary record. In one of 
his postwar reports, Josef Beer claimed that anonymous opinion polls, supposedly 
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conducted by the Volksgruppenführung to assess their co-nationals‟ affinity for National 
Socialism, showed an 80% drop in positive response between 1941 and 1944.
584
 So huge 
a drop seems too pat and convenient, especially in a postwar report.  
In assessing the wartime evidence, East German historian Jutta Komorowski 
succinctly identified a blend of positive and negative incentives offered to ordinary 
Volksdeutsche to conform with, if not to enthusiastically embrace, Nazi policies. The 
former took the form of ideological blandishments (see Chapter 6 for a detailed 
discussion) and practical, material perks. As for the latter, Komorowski emphasized – 
even overemphasized – official threats to one‟s physical and material wellbeing in the 




These courts were created in November 1941 to “settle matters of honor” arising 
between individual Volksdeutsche and to defend the “honor and prestige of the German 
Volk or . . . of leading German personages in their public functions” against injury “by 
word or deed.”
586
 They were also intended to prosecute instances of official corruption,
587
 
and to protect individual Volksdeutsche‟s standing in the Volksgruppe against injury by 
false allegation or by sentences passed by a regular state court.
588
 Depending on the 
gravity of the charges, the honor courts could publicize the accusation and sentence in the 
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Amtsblatt für das Banat or by town crier, and could admonish, reprimand or sentence a 
Volksdeutscher to anything from loss of official post, property or liberty, to the wearing 
of a sign stating the person‟s crime (typical examples being work-shyness, cowardice and 
being an enemy of the people), to a loss of legal rights and expulsion from the 
Volksgruppe.
589
 The latter would have been the harshest punishment, since the threat of 
ostracism would have checked undesirable behavior even more effectively than the threat 
of material suffering.  
The honor courts‟ jurisdiction, so vaguely defined, could extend to nearly 
anything, and would have kept the courts constantly bogged down investigating private 
score-settling disguised as ideological probity. In fact, there is almost no explicit mention 
of the courts‟ activity either in the Amtsblatt or in the Verordnungsblatt der 
Volksgruppenführung der deutschen Volksgruppe im Banat und Serbien. Reports of 
individual Volksdeutsche sentenced for activities which could have easily fallen within 
the honor courts‟ purview do not mention the honor courts explicitly. For example, a 
1943 report on several village notaries punished with salary cuts and forced labor for 
irregularities in rationing or dereliction of duty was announced by the Volksdeutsche 
administration, not by an honor court. This may have been because not all of the accused 
were Volksdeutsche,
590
 hence not all came within the honor courts‟ jurisdiction, but also 
suggests that the honor courts were so short-staffed as to barely function.  
Moreover, the ostensible purpose of the honor courts – to discourage other 
Volksdeutsche from undesirable or dissentious behavior – was undermined by a failure to 
state explicitly crimes deserving of the harshest punishment. Thus when a Volksdeutscher 
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from Grosskikinda was excluded forever from the German Volksgemeinschaft and 
sentenced to death, his crime was described simply as behavior “unworthy of a 
German.”
591
 This and similar euphemisms were used on other occasions when individuals 
were excluded from the Volksgruppe or its youth organizations,
592
 which had the same 
discretionary right to discipline their members as the honor courts had vis-à-vis the 
Volksgruppe as a whole.
593
 
The honor courts‟ ineffectuality was likely due in large part to the fact that service 
in them was an honorary, unpaid position requiring at least a university degree.
594
 In vain 
did Paul Bader, then German commanding general in Belgrade, consider the honor courts 
a useful way to instill a healthy dose of fear in Volksdeutsche on the eve of massive 
mobilization for the Waffen-SS – which he knew would be an unpopular policy – in 
January 1942.
595
 The honor courts barely functioned long before they were finally 
dissolved in April 1944, their role assumed directly – and probably as ineffectively – by 
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 Considering the overstretched conditions under which the 
Volksdeutsche administration labored even before the Waffen-SS mobilization in spring 
1942, an excuse not to serve as an honor court judge cannot have been hard to find.  
Taking all this into consideration, Komorowski rather overstates the case when 
she describes these courts as an instrument of the “psychic and moral terror”
597
 by which 
the Volksdeutsche were kept in line. Open terror – physical, psychological or, indeed, 
moral – was not really needed in a small community where peer pressure and the desire 
for conformity were powerful social agents. When Sepp Janko decreed that members of 
the Waffen-SS division “Prinz Eugen” would go from house to house to collect donations 
for the German Red Cross
598
 or the Kreisleiter (Volksgruppe county chief) in 
Grosskikinda asked for Volksdeutsche police to help collect for the Winter Relief,
599
 they 
were not laying their trust in the ability of men in uniform to scare people into giving 
donations. They assumed that people would be ashamed not to donate if asked to do so 
by their neighbors or their neighbors‟ sons wearing the Führer‟s uniform, demonstrating 
their willingness to give much more than just money for Hitler and Germandom. Such 
methods represented coercion only insofar as individual Volksdeutsche internalized the 
social dynamic at work and chose to obey because their whole social experience led them 
to conform. The Volksgruppenführung had a sufficiently good grasp of their co-
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nationals‟ psychology to understand that social pressure and informal ways of exercising 
power went much further within their community than physical violence.  
Failure on the part of members of the Volksgruppenführung to live up to what 
their co-nationals expected from moral and administrative leaders of the Volksdeutsche 
community resulted on occasion in sharp drops in morale, but almost never in acts of 
open rebellion. A historical sense of belonging to a beleaguered minority and the not-
contradictory conviction of German superiority over other Balkan ethnicities, a sense of 
abstract duty to an idealized German Reich, the desire for material gain, even apathy 
were all strong motivating forces for Volksdeutsche of different ages and both genders to 
fall into line, even if they did not always express quite the level of enthusiasm Berlin and 
the Volksgruppenführung may have desired. As for the threat of physical punishment, the 
possibility of ostracism and social exclusion would have carried far more weight in this 
small, tightly knit, self-consciously exposed community. Personal acquaintance and local 
prestige – as well as the Volksgruppenführung‟s role as a stand-in for Hitler and the 
Reich – were far more important than brute force, especially since the latter was rarely an 
option for the Volksgruppenführung. Only within the ranks of the Waffen-SS, which was 
Heinrich Himmler‟s playing ground, could the punitive power of the Reich fully come to 
bear on large numbers of the Banat Volksdeutsche. Not so in the Banat‟s civilian affairs.  
This is not to give the right to Josef Beer‟s claim that within the Banat 
Volksgruppe the Führerprinzip was really a form of popular consensus not tantamount to 
dictatorship.
600
 It does, however, suggest that Sepp Janko‟s ability to make (or, rather, 
announce) unpopular decisions depended on the willingness of the majority of his co-
nationals to do no more than grumble against these decisions. While acceptance of the 
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Platonic ideal of the dutiful, disciplined Volksdeutscher fostered by Nazi ideology did not 
make an actual Volksdeutsche person proof against the occasional complaint, it certainly 
helped ensure widespread obedience, especially when buffered by material incentives.  
Not everyone who insulted the honor and prestige of the Volksgruppe, the Volk 
and the Führer needed to be openly excised from the Volksgruppe. It was sufficient to 
make an early example of a few for the others to learn to hold their tongues, whatever 
their personal opinions. This is precisely what happened in June 1941, when more than 
one hundred members of the Kathreinfeld Ortsgruppe (village chapter of the 
Volksgruppe) were temporarily excluded for refusal to pay their membership dues. Two 
other Kathreinfeld Volksdeutsche and another Volksdeutscher from Modosch were fully 
and permanently expelled from the Volksgruppe for refusing to be recognized as racial 
Germans.
601
 No later mass exclusions are documented, likely because the public shame of 
the Kathreinfeld Ortsgruppe had the desired effect on other recalcitrants, and partly 
because it became progressively harder to either join or leave the Volksgruppe.  
The lack of trained personnel for administrative, engineering, teaching and other 
positions requiring higher education and experience meant that it was relatively easy to 
get permission to reside in the Banat after occupation, even if one was not a 
Volksdeutscher (see below), as indicated by requests for residence permits submitted to 
the Banat Police Prefecture in Grossbetsckerek. It was especially easy for Volksdeutsche 
moving to the Banat from other Yugoslav lands or those who had been born outside of 
the Banat before 1918, if they were usefully employed
602
 or married to an employed
603
 or 
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 Volksdeutscher, could claim descent from the first German-speaking settlers 




 or had been born on the Romanian side of the border 
and moved only recently from resistance-infested southern Serbia but claimed a spiritual 
affinity with the Serbian Banat.
606
 Some overcompensated for their Serbian-sounding 
names by meticulously filling out their applications in German and signing them with 
“Heil Hitler!”
607
 Others made nervous reference to their deported Jewish spouses.
608
 And 
one elderly hairdresser disarmingly claimed he decided to leave Belgrade for the Banat 
only in 1944 because the frequent air raid alarms in the city made his hands shake so 
badly he could not work.
609
 
Everyone who could make even a passable claim to Volksdeutsche origin was 
allowed to reside in the Banat, being accepted as a full member of the Deutsche 
Volksgruppe was a different matter. This policy drew on the general vagueness of the 
term „Volksdeutscher.‟ However, it also demonstrated how a tentative identity could 
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become ossified once embraced by an individual as one‟s primary identity and officially 
confirmed as such. Following the admonishment of the Reich military authorities issued 
in summer 1941,
610
 great pains were taken to weed out those who attempted to join 
without actually being Volksdeutsche, in order to get better rations or other privileged 
treatment. Again showing that many Volksdeutsche administrators took their practical 
and ideological duties very seriously is the example of an official in Banater Hof, who 
was admonished by higher-ups for coming into conflict with his Ortsleiter (local 
Volksgruppe leader) over the latter‟s refusal to allow the former‟s self-confessed ethnic 
Hungarian foster-daughter into the Volksgruppe.
611
  
The Belgrade Ortsgruppe (Volksgruppe chapter)
612
 and the small Ortsgruppen in 
Serbia proper were also admonished to screen new applicants carefully, keeping a wary 
eye out for evacuated Slovenes who tried to pass themselves off as Slovenian 
Volksdeutsche.
613
 So carefully were the newcomers to the Volksgruppe screened that 
only in July 1943 did Janko feel sufficiently confident of the results to report to Himmler 
a tentative division of these newly admitted Volksgruppe members into three racial 
categories – likely modeled on the Volksliste in occupied Poland – with suggestions for 
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the most Serbianized to be resettled to the Reich lest they should be lost to the Volk 
entirely.
614
 While Himmler had bigger fish to fry than to bring Serbian-speakers into the 
Reich just then, new „ethnic IDs‟ (Volkszugehörigkeitsausweise) for approved members 
of the Belgrade Ortsgruppe were still not issued in February 1944.
615
  
As for the Banat, the new applicants for Volksgruppe membership hailed most 
often from the Baĉka or Belgrade, and made for more plausible candidates than 
Slovenian German-speakers or Serbian-speaking Volksdeutsche settled in Belgrade, 
Kraljevo or Niń. Paradoxically, the more plausible they were as Volksdeutsche, the more 
constraining Volksgruppe membership was on them, once they were accepted. In spring 
1944 Janko allowed that a mobilized Volksdeutscher married to an ethnic Hungarian did 
not have to participate in Volksdeutsche activities. Janko flatly refused to allow the man 
to stop paying his dues or to leave the Volksgruppe, since this would have led to his 
demanding a discharge from the Waffen-SS.
616
  
Once recognized as a Volksdeutscher, it was nearly impossible for an individual 
to hold multiple identities other than the ethnic-racial one (ambivalent as it was in view 
of the very existence of the term Volksdeutsche) and the one related to one‟s home village 
or town. Even German-speakers of mixed descent or married to non-Germans became 
simply Volksdeutsche by dint of being members of the Volksgruppe. Once approved to 
stay in the Volksgruppe, they owed it – and the Reich – both material and spiritual 
loyalty, but could expect material and ideological benefits as well. Nevertheless, the 
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balance sheet of Volksdeutsche gains and losses tilted increasingly toward the latter as 
the war wore on.  
 
Volksdeutsche Economies 
Reich memos from the war years routinely praised the Banat Volksdeutsche‟s hard work 
and productivity as well as the efficiency of their agricultural cooperatives.
617
 They 
stressed that these Volksdeutsche inhabited a land “small in area, towering in 
achievement,”
618
 a land whose produce could reach the Reich in a matter of days, not 
weeks as did the grain from Ukraine.
619
 The very first issue of the Verordnungsblatt der 
Volksgruppenführung contained an appeal to the Banat Volksdeutsche peasant from the 
new official in charge of peasant affairs (Bauernführer), Sepp Zwirner, exhorting them to 
produce even more than before. Although it was tucked away slyly on the last page of the 
publication and represented as the ultimate sign of Volksdeutsche gratitude to Adolf 
Hitler, the man “who liberated us from long years of servitude,”
620
 the order underlying 
the rapturous appeals to the peasant to achieve greatness by an effort of will was stern 
and clear: the Banat was expected to feed not only itself, but the Reich as well. 
 In official Volksdeutsche circles, the main complaint leveled against this 
expectation was that the Reich companies interested in exporting food, founding or 
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leasing economic enterprises in the Banat rarely bothered to consult the Volksgruppe‟s 
economic office before doing so.
621
 The erstwhile chief of this office, Leopold Egger, 
commented in his postwar report on the Banat economy that of all the Reich offices he 
had had to deal with, only the economic planning office of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle 
(VoMi) had the right “Volksdeutsche touch.”
622
 Other state and private companies from 
the Reich wanted to treat the Banat like they would any other conquered territory, 
regardless of the presence of a productive Volksdeutsche population whose favor they 
would have been better advised to court.
623
 Egger‟s predecessor, Jakob Awender, 
countered this in his own postwar statement to the Ministry for Expellees by accusing 
Lothar Heller, the VoMi‟s Plenipotentiary for the Economy, of monopolizing the Banat‟s 
agricultural output by assigning his personal acquaintances from the Reich to arrange for 
the export of food instead of employing experienced Banat Volksdeutsche.
624
 This 
jurisdictional conflict led eventually to Awender‟s being sent to work in economic offices 
first in the Reich and then in the General Government.
625
 He was replaced in the Banat by 
the more biddable Egger.
626
 
Despite their wartime rivalry, Awender agreed with Egger on the general 
rapaciousness and disregard for Volksdeutsche interests and sensibilities displayed by 
Reichsdeutsche economic personnel, epitomized by the General Plenipotentiary for the 
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Economy (Generalbevollmächtigter für die Wirtschaft, GBW) in Serbia, Franz 
Neuhausen. In a meeting in January 1942, Neuhausen shrilly asserted: “I and I alone am 
responsible for all economic activities in Serbia and the Banat!”
627
  
Yet Heller wrote that same month that it would be desirable to strengthen the 
Banat Volksdeutsche‟s economic standing with the cooperation of enterprises from the 
Reich, in view of the Banat‟s potential future occupation by Hungary and the precedent 
set by the Hungarian mistreatment of Volksdeutsche in the Baĉka.
628
 Heller was 
responding to the intense debates of the preceding eight months regarding future 
ownership of the Banat (discussed in Chapter 3), but possibly also to an awareness that 
the Banat‟s economic potential might be better exploited by giving the Volksdeutsche 
there support and certain privileges. While propaganda disseminated by the Banat 
Volksgruppenführung extolled the Volksdeutsche peasant as a paragon of virtue and the 
guardian of Europe‟s borders (see Chapter 6), practical measures were taken to encourage 
the Volksdeutsche peasant to produce more and more food, ultimately serving the 
interests of a Germany chronically unable to produce enough food for its population 
without relying on imports. 
 The most obvious of these measures was the overturning of the interwar Yugoslav 
land reform, by which land in the Vojvodina which had used to belong to the Hungarian 
nobility before World War I was distributed mostly to Serbian veterans of that war. This 
had been a staple complaint of the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche. While initially some 
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Volksdeutsche peasants did manage to purchase land affected by the reform,
629
 in the late 
1930s it became more difficult for them to do so, as concerns grew regarding 
Volksdeutsche irredenta along Yugoslavia‟s borders.  
 The interwar land reform was officially overturned in June 1941. Like the laws 
guaranteed the Volksdeutsche‟s legal standing and rights (see Chapter 3), this decree was 
passed by the Serbian collaborationist government, but inspired and encouraged by the 
German commanding general in Belgrade and the Reich government. The reform repeal 
targeted specifically the so-called „volunteer fields‟ (Dobrovoljzen-Felder, from the 
Serbian „dobrovoljac‟ = volunteer) i.e. land given to veterans who had volunteered for the 
Serbian army in World War I. It left all land transactions already on the books open to 




 discretion of Sepp Lapp in his 
role as head of the Banat administration.  
This decree aimed explicitly to benefit not only Volksdeutsche from the Serbian 
Banat, but also Romanian citizens of Romanian, Hungarian and German ethnicity, who 
lost their land in the Serbian Banat due to the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the 
Yugoslav land reform.
632
 The latter decision was a salve to Romanian pride in the face of 
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the perceived slight incurred by Hungary having been granted a stronger claim on the 
Serbian Banat by the Third Reich. Yet there is a tentativeness to the reform-repeal text, 
inspired largely by foreign-political considerations. At a time of increased tension 
between Hungary and Romania over any and every issue pertaining to the Serbian Banat, 
the Reichsdeutsche administration in Belgrade was intensely aware of the need to make 
the reform repeal not seem like a move of the Third Reich against either ally. Hence the 
stress placed on the fact that the repeal was officially passed by the Serbian 
collaborationist government, and that each individual land transaction would in principle 
be examined separately, rather than passing a blanket order benefitting Banat 
Volksdeutsche over all other local ethnicities.
633
 
Such fine distinctions were too fine for the Hungarian government, which made 
no secret of the fact that it intended to carry out its own land reform once it occupied the 
Banat, in which latter reform all land transactions occurring after April 6, 1941 would be 
rendered as null and void as would those which had occurred under the interwar 
Yugoslav land reform. Despite the German Military Commander‟s reassurances, 
Hungarian intentions caused much consternation within the Volksgruppenführung, which 
justifiably perceived its authority and that of the German commander in Belgrade as 
being undermined from without.
634
 Still desirous of pacifying its Hungarian ally, the 
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Reich proposed to offset Hungarian demands for land in the Banat by expropriating the 
fertile area in the Panĉevaĉki Rit (a drained wetland outside Pantschowa) from the 
Serbian state as nominal war reparations, settling it with Volksdeutsche, and thus creating 




While the legality of such a move in the face of general Hungarian disregard for 
extant laws in territories they occupied was being debated,
636
 the issue of large-scale land 
purchases by ethnic Hungarians in the Banat became moot when it became apparent that 
the Hungarian state lacked the funds to back any large land purchases.
637
 The 
Reichsdeutsche in Belgrade became aware of this fact before the Hungarian government 
owned up to it. With this rare open acknowledgement of Hungary‟s weakness vis-à-vis 
Reich interests, the AA (Auswärtiges Amt, the German Foreign Ministry) and 
Wehrmacht could afford to pay lip-service to Hungary. These Reich offices jointly 
prompted the Serbian government to pass a reiteration of the reform repeal in December 
1941. This later document officially and explicitly placed expropriated land in Banat 
municipalities with large ethnic Hungarian populations at the latter‟s disposal.
638
  
Following the established pattern, where ethnic Hungarians won a concession, 
ethnic Romanians demanded the same. Kreiskommandantur 823 in Grossbetschkerek 
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reported in fall 1943 that it had been compelled by practical concerns to allow members 
of both ethnic groups to buy at least some of the available Dobrovoljzen-Felder.
639
 Even 
so, these purchases remained always far inferior to purchases allowed to Banat 
Volksdeutsche. Benzler admitted as much in early 1942,
640
 at a time when the Hungarian 
claim on the Banat remained active, yet without real bite. 
Moreover, rather than declaring all Serbian-owned land up for grabs, the June 
1941 reform repeal explicitly stated that only land obtained by Serbs through the interwar 
agrarian reform, which was not being cultivated by its owner, could be expropriated.
641
 
This indicates an initial hesitance on the part of the Reich Germans in Serbia about 
mistreating the Serbian population or impinging on its rights without at least a plausible 
pretext. Even though the reform repeal was announced a mere two days before the start of 
Operation Barbarossa and the related flaring up of communist resistance in Serbia proper, 
efforts continued to be made to alleviate at least some of the repeal‟s impact on the 
Serbian peasantry in the Banat. Even though many World War I veterans lost everything, 
an official decree was passed in fall 1942 to provide such extreme cases with at least a 
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small piece of land, enough to survive on.
642
 Plans were even made to use a part of the 
Panĉevaĉki Rit to settle newly landless Serbian peasants.
643
  
While such plans had little practical result, they showed at least a modicum of 
good will toward the predominantly peasant Serbian population on the part of the Reich 
authorities. However, this good will was based on practical calculation rather than a 
sudden improvement of the Serbs‟ standing in the Nazi racial hierarchy. A 1942 memo 
from the Reich Ministry of the Four-Year Plan recommended that those World War I 
veterans in the Banat who had not already been expropriated, not be expropriated at all, 
in view of the Hungarian practice of expelling Serbs from the Baĉka without benefiting 
the Baĉka Volksdeutsche thereby; the Banat Volksgruppe‟s lack of funds for large land 
purchases; the thorny legality of overturning the interwar land reform, since the 
redistributed land was still partly owned by the Serbian state; and especially increased 
labor needs at a time when Banat Volksdeutsche men would be recruited for the Waffen-
SS.
644
 All these practical concerns suggested the desirability of a relatively stable Serbian 
peasantry continuing to live and work in the Banat, available to work the fields of 
absentee Volksdeutsche (see below). 
Even with these reservations, prompted by foreign and economic policy, the net 
result of the June 1941 reform repeal decree was that Banat Volksdeutsche could and did 
obtain land more easily, cheaply and in greater quantities than at any other point in the 
twenty years preceding the occupation. Although the Volksgruppenführung cautioned 
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them in fall 1941 that they bought land at their own risk, in view of the avowed 
Hungarian disregard for the reform repeal, within the first four months following the 
repeal almost one eighth of the newly available land was bought up by Volksdeutsche 
peasants.
645
 Even the formal obstacle of needing Neuhausen‟s permission for land 
transactions by Volksdeutsche
646
 was lifted barely two months after it was imposed.
647
 
This left Sepp Lapp‟s permission, easily obtained by Volksdeutsche, as the only firm 
legal requirement for Volksdeutsche to buy Serbian-owned land. By July 1943, 
Volksdeutsche owned about 25,9% of the total land (as opposed to 21% in 1938
648
), and 
cultivated some 30% of the arable land in the Banat.
649
 
As was often the case even in such a small area as the Banat, reports differ on the 
actual form the interwar land reform repeal took. Most testimonies of surviving 
Volksdeutsche emphasize that they could buy but not simply alienate or seize 
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 Some even implied that Volksdeutsche refrained from buying 
such land for fear of engendering bad blood with the local Serbs.
651
 On the other hand, 
some confirmed the worst Nazi anti-Slavic prejudice by complaining after the war that 
only those Dobrovoljzen-Felder not worked by their Serbian owners could be bought up 
by Volksdeutsche,
652




Depositions made mostly by the Banat‟s non-German residents to the postwar 
Yugoslav State Commission for the Determining of Crimes Committed by Occupiers and 
Their Helpers (Drņavna komisija za utvrĊivanje zloĉina okupatora i njihovih pomagaĉa) 
predictably tell a different story. In this version of events, Volksdeutsche peasants – and 
the occasional ethnic Hungarian – outright alienated land from their Serbian neighbors
654
 
or went through the motions of a legal transaction but withheld payment
655
 or obtained 




These testimonies as well as those about Volksdeutsche – and, again, the 
occasional ethnic Hungarian – compelling Serbs to sell them land at ludicrously low 
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 or to work their fields without payment
658
 were likely inspired by a mixture of 
true grievance and the desire to obtain property (possibly even property legally sold 
during the occupation) or redress following the occupation‟s end. These mixed motives 
were not unlike the blend of greed and sudden empowerment expressed laconically by a 
Volksdeutscher who, when asked by a Serb why he had not called in an old, mostly 
invented debt sooner, said simply: “Ja, those were different times!”
659
  
The official stance toward Serbian ownership of land in the occupied Banat 
remained ambivalent, with the Serbian peasant‟s value as both laborer and producer 
offset by the desire to improve the overall standing of Volksdeutsche. In practice there 
was much room for individual Volksdeutsche to abuse their new prominence and the de 
facto (if not always de jure) right given them to do so by the Reich authorities in 
Belgrade and Berlin. Even so, the alienation of Serbian land never became a matter of 
course as did the alienation of Jewish real estate (see Chapter 5), despite occasional 
proposals from Volksdeutsche administrators to Lapp and Neuhausen to place large 
Serbian landholdings under commissarial administration.
660
 
Access to land expropriated from Serbs carried with it the expectation that its 
Volksdeutsche owners would cultivate it and extract the maximum amounts of produce 
and grain from it. Whether they chose to avail themselves of the legal and extralegal 
possibilities for increasing their landholdings, Volksdeutsche peasants under Reich 
occupation no longer produced for a free market. The food supply in occupied Serbia was 
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under as strict a control as Neuhausen and the Wehrmacht could impose – meaning it was 
at its strictest in the Banat, the most stable area of all the Yugoslav lands under 
occupation, even if it had the fewest Axis troops occupying it. The Banat‟s grain 
deliveries were not affected by the unsettled conditions and black market in Serbia 
proper, with its two competing resistance movements and only nominal Reich German 
control outside of major urban centers.
661
 Franz Neuhausen avowed that the Reich 
Germans in Serbia were fed by the Banat more than by Serbia proper.
662
 After the 
Waffen-SS division “Prinz Eugen” was deployed in the Independent State of Croatia in 
early 1943, Neuhausen – and specifically the Banat – took on the added burden of 
feeding the Reichs- and Volksdeutsche and even the Croatian forces in Croatia (the rural 




To this end, ostensibly the Banat administration – but really Neuhausen‟s office in 
Belgrade – determined yearly quotas of various agricultural produce from the Banat, as 
well as which peasant should grow what to ensure these quotas were filled.
664
 
Agricultural cooperatives dominated by Banat Volksdeutsche bought up food and 
delivered it to the Reich‟s economic representatives in Serbia.
665
 Although they were 
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only one fifth of the Banat population, Volksdeutsche were responsible for anywhere 
between one quarter and nearly one half of the Banat‟s deliveries of various foodstuffs.
666
 
Peasants who failed to deliver their predetermined quota could have it requisitioned 
without payment.
667
 This was coercion of a more obvious kind than the social pressures 
at work within the Volksgruppe. It affected Volksdeutsche and others alike, and was 
inspired by the Reich‟s need for food rather than ideology. 
Volksdeutsche peasants were as likely not to meet their individual quotas as 
others. Examples include the villages of Soltur, where the required delivery of pigs for 
the Wehrmacht was customarily preceded by a few days‟ arguing back and forth before 
the locals agreed to hand the porkers over,
668
 and Nakodorf, whose Volksdeutsche found 
themselves in default for more than one half of their expected wheat delivery from the 
1942 harvest.
669
 The reasons varied from bad weather and flooding,
670
 to a scarcity of 
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draft animals, tools, seed and animal feed for milk cows, to low prices offered for food 
and cattle delivered.
671
 These were all valid reasons, but they could be seen as the 
Volksdeutsche‟s ideological and racial failure. One Vojvodina Volksdeutscher who took 
the Reich‟s perspective accused his co-nationals of “pettiness”
672
 and unjustified 
grumbling over low prices: “the Banat Swabian‟s materialism knows no limits.”
673
 
The lower prices offered to Banat peasants were not without logic: because the 
risk run by peasants who delivered food for Reich forces was far greater in Serbia proper 
than in the Banat, the prices fetched by food sold to the Reich and by food sold on the 
official, controlled market were also higher in Serbia proper.
674
 By the same logic, the 
land tax increased in Serbia proper during the occupation twice as much as in the Banat. 
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This was small consolation since the land tax in the Banat increased by 60%, and in 
Serbia proper by 120% in 1943,
675
 preceded already in 1941-1942 by a 100% increase in 
general taxation.
676
 This was a huge tax hike even taking into account wartime inflation 
and the relative weakness of the Serbian currency vis-à-vis the Reichsmark. It was due 
not least to Berlin‟s expectation that occupied territories should pay for the privilege of 
being occupied by the Third Reich.
677
  
Economic historian Karl-Heinz Schlarp estimates that the Reich did try not to tax 
the Banat Volksdeutsche‟s ability to pay taxes too much, mostly through such short-term 
means as bonds and keeping prices artificially low.
678
 Even so, the perception of the vast 
majority of Volksdeutsche was that it was a strange liberation which brought such a tax 
burden with it. In this, at least, the Volksgruppenführung and ordinary Volksdeutsche 
saw eye to eye. The issue around which their resentment revolved was more fundamental 
than taxation alone: it had to do with the Banat‟s continuing status as a part of the Serbian 
state. There were mutual accusations of the Banat‟s supposed failure to pay its way and 
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Foreign policy dictated that the Banat should not become a precedent-setting 
Volksdeutsche state within Hitler‟s Europe. Hence it also dictated that the Banat 
Volksdeutsche should get no special preferential tax rate via-à-vis the ethnic Hungarians 
and ethnic Romanians
680
 or vis-à-vis “their former oppressors in Belgrade.”
681
 Though 
the Volksgruppenführung shrewdly pointed out that just such an arrangement had been 
made with the Volksdeutsche in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine,
682
 this had more to do 
with the Ukraine‟s importance to Hitler and Himmler‟s projected Germanic East than 
with any special qualities the Ukrainian Volksdeutsche had, which the Banat 
Volksdeutsche had not. Paradoxically, the latter‟s very efficiency in administration, 
agriculture and affirming their Deutschtum (Germanness) worked against their best 
interests in this matter.  
Though officially economic matters in the Banat were kept separate from those in 
Serbia proper,
683
 even the Reich had to allow for the mutual dependence of the two. The 
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Banat needed shipments of wood for heating and construction from Serbia, and Serbia 
needed (occasionally even depended on) food from the Banat.
684
 But whereas the Banat 
Volksdeutsche were not always gracious about supplying the Wehrmacht and other 
Reichs- and Volksdeutsche in Serbia with food, they positively bridled at feeding the 
civilian population in Serbia proper.
685
  
It was officially forbidden to „export‟ food from the Banat to markets in Serbia 
proper
686
 or for non-Banat residents to cross the Danube
687
 with the intention of buying 
food on the black market and bringing it from the Banat into Serbia proper without prior 
authorization.
688
 Even so, due to Neuhausen‟s miscalculations regarding Serbia-Banat‟s 
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overall ability to supply the Reich with food and the frequent disruption of 
communications in Serbia proper, on more than one occasion starting in 1942 Belgrade 
had to be supplied with basic foodstuffs from the Banat.
689
 This confirmed some 
Volksdeutsche peasants‟ aggrieved conviction that they had been badly served by the 
Third Reich. 
In order to encourage Banat Volksdeutsche peasants to produce large quantities of 
food for the Reich‟s needs – including the shortages caused by Reich representatives‟ 
dilatory approach to the occupied Serbian territory – the Volksdeutsche were offered 
incentives in addition to access to Dobrovoljzen-Felder. Teams of draft horses or oxen 
belonging to the municipality were placed at the Volksdeutsche‟s disposal free of 
charge
690
 if they had had their own draft horses confiscated by the Yugoslav army during 
the April War or, later, for use by German armed forces.
691
 In 1943 the Banat 
administration even offered a monetary bonus to all peasants who sowed the same or a 
greater amount of land with certain basic crops (wheat, corn, sunflowers) as they had 
done the previous year.
692
 So important was the Banat as a stable food source, and so 
much more peaceful than Serbia in terms of resistance activity, that even the 
economically deleterious attempt to thwart resistance activities and increase 
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Reichsdeutsche security by clearing a 500m stretch along the sides of roads and railways 
in Serbia proper of tall crops, trees and bushes, was never applied to the Banat.
693
  
In March 1943, most likely inspired by the proclamation of total war in the Reich, 
the Banat office for peasant affairs (Landesbauernführung) encouraged Volksdeutsche 
men who had not been drafted into the Waffen-SS to volunteer their advice and help to 
the wives of mobilized co-nationals. They would become custodians (Hofpaten) to a 
neighbor‟s “orphaned estate”
694
 so as to ensure the harvest yield remained undiminished 
despite the absence of a substantial portion of the Banat‟s land-working population. As 
incentives went, this appeal to community spirit was not much of a „carrot.‟ This unpaid 
service must have been very unpopular among the already overworked Volksdeutsche 
peasants. Moreover, most of those still in the Banat in 1943 were too young or elderly or 
disabled. By year‟s end the office for peasant affairs managed to muster 883 men to look 
after 1287 estates,
695
 which was not much considering more than 20,000 Volksdeutsche 
had been mobilized by the Waffen-SS. One can only imagine what the drafted men‟s 
wives thought of the advice and low opinion of their abilities proffered by the office for 
peasant affairs and the assigned Hofpaten.  
Since increasing Volksdeutsche landownership and productivity ultimately served 
not just the ideological goal of elevating Volksdeutsche, but also the interests of the Third 
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Reich‟s war machine, a certain amount of coercion was acceptable to the Reichsdeutsche 
in extracting all they could from the Banat. Thus all Banat peasants – Volksdeutsche 
included – could have land they could not cultivate themselves or with the use of hired 
labor taken away and given to others for cultivation.
696
 Land could also be expropriated if 
it was needed for a range of melioration projects the Reich invested in
697
 e.g. 
improvement of the irrigation system and construction of food processing facilities such 
as dairies.
698
 This suggests that while the Reich certainly did exploit the Banat‟s 
economic potential, this was not done as heedlessly and without long-term planning as 
was the case in occupied areas of the Soviet Union. However, since economic extraction 
from the Banat was inextricably linked to that from Serbia proper, the Banat‟s economic 
potential in the war years was more damaged than aided by associated pressures and 
demands. A portion of melioration investments came from Serbian tax revenue, which in 
turn derived partly from the Banat. Thus the Third Reich had the Banat pay for its 
occupation and for improvements to its agriculture, of which the Reich was the chief 
beneficiary. 
A final major source of economic pressure on the Volksdeutsche peasantry was 
the constant labor shortage, which affected agricultural production as acutely as it did the 
young Volksdeutsche administration. Already in February 1942, before official Waffen-
SS mobilization began in the Banat, the VoMi estimated it would result in some 15,000 
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non-German laborers being required to fill in for mobilized Volksdeutsche.
699
 The 
following month, Sepp Janko suggested the number might actually exceed 25,000 
laborers.
700
 In view of such numbers, relatively few Banat Volksdeutsche obtained 
official permission to move to the Third Reich for work. The process to obtain such a 
permission was made deliberately cumbersome.
701
 Volksgruppe officials were 
discouraged from making even flippant remarks about leaving for the Reich
702
 so as to 
prevent invaluable Volksdeutsche personnel from departing in search of better wages or 
out of a sentimental attachment to the ancestral homeland.  
The two years between the deployment of the division “Prinz Eugen” outside the 
Banat in fall 1942 and the arrival of the Red Army in fall 1944 were certainly the kind of 
civilian experience Tony Judt has termed typical of World War II in Europe,
703
 with 
women, children and the elderly fending very much for themselves. Following the men‟s 
departure with the Waffen-SS in fall 1942, propaganda praised the exertions of 
Volksdeutsche women – as caregivers, cultivators of land and givers of life
704
 (see 
Chapter 6 for a discussion of images of women in Banat Volksdeutsche propaganda) – 
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 Propaganda aside, the continued massive agricultural output 
expected of the Banat would have been impossible without the use of organized labor.  
The Volksgruppenführung wed ideology to necessity in the founding of the 
German Labor Service (Deutscher Arbeitsdienst, DAD) for Volksdeutsche youths of both 
genders in spring 1942. Coinciding with the start of the recruitment for the division 
“Prinz Eugen,” both forms of service were heralded as joyful yet voluntary obligations, 
an “honor service to the German Volk,”
706
 which would help forge the Volksdeutsche 
into a true Volksgemeinschaft. An article in the Reich journbal Nation und Staat made 
the connection between the training of youth for service at home and their elders‟ service 
on the front. The youths had “to prove themselves worthy of their fathers and older 
brothers on the front, and to contribute to German victory through complete dedication in 
the Heimat [homeland].”
707
 Some allowances were made for boys and girls needed to 
work on their parents‟ landholdings, but overall labor service was made concomitant with 
being a member of the Deutsche Jugend or the Deutscher Mädelbund (the girls‟ wing of 
the Deutsche Jugend), and obligatory for all students of German private schools.
708
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Aside from its propaganda value in a period of increased regimentations and 
mobilization of Volksdeutsche civilian life, the DAD‟s value as a labor source was 
limited by the necessity to allow most of its young recruits to continue to attend school. 
Since recruitment for the Waffen-SS in spring 1942 rapidly drained the available pool of 
adult Volksdeutsche men, the authorities in Belgrade and the Banat turned to the majority 
non-German population of the latter. Three months after the DAD, the creation of an 
obligatory labor service for adult Banat non-Germans was also proclaimed. In a display 
of the Volksgruppenführung acting under the pretense of independence, but really as an 
extension of the Third Reich in Serbia, this particular order was proclaimed by Lapp on 
behalf of the Wehrmacht in Serbia. Although its primary beneficiaries were 
Volksdeutsche households whose men were mobilized, missing, killed in action or 
POWs,
709
 the purpose of the new labor service was to ensure regular deliveries of 









In principle, the men affected by the labor service could gain exemptions if they 
were employed or attended school full-time, or if they were the sole breadwinners in their 
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 They were supposed to receive a small wage, room and board, and a 
clothing and shoe allowance to replace those worn out in labor service.
714
 The period of 
service should have been 45-60 days with regular rotation of laborer contingents.
715
 Lip-
service was even paid to an inchoate notion of a multiethnic Banat Volksgemeinschaft of 
sorts, laborers and masters of different ethnicities brought closer together by shared work 
for a greater cause.
716
 By April 1943, less than a year after it was proclaimed, the labor 
service conscripted some 13,500 men.
717
 
In practice, however, proof of having done one‟s labor service was required in 
order to attend university, so high-school and university students could not claim an 
exemption even if they did attend classes full-time.
718
 By fall 1943, the labor service 
duration was extended from two to four and a half, and then to more than six months; the 
age of the men affected was extended to 17-23 years.
719
 There could be little talk of 
building a classless community when the overwhelming impression left on 
Volksdeutsche employers and Serbian (the ethnic group most affected by the labor 
service
720
) laborers alike was that of mutual disappointment and barely concealed 
resentment. Only one Volksdeutsche interviewed after the war suggested that relations 
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between employers and laborers had been good enough for the latter to choose to prolong 
service past the required date.
721
 Otherwise, the most charitable assessment laid some of 
the blame on Volksdeutsche women, whose lack of language skills made communication 
with the workers very difficult.
722
 The Serbian, ethnic Romanian and ethnic Slovak 
workers were routinely described as fairly useless.
723
 They committed the gravest sin in 
any peasant‟s book: “they habitually ate more than they earned.”
724
  
In March 1943, in conjunction with the proclamation of total war in the Third 
Reich, Sepp Lapp issued a decree that all adult Banat residents regardless of ethnicity, 
who were not already employed, had to report and be assigned to an agricultural or 
industrial enterprise needing labor. Those who failed to do so could be compelled to do 
their labor service. This was so especially for those sentenced by a court to forced labor, 
alcoholics, „asocial‟ personalities, the „work-shy‟ and Roma.
725
 A related order decreed 
that specifically Reichs- and Volksdeutsche adults in Serbia-Banat could be called up for 
labor service, yet provided so many exceptions that few were actually called up.
726
 Thus 
not only did the Banat Volksgruppenführung start to apply Nazi social – as well as racial 
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– categories to the Banat labor pool, but it ascribed them mostly to non-German laborers, 
exposing these to physical and verbal abuse even in paid positions.  
In the non-German workers‟ perception, there was very often little or no 
distinction between labor service and forced labor. Even if they received the token 
payment promised, non-Germans affected by the labor service cannot have been happy 
about having to take time away from their own fields in order that Volksdeutsche fields 
be tilled. Even one Volksdeutsche testimony from the village of Schurjan blurred the 
distinction by describing young Serbs conscripted for paid labor service for up to two 
months in duration as “Zwangs-Arbeiter.”
727
 The distinction was further blurred by the 
fact that many former conscripted laborers never worked in the fields, as the 1942 labor 
service decree stipulated they should. Instead they did construction work on roads and the 
Pantschowa airstrip under Luftwaffe supervision
728
 and menial labor such as cleaning and 
laundry work in barracks, hotels and casinos taken over by the Wehrmacht.
729
 They could 
also be assigned as well as sentenced to spend a few months cutting wood in the work 
camp on Ostrovaĉka Ada (an island in the Danube near the Romanian border) where 
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most testimonies agree the worst one had to contend with, apart from the actual work, 
were a low-fat diet and squadrons of mosquitoes in summer.
730
  
In general, enforcing labor rules – whether they referred to forced or paid labor – 
outside of the Banat‟s concentration camps (see Chapter 5) was well-night impossible, 
although to dodge labor service was officially labeled punishable as sabotage.
731
 People 
often failed to show up, and the Volksgruppenführung lacked the policemen to round up 
errant workers.
732
 The Volksgruppenführung exercised its ability to pass decrees which 
were in the Reich‟s and its best interest, and which affected the daily lives of other Banat 
residents, but it often lacked the executive power to enforce them. Between the lax labor 
discipline and exemptions made for the ethnic Hungarians and the remaining 
Volksdeutsche, by late summer 1943 the Banat was in dire need of some 6,000 workers, 
but there were simply no locals left to be conscripted for labor service.
733
 By spring 1944, 
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500 Italian POWs had been promised as additional labor but failed to arrive, and the 
demand for agricultural machinery had not been met. Despite all these setbacks, Banat 
Volksdeutsche were still described as “dutiful and willing to make sacrifices.”
734
 A few 
months earlier, Franz Neuhausen gave the highest praise a Reich German could to the 
Banat when he wrote that “it fulfills its duty [as though it were] a German Heimatgau.”
735
 
This attitude – a mixture of pride in supposedly German qualities of hard work, 
thriftiness and dutifulness, a material as well as spiritual (or ideological) interest in the 
Third Reich‟s victory, and the desire to prove Volksdeutsche superior to other Banat 
ethnicities – should be credited with the Banat Volksdeutsche‟s ability to produce as 
much as they did under conditions of increasing adversity. Though they were not the sole 
Banat population group to supply the Reich, they were clearly seen – and saw themselves 
– as the most important one in that regard.
736
 While there was almost no actual fighting in 
the Banat until fall 1944, conditions for agricultural production were nonetheless 
unfavorable. No sooner had Volksdeutsche been given the opportunity to obtain more 
cultivable land from expropriated Serbs and Jews than the bulk of their labor force was 
conscripted into the Waffen-SS, leaving the rest to contend with unreliable non-German 
laborers, demanding Reichsdeutsche economic officers, a lack of draft animals and 
machinery, and a disparity between earning power and the tax rate. Whether they 
personally embraced the ideology broadcast to them from Berlin, Belgrade and 
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Grossbetschkerek, Volksdeutsche peasants certainly adopted its main tenet as it related to 
them: their duty to soldier on in their fields, much as their brothers and sons in the 
Waffen-SS did in the field.  
 
Oranges and Schools 
In addition to economic measures intended to benefit both the Banat Volksdeutsche and 
the Third Reich, the latter provided the former with certain other perks which improved 
the material quality of their lives and elevated them above other Banat ethnic groups. An 
obviously ideological issue like German education was one arena in which ideology was 
wedded to material privilege, but so was the less obvious issue of food rationing.  
 Although officially rations should have been the same for all, in practice a 
qualitatively better ration was provided for those serving in any Axis armed formation. 
Thus those who got the better ration were almost all Volksdeutsche (since almost all had 
male relatives in the Waffen-SS or the Banat police
737
), also the families of some four 
hundred ethnic Hungarians serving in the Banat police (see Chapter 5), a mere handful of 
ethnic Romanians,
738
 and practically no Serbs.
739
 The better basic ration meant 200kg of 
wheat per person, whereas the second-grade ration consisted of 70kg of wheat and 130kg 
of corn per person.
740
 Most postwar Volksdeutsche testimonies confirm this, though with 
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varying amounts of wheat in the second-rate ration.
741
 One asserted that the 
Volksdeutsche village mayor of Haideschütz enabled even the Serbian villagers to get 




Volksdeutsche were often the targets of envy over food, especially luxury items 
such as oranges, which the Volksgruppenführung secured for its members, but not for 
other Banat residents.
743
 Ordinary Volksdeutsche‟s motifs in this matter were mixed at 
best. While several reports also mentioned that the Volksdeutsche received a better sugar 
ration than others,
744
 one took the cynical view that women joined the Deutsche 
Frauenschaft for that express reason.
745
 Another maintained that many Volksdeutsche 
were actually embarrassed by this preferential treatment, and that the informer‟s own 
aunt used the extra sugar she received to bake cakes for Serbian POWs in the Reich.
746
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Social pressure could work both ways, not only enforcing conformity but also 
prompting discomfort among those seen to be elevated above others. A slightly less 
Pollyanna-ish variation found in an official report suggests that some Volksdeutsche 
women, whether on their own initiative or prompted by the Volksgruppenführung, used 
their bigger sugar ration to make sweets for German soldiers recovering in field 
hospitals,
747
 including members of the division “Prinz Eugen.” Thus any embarrassment 
over the sugar ration could be rationalized away as being used in service to the greater 
German cause as well as a source of joy for the local men serving on the front.  
A thornier issue was presented by changes in the education system which, while 
ostensibly promoting and benefiting Volksdeutsche, caused both material and ideological 
contention within the Volksgruppe. In view not only of its relative isolation from the 
German heartland, but of its likely future fate as part of the Hungarian state,
748
 the Banat 
Volksgruppe required ideological consolidation. Therefore the Reichsdeutsche 
administration in Belgrade prompted the Serbian government to issue a decree in 
September 1941 placing German-language education in the Banat on a firmer footing.  
The “Verordnung über die Schulen der Deutschen Volksgruppe im Banat” 
(“Decree on the Schools of the German National Group in the Banat”) built on the 
precedents set by the opening of a handful of German-language schools by the Yugoslav 
government in late 1940,
749
 the provision under Yugoslav law of German-language 
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classes in municipalities with a Volksdeutsche majority or substantial minority,
750
 and the 
consolidation of Volksdeutsche group legal rights in July 1941.
751
 The new school law 
confirmed that only students of German origin – Volks- and Reichsdeutsche alike – could 
attend German-language schools.
752
 It also determined that buildings, rooms and teaching 
tools required by extant or future German schools or classes in mixed schools in the 
Banat would be provided, free of charge, by the municipal authorities.
753
 In effect, this 
meant that teaching tools and furniture were requisitioned from property belonging to the 
Serbian state or private institutions. For example, gym equipment belonging to the Sokol 
(a Slavophile gymnastic society) and the municipal high school was transferred to the 
German Gymnasium in Grosskikinda already in late April 1941.
754
 The September school 
law merely ratified such gestures after the fact. 
The practical effects of the school law were the creation of a truly separate 
educational sphere for German-speakers in Serbia-Banat – “complete autonomy [of] 
upbringing, instruction, administration and school supplies [underlined in the 
original]”
755
 – and the furthering of the Volksgruppenführung‟s efforts to make the 
occupied Banat an extension of the Reich. Yet it also confirmed the impossibility of 
separating the Banat from Serbia entirely. Though the September 1941 law made 
German-language schools private institutions nominally separate from state control, their 
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employees remained public servants of the Serbian state. Even more importantly, 
German-language schools depended on a yearly subvention from the Serbian Ministry of 
Education.
756
 In addition to confirming Volksdeutsche dependence on the Reich, the 
school law confirmed their continued existence in a kind of limbo: members of the 
German Volk but not quite equal to Reich Germans, residents of an area controlled by an 
administration of their own, yet a part of an occupied territory.  
Much like the Volksdeutsche administration as a whole, the improved status of 
German-language schools did not always meet with the approval of those it was supposed 
to benefit the most, for reasons which were sometimes material and sometimes 
ideological. The part of the school budget not covered by state subsidy derived from an 
obligatory school tax levied on all Volksdeutsche and all economic enterprises with at 
least a 50% capital share owned by racial Germans. While it had the sentimental 
advantage of being a tax which never left the Banat for Serbia proper, and was used 
entirely for Banat purposes,
757
 this was an added financial burden on a peasant 
community in which higher education was not the highest premium. 
Furthermore, despite the quantitative increase in the number of German-language 
schools and classes in mixed schools,
758
 the actual quality of the education cannot have 
been very high, since the Volksgruppe suffered from a lack of qualified teachers as well 
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as administrators. A teacher training college (Lehrerbildunganstalt) was opened in 
Werschetz to replace the one from Yugoslav times in the Baĉka.
759
 Even though its 
employees scrambled to train some three dozen young Volksdeutsche teachers before the 
start of the 1941-1942 school year, in his December 1941 report Harald Turner (chief of 
the Reichsdeutsche civilian administration in Belgrade) remarked that the gaps in the 
ranks of German-speaking teachers were far from closed.
760
 Once recruitment for the 
Waffen-SS started in spring 1942, the situation became more critical.
761
 Even 
Volksdeutsche with a middle- or high-school diploma and a completed training course 
could be licensed as teaching assistants or honorary teachers.
762
  
What is more, the 1941 school law‟s provision that only persons of German origin 
could work as teachers in German-language schools was openly bypassed by the 
employment of non-Germans who had teaching experience and could teach classes in 
German. Postwar Volksdeutsche apologia claimed piously that it was preferable to have 
Volksdeutsche children taught by less-qualified teachers with a good command of the 
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German language than good teachers who did not speak the language.
763
 In reality a 
compromise was established so that quite a few Serbs and ethnic Russians (White Guard 
émigrés who had escaped the Russian Civil War and settled in Yugoslavia), who had 
taught in Yugoslav state schools before the April War, now taught Volksdeutsche 
children in German, and were allowed to reside in the Banat due to the chronic shortage 
of teachers considered racially German.
764
  
Whatever the ethnicity of individual teachers, the content of the lessons taught in 
the Banat‟s German-language schools was unabashedly gleichgeschaltet (coordinated 
with National Socialist ideology), based on textbooks imported from the Third Reich.
765
 
This meant that especially lessons in German, history, geography and biology were 
shaped by ideological principles. The younger, openly Nazified school staff saw in 
National Socialism a “magic charm,” which made up for lack of teaching 
qualifications.
766
 The new German-language schools also extended the regimentation of 
the Volk into the students‟ lives outside of school. All pupils of German-language 
schools automatically became members of the Deutsche Jugend, the Banat version of the 
Hitler-Jugend.
767
 Alongside their high-school diploma, they received a völkisch diploma 
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testifying to the strength and Germanness of their character, and their readiness for future 
sacrifices for Volk and Führer – namely for mobilization into the Waffen-SS.
768
  
These factors made for much tension between the older generation of educators 
and parents on one side and younger teachers and pupils on the other,
769
 along the same 
lines as the tension between the Volksgruppenführung and the Kulturbund leaders who 
had preceded them. One postwar work conveyed the following glib view of the issue:  
Although the school law did not state that German children had to attend German 
schools, the longing for an education in the mother tongue, awoken and developed 
during the [preceding] years of oppression, was so strong that not a single German 




In actual fact, some Volksdeutsche parents chose to send their children to a Hungarian-
language school either out of a lingering Habsburg loyalty or from sheer calculation and 
in expectation of proximate annexation of the Banat by Hungary. Either way, the near-
apoplectic threats of the local Volksdeutsche authorities for parents to either send their 
children to a German-language school or provide them with private tutoring in German 
had no effect,
771
 and the Reichsdeutsche in Serbia had bigger problems than the number 
of German-speaking children in various schools.  
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The high number of people dodging the obligatory labor service demonstrated 
that the Volksgruppenführung lacked sufficient police and punitive resources to enforce 
total discipline over non-Germans in the Banat. The issue of attendance in German-
language schools highlighted the Volksgruppenführung‟s limited ability to coerce even 
Volksdeutsche for such lesser infractions. Only extreme corruption and serious breaches 
of discipline against a branch of the Volksgruppe like the DAD or the Hitlerjugend could 
earn a Volksdeutscher real censure and tangible punishment by exclusion from the 
Volksgruppe, loss of position or imprisonment. For anything less, the 
Volksgruppenführung had to rely on its co-nationals willingness to comply with its 
orders.  
Most Volksdeutsche were willing, since obedience to the Reich‟s expectations 
carried with it material, ideological and social benefits through inclusion into the tightly 
knit Volksdeutsche community. Once a child was signed up for German-language classes 
– which required written proof of the parents‟ racial Germanness – it was impossible to 
take the child out without the whole family forfeiting its membership in the 
Volksgruppe.
772
 Likely it was a rare Volksdeutscher who weighed the chance to increase 
his landholding or obtain rare or rationed foodstuffs with relative ease as less valuable 
than the money saved by not paying the school tax and the gossip incurred by an act 
which would have prompted the whole family to be expelled from the Volksgruppe. 
Whether they approved of – or even cared about – the ideological content of their 
children‟s education, fundamentally the Volksdeutsche accepted the material and 
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ideological costs of occupation, and justified them as, ultimately, in their own best 
interest. 
 
Reactions: Ethnic Hungarians, Ethnic Romanians, Serbs 
Patterns of official and private behavior established in the second half of 1941 held as 
true of other Banat ethnicities as they did of Volksdeutsche. Ethnic Hungarians and 
ethnic Romanians zealously tracked each other‟s complaints to the authorities in 
Grossbetschkerek, Belgrade and Berlin in what had started out as genuine competition 
but descended quickly to the level of petty, ineffectual bickering. Both Hungary and 
Romania had shown their relative weakness vis-à-vis Germany in the first half of 1941, 
especially in their inability to wrest more of the conquered Yugoslav territory than Hitler 
was willing to concede to them. By late 1941 they profoundly implicated in Hitler‟s war 
on the Eastern Front. By 1942, neither government made as many or as grandiose 
demands on behalf of its co-nationals in the Banat as it had been wont to do.  
This left the ethnic minority leaders in the Banat itself to make demands, but 
neither was very successful. In terms of schooling in Hungarian and Romanian, both 
ethnic groups felt entitled to the same kind of preferential treatment meted out to 
Volksdeutsche. As in all their demands, they were hampered by their inferior numbers 
vis-à-vis Volksdeutsche. Felix Benzler, the AA representative in Belgrade, ordered the 
closing of several Hungarian-language middle schools in late 1942 on the pretext that the 
Volksdeutsche in the Baĉka, far more numerous than the ethnic Hungarians in the Banat, 
were only allowed three German-language middle schools. The Hungarian Ambassador 
in Berlin protested that the comparison was inappropriate – despite the fact that the his 
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side often made similar comparisons in order to prove that ethnic Hungarians in the Banat 
were being oppressed – but failed to have the same number of schools reopened.
773
  
Likewise, the Banat ethnic Hungarians enjoyed only partial success in importing 
schoolbooks in Hungarian (which called for the restoration of all the lands of St. 
Stephen‟s Crown including the Banat) and Levente (the Hungarian youth organization) 
uniforms masquerading as school uniforms. The textbooks had to be submitted to the 
Reichsdeutsche censors in Belgrade
774
 while the Levente uniforms had to have their 
distinctive decorations removed and were then distributed to schoolboys as ordinary 
coats,
775
 which was only reasonable in view of the textile shortage. When the ethnic 
Hungarians demanded that teachers from Hungary be allowed into the Banat to make up 
the numbers,
776
 fewer teachers were allowed than had been requested.
777
 Reich foreign 
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policy demanded that ethnic Hungarian requests not be rejected out of hand. With regard 
to their lower standing in the Nazi racial hierarchy, the ethnic Hungarians were never 
allowed the same level of privilege or expected to make the same kinds of sacrifices as 
the Banat Volksdeutsche.  
Another bone of contention was the issue of better rations for Volksdeutsche, but 
there the Reichs- and Volksdeutsche had seized the moral high ground by associating 
better rations with serving the Reich‟s interests under arms. There was no recruitment for 
the Hungarian army within the Banat, and barely four hundred ethnic Hungarians served 
in the police there. The vast majority got the same ration as Serbs and ethnic Romanians, 
despite much complaint.
778
 Playing the numbers game – inflating ethnic Hungarian 
numbers as a means to wrest more privileges
779
 and ease the future Hungarian takeover of 
the Banat – did no good. The Volksdeutsche administration sedulously denied ethnic 
Hungarian claims.
780
 Berlin was hardly naïve when it came to such unsubtle tactics, 
having played the numbers game itself with regards to the Volksdeutsche in Poland, 
Yugoslavia and Russia.  
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For all their suspicion of Volksdeutsche, policymakers in Berlin remained 
steadfast on the main issues around which Volksdeutsche loyalty revolved. As one 1943 
memo put it succinctly, to hand over the Banat to Hungary at that point would have been 
disastrous for the fighting morale of the division “Prinz Eugen,”
781
 the one reliable (if not 
always very effective) anti-Bolshevik fighting force in occupied Yugoslavia in addition 
to the Wehrmacht. Foreign policy aside, handing a Volksdeutsche community into which 
the Reich had invested time and effort to a racially inferior state whose loyalty was 
increasingly suspect, was fundamentally alien to the National Socialist mindset. After the 
Third Reich occupied its erstwhile ally Hungary in March 1944, the whole issue of the 
Banat‟s ownership dropped from sight as the ethnic Hungarian community in the Banat 
descended irreversibly into internal squabbling.
782
 
As for the ethnic Romanians, they issued much the same complaints as the ethnic 





 and the fact that the Levente uniforms had not been sent back to Hungary.
785
 
If ethnic Hungarian complaints engendered a barely suppressed tone of irritation in AA 
responses, Benzler and the Banat Volksdeutsche did not even take ethnic Romanian 
missives seriously.
786
 Although Romania‟s participation in the economic and military 
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efforts of the Axis carried substantially more weight than Hungary‟s, Romania offered its 
co-nationals abroad far less overt support.
787
 Thus whatever minor complaint the ethnic 
Romanian leadership made on behalf of its community in the Banat and the Timok 
Region fell on completely deaf ears.
788
 Bucharest consistently failed to exert any of its 
considerable leverage with the Reich, apparently satisfied that the Serbian Banat 
remained out of Hungarian hands. The ethnic Romanian community in the Serbian Banat 
was riven by internal dissension and abandoned in 1943 by its appointed leader in a futile 
gesture of protest over the Serbian Banat‟s continued occupation by German (rather than 
Romanian) forces.
789
 If it had been weak in late 1941, it became completely ineffectual in 
Banat affairs thereafter.  
For all intents and purposes, once a Reich-occupied, Volksdeutsche-administered 
Banat remained as the only long-term viable option in late 1941, Hungarian, ethnic 
Hungarian and ethnic Romanian demands lost what little power they had had to compel 
any real concessions from Berlin. The incessant complaints and mutual accusations 
leveled thereafter – most consistent in their failure to achieve any major change in ethnic 
Hungarian or ethnic Romanian standing within the Banat – served only to underscore 
Hungary and Romania‟s willing adoption of an inferior position vis-à-vis the Third 
Reich. For their co-nationals in the Banat, this ineffectuality and their middling standing 
in the Nazi racial hierarchy translated into an odd mixed blessing. The ethnic Hungarians‟ 
and ethnic Romanians‟ inferior position vis-à-vis Volksdeutsche meant they did not have 
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privileged access to land, food and schoolrooms. It also meant that they were not 
expected to bear the high material and human cost with which Volksdeutsche paid for 
their privileges.  
The ethnic groups which suffered real inferiority vis-à-vis the Volksdeutsche 
administration were the Serbs and the Jews. The former were protected only nominally 
by the weak, Reich-dependent collaborationist government in Belgrade. Nobody 
protected the latter, who met with the same kind of unrestrained degradation and loss of 
life and property as did Jews elsewhere in Hitler‟s Europe (see Chapter 5).  
The Banat Serbs were in a more complex position: the numerical majority in the 
Banat and in Serbia-Banat as a whole, the Banat Serbs lacked a Volksgruppe of their own 
to represent their interests.
790
 As Banat residents, they had to deal with the Volksdeutsche 
administration – rather than directly with the collaborationist Serbian government in 
Belgrade – which could have been expected to treat them with nothing but contempt and 
a desire to strip them of all rights. This is certainly the view taken by most historians in 
postwar Yugoslavia.
791
 In fact, though there are many examples of Volksdeutsche 
robbing and mistreating Serbs, their overall standing did not deteriorate greatly during the 
war years, provided they fulfilled one all-important criterion: they remained free of 
association with the communist resistance which flared up in summer 1941.  
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Before organized communist resistance started after June 22, 1941, Banat Serbs 
found themselves targeted by unsystematic violence committed by Volksdeutsche police 
and civilians aided and abetted by Reichsdeutsche soldiers and officials. This violence 
was a result of the euphoria of liberation by Reich forces and the early days when a 
Freistaat Banat – or at least separation from Serbia – seemed a distinct possibility. 
Occurring at the same time as the first attacks on the Banat Jews, the most startling 
example of an assault on Serbian life and safety occurred right after the conclusion of the 
April War, when physical danger should have been on the wane.  
On April 22, 1941 the nine Pantschowa Volksdeutsche men who had been taken 
hostage at the outbreak of the war between Yugoslavia and the Axis, and murdered en 
route to Belgrade,
792
 were interred in front of the Pantschowa town hall with much pomp 
and circumstance, in the presence of many Volksdeutsche.
793
 That same day, a kangaroo 
court was held in the town hotel, presided over by Reichsdeutsche officers and attended 
by several prominent local Volksdeutsche. It tried forty Serbian men from the town, 
thirty-six of whom were sentenced to death. Eighteen were hanged and another eighteen 
shot on the Orthodox Christian cemetery. The executioners seem to have been 
Reichsdeutsche officers as well as some local Volksdeutsche.  
The burial of the murdered Volksdeutsche and the execution of men whose 
involvement in the murders could not be proven by any real legal means were clearly 
carefully planned and executed. They followed closely on the heels of the celebrations in 
honor of Hitler‟s birthday two days earlier. The convicted men were selected from among 
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people arrested (by a haphazardly assembled Volksdeutsche police
794
) in preceding days 
for the „crimes‟ of belonging to the Sokol or the Ĉetnik organizations, open expression of 
pro-Yugoslav, royalist and anti-German sentiment in the prewar period, and especially 
participation in the March 27 demonstrations against Yugoslavia‟s accession to the 
Axis.
795
 (It is striking that none of the surviving witnesses mention communist loyalty as 
cause for this early arrest and abuse. Under the new, communist Yugoslav authorities, 
witnesses might have been expected to play up the political angle when giving their 
statements. But because the Communist Party had been illegal in the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, in 1941 its adherents – if any – would have been more circumspect and 
secretive about their loyalties than the Slavophile Sokoli or the royalist Ĉetnici.) 
Some surviving witnesses – including men who had been arrested, but not picked 
for the April 22 trial – drew the conclusion that the local Volksdeutsche must have drawn 
up a „black list‟ of prominent Serbs and Yugoslav patriots for just such retaliatory 
action.
796
 This does not necessarily follow. In a town like Pantschowa, all potential 
Volksdeutsche informers had to do was keep their eyes open. Just as in later months and 
years every Volksdeutsche‟s adherence to official German proclamations could be 
observed by neighbors, so before the April War everyone could see which of the 
townspeople expressed anti-German opinions.  
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It is unclear whether the idea for the events of April 22 derived from Volks- or 
Reichsdeutsche. Either way, these events achieved a threefold goal: they demonstrated 
the abrupt transition from life in a sovereign state to that in an occupied territory; they 
successfully conveyed the impression of a united front between invading and local 
Germans (with early alienation of many potential Serbian collaborators an inadvertent 
consequence); and they burned into the witnesses‟ memory the accusatory image of local 




The transition from an independent, Serbian-dominated land to an occupied, 





 names to German ones, and by the destruction of monuments to Serbian kings 
and other historical figures. These had been erected in order to mark the Banat as a 
Serbian landscape following its inclusion in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
after World War I. The invading Reich Germans set the tone with the ransacking of 
Serbian cultural landmarks such as churches and libraries.
800
 The dismantling-cum-
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destruction of monuments to King Petar I KaraĊorĊević in Grossbetschkerek,
801
 King 
Aleksandar KaraĊorĊević and poet Đura Jakńić in Deutsch-Zerne,
802
 and several 
monuments to Serbian soldiers in World War I
803
 took place over a more protracted 
period of time, usually at the instigation of local Volksdeutsche and other local 
administrators trying to curry favor with the new German administration. Alongside the 
destruction of the Banat synagogues (see Chapter 5), these acts demonstrated in a highly 
visual manner the decisive shift in the balance of power in favor of the Volksdeutsche as 
representatives of the Greater German Reich.  
The Volksdeutsche‟s euphoria of liberation and their overnight transformation 
from a self-consciously beleaguered minority into the ruling elite of the Banat found an 
outlet also in a rapacious approach to Serbian property, which continued intermittently 
throughout the years of occupation. While violence by those high in the Nazi racial 
category toward those low in it was in evidence across the German sphere of influence in 
World War II, Banat Volksdeutsche stealing the property of Serbs and Roma 
demonstrated yet again the essential narrow-mindedness of the Banat Volksdeutsche 
community, its closeness and turning away from grander, global schemes. Even the 
Volksdeutsche peasants later accused of stealing land from their neighbors did so on a 
fairly small scale. The real large-scale pilfering took place during the Aryanization of 
property alienated from the Banat Jews, but even then Reich economic offices 
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approached the process more systematically and effectively than did the Volksdeutsche 
who profited from it (see Chapter 5). 
As for movable property – whether it was a nice new car belonging to a Serbian 
lawyer, requisitioned for use by Police Prefect Franz Reith, Volksgruppenführer Sepp 
Janko and other leading Volksdeutsche
804
 or a Rom‟s horse which the municipal 
president sold to another Volksdeutscher as his own,
805
 a Volksdeutsche seamstress 
filching sewing supplies and bits and bobs of a Serbian competitor‟s household over the 
years,
806
 individual Volksdeutsche policemen taking a poorly paid railway man‟s 
bicycle
807
 or leaving a store with ten pairs of unpaid-for silk stockings
808
 – the thieving 
committed by Volksdeutsche
809
 was easy, petty and down-to-earth. It showed how the 
Nazi occupation brought out the worst in people considered racial kin to the Reich 
Germans, but also a fundamental lack of imagination and grandiose ambition on the part 
of the Volksdeutsche.
 
The same is true of furniture and clothes requisitioned by the 
Volksdeutsche police and the Waffen-SS division “Prinz Eugen” for the furnishing of 
officers‟ clubs and apartments, and of draft animals, cars, bicycles and radios 
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commandeered by the latter.
810
 The behavior of the Volksdeutsche in charge of the 
requisitioning was one of crass one-upmanship rather than a real sense of righteous 
superiority, a provincial materialism rather than ideological empowerment.
811
 
Despite these individual acts of violence, the most striking impression produced 
by Volksdeutsche behavior toward Banat Serbs – and the latter‟s reactions to the 
occupation – is that of relative restraint. No blanket effort to expel all Serbs from the 
Banat or to expropriate all of them ever happened. The contrast with the treatment of 
Banat Jews or the likelihood of violence and expulsion faced by Serbs living in 
Hungarian Baĉka or in the Independent State of Croatia is striking. The violence Banat 
Volksdeutsche inflicted on Banat Serbs was haphazard and unsystematic (even the 
obligatory labor service was relatively easy to dodge for those Serbs who wished to 
dodge it). This haphazardness did nothing to diminish the resentment of those personally 
affected, but it never came close to the kind of violence common in Poland and the Soviet 
Union – or Serbia proper and Bosnia, in all of which the resident Slavs were considered 
synonymous with racial inferiority, resistance and/or communism. 
The Banat Serbs did not hold a privileged position in the Nazi gradation of Slavic 
peoples. They did, however, feel the proverbial lash considerably less than their co-
nationals south of the Danube, in large part because neither the communist nor the 
royalist resistance movements were very active in the Banat (see Chapter 5). In August 
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1941, when Tito‟s Partisans were just gathering steam in Serbia proper, official reports 
from Serbia-Banat spoke of the Banat Serbs‟ distaste for the possibility of Hungarian 
rule. This gave the Banat Serbs common cause with the Volksdeutsche administration 
even if some did sympathize also with the communist cause as an anti-German one.
812
 
The Banat Serbs were a mostly peasant population – not a social group predisposed to 
favor an ideology opposed to the ideal of private property.  
Actual experience of violent action by the Partisans led within a month to a sharp 
rise in tip-offs to the Volksdeutsche police.
813
 By year‟s end the communist threat in the 
Banat had been almost completely neutralized along with the possibility of Hungarian 
annexation. Building on a historical sense of cultural and civilizational superiority among 
the Vojvodina Serbs vis-à-vis the Serbs from Serbia proper,
814
 the conditions in late 1941 
convinced the vast majority of Banat Serbs of the benefits to be derived from a quiet, 
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 even if some Serbs lost land or other property to it or 
were treated as second-class subjects.
816
 
In addition, there were significant benefits to be derived from active collaboration 
with the occupying Reichsdeutsche and the Volksdeutsche administration. Serbs did not 
receive easy access to land, better rations or movable property as did Volksdeutsche and 
some ethnic Hungarians. However, the chronic lack of trained personnel meant that Serbs 
continued to be employed in the Banat administration
817
 and schools even if officially 
they were supposed to be replaced by Volksdeutsche. In fact, records of the Police 
Prefecture for the Banat (Polizeipräfektur des Banates) suggest that Serbs who had been 
born or resided for any period of time within the Banat before April 6, 1941, as well as 
those expelled from the Baĉka or Croatia, had no trouble getting legal residency in the 
Banat provided they filled posts in the Banat‟s schools, technical and administrative 
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The same held true of ethnic Russians of long residence in Yugoslavia,
819
 
suggesting that in this case Nazi racial categories were not so much flexible as a blind eye 
was turned to them when not enough racial Germans were on hand to fill all the positions 
required for the daily running of the Banat. Residence applications were not usually 
denied on grounds of ethnicity alone, with the occasional exception like that of an ethnic 
Hungarian nun from the Baĉka living in Grossbetschkerek, whose presence in the Banat 
as a Hungarian citizen (after April 1941) and teacher in a Hungarian-language school ran 
up against bureaucratic bloody-mindedness.
820
  
A Serb, even one born in the Banat, was most likely not to be allowed to reside 
there if he or she lacked a steady income and employment, had moved to the Banat after 
the April War, and was likely to be a burden on local resources by requiring medical 
attention or a pension earned in Yugoslavia before the April War.
821
 In short, though they 
may not have prospered, most Banat Serbs could count on a reasonably peaceful 
existence in the Banat provided they were employed in a capacity the Volksgruppe could 
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not fill with one of its own, did not participate in communist activities or associate with 
those who did, and were not Jewish.  
 
Conclusion  
One of the benefits for the Third Reich of having its troops occupy the Serbian Banat was 
the fact that it could implement its racial policies there with only minimal regard for other 
policy considerations. Since the Hungarian and Romanian claims on the Banat had lost 
most of their diplomatic power in late 1941, the interests of the Banat ethnic Hungarians 
and ethnic Romanians could be settled with minimal concessions in education and access 
to land, food and textiles. By contrast, the Reich‟s influence over Banat affairs continued 
to grow exponentially after 1941, as the Reich tied the Banat Volksdeutsche to its 
policies by a range of material and ideological incentives. 
 For the Banat Volksdeutsche, being recognized as a member of the Volksgruppe 
became the prerequitie for enjoying the many material benefits the Reich afforded to 
Volksdeutsche: easy access to land expropriated from Serbian veterans of World War I, a 
better grain ration and access to luxury items like sugar and fruit, being assigned 
auxiliary labor, more administrative jobs and German-language classes than before. 
Volksdeutsche also enjoyed the prestige of belonging to the very top of the Nazi racial 
hierarchy, and the predominance it lent them vis-à-vis other Banat residents. Both 
material and ideological motives inspired ordinary Volksdeutsche as well as their leaders 
to collaborate with the Reich. 
Once accepted into the Volksdeutsche community, it became very difficult for 
individuals to maintain multiple identities as their loyalties devolved to Reich and Volk 
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and, to a far lesser extent, their home villages and towns. Likewise, personal conflicts 
were translated into ethnic conflicts as Volksdeutsche came to embrace the Nazi view of 
Slavs, Jews and other non-Germans, while the non-Germans in turn blamed all Germans 
for acts of violence or robbery inflicted by individual Volksdeutsche. This tendency of 
perceptions to become generalized and universal under the impact of National Socialist 
ideology was undiminished by generational, class and political tensions within the 
Volksgruppe.  
Volksdeutsche accepted the policies passed by the Volksgruppenführung (with 
Reich approval) because their own administration was preferable to a Serbian or a 
Hungarian one. This general compliance enabled the Volksgruppenführung to exercise a 
degree of coercion only rarely, in matters such as gross dereliction of duty by 
Volksdeutsche administrators, cultivation of land and mandatory food deliveries for the 
Reich. Otherwise, cajoling through perks, social pressure and local prestige of 
Volksgruppenführung members were more effective tools of control than open coercion. 
The Volksgruppenführung was, at best, a weak dictatorship which depended on both 
internal (Volksdeutsche) and external (Reich) approval and support for its existence.  
The Reich exercised its power over the Volksdeutsche administration to ensure 
that the Volksdeutsche paid it back for every perk and privilege the received. Access to 
land and labor were intended to increase Volksdeutsche food deliveries. German-
language schools promoted National Socialist ideology. Volksdeutsche taxes helped pay 
for the occupation of their home region by scant Reich troops. This ambivalent attitude 
toward the Volksdeutsche – half exploitation, half promotion – drew on the essential 
ambivalence of the Volksdeutsche position in Hitler‟s Europe.  
278 
 
It was also evident in the Reich‟s attitude to Volksdeutsche in relation to the 
resistance movements and the Holocaust in Southeast Europe. While it allowed for a 
degree of Serbian collaboration to ensure the smooth running of the Banat, the Third 
Reich and the Banat Volksgruppenführung alike encouraged ordinary Volksdeutsche to 
prove their worth as racial Germans by combating the anti-German resistance in Serbia-





































CHAPTER V „. . . AND THE LASH‟
822
: THE VOLKSDEUTSCHE POLICE,  
ANTI-PARTISAN ACTION, AND THE HOLOCAUST IN THE SERBIAN BANAT 
 
Active collaboration with the Third Reich was not the only way in which the 
Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) of the Serbian Banat aided the occupation forces. The 
Volksgruppenführung (ethnic German leadership) shared the Reich‟s ideological 
convictions about natural racial supremacy, and the dangers of racial mixing and 
communism. So did some ordinary Volksdeutsche. For the vast majority of the Banat 
Volksdeutsche – including the ardent National Socialists among them – ideological zeal 
was only one element of their positive attitude to the Nazi regime. As shown in the 
previous chapter, the Reichsdeutsche (Reich German) occupation regime offered, with 
Berlin‟s agreement, a range of material incentives to Volksdeutsche. It did so in order to 
achieve a dual objective: bolstering their standing as members of the German Volk in a 
multiethnic region, but also gaining the Volksdeutsche‟s complicity with its policies. 
However, access to land, German-language education and better food rations were 
material incentives from which the Reich profited even more than the Volksdeutsche 
themselves, since it allowed the Reich to exploit the Volksdeutsche‟s economic potential 
while also tying them securely into the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft.  
 Two additional types of privileges for Volksdeutsche also carried material 
benefits, but were more overtly ideological: security operations and access to Aryanized 
property (property confiscated from its previous, Jewish owners). Volksdeutsche 
participation in border patrols and the Banat police dovetailed with the emphasis placed 
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in propaganda on their heritage as soldiers along the ethnic borders of the Greater Reich 
(see Chapter 6). It also allowed the Third Reich to utilize the Volksdeutsche as a reliable 
local resource instead of tying down Reichsdeutsche soldiers after the campaign in the 
Soviet Union proved not as swift and victorious as Hitler had hoped. Finally, 
Volksdeutsche policemen actively collaborated with the Reichsdeutsche in Serbia in 
combating the communist resistance. This embroiled them in Hitler‟s anti-Bolshevik 
crusade and, starting in 1942, left them vulnerable to the Reich‟s growing demand for 
soldiers, not just policemen and border guards. In 1941, however, the Reich still preferred 
to cajole rather than coerce the Banat Volksdeutsche. This, and the 
Volksgruppenführung‟s relative weakness in enforcing policy among its co-nationals, 
meant that even service in the Banat police and the Deutsche Mannschaft (DM, the 
Volksdeutsche militia) was voluntary rather than compulsory. This element of 
voluntarism meant that Volksdeutsche policemen and concentration camp guards had to 
actively choose to collaborate. 
The Volksdeutsche participation in the Holocaust in Serbia-Banat was more 
insidious as a means of implicating the Volksdeutsche in the Reich‟s policies, and had a 
more widespread effect. Volksdeutsche aided Reichsdeutsche in arresting Jews right after 
the end of the April War and in August 1941, when the Banat Jews were deported en 
masse to Belgrade. Volksdeutsche also served the Reich as concentration camp and labor 
camp guards in the Banat, but participated mostly peripherally and sporadically in the 
actual killings. However, Volksdeutsche were the most obvious benefactors from 
Aryanization in the Banat, which implicated them in the Reich‟s racial policies. Even 
though the Reich drew the greater material benefit by Aryanizing commercial enterprises, 
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the most visible side of Aryanization in the Banat consisted of the ordinary 
Volksdeutsche‟s stealing or purchasing of Jewish furniture, clothes and other movable 
belongings. Like their participation in the anti-partisan struggle in Southeast Europe, 
individual Volksdeutsche‟s participation in Aryanization tainted them irrevocably in the 
eyes of their non-German neighbors. But while only some Volksdeutsche took part in 
anti-partisan activities before 1942, very many profited materially from the dispossession 
and deportation of the Banat Jews.  
Postwar Yugoslav historians such as Zdenko Levntal and ĐorĊe Momĉilović 
embraced the image of a universally Nazified Volksdeutsche community, wrought of a 
series of individual decisions taken by individual Volksdeutsche in the war year. These 
historians took the postwar socialist-ideological view which stressed the fascist 
allegiances of the Volksdeutsche and their greed for Jewish property as the 
Volksdeutsche‟s prime motivations.
823
 Paradoxically, so did Akiko Shimizu in her highly 
descriptive – and not-ideological – recent book on the Banat Volksdeutsche under 
occupation. Shimizu‟s main complaint was with other German historians such as 
Ekkehard Völkl, whom she accused of accepting wholesale Volksdeutsche expellees‟ 




All of these authors based their interpretations in part on the postwar testimonies 
of Volksdeutsche expellees and refugees made to the West German Federal Ministry for 
Expellees, Refugees and Persons Damaged by War or (in Shimizu‟s case and) on 
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depositions Banat residents (mostly non-Germans, but also some Volksdeutsche) made to 
the Yugoslav Commission for the Determining of the Crimes Committed by Occupiers 
and Their Helpers, which amassed proof in preparation for war crimes trials of 
Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche alike.
825
 However, none of these authors have gone 
sufficiently deep into the material or combined the two sets of postwar testimonies so as 
to provide as complex a picture as possible of Volksdeutsche actions and motivations in 
Hitler‟s war against communism and the Jews. In this chapter, the two sets of materials, 
analyzed together, offer a nuanced picture of the ever-shifting balance of greed, ideology, 
apathy, giving in to social trends, and Schadenfreude among Banat Volksdeutsche. Mixed 
motives led some Volksdeutsche into active collaboration with the Reich‟s policies. They 
led the vast majority of Volksdeutsche into at least a tacit complicity with the persecution 
of their neighbors accused of racial or ideological enmity to the Nazi regime.  
 
Deutsche Mannschaft 
There was practically no fighting in the Serbian Banat between its occupation in April 
1941 and the arrival of the Red Army in early October 1944. Unlike in other occupied 
Yugoslav lands, resistance activity in the Banat was small in scale and never caused more 
than temporary disruption. However, as in other occupied Yugoslav lands, the measures 
taken to combat resistance activity were often far out of proportion to the actual 
achievements of the resistance fighters. Retaliation was shaped by an ideological view of 
the enemy as an exponent of a Jewish and Slavic Bolshevik conspiracy against Germany. 
But whereas in Serbia proper anti-partisan fighting was the purview of the Wehrmacht, 
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) police and, in fall 1942, the Volksdeutsche Waffen-SS, in the 
Banat security was almost exclusively a Volksdeutsche matter
827
 – even though 
Volksdeutsche policemen acted on Reichsdeutsche orders. 
Since the Wehrmacht‟s Kreiskommandantur 823 in Grossbetschkerek had very 
few Reichsdeutsche soldiers attached to it, it became necessary right after the April War 
to form a Volksdeutsche police force to prevent and investigate crime. Following the start 
of Operation Barbarossa and the concomitant beginning of the communist resistance in 
Yugoslav lands, the Volksdeutsche police was also expected to carry out anti-partisan 
actions in the Banat. Despite the establishment of a Volksdeutsche administration in 
summer 1941, the Banat Volksdeutsche were not necessarily the logical candidates for 
the role of policemen and concentration camp guards. The circumstances which gave 
them this role, and confirmed their predominant position over the other Banat ethnicities, 
included the reluctance of other Banat residents to take on the burden of security, the 
disenchantment of the Reichsdeutsche in Belgrade with the possibility of widespread, 
effective Serbian collaboration, and the willingness of many Volksdeutsche to accept 
both the power and the responsibility a police officer‟s position carried. The recruitment 
of Banat Volksdeutsche for police duties also created a precedent which later allowed the 
Reich to exert ever more coercion over Volksdeutsche reluctant to serve it in another 
capacity: as soldiers of the Waffen-SS. 
In February 1942, Werner Lorenz of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VoMi) 
compiled a report on the anti-German resistance in occupied Serbia. Writing about the 
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Banat, he stressed the importance of its Volksdeutsche administration for maintaining 
fairly good relations with the Banat Serbs.
828
 The Banat was the direct opposite of Serbia 
proper, where the competing royalist (Ĉetnik) and communist (Partisan) resistance 
movements profited from the lack of Reichsdeutsche control outside of the major urban 
areas. Lorenz ended his report by calling the Banat a place of “absolute peace.”
829
 After 
the war, former deputy Volksgruppenführer (Volksdeutsche leader) Josef Beer took it up 
a notch, calling the Banat in the war years an “oasis of peace and order in the chaos 
which was former Yugoslavia.”
830
  
The first major safety issue facing the occupation authorities in Serbia-Banat 
before the outbreak of the Partisan resistance in late June 1941 was securing the borders 
of Serbia-Banat. The problem was not so much the possibility of attack from outside. 
Serbia-Banat was surrounded on all sides by states allied with (Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Croatia) or occupied by Germany and Italy (Greece, Montenegro, Albania). 
The main issue was daily traffic across borders and customs control. Although an 
inchoate Deutsche Mannschaft, the Volksdeutsche paramilitary organization, existed in 
the Banat already at the time of the April War, it was then neither uniformly nor very 
well trained or equipped. More importantly, the initial decision made by the Reich 
military authorities was to use only Serbs as gendarmes and customs agents. 
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Volksdeutsche in the north and ethnic Albanians in the south of occupied Serbia-Banat 
were discouraged from applying for these positions, and denied if they did apply.
831
 
 The reasoning behind this decision had to do with the desire to utilize as many 
native collaborators as possible, so as to release Reichsdeutsche military and 
administrative personnel for deployment away from the Balkans or for more upper-level 
tasks in Serbia proper. The Serbian collaborationist government had the support of 
Harald Turner, chief of the Reichsdeutsche civilian administration in Belgrade. In early 
June 1941, it seemed a viable option as far as collaborationist governments went. 
Moreover, the Reichsdeutsche authorities may have suspected Volksdeutsche and ethnic 
Albanians of trying to establish contact with their co-nationals across Serbia‟s borders, 
possibly even making common cause for the creation of a Freistaat Banat (which attempt 
had just been prevented in May 1941
832
) or a Greater Albania. Both hypothetical states 
would have alienated the Reich‟s allies and clashed with Reich interests in Southeast 
Europe.  
The Wehrmacht reached an agreement with the Reich Finance Ministry to replace 
Wehrmacht soldiers manning border crossings with Serbian officials supervised by a 
handful of commissars representing the Reich Border and Customs Patrol 
(Zollgrenzschutz).
833
 This proved easier said than done as both the Banat 
Volksdeutsche
834
 and the ethnic Hungarians
835
 denied the newly arrived border officials 
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access to their posts, requiring the Volksgruppenführung to intervene and exercise its 
somewhat shaky authority or even to call Reichsdeutsche soldiers for help. The Serbian 
border guards were perceived as an extension of the Serbian government in the Banat at a 
time when the prospect of severing all ties to Belgrade still seemed feasible to the Banat 
Volksdeutsche and ethnic Hungarians.  
In the course of summer 1941, however, the Banat Volksdeutsche administration 
cemented its position in the Banat precisely by acknowledging and confirming its 
dependence on the Third Reich‟s foreign policy. This meant accepting its likely future 
annexation by Hungary, but also the current reality of Reich German rule. It also meant 
accepting the fact that a Volksdeutsche state separate from Serbia was impossible for the 
foreseeable future. Paradoxically, the Volksgruppenführung‟s tenuous status – a quasi-
state within a state which was no real, independent state but an occupied territory – and 
its dependence on the Third Reich made the long-term deployment of Serbian security 
officials unacceptable to Volksdeutsche sensibilities.  
However, Volksdeutsche sensibilities never ranked as high in Berlin‟s 
policymaking as official rhetoric let on. The eventual decision to replace Serbs with 
Volksdeutsche as agents of the Zollgrenzschutz was less a sign of the Reich‟s growing 
trust in Volksdeutsche and more of the developing realities of warfare in the Balkans. In 
spring 1942, when Volksdeutsche border guards under Reichsdeutsche supervision 
replaced Serbs on the Banat‟s borders,
836
 the likelihood of a stable and reliable 
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collaborationist Serbia already seemed a foolish prospect. Both the Partisan and the 
Ĉetnik resistance stepped up their activities, while the Nedić government‟s ability to 
control the situation diminished exponentially. Serbian officials lost much of the Reich‟s 
good will, and Volksdeutsche rose correspondingly in the military administration‟s 
esteem as agents of keeping the peace.  
Moreover, in spring 1942 Heinrich Himmler and Adolf Hitler started 
implementing the systematic recruitment of Banat Volksdeutsche for the Waffen-SS, 
building on previous, unsystematic recruitment for the Deutsche Mannschaft, the Banat 
police and the border patrol. Recruitment for the Waffen-SS and for the police and border 
patrol continued side by side throughout 1942 and 1943, to the point where the sheer 
scope of the recruitment for the Waffen-SS hobbled the Volksgruppenführung‟s ability to 
fill the ranks of the police and border security forces from among its ranks. Already in 
summer 1942 most of the men trained to serve as border guards and customs agents had 
been taken into the Waffen-SS, and had to be replaced with poorly trained men too old 
for military service.
837
 Few as these were, by May 1943 Volksdeutsche helped guard the 
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As far as the Banat‟s police force was concerned, the Deutsche Mannschaft never 
fit comfortably into a specific niche. Most likely in an attempt to downplay the 
seriousness of Volksgruppenführer Sepp Janko and other leading Volksdeutsche‟s 
(himself included) ambition to recruit willing Volksdeutsche for the Waffen-SS before 
the April War,
839
 in his postwar testimony Jakob Lichtenberger melded these attempts 
with the creation of the Deutsche Mannschaft. Before the April War, it was ostensibly an 
apolitical, völkisch organization for cultural and sports activities by Volksdeutsche men 
in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
840
 Even after the April War, it never became the official 
Banat police force, much less an inchoate army. Like the SA in the Third Reich,
841
 the 
Deutsche Mannschaft occupied a no man‟s land halfway between a civilian and a military 
institution. It aped the military chain of command and dressed its members in the black 
uniforms which eventually earned it the nickname the „black police,‟ but was under the 
Volksgruppenführung‟s command.
842
 This quasi-military, but really civilian chain of 
command was due to the fact that, alongside the Deutsche Frauenschaft and the Deutsche 
Jugend, the Mannschaft was as one of the Gliederungen (organizations based on age and 
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gender) of the Deutsche Volksgruppe im Banat und in Serbien (German National Group 
in the Banat and Serbia).
843
  
Ideologically, the Volksgruppenführung exerted itself to represent service in the 
Mannschaft as a duty and an honor for every völkisch-conscious male member of the 
Volksgruppe, and the Mannschaft itself as an ideological and practical school of the 
Volk. Its duty was officially to “educate all ideologically and racially irreproachable men, 
regardless of their age and class, for the great tasks before our Volk, and to deploy them 
in direct service to the Volksgruppe. The DM should be the political instrument of the 
Volksgruppe‟s will and accomplishment.”
844
 In later years, service in the Mannschaft was 
strenuously represented as in no way inferior to that in the Waffen-SS. The comparison 
did not hold up even in propaganda materials, which stressed that those men who “were 
not in the position to wear the grey soldier‟s tunic [could still] do justice to their duty as 
soldiers – if only in part.”
845
  
The Deutsche Mannschaft was thus something of a neglected stepchild so far as 
the Volksgruppe‟s institutions went. Its position was not aided by the fact that, though it 
regularly absorbed members of the Deutsche Jugend as these came of age
846
 and enforced 
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a quasi-military discipline on its members,
847
 service in the Mannschaft was initially not 
obligatory for all adult Volksdeutsche men. Even the administrators and Volksgruppe 
officials obliged to hold honorary rank in it were relieved of any actual duties within the 
Mannschaft.
848
 Despite efforts to train it both ideologically and militarily in summer 
1941,
849
 the Deutsche Mannschaft never overcame its status as an auxiliary institution, a 
militia force of peasants so ill-trained and -equipped that even Reichsdeutsche customs 
officials remarked on it in early 1942.
850
  
Nevertheless, in fall 1941 the Mannschaft aided the newly formed Banater 
Hilfspolizei (Banat Auxiliary Police) in combating Partisans inside the Banat, even 
standing in for the real police on occasion due to a general lack of trained personnel.
851
 
The same was true of village militias, which did their duties as best they could, but were 
armed “some with rifles, some with sticks,”
852
 and lacked the shoes and coats to patrol 
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 They were the target of much resentment in the more peaceful 
villages
854
 before being gradually disbanded around the turn of 1941-1942.
855
 As for the 
citizens‟ militia mustered in Pantschowa in 1941, even guarding the airstrip in 
Smederevo proved beyond its capabilities, prompting the following description of its 
fighting potential: “[T]hese citizens first [need to be] instill[ed] with some martial spirit. 
At the moment, they are well and truly useless.”
856
 
The situation only worsened with the start of the Waffen-SS recruitment in spring 
1942, which was not only better organized, but did not allow for voluntarism. So many 
were the Deutsche Mannschaft members called up by the Waffen-SS that Janko 
temporarily dissolved the Mannschaft in March 1942 – in the same issue of the 
Verordnungsblatt der Volksgruppenführung der deutschen Volksgruppe im Banat und 
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The Deutsche Mannschaft was very low on the list of priorities, both with the 
Volksgruppe and in Berlin‟s view of Southeast Europe. In fall 1942 Himmler proclaimed 
that every racial German residing in the East, who did not already serve in the Waffen-
SS, Wehrmacht or the German police could be called up to help combat resistance. Janko 
and Felix Benzler (the German Foreign Ministry representative in Belgrade) were quick 
to point out – and the AA (Auswärtiges Amt, the German Foreign Ministry) in Berlin to 
concur – that the Banat Volksdeutsche men not already in “Prinz Eugen” were too few to 
be much use for such anti-partisan action in the Banat,
858
 apart from poor training and 
discipline. Even so, the manpower shortage necessitated the resurrection of the Deutsche 
Mannschaft in December 1942,
859
 as well as military training for the boys who would 
eventually join the Mannschaft, and even for those who were not in the Deutsche 
Jugend.
860
 This latter measure extended still further the regimentation of Volksdeutsche 
civilian life started in German-language schools – regimentation which laid the 
groundwork for, and was in turn exacerbated by, recruitment for the Waffen-SS. 
Whereas service in the Waffen-SS was obligatory, the Mannschaft proved to be a 
true arm of the Volksgruppenführung in its inability to enforce full compliance. 
Membership was made obligatory for adult men up to forty years of age after the 
Mannschaft started up again in late 1942. The Waffen-SS recruits discharged in 1943 on 
grounds of advanced years felt the full brunt of social pressure to join the Mannschaft as 
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soon as they returned home,
861
 but could not really be compelled to join. In the words of 
one man who proved stronger than the social mechanisms by which the 
Volksgruppenführung ruled (see Chapter 4): “At home they tried to get us to join the 
Deutsche Mannschaft. But we said no! They got us once as volunteers by their refined 
wiles, but they wouldn‟t get us a second time.”
862
  
In vain did Janko decide in March 1944 to revamp the Mannschaft into the 
Deutsche Männergruppe, a broader organization of Volksdeutsche men (what was left of 
them in the Banat after the Waffen-SS recruitment), of which the Mannschaft would be 
the armed, (para)military wing.
863
 No mere change of title could transform the 
Mannschaft into an ideological and gender elite like the SS. Far from it: in late summer 
1944, the Deutsche Mannschaft‟s deployment in aid of the regular Volksdeutsche police 
pursuing Partisan groups within the Banat resembled a bad comic opera, as Mannschaft 
members gossiped openly about supposedly secret operations
864
 and exchanged friendly 
fire with the police after getting lost in some tall reeds in broad daylight.
865
 The evidence 
suggests that not even its members took the Mannschaft very seriously, probably because 
service in it was part-time, and offered little in the way of material and only marginal 
ideological incentive. The situation was different in the regular Volksdeutsche police. 
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The police system in the Banat replicated that in the Third Reich, with parallel and 
partially overlapping jurisdictions between the Kommando Öffentliche Sicherheit under 
Juraj Spiller (Command of Public Safety, equivalent to the political Sicherheitspolizei) 
and the Kommando der Staatswache under Ernst Pelikan (Command of the State Guard, 
equivalent to the regular, uniformed Ordnungspolizei). Both were subsumed to the 
Polizeipräfektur des Banates (Banat Police Prefecture) under Franz Reith. Officially 
separated from the Volksgruppenführung in early 1942,
866
 it answered directly to the 
newly installed Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer (HSSPF, Higher SS and Police Chief) in 
Serbia, Austrian SS-Gruppenführer and career policeman August Meyszner.
867
 Meyszner 
represented Himmler and took control of Waffen-SS recruitment completely out of Sepp 
Janko‟s hands (see Chapter 7).
868
 In addition, there was a Gestapo outpost in 
Grossbetschkerek, commanded by a succession of Reichsdeutsche officers reporting 
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 Spiller, Reith and Pelikan were avowed Volksdeutsche,
870
 but actual command of 
all security matters in the Banat rested with the Reichsdeutsche administration in 
Belgrade. This was where orders issued, but it was left to Spiller and Reith‟s discretion to 
plan and coordinate anti-partisan actions. Only a single police battalion from the Reich 
(Police Battalion 64) and the scant forces of Kreiskommandantur 823 existed as an actual 
police force in the Banat,
871
 the Deutsche Mannschaft had proved not up to ensuring that 
the communist resistance flaming up in Serbia proper in summer 1941 would not spread 
to the Banat, and the events surrounding the installation of Serbian border guards showed 
the extent of the locals‟ animosity toward Serbian governmental bodies. A real police 
force had to be created from the Banat civilian population. This left only the 
Volksdeutsche and, to a lesser extent, the ethnic Hungarians as viable candidates, after 
Kurt Daluege, chief of the Third Reich‟s Ordnungspolizei, refused General Heinrich 
Danckelmann‟s (German commander in Belgrade) request to have additional police 
battalions from the Reich sent to Serbia.
872
 Instead, Daluege petitioned the 
Oberkommando des Heeres for permission to create “protective formations” from the 
Volksdeutsche in occupied Serbia-Banat.
873
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Permission arrived in due course, and a one thousand-strong auxiliary police 
(Hilfspolizei) composed of Banat Volksdeutsche was planned.
874
 Volksdeutsche were at 
this point a logical choice for the role, since the position of the Volksdeutsche 
administration in the Banat was sufficiently secure vis-à-vis the Serbian collaborationist 
government and Hungarian ambitions alike to justify giving it a measure of executive 
power. However, as indicated, police work was not left solely to the 
Volksgruppenführung‟s discretion. As an armed formation with the full force of the law 
behind it, the Hilfspolizei served the security, political and ideological interests of the 
Third Reich, as transmitted by Meyszner and Schäfer to the Volksgruppenführung before 
the creation of the Banat Police Prefecture, later to the Prefecture itself.
875
 Coinciding 
with the recruitment for the Waffen-SS division “Prinz Eugen,” the Hilfspolizei‟s status 
as an instrument of the Third Reich did not protect it from having its freshly trained ranks 
depleted by Waffen-SS demands.
876
 Nevertheless, it remained a significant factor in the 
anti-partisan struggle in the Banat. 
Both as a police force and as a Volksdeutsche force, the Banat Hilfspolizei was a 
part of Heinrich Himmler‟s private empire within the Third Reich‟s sphere of 
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 It therefore had more power over its members. Unlike the Deutsche 
Mannschaft, membership in the Hilfspolizei was a paid auxiliary position with the 
Ordnungspolizei
878
 which carried with it certain privileges, not the least of which was a 
better grain ration for the policemen and their families.
879
 This certainly attracted some 
recruits to its ranks. While the Volksgruppenführung thus cajoled Volksdeutsche to join 
the Hilfspolizei, with the weight of Himmler‟s authority behind it, it could also compel 
them to join it and stay in it.  
This was an early indication that the Volksgruppenführung would willingly put 
the Reich‟s interest ahead of its co-nationals‟ interest when recruitment of Volksdeutsche 
was at stake, removing even the possibility of voluntarism beyond the Volksdeutsche‟s 
grasp (see Chapter 7). On the whole, recruitment for the Hilfspolizei was not left up to 
the good will of individual Volksdeutsche. When summons were issued to groups of men 
from individual villages, in Franzfeld first the village mayor‟s son and then all of the men 
summoned for police duty refused to go. This Volksdeutsche village provided the 
Volksgruppenführung with an object lesson in dealing with recalcitrants. Chief of the 
Banat administration Sepp Lapp, himself from Franzfeld, came to the village with a 
detachment of the Deutsche Mannschaft and arrested not only the men who had refused 
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their summons, but several dozen other Volksdeutsche of both sexes who had protested 
the summons most loudly. The arrestees were paraded through the village, with a local 
woman known for her anti-Nazi sentiment forced to wear a sign saying “We are 
Franzfeld‟s shame.”
880
 Once this tale spread through the Volksgruppe, it did more than 
any amount of propaganda to ensure acceptance of the fact that the privileges and perks 
Volksdeutsche received did not come without a price, as well as compliance with future 
mobilization summons. By the time Waffen-SS recruitment started a few months later, 
almost no one in the Banat protested those summons too loudly, least of all the residents 
of Franzfeld, the fight knocked right out of them.  
The remarkable thing about this affair was not so much that the 
Volksgruppenführung openly cracked the proverbial whip against a large number of its 
co-nationals in a decisive and rare departure from its usual cajoling approach. What is 
truly remarkable is the precedent set by the events in Franzfeld for future relations 
between the Volksgruppe and the Reich. Although the crackdown on the rebellious 
village was performed by representatives of the Volksgruppenführung (fellow 
Volksdeutsche), the impetus came from Meyszner‟s predecessor, erstwhile 
Sicherheitspolizei and SD chief in Serbia Wilhelm Fuchs, the Reichsdeutsche personnel 
dispatched to train the Hilfspolizei, and the whole persuasive power of the Reich ranked 
behind them. It is unclear whether Fuchs actually commanded Lapp to deal with 
Franzfeld and how. The very fact that a Volksdeutsche police was being formed and that 
the Reich was willing to employ even the lightest of coercions in the form of summons 
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for armed duty to ensure its timely creation, was sufficient to prompt the 
Volksgruppenführung to some coercive action of its own. 
With this precedent – that Volksdeutsche could be openly coerced into the 
Reich‟s service, in however roundabout a way – set, the training first of the Hilfspolizei 
and later of the division “Prinz Eugen” marked the transition into a prolonged period of 
ever more coercion of the Volksdeutsche by the Third Reich. however, this approach 
never tipped over into unrelieved coercion, not least because even the resolution of the 
incident in Franzfeld relied on extant social mechanisms more than outright violence.  
Moreover, the „lash‟ as applied to Volksdeutsche never came without a positive 
incentive or two. Preferential rations remained de rigueur for all Hilfspolizei members, 
and acted as a powerful incentive to compliance, as did access to Aryanized property, 
especially in the first months of the occupation (see below). On the other hand, when a 
group of new Banat policemen tried to wheedle their way out of taking the final, binding 
oath, the Reichsdeutsche personnel in charge of training them first patiently addressed 
each complaint. Those who claimed ill health got a check-up and a doctor‟s note of 
approval or discharge, those who claimed economic need were promised a laborer, those 
with bad eyesight – eyeglasses, and those with flat feet – arch supports. Only then did the 
officers in charge resort to abusive language. By that point, the Volksdeutsche‟s resolve 
had already been worn out by the Reich representatives‟ polite refusal to give in to 
blatant excuses.
881
 The desire not to stand out from the crowd was a powerful social force 
in the tightly knit Volksgruppe, with its traditional self-perception as an exposed ethnic 
and cultural minority. The Volksdeutsche on the whole had no more strength of resolve 
in objecting to individual policies of the Third Reich and the Volksgruppenführung than 
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did the Germans in the Reich. One negative example like that of Franzfeld served to 
render the majority docile, if not enthusiastic. 
Contrary to what might be expected, coercion was not always applied more 
openly against Banat non-Germans. There were roughly four hundred ethnic Hungarian 
members of the Hilfspolizei. Likely attracted by the promise of better rations, they had to 
brave quite a lot of criticism from their co-nationals, who saw in their becoming 
policemen for the Reich a betrayal of the Hungarian plans for the Banat.
882
 When the four 
hundred objected strenuously the Hilfspolizei‟s impending deployment in Serbia proper 
in summer 1943, most were dishonorably discharged, but do not seem to have suffered 
any worse consequences.
883
 In their refusal to leave the Banat, they had the support of 
their leader Jeszenszky.
884
 They also had the implicit support of the Hungarian 
government, which may not have had enough diplomatic or military leverage to secure 
special privileges for their co-nationals in the Banat, but could at least prevent their 
deployment outside of it. The Third Reich‟s continued need to keep its allies close 
dictated that the ethnic Hungarians in the Banat did not suffer even when they damaged 
Reich interest. Paradoxically, the Volksdeutsche could count on no such protection, since 
their sole protector and master was the Third Reich, so that when they refused to serve it 
they could anticipate treatment like that doled out to the recalcitrant residents of 
Franzfeld. 
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Banat Slavs had it comparably worse (see Chapter 4). Even the Banat ethnic 
Croats, though they were co-nationals of the Croats in the Independent State of Croatia, 
could receive summons for the depleted Hilfspolizei. If they refused, as racial Slavs 
linked to a state which was Germany‟s satellite (rather than a weaker, but independent 
government like Hungary), they faced arrest, forced labor and imprisonment. This is what 
happened to about one hundred ethnic Croats from Startschowa in May 1943.
885
 For 
those Slavs – mostly Serbs – accused of participating in communist activities and 
sabotage, the prospects were much worse. Although overall treatment of Serbs was not as 
terrible as that common against Russians or Belarusians, in the Banat as in the occupied 
parts of the Soviet Union there could be no worse crime than being associated with 
communist activities or sympathies, or being Jewish. 
 
Partisans 
In summer and fall 1941, as the Partisan movement was taking off in Serbia proper, a real 
danger existed that it would spread to the Banat.
886
 Reichsdeutsche forces were woefully 
overstretched and faced with an enemy fired by an ideological zeal for an inimical 
ideology, an enemy made all the more fearsome by association with the Jews and the 
Slavs: the unholy trinity of Nazi nightmare. As elsewhere in Yugoslav lands, the 
Partisans‟ greatest strength were mobility and the ability to blend in and live off the land 
– in the Banat mostly through the help of relatives and sympathetic civilians. In early fall 
1941, the Deutsche Mannschaft was not up to the task of fighting this demonic force, the 
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Hilfspolizei was in the process of formation and training, and the Reich forces in the 
Banat were few and ready to deploy in Serbia proper.
887
  
Yet despite their fearsome reputation, the Partisans in the Banat before summer 
1944 never amounted to more than six organized cells, only two of which were in major 
urban centers.
888
 They had about one hundred active members in all of the Banat.
889
 Their 
efforts at sabotage in summer and early fall 1941 were disjointed and of limited success: 
setting fire to the odd field, piece of field machinery or agricultural object, cutting 
telegraph wires, throwing a grenade through the window of a police barracks or the home 
of a member of the Banat administration, threatening village administrators or opening 
fire on a policeman or other armed Volksdeutscher on the open road.
890
 This was hardly 
the widespread struggle of freedom-loving Yugoslav peoples, as it would be portrayed in 
Yugoslav historiography and popular culture after the war.  
Also working in the Partisans‟ disfavor were the general prosperity of the Banat 
population, so that even the average Serbian peasant was not very open to their 
ideological arguments; the relatively benign attitude of the Volksdeutsche administration 
to Serbs (as opposed to the Hungarian habit of expelling Serbs from the Baĉka); and the 
geography. Guerrilla warfare was considerably easier in mountainous central, southern 
and eastern Serbia, southern Croatia or Bosnia. In the Banat, corn fields provided cover 
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much of the time, leading to such commonsense measures as Lapp‟s order that fields 
should be cleared of empty stalks right after the corn harvest.
891
 Hiding in the corn fields 
was such a common evasive maneuver in the flat Banat that anti-partisan warfare was 
nicknamed the “corn war.”
892
  
Last but not least, Juraj Spiller‟s department of the Banat police proved 
surprisingly effective at investigating, infiltrating and coordinating attacks on Partisan 
hideaways and villages
893
 known as communist strongholds. Even in his exculpatory 
memoir, composed as evidence for the defense at his trial as a war criminal in postwar 
Yugoslavia, he could not resist describing just how efficient and conscientious he had 
been. With a small group of policemen whom he trained especially as the core of an anti-
partisan fighting force which never quite materialized, Spiller‟s great talent was 
coordination. He successfully pulled together all the limited resources of the 
Grossbetschkerek Gestapo, the Hilfspolizei, the Deutsche Mannschaft, the 
Zollgrenzschutz and even the village militias in order to ensure that communist activity 
was suppressed ruthlessly and effectively.
894
  
Like the Gestapo in the Reich,
895
 Spiller relied on informers,
896
 whether coerced 
through arrest, paid or anonymous. Included among the latter were quite a few Serbs,
897
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as well as village notaries and other representatives of the Volksdeutsche administration 
(not all of whom were Volksdeutsche, see Chapter 4), whose motives Spiller described as 
a sense of duty to their position and/or anti-communist sentiment.
898
 By informing on 
neighbors, individual Banat Volksdeutsche (and other Banat residents) allowed 
themselves to be drawn by degrees deeper into complicity with the Third Reich. 
Spiller behaved like many a career policeman in the Third Reich, for whom the 
distinction between regular police work and ideological effort became blurred beyond 
recognition. In his memoir, he twisted this way and that to make it seem that Reith, 
Pelikan, the Volksgruppenführung and anyone else he could think of had hobbled his 
efforts, made murderous decisions and acted in ways far worse than he and his small 
circle of confidants. Nevertheless, he confessed that he had devoted the lion‟s share of his 
time to fighting communism in the Banat, because he saw it as the primary enemy of the 




Even before one hundred Serbs (and Jews and Roma) shot in retaliation for each 
murdered German became the norm in Serbia in October 1941 (see Chapter 7), 
disproportionate response to the perceived communist threat was common in the Banat. 
For example, when on July 31, 1941 two Reichsdeutsche soldiers were wounded and one 
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killed fighting Partisans near Grossbetschkerek, the very following day ninety arrestees 
were executed publicly in town, to serve as a warning to others.
900
  
Such sharp retribution was due partly to Spiller‟s ideological zeal, and partly to 
the fear and uncertainty felt by the Volksdeutsche rank and file. The Volksdeutsche sense 
of self had been shaped by two centuries of living in a borderland, among a non-German, 
frequently hostile (or, at least, perceived as such) population. Following the physical 
removal of the Banat Jews, the Banat Volksdeutsche‟s understanding of the enemy boiled 
down to the Serbian communists, “who hide out in the corn and sunflower fields like wild 
animals, feeding at the expense of the peasants who work those fields.”
901
 This is a 
unique example of a central tenet of National Socialism, which the Banat Volksdeutsche 
not so much reinterpreted as they adapted it to local conditions and made it their own. 
The local enemy against which Banat Volksdeutsche were mobilized en masse in 1942 
superseded the global enemy of Reich and Volk in their concerns. In the Banat 
Volksdeutsche‟s worldview, the communist loomed larger even than the Jew (see 
Chapter 6). Even those Volksdeutsche who considered themselves apolitical were 
receptive to the avowed need to combat communist guerrillas with great severity. 
By early October 1941, thanks to the coordination of various Reichs- and 
Volksdeutsche armed forces and the fine use of intelligence, the nascent communist 
movement in the Banat had been all but extirpated. Active Partisans not captured or 
killed had escaped to the Baĉka, and even non-violent activities like communist 
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propaganda had been rendered impossible by the arrests of several hundred persons 
suspected of aiding Partisans or being members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia 
(illegal since 1923).
902
 Thus the Banat‟s Volksdeutsche earned for their home region the 
reputation of a peaceful haven in the chaos of occupied Yugoslavia. This reputation 
brought the dubious reward of Waffen-SS recruitment for these Volksdeutsche, whose 
völkisch fighting spirit seemed very strong, because they resided in an area where the 
resistance was very weak.  
The initial victory over the Banat Partisans brought a return to relative peace even 
for Serbs suspected of communist sympathy. Though family members of known Partisans 
were arrested as hostages in early October, six weeks later Pelikan went so far as to allow 
children and nursing mothers to be released.
903
 In order to maintain the relative peace of 
late 1941, in subsequent years – especially after the depletion of its ranks by Waffen-SS 
recruitment – Spiller‟s office stepped up its efforts to put down even the slightest hint of 
resurgent communist activity. In this, Spiller had the support of the Kreiskommandantur 
in Grossbetschkerek, and of the Wehrmacht and the SS in Serbia proper.  
When Ņarko Zrenjanin,
904
 the leader of the Partisan movement in the Banat in 
1941, returned to the area in late 1942, Spiller struck a coup for the Greater German war 
effort: Zrenjanin was killed in an ambush set up by Spiller and Reith‟s forces with the aid 
of “Prinz Eugen.”
905
 As though to confirm the Banat Serbs‟ reputation as mostly averse 
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to left-wing propaganda, the whole operation was set in motion by a tip-off from a 
woman whose husband had been executed as a communist. She herself had spent time in 
prison until she was, by her own admission, “cured of communism.”
906
 Not even the 
Reich Propaganda Ministry could have invented a better example of successful 
cooperation across departmental boundaries in the struggle against the racial and 
ideological enemy of all things German, and of the supposed peaceful co-existence of 
European peoples faithful to the Reich.  
In reality, while the Banat was certainly much more peaceful than other occupied 
Yugoslav lands, periodic mass executions of men as well as women continued to occur. 
After the Jewish hostage pool was exhausted (see below), the victims were mostly Serbs 
and Roma who had been arrested and imprisoned in one of the Banat‟s concentration 
camps on suspicion of involvement in communist activities. The pattern which emerges 
from witnesses‟ testimonies, made as potential evidence against Volksdeutsche accused 
of war crimes in postwar Yugoslavia, involved Spiller‟s men rounding up local Roma to 
dig graves and, sometimes, finish off the victims if the method of execution was hanging; 
Germans (both Volksdeutsche policemen and Deutsche Mannschaft members, and 
occasionally Reichsdeutsche soldiers) acting as security and executioners; the bodies 
being left on display for 24 hours before they were buried. As a deterrent to guerrilla 
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The destruction of suspected communists‟ homes by the Volksdeutsche police
908
 
did not help destroy all trace of the communist resistance in the Banat either, nor did the 
sending of some arrestees to concentration camps in the Reich, far from the Banat
909
 or 
their prolonged incarceration in camps inside the Banat.
910
 Of the latter, the major camp 
for long-term prisoners was in Grossbetschkerek, while the police headquarters in all the 
major Banat towns served as prisons and interrogation centers. In addition, a camp 
operated in the Svilara (silk spinnery) in Pantschowa until September 1941, but was 
closed down following the deportation of the Banat Jews the previous month. There were 
also three small work camps on Ostrovaĉka Ada (an island in the Danube near the 
Romanian border), where prisoners worked in close proximity to civilians – including 
Volksdeutsche – doing their labor service, and the discipline was comparatively lax. 
Some prisoners were also sent to work on large landholdings.
911
 
While none of these were death camps, they were certainly places where prisoners 
were routinely beaten, interrogated under torture, degraded, mocked and even killed.
912
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On one occasion on Ostrovaĉka Ada a group of Bosnian prisoners sent there from the 
Sajmińte on the outskirts of Belgrade were almost literally worked to death before the 
guards executed them on the tugboat taking them back to Sajmińte.
913
 The camp 
commanders and guards were Volksdeutsche and the occasional ethnic Hungarian, 
members of the Deutsche Mannschaft, the Hilfspolizei or the division “Prinz Eugen.”
914
 
Many cut their teeth as camp personnel in spring and summer 1941, when the Banat Jews 
were imprisoned in Pantschowa and Grossbetschkerek, some for months at a time. The 
physical punishments inflicted on the Jews later became routine treatment for imprisoned 




Holocaust and Aryanization 
The deportation of the Banat Jews and the disposition of their property in favor of 
Volksdeutsche gave the latter yet another incentive to enforce peace and order in their 
home region at the expense of the non-German population. If the Reichsdeutsche 
occasionally cracked the whip over the Volksdeutsche, the Volksdeutsche certainly 
cracked their own whip over the Banat Jews with the aid and approval of the 
Reichsdeutsche in occupied Serbia. The 1931 Yugoslav census provides the only reliable 
estimate of Jewish numbers. According to it, there were around 4000 Jews living in the 
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 Reliable numbers as to how many survived the war are difficult to find, 
but overall Jewish survival in Yugoslav lands and a few documents from the war and 
immediate postwar period suggest the vast majority did not (see below).  
Several historians of the Holocaust in East Europe have remarked on the fact that, 
in the Nazi worldview, promoting Volksdeutsche and persecuting Jews went hand in 
hand. “Nazi racial policy was two-pronged,”
917
 in Doris L. Bergen‟s succinct phrase. 
Bergen also links the sharpening of Nazi anti-Semitic practices in conquered territories to 
the very tenuousness of the term „Volksdeutscher.‟ Her argument is that for people 
considered German, yet never quite up to par with the Reich Germans, the easiest way to 
prove their racial credentials was to commit acts of violence against the Jews, the primary 
enemy of the German in the Nazi worldview.
918
 Götz Aly adds that the desire to 
exterminate Jews eventually overpowered even the desire to promote and support 
Volksdeutsche as a priority for the Nazis, but even so the two policies were inextricably 
linked.
919
 This conclusion can be applied more broadly to Nazi policies regarding 
Volksdeutsche. As demonstrated in Chapter 4‟s discussion of the Third Reich‟s interest 
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imovine u Banatu 1941-1944,” in Tokovi revolucije: Zbornik istorijskih radova (Belgrade, 1967), 
p. 375; Shimizu, p. 244; Völkl, p. 65. 
The biggest Jewish populations lived in Grossbetschkerek (1269 Jews in 1931), Pantschowa 
(599), Werschetz (570), Grosskikinda (436), Debeljatscha (220), Neu-Betsche (136), 
Weisskirchen (130), Kubin (57), Tschoka (55) and Neu-Kanischa (55) (Shimizu, p. 245). Another 
56 towns and villages with had smaller Jewish populations (Ivković, p. 375).  
In the Danube banovina (roughly the Vojvodina) in 1931, 43% of Jews put down Hungarian as 
their mother tongue, 29% German, and 13% Serbo-Croatian (Shimizu, p. 243).  
Some 60% of the Banat Jews worked in trade and credit businesses (Shimizu, p. 244).  
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 Bergen, “The Nazi Concept of „Volksdeutsche‟,” p. 570. 
918
 “[A]spiring ethnic Germans in the east found the easiest way to prove themselves good 
Germans was to prove themselves good nazis [sic]. And the easiest way to establish nazi 
credentials was by endorsing and actively implementing attacks on Jews. Nazi authorities further 
encouraged that tendency by fostering an atmosphere of uncertainty around the identification of 
Volksdeutsche.” Bergen, “The Nazi Concept of „Volksdeutsche‟,” p. 574. 
919
 Aly, „Final Solution‟, pp. 5-7; also Bergen, “The „Volksdeutschen‟ of Eastern Europe,” p. 81. 
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in the Banat‟s agricultural output, economic extraction ran parallel to privileges granted 
to Volksdeutsche peasants. Ultimately, however, the Reich‟s need came first, and even 
Volksdeutsche privilege was subsumed to it.  
 With regards specifically to the destruction of the Jews, Bergen and Aly were 
writing predominantly about Poland and the Soviet Union, areas in which the 
Volksdeutsche‟s preferential position vis-à-vis other ethnicities was a fluid matter, 
subject to the whims of Reich policy. In the Banat, the existence of the Volksdeutsche 
administration and its key role in the daily running of the region not only gave the 
Volksdeutsche there greater responsibility than elsewhere in Hitler‟s Europe, it also 
shielded them to a large extent from changeable parameters of what constituted a 
Volksdeutscher.
920
 In terms of the Banat Volksdeutsche‟s attitude to the Banat Jews, 
however, there was no difference of opinion between the former and the Reichsdeutsche 
in Belgrade and Grossbetschkerek, nor was there any doubt on either side that 
Volksdeutsche should participate in and profit from the persecution of Jews. 
 It is difficult to gauge how widespread and acute anti-Semitism was among the 
Banat Volksdeutsche before the April War, or how much of it was based on attachment to 
Christian belief and how much was racial. The postwar testimonies of both non-German 
Banat residents and Volksdeutsche expellees in West Germany suggest that some anti-
Semitism (based on Christian prejudice but even more on economic competition) existed, 
and became exacerbated by the euphoria attending the arrival of Reich forces in April 
1941. Both sets of testimonies suggest that violence against Jews and their property in the 
Banat occurred along similar lines to such events in other parts of East and Southeast 
                                                 
920
 Sepp Janko‟s attempt to introduce a Volksliste-type gradation for new applicants to the 
Volksgruppe was not given as much weight as the Reich‟s endless sifting of Volksdeutsche 
resettled from the East. See pp. 222-223. 
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Europe under Reich occupation. Some preexisting prejudice was polarized by the 
presence and example set by the Nazis, and made the Jews into easy victims. Even 
Volksdeutsche who may not have disliked the Jews in quite the same way as the Nazis 
did, saw little reason to refrain from exploiting the Jews‟ vulnerability. The 
Reichsdeutsche gave official approval to, sometimes instigated, other times merely 
abetted violence against Jews committed by Volksdeutsche. 
A parallel examination of the two sets of postwar testimonies is all the more 
convincing on this account. The Yugoslav State Commission on war crimes was 
compiling eyewitness reports in the immediate postwar period (most date from 1944 and 
1945), which would have incriminated Volksdeutsche and other collaborators as war 
criminals. It had little interest in exculpatory narratives. The Volksdeutsche testimonies 
to the Federal Ministry for Expellees, on the other hand, were made mostly in the 1950s 
and aimed to curry sympathy for the expellees. They might be expected to fudge or avoid 
entirely the topic of how the Banat Jews were treated. Yet while former members of the 
Volksgruppenführung did exert themselves to whitewash their wartime activities, 
ordinary Volksdeutsche were, for the most part, refreshingly frank. It must be said that 
most failed to point the finger at specific Volksdeutsche who profited from the 
dispossession of the Jews, but so did some surviving Jews in their depositions to the 
Yugoslav State Commission. Whether this was due to the desire to shield former 
neighbors or a failure of memory, evidence found in the two sets of testimonies dovetails 
to a remarkable degree.
921
  
                                                 
921
 I deliberately steered clear of the few extant narratives of the Holocaust in the Banat (not 
including Serbia proper) because, whether they were penned by Yugoslav or (West) German 
historians they tend not to offer a lot of detail or they generalize. I used eyewitness and survivor 
testimonies reprinted in some of these books as primary documents in addition to the testimonies 
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These testimonies combined suggest that even before the German commanding 
general in Belgrade issued an official ruling on the changed status of Jews and Roma in 
late May 1941, anti-Semitic behavior was de facto policy in the Banat. Historians dispute 
whether the main instigator of such behavior were the invading Reichsdeutsche or the 
local Volksdeutsche. Yugoslav historians tend on the whole to blame the latter, which 
gives the Volksgruppenführung‟s ability to influence Reich policy far too much credit.  
There can be no doubt that it was the Reichsdeutsche who arrested the few Jews 
scattered in Banat villages right after the invasion. They followed the practice already 
established in Poland of rounding up Jews from rural communities and moving them to 
urban centers. They sometimes had help from local Volksdeutsche, but the primary 
instigators were the Reichsdeutsche.
922
 In Grossbetschkerek, the Banat‟s biggest town 
and administrative center, the same thing happened. In the atmosphere of victory and 
celebrations for Hitler‟s birthday, which also inspired the decision to „honor‟ the nine 
dead Volksdeutsche hostages from Pantschowa by executing a number of Serbs in that 
town,
923
 the vast majority of the Grossbetschkerek Jews were arrested by the Wehrmacht 
regiment “Grossdeutschland” on April 21, 1941.
924
  
                                                                                                                                                 
found in archives in Serbia and Germany. The narrative I offer here is based almost exclusively 
on first-person testimonies and a handful of relevant wartime administrative documents available.  
My discussion of Aryanization draws a bit more on secondary literature, but there too my goal 
was to portray the multiplicity of Volksdeutsche actions and responses. Hence the prevalence of 
evidence from eyewitness and survivors‟ testimonies in that section as well, in addition to 
wartime documents of the various economic offices involved in Aryanization. 
922
 This happened during the arrest of the thirteen Jews living in Srpska Crnja, the Serbian part of 
Zerne (testimony of Josef Stirbel (no date), LAA, Ost-Dok. 17/5, frame 703), the one Jewish 
family in Mastort (testimony of Jakob Laping (1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 17/5, frame 744), and an 
old Jewish woman in Sakula, though her daughter was married to a Serb and protected by local 
Volksdeutsche (testimony of Franz Scheidt (no date), LAA, Ost-Dok. 17/6, frame 818). 
923
 See p. 267. 
924
 Hauptmann Rentsch (Krieskommandantur 823 in Grossbetschkerek) to Militärbefehlshaber 
Serbien, April 23, 1941, NARA, RG 238 World War II War Crimes Records, entry 175, roll 16, 
document NOKW-1110, frame 275.  
314 
 
Although the commander of Kreiskommandantur 823 did not mention whether 
Volksdeutsche participated in this event in the document he produced only two days later, 
a Jewish survivor did in his postwar deposition. He testified that a group of 
Volksdeutsche policemen arrested him, after he had already been robbed by another 
armed gang led by future chief administrator for peasant affairs Sepp Zwirner.
925
 The 
Kreiskommandantur 823 document from April 1941 did add, almost as an afterthought, 
the idea that the arrested Jews should be ghettoized and made to wear distinctive 
markings singling them out as Jews. Whether the Reichsdeutsche Kreiskommandant 
drew inspiration from the treatment of Jews in Poland or simply threw that in to justify 
the mass arrest, the fact is that the primary motivation – besides the sheer opportunity to 
humiliate the merchants, bankers, doctors, men of business and other well-off Jews of the 
town – was material. The Kreiskommandantur ordered the Grossbetschkerek Jewish 
community to collect twenty million Serbian dinars in just one day as ransom for the 
arrestees.
926
 The director of the local sugar factory (one of Grossbetschkerek‟s major 
economic enterprises) Viktor Elek was released conditionally to try and collect the 
ransom. Even three days proved not enough time, so many of the arrested Jews remained 
in custody until deportation in August.
927
  
Most Jews still at large in the Banat suffered verbal abuse, random house 
searches-cum-robbery, assault (including sexual assault against women), battery and 
incarceration between April and August 1941. The perpetrators were Reichsdeutsche 
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 Deposition of Vilim Herzog, born in Czechoslovakia, resident of Grossbetschkerek, no date, 
AJ, fund 110, box 746, p. 1125. 
926
 Ibid.; Hauptmann Rentsch to Militärbefehlshaber Serbien (1941), NARA, RG 238, entry 175, 
roll 16, document NOKW-1110, frame 275; Slavik testimony (1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/153, 
frame 805. 
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 Herzog testimony (no date), AJ, fund 110, box 746, p. 1125. 
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soldiers, but mostly (or most noticeably) younger
928
 Volksdeutsche. Some took advantage 
of their new role as policemen. Others – including the child who, likely echoing his 
parents, called a woman wearing the yellow armband a “[d]irty Jewish sow”
929
 – needed 
not even that pretext.
930
  
Elek himself was hanged outside Grossbetschkerek on April 24, 1941 in front of a 
large crowd of local Volksdeutsche and ethnic Hungarians, many of whom had been his 
employees and came to gloat at his humiliation and death.
931
 Similar scenes occurred in 
May or June, when other groups of Jews – including one Kon, owner of the town hotel – 
were publicly executed.
932
 The remarkable thing about these eyewitness testimonies is 
that none of the witnesses state for certain whether the executions were carried out by 
Reichs- or Volksdeutsche, though they mention executioners were men in uniform 
(Wehrmacht grey as well as black, which could have been either the SS or the Deutsche 
Mannschaft). It is certain that Volksdeutsche civilians attended and cheered on the 
executions, and sometimes even herded prisoners to the execution site.  
Almost the same scenario was in evidence in fall 1941, after the Jews had been 
deported from the Banat to Belgrade. Then, on several occasions prisoners – Jews, Serbs 
                                                 
928
 As was the case in relation to the establishment of and policies implemented by the 
Volksdeutsche administration, there was much difference of opinion between the younger, more 
openly Nazified Volksdeutsche, and the older generation of Kulturbund members. The latter‟s 
voices were drowned out, according to one eyewitness, by the moniker “white kike” (“beli ĉivut”) 
hurled at them by the younger Volksdeutsche. Deposition of Dr. Boņa Ankić from Sakula, May 
15, 1945, AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 143. 
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 “Prljava jevrejska krmaĉa” Deposition of Dr. Lila Stejić from Pantschowa, May 15, 1945, AJ, 
fund 110, box 691, p. 142. 
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 Ibid.; deposition of Dr. Aladar Debreceni from Pantschowa, March 13, 1945, AJ, fund 110, 
box 691, p. 124; deposition of Jovan Kaloĉaji from Pantschowa, April 4, 1945, AJ, fund 110, box 
691, p. 131; Klajn deposition (April 1945), AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 136; Ankić deposition 
(1945), AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 143. 
931
 Ninin deposition (1944), AJ, fund 110, box 669, p. 33. 
932
 Deposition of Veselin Grujin from Grossbetschkerek, January 25, 1945, AJ, fund 110, box 
669, p. 245. 
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and Roma mixed together – were transported by trucks from Belgrade to a spot on the 
road outside of the Banat village of Apfeldorf, where the Wehrmacht shot them as part of 
the retaliatory measures intended to combat the communist resistance.
933
 The main 
difference was in the role played by the Volksdeutsche police. It was in charge of 
rounding up local Roma to dig graves and of crowd control, but one eyewitness reported 
after the war that some policemen had also executed prisoners. At least one was 
apparently settling an old score with a Jewish acquaintance.
934
  
These were the only large-scale killings of Jews inside the Banat – though not the 
only killings in the Banat (see above) – and were very well-known in the Banat at the 
time. Security was very lax and travelers on the Apfeldorf road could see people waiting 
to be executed and hear gunshots.
935
 The open-roofed trucks which had transported 
people of a morning were seen full of their clothes and shoes in the evening.
936
 Overall 
the Volksdeutsche played an important, yet secondary role in the Holocaust in the Banat. 
Their role was that of occasional participants and frequent beneficiaries far more than 
instigators or ringleaders.  
Violent as they were, early anti-Semitic acts were random and spur-of-the-
moment. The “Verordnung betreffend die Juden und Zigeuner” (“Order Concerning Jews 
and Gypsies”), passed by the German commanding general in Belgrade on May 30, 1941, 
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 Oberleutnant Walther of Infanterie-Regiment 734 to 704. Infanterie-Division, November 4, 
1941, USHMM, RG 49.007M Selected Records from the Archives of the Jewish Historical 
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provided a legal basis and a system for anti-Semitic action. It introduced the same 
parameters for Jewish existence as had already been passed in the Reich and occupied 
territories other than Serbia-Banat.
937
 It also set the legal groundwork for the registering, 
alienation and transformation of Jewish property into Aryanized property.
938
 The Banat 
Volksdeutsche administration dutifully adopted and implemented these guidelines.
939
 
Within two months Jews had become completely isolated from the larger Banat society, 
suffering what historian Marion Kaplan termed “social death”
940
 in ways that did not 
always benefit even the Volksdeutsche. “Meldungen aus dem Reich” for early August 
1941 mentioned that the quality of health care in the Banat had deteriorated sharply since 
Jewish doctors, who used to treat the poor out of compassion, were forbidden to treat 
Gentiles, and Gentile doctors expected to be paid high fees.
941
  
The legal ruling on the Jews in occupied Serbia-Banat followed the same 
accelerated approach as had already been applied in Poland, with only ghettoization 
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 According to this decree, a person was considered Jewish if they had at least three Jewish (by 
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document 19616. 
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New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 5.  
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skipped over as a stage in the progressive stripping away of Jewish rights.
942
 Though this 
legal ruling was passed and the major role in the extermination by firing squad of most 
Serbian Jewish men played by the Wehrmacht, the army operated in agreement with the 
SS, the AA (Auswärtiges Amt, the German Foreign Ministry) and the RSHA 
(Reichssicherheitshauptamt, the Reich Security Main Office under Heinrich Himmler). 
This demonstrated the ability of Reich offices vying for power with each other to 
cooperate in order to achieve the primary objective: the destruction of the perceived 
Jewish conspiracy against Germany.
943
 In the Banat, too, the ability of the 
Volksgruppenführung to apply coercive methods against the Jews over a period of 
several months rested on the great interest the Reichsdeutsche in Belgrade and Berlin 
took in the implementation of anti-Semitic policies. The Banat Volksdeutsche „lash‟ had 
the most bite when it had the Reich‟s ideological and material interest to back it.  
Historians Christopher R. Browning and Walter Manoschek have written 
extensively on the occasionally belabored process by which the destruction of the Serbian 
Jews was decided on without deporting them to the death camps in the East. Instead, the 
men were shot in fall 1941 as nominal retaliation for attacks on Reichs- and 
Volksdeutsche by the anti-German resistance.
944
 The women and children were interned 
in the concentration camp at Sajmińte on the outskirts of Belgrade, before they were 
                                                 
942
 Walter Manoschek, ““Gehst du mit Juden erschiessen?” Die Vernichtung der Juden in 
Serbien,” in Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944, ed. Hans Heer and Klaus 
Naumann (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995), p. 39. 
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 This measure did nothing to staunch the resistance, since the Jewish hostages selected to die in 
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killed by gas van in spring 1942.
945
 Serbia had the dubious distinction of becoming only 
the second country in Hitler‟s sphere of influence (after Estonia) to be declared 
„judenfrei‟ (free of Jews).
946
 The AA‟s participation in the decision-making process 
marked the last high-water mark for that institution‟s involvement in occupied Serbia. 
Thereafter, although foreign-political considerations continued to matter, military 
requirements and ideology were dominant and carried even foreign policy with them, as 
the case of the mobilization of Banat Volksdeutsche into the Waffen-SS would 
demonstrate (see Chapter 7). 
Historian Holm Sundhaussen estimates that of the approximately 17,000 Jews 
living in Serbia-Banat in 1941 some 10,700 died during the war.
947
 As for Banat Jews, no 
specific numbers are available, but the high death rate is indicated by an AA memo from 
late October 1941, which indicated that of approximately 2000 Jewish men deported to 
Belgrade from the Banat in August only 600 were still living.
948
 In addition, two Jewish 
survivors estimated that the 1300- to 1500-strong Grossbetschkerek Jewish community 
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had between 90 and 135 members still living in 1945.
949
 The Serbian Banat was certainly 
„judenfrei‟ already in August 1941, leaving the field open to the visible erasure of the 
Jews‟ past presence by the destruction, conversion, theft and sale of their property.  
Apart from the events on the Apfeldorf road in fall 1941, the participation of 
Volksdeutsche in the organized killing of Jews was limited to their role as concentration 
camp guard, interpreters and occasional auxiliaries. Postwar Yugoslav historians rather 
overstate the case when they insist the deportation of the Banat Jews to Belgrade in 
August 1941 was undertaken by Reichsdeutsche at Volksdeutsche urging alone.
950
 
Volksdeutsche in general did not play the role of policymakers, and very rarely that of 
policy-instigators in Hitler‟s Europe. The deportation of the Banat Jews took place in the 
context of the Reichsdeutsche desire to concentrate the Serbian Jews, as a racially and 
politically dangerous social element, in Belgrade. Away from the countryside in Serbia 




There can be no doubt, however, that the Volksgruppenführung agreed 
wholeheartedly with these Reichsdeutsche decisions or that the Banat Volksdeutsche 
were no longer just cheering on Reichsdeutsche soldiers during the rounding up and 
deportation of the Banat Jews to their ultimate fate in Belgrade. They participated fully 
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 Deposition of Dr. Julije Dohanj from Grossbetschkerek, September 15, 1945, AJ, fund 110, 
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 In a rare moment of clarity, former Volksgruppenführung official Johann Wüscht makes the 
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and actively in the expropriation and physical removal of their Jewish neighbors from the 
Banat.  
On the night of August 13-14,
952
 1941 all of the Banat Jews still at large were 
rounded up from their homes in a highly coordinated, joint action by Reichsdeutsche 
soldiers, the Volksdeutsche police and the Deutsche Mannschaft. They were interned 
briefly in concentration camps in Grossbetschkerek and Neu-Betsche before being 
transported to Belgrade by river barge on August 18. The Pantschowa Jews were taken 
from the municipal police building straight to Belgrade.
953
 In Belgrade the deportees 
were quartered temporarily with the Belgrade Jewish community before the men were 
interned in the camp at Topovske Ńupe,
954
 from where their ranks were gradually thinned 
as Jews were killed by Wehrmacht firing squads. The Jewish women and children lived 
in relative freedom until the Sajmińte camp opened in December 1941, by which point 
the prisoner pool at Topovske Ńupe was nearly gone, and the Holocaust in Serbia a 
foregone conclusion with the decimation of the adult male Jewish population. Heinrich 
Himmler issued guidelines for the application of the Nuremberg Laws to all 
Volksdeutsche in Europe in July 1942.
955
 By then the physical removal of all German-
speaking Jews but a handful of women (see below) from the Banat had been a practical 
reality for nearly a year. The document ordering the deportation of the Banat Jews to 
Belgrade in August 1941 has not been found. It must have come from the German 
commander in Belgrade, relayed by Kreiskommandantur 823 in Grossbetschkerek to the 
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 See pp. 29-30. 
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Volksgruppenführung, which in turn instructed the newfangled Volksdeutsche security 
forces to take part in the rounding up of Jews. 
Some forty-three
956
 Jewish women married to Gentiles – whether Serbs, ethnic 
Hungarians or Volksdeutsche – were allowed to return to the Banat by special 
dispensation in late fall 1941.
957
 This decision came after much wrangling between some 
their husbands and the Belgrade SD, which stressed the biological-ideological dimension 
of Nazi anti-Semitism by compelling one woman to provide medical proof that she was 
barren, and another woman‟s spouse to sign an affidavit to the effect that he would not 
have children with his wife.
958
 In 1943, the women who had become widowed in the 
meantime were arrested and deported again,
959
 though even then loopholes could be 
found. One Jewish woman who had three daughters all married to Aryans and was too 
old to have more children herself, was allowed to stay.
960
  
Once back home, these women were not free of periodic maltreatment in the form 
of querulous demands that they go on wearing their yellow armbands or summons to 
present their papers for inspection after they had waited in the hot sun for several 
hours.
961
 The uncertainty of the rules which circumscribed their existence after 
occupation, coupled in many cases with a lack of support from their Gentile spouses,
962
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had a profoundly dispiriting effect on these women. One survivor explained how dignity 
prompted her to obey the order to report to the concentration camp in Grossbetschkerek 
rather than waiting to be rounded up with the others: “I wanted to avoid being escorted 
[through the town] and mistreated by the guards.”
963
 
The most striking details survivors‟ testimonies stress about the actual deportation 
from the Banat were not the random beatings suffered by the Jewish men, the possibility 
of sexual assault against the women
964
 or the general humiliation and the crowded 
conditions in transit and upon arrival in Belgrade.
965
 The most striking are most 
survivors‟ failure to seek a way out before the deportation, though there were 
exceptions,
966
 and especially the wanton greed displayed by Volksdeutsche 
administrators, guards, policemen and ordinary people toward the Jews‟ property.  
                                                                                                                                                 
fund 110, box 691, p. 116), there seem to have been two husbands who panicked for their own 
safety and guaranteed their wives would report for deportation (deposition of Gizela Malbańki 
from Grossbetschkerek, February 16, 1945, AJ, fund 110, box 669, p. 238) or accompanied them 
to ensure they would not escape (Veljĉin deposition (1945), AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 119). 
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Deposition of Elvira Milovanĉev from Grossbetschkerek, February 15, 1945, AJ, fund 110, box 
691, p. 240.  
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 Testimony of Anuńka Kneņević from Grosskikinda (April 3, 1945) in Levntal, pp. 13-14.  
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 Some enterprising families, who still had enough money and valuables on them after the 
outright robbery they had suffered in the Banat and during the deportation, used the period of 
relative calm upon arrival in Belgrade to bribe their way onto trucks going to the Baĉka, where 
many survived the war either in hiding or in Hungarian work battalions (deposition of Pavle 
Ribar from Pantschowa, December 29, 1944, AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 96; deposition of Aranka 
Klajn, February 22, 1945, AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 114; deposition of Jozefa Elizabeta Dajĉ 
from Pantschowa, March 5, 1945, AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 121). Others had left the Banat for 
the Baĉka right after the occupation began (deposition of Mendel Rot from Debeljatscha, April 
17, 1945, AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 137) or went to Serbia proper after the April War, then to the 
Baĉka from there (deposition of Imre Ńugar from Debeljatscha, February 19, 1945, AJ, fund 110, 
box 691, p. 113). A very brave few – mostly men in their late teens and in their twenties – ran 
away to join the Partisans (deposition of Deneń Najhauz from Pantschowa, February 7, 1945, AJ, 
fund 110, box 691, p. 111; Klajn deposition (February 1945), AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 114). 
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One Jewish woman from Pantschowa described the experience after she was 
rounded up for deportation succinctly as “formal weeding,”
967
 a complete stripping of the 
Jews‟ remaining property and dignity. Only allowed to bring hand luggage and a limited 
amount of money and valuables, the Jews had their pockets turned out and their luggage 
pilfered by the Volksdeutsche guards first while waiting to be processed in the police 
stations and camps in the Banat, and then again in transit or upon arrival in Belgrade.
968
 
Some Volksdeutsche rationalized that they were taking valuables for safekeeping only, 
holding up the illusion of the Jews‟ speedy return to the Banat.
969
 Others disdained to do 
even that much: a young secretary with the Pantschowa police flounced into the room 




This young woman displayed a teenager‟s heedlessness as well as a new-found 
sense of right in her Germanness, which she must have considered an indisputable 
quality. In the grander Nazi scheme, too, however tenuous the term „Volksdeutscher‟ 
may have been, there is no doubt that Volksdeutsche across East and Southeast Europe 
profited directly from the expropriation of Jewish property in their host countries.
971
 The 
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 “u policij[i] . . . su me formalno oplevili” Dajĉ deposition (1945), AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 
121.  
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 Deposition of Dr. Branislav Matić from Pantschowa, January 9, 1945, AJ, fund 110, box 691, 
p. 97; Stejić deposition (February 1945), AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 108; Klajn deposition 
(February 1945), AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 114; Bukovac deposition (March 1945), AJ, fund 110, 
box 691, p. 116. 
969
 Dajĉ deposition (1945), AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 121. 
At war‟s end, some Volksdeutsche still clung to the notion that they were just holding valuables 
for the Jews until the rightful owners returned. By then, this was the last straw which they hoped 
might save the Volksdeutsche who did not escape the Banat from their postwar 
disenfranchisement and imprisonment. Deposition of Rudolf Bergman from Pantschowa, January 
10, 1945, AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 99; deposition of Jozefina Bergman, January 12, 1945, AJ, 
fund 110, box 691, p. 103. 
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 Bukovac deposition (March 1945), AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 116. 
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 Bergen, “The „Volksdeutschen‟ of Eastern Europe,” pp. 76-77.  
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“Verordnung betreffend die Juden und Zigeuner” of May 1941 and its addenda
972
 laid the 
legal groundwork for Aryanization, and effectively legalized the unpunished plundering 
of Jewish property already taking place („wild‟ Aryanization).
973
 They did not specify 
explicitly that Volksdeutsche should profit from it. The main beneficiary would, 
naturally, be the Third Reich, but allowing Volksdeutsche a share of the pie was part and 
parcel of the ideological plan to strengthen their position both as racial Germans and as 
residents of largely non-German East and Southeast Europe. However, unlike the ulterior 
motive the Reich had in allowing Banat Volksdeutsche easy access to more arrable land, 
which was that the crops grown on them would feed Reichsdeutsche soldiers, allowing 
Volksdeutsche to appropriate the Jews‟ property seems to have come from a purely 
ideological impulse, an ideal and, for once, frictionless marriage of ideological 
righteousness and material greed. 
In this respect, the effect of Aryanization in the Serbian Banat mirrored exactly 
that in the Third Reich. In a recent history of the role of Aryanization in Reich society, 
Götz Aly argues that, in addition to the profit drawn by large Reich corporations and 
banks from Jewish real estate and businesses, the vast majority of ordinary 
Reichsdeutsche benefitted materially from the expropriation of Jews.
974
 These material 
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 “Verordnung zur Ergänzung der Verordnung betreffend die Juden und Zigeuner vom 30. Mai 
1941,” Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers Serbien, July 25, 1941, pp. 137-138. 
973
 Ivković, p. 381.  
974
 They received food, money and personal items stolen as part of „wild‟ Aryanization, sent them 
in care packages by relatives serving in the Wehrmacht, the SS and various occupation 
administrative posts across Europe. They also enjoyed the social programs the Reich government 
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benefits made it easier for the Nazi regime to make its citizens amenable to its less 
popular policies. They also meant that many ordinary Germans ignored whatever pangs 
of conscience they may have suffered about the Jews‟ fate or, even, embraced National 
Socialist ideology more enthusiastically. „Low‟ material cravings and „high‟ ideological 
aspirations drew nourishment from each other, and conspired to produce a moral myopia 
among many Reichs- and Volksdeutsche alike. 
The same reasoning underlay the decision of the Reichsdeutsche in Belgrade and 
the Volksgruppenführung in the Banat to turn a blind eye to the theft of movable Jewish 
property both before and during the deportation.
975
 In the Banat, the swift physical 
removal of the Jews must have made taking or accepting their property easier, as 
individuals could argue that houses, furniture and other belongings had simply been left 
behind, masterless and ownerless. The Volksgruppenführung itself profited from this 
„wild‟ Aryanization, as did ordinary Volksdeutsche. In their postwar testimonies, given 
under very different circumstances, a Jewish survivor and an older Volksdeutsche 
woman, who expressed disgust at what she perceived as indecent behavior and unseemly 
greed on the part of lazy upstarts within the Volksgruppe,
976
 were in agreement on this. It 
was common to see the wives of members of the Volksgruppenführung and other 
prominent Volksdeutsche wearing jewelry which everyone knew had belonged till 
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 Though this does not detract from his overall analysis, it bears noting that Aly discusses 
Aryanization in Serbia over several pages, but limits his discussion of Aryanization in the Banat 
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 or taking basketful after basketful of fine china, crystal and linens 
from empty Jewish homes.
978
  
At the same time, Reichsdeutsche soldiers plundered deported Jews‟ homes for 
furniture, carpets, clothing materials and other bulkier goods, which were then 
transported to the Reich.
979
 But Franz Neuhausen, the Reich‟s Plenipotentiary for the 
Economy in Belgrade, and the Ministry of the Four-Year Plan in Berlin had their eye on a 
far bigger prize than carpets and suits, fine as those might be: the regulated, legalized 
Aryanization of Jewish real estate and economic enterprises. Even before the deportation 
in August 1941, Reichsdeutsche officials, working sometimes in conjunction with 
representatives of the collaborationist Serbian government, exerted pressure on Banat 
Jewish business owners to sign over their properties for a minimal price.
980
  
After the deportation, the Reichsdeutsche fell upon Jewish real estate without 
restraint, with frequent help from Volksdeutsche.
981
 They destroyed or desecrating the 
most obviously Jewish objects: synagogues and cemeteries. Thus the lavishly furnished 
synagogues in Grosskikinda and Werschetz were stripped of all their furnishings and 
decorations and transformed into, respectively, a laundry
982
 and a property of the 
Reformed Church. (The original intention had been for the Wehrmacht to sell the 
Werschetz synagogue to a Volksdeutsche butcher for use as storage space or a 
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 Slavik testimony (1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/153, frames 817-818. 
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 Debreceni deposition (1945), AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 124.  
981
 Possibly more: Shimizu holds the Reichsdeutsche commander in Grossbetschkerek and the 
town‟s Volksdeutsche mayor equally responsible for the decision to demolish the synagogue 
there (p. 249). 
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 Yugoslav War Crimes Commission memo, August 4, most likely 1945; deposition of Matija 
Frankel  from Grosskikinda; deposition of Vojislav Kneņević from Grosskikinda – all AJ, fund 





 adding the insult of pigs being slaughtered inside to the injury of 
Jewish deportation and expropriation.) The Pantschowa synagogue became a Wehrmacht 
storage space for Aryanized movable property.
984
 Volksdeutsche broke gravestones and 
used the town‟s Jewish cemetery as an open-air toilet.
985
 While Aryanization on the 
whole represented a happy marriage between Nazi ideology and economic exploitation, 
the treatment of Jewish religious buildings and property was explicitly ideological in 
purpose, as was the destruction of the most visible monuments raised by the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia.
986
 This destruction served to make the Banat landscape more closely 
resemble the Reich. 
Jewish property of explicitly economic value was legally transferred into Reichs- 
or Volksdeutsche hands i.e. it was Aryanized. At a meeting on May 14, 1941, two weeks 
before the proclamation on the new status of Jews, Felix Benzler, the AA representative 
in Belgrade, recommended that “capable Volksdeutsche or reliable Serbs” be appointed 
commissars for Aryanized property.
987
 The AA‟s position likely stemmed from an 
awareness of the overstretched Reichsdeutsche resources in Serbia, possibly also from 
past experience with corruption among Reichsdeutsche in charge of Aryanization. Either 
way, Aryanization in Serbia-Banat remained within Franz Neuhausen‟s purview,
988
 but in 
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988
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the Banat Volksdeutsche with a background in bookkeeping, teaching, administration and 




Surviving Volksgruppenführung members after the war contorted the facts to 
make it seem like Aryanization had, at best, nothing to do with Volksdeutsche and had all 
been Neuhausen‟s doing.
990
 At worst, the Volksdeutsche supposedly profited from 
Aryanization as a community (the Volksgruppenführung purchased facilities for the 
storing and preserving of foodstuffs, as well as office space, space for youth recreation 
centers, etc.
991
), but not individually.
992
 Alternatively, their participation had supposedly 
been a “logical consequence” of the removal of the Jews – with which the Volksdeutsche 
had had nothing to do – in order to prevent Volksdeutsche businesses being undercut by 
Reichsdeutsche ones.
993
 In actual fact, the pattern established in the general operation of 
the Volksdeutsche administration repeated itself: some individuals exerted themselves 
                                                                                                                                                 
Banat,” September 7, 1942, PA AA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Belgrad, file Belgrad 62/6, p. 
E422,516. 
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 E.g. the textile factory in Pantschowa got a Volksdeutsche commissar (“Postavljanje komesara 
Panĉevaĉkoj tekstilnoj industriji,” Službene novine, August 26, 1941, p. 13); see also depositions 
of former commissars Vilhelm Prohaska from Pantschowa (June 8, 1945, AJ, fund 110, box 691, 
p. 148) and Julije Saueresig from Pantschowa (June 11, 1945, AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 152).  
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LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/8, frames 143-144; Beer, “Volksgruppe Banat-Serbien” (1958), LAA, Ost-
Dok. 16/34, frame 621; Wüscht, “Bekämpfung der Partisanenbewegung, Ausrottung der Juden” 
(1969), LAA, Ost-Dok. 18/20, p. 19.  
991
 Leopold Egger (Banat Volksgruppenführung‟s economic office chief), “Tätigkeitsbericht des 
Hauptamtes für Volkswirtschaft und des Landesschatzamtes der Deutschen Volksgruppe im 
Banat/Serbien” (1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/97, frame 306. 
992
 Transcript of Jakob Awender‟s (Banat economic office chief before Egger) taped statement 
(1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/4, frame 72; Beer, “Volksgruppe Banat-Serbien” (1958), LAA, Ost-
Dok. 16/34, frame 621; Josef Beer, “Der Aufbau der Volksgruppenverwaltung im Banat” (1958), 
LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/35, frame 638; Egger, “Tätigkeitsbericht” (1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/97, 
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with a zeal born of ideology or an abstract sense of duty, while others cared mostly for 
personal advancement.  
Some commissars saw in their appointment an ideological (though they took 
pains not to stress this aspect in their postwar testimonies), professional and personal 
duty. They balked at having to sell off plundered properties because they had been 
plundered, not because they had belonged to deported Jews.
994
 Others saw in their 
appointment a duty only to their own pocketbooks. Postwar testimonies and wartime 
complaints alike paint a picture of manifold possibilities for corruption and legalized 
robbery. One woman from Pantschowa described how erstwhile employees or 
apprentices stole or sold off the inventory of Jewish stores, then applied for liquidation 
and pocketed the proceeds.
995
 A Volksdeutsche butcher from Grossbetschkerek earned 
the loathing of his co-nationals when, as commissar for a leather goods factory, he 
consistently failed to provide shoes even to Volksdeutsche with the right ration card, 
instead using the inventory to curry favor with Reichsdeutsche attached to the 
Kreiskommandantur.
996
 And a man from Deutsch Elemer embraced becoming a 




 Bukovac deposition (April 1945), AJ, fund 110, box 691, p. 132. 
996
 Slavik testimony (1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/153, frames 801-802.  
This commissar apparently resorted in 1943 to robbing leather goods stores owned by Serbs in 
order to continue his operation, after his original stock had run low (Borivoj Utvić from 
Grossbetschkerek accuses Kornelije Harle from same, October 24, 1944, AJ, fund 110, box 676, 
p. 299). 
This blatant failure of community spirit on the part of the commissar rankled especially with 
other Volksdeutsche, considering that already in the dead of winter in early 1942 the Banat 
experienced such a dire lack of essential finished products (including shoes) that schoolchildren 
and even adults resorted to weaving shoes out of corn straw and leaves with wooden soles 
(Gemeindeamt Heufeld to Landratsamt Gross-Kikinda (1942), Istorijski arhiv Kikinda, fund 84, 
box 1, p. 464). Non-Germans doing their labor service in the fields could only get uncomfortable 
wooden clogs as their shoe ration because the Wehrmacht controlled the leather supply 
(testimony of Berta Sohl from Haideschütz (1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 17/9, frame 1006). By 1944 
manufactured shoes with wooden soles became a staple sight in Banat shop windows (Hilde 
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Corruption-by-Aryanization was not an uncommon phenomenon in Serbia proper 
either.
998
 So far as the Banat was concerned, several wartime Reichsdeutsche sources 
praised the Volksgruppenführung and its appointed commissars‟ overall professional and 
ideological dedication.
999
 Sepp Janko earned special praise for his early efforts to prevent 
the misappropriation of Aryanized property by some commissars and members of the 
Volksgruppenführung.
1000
 Three Volksdeutsche were arrested for gross plunder during 
the deportation of the Jews from Pantschowa (though they were released after barely 
three weeks for lack of evidence).
1001
Official orders for property obtained by „wild‟ 
Aryanization in the Banat to be turned in without punishment apparently met with much 
positive response within the Volksgruppe.
1002
 Finally, starting in spring 1942, the 
Volksgruppenführung started remedying the fact that real estate was often Aryanized at a 
fraction of its real value – such as in Pantschowa, where Jewish houses were sold for as 
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Registar imena [„Name Registry‟], file J-167, pp. 5-6; BA Berlin, NS 5 VI, file 29277/a, p. 146. 
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little as one quarter (though most went for about one third) of their value
1003
 – by making 
the new owners pay additional dues on the properties.
1004
  
Regularized Aryanization was plagued by lack of personnel and imperfect 
bookkeeping,
1005
 but this was no deterrence to Volksdeutsche to keep the upper hand vis-
à-vis the other Banat ethnic groups. Ethnic Hungarians especially demanded an equal 
share of Aryanized real estate. As on other occasions when they made special demands, 
the AA officially fobbed them off with a promise of one third, in line with their official 
share of power in municipalities where they had significant numbers.
1006
 The ethnic 
Hungarian community lacked the strength of numbers and Hungarian government 
support to press their claim. Ethnic Romanians and Serbs had practically no opportunities 
to obtain Aryanized property at all,
1007
 especially not by legal means. 
Within the Volksgruppe, there was some resentment caused by the fact that very 
often well-off people bought Aryanized houses instead of leaving them for poorer 
Volksdeutsche families.
1008
 Nevertheless, whether they took the opportunity to help 
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themselves to Jewish property before or during the deportation
1009
 or bought it directly 
from a Jewish house or at a public auction,
1010
 even the poorest Volksdeutsche could, if 
they wished, obtain movable property which they never would have been able to afford at 
normal prices. Thus one married couple of modest means – the husband a waiter, the wife 
a cook – were quite proud of a good deal they got on expensive furniture and clothes 
which used to belong to a Jewish banker.
1011
 They did feel sufficiently ashamed to assure 
their neighbor, herself a Jew, that they would give it all back if the former owner came 
back to claim it.
1012
 
Whatever their opinion of the Jews and of Nazi ideas about the Jews, for most 
Banat Volksdeutsche the physical absence of Jews after summer 1941 seems to have 
produced an „out of sight, out of mind‟ mentality. While they may not have considered 
themselves anti-Semites, even the older, more conservative Volksdeutsche accepted 
Aryanization as a matter of course. Illustrative is the letter written in late 1942 by an 
elderly Volksdeutscher from Grossbetschkerek, former caretaker of the Jewish cemetery 
there, demanding compensation for his loss of livelihood, caused by the deportation of 
the Banat Jews. He considered it only natural to demand compensation from the 
Aryanized property of the dissolved Jewish Community in Grossbetschkerek.
1013
 Though 
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he did not state it explicitly, his reasoning is clear: he had worked for the Jews his entire 
adult life, and was not personally responsible for their absence. Even more importantly, 
all around him he saw people both younger and richer than himself appropriating objects 
and real estate which had belonged to the Jews with no qualms, and decided to fall in 




One thing no Volksdeutscher who claimed Jewish property could rightly claim 
after the war was ignorance of what had happened to the Jews,
1015
 though some tried.
1016
 
An expellee from Kudritz admitted as much when he recounted how, while purchasing an 
Aryanized house in Belgrade, he enquired after the previous owner‟s signature on the sale 
agreement, and was told that the previous owner was “certainly no longer living.”
1017
 
Indirect as this admission of mass murder was, between such oblique statements, the 
sounds of gunfire and the tales of passersby and Romany gravediggers from the 
Apfeldorf road, and the sight and sounds of the gas van driving through the streets of 
Belgrade in spring 1942, the Holocaust was a tangible presence for the Volksdeutsche 
and other residents of Serbia-Banat. The Banat Volksdeutsche were mostly peripheral to 
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 Josef „Sepp‟ Zwirner (Banat Bauernführer) to Neuhausen, December 2, 1942, NARA, RG 
242, T-75/18/300. 
1015
 Or to their property, since the Banat press reported extensively some instances of 
Aryanization e.g. a Jewish-owned warehouse was turned into the soldiers‟ rest home 
(Soldatenheim) in Pantschowa. “Soldaten planen, gestalten und… ein Soldatenheim entsteht,” 
Volkswacht. Stimme des schaffenden und kämpfenden Deutschtums im Banat [regular addition to 
the Grossbetschkerek daily Banater Beobachter], November 15, 1942, pp. 3-4. 
1016
 One expellee from Deutsch-Etschka ingenuously claimed that the Jews‟ fate upon reaching 
Sajmińte “eludes [his] knowledge” (“entzieht sich meinen Kenntnissen”). Testimony of Johann 
Keller from Deutsch-Etschka (no date), LAA, Ost-Dok. 17/8, frame 956. 
1017
 “er sicher nicht mehr lebe.” Testimony of Thomas Welter from Kudritz (1958), LAA, Ost-
Dok. 17/9, frame 1002. 
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the physical destruction of the Banat Jews, but they were central to the efforts to erase the 
memory of a Jewish presence from the Banat‟s physical and mental landscape. 
In late 1941, in the midst of regularized Aryanization, the central role 
Volksdeutsche played in it was reiterated following a ham-fisted attempt by the 
Wehrmacht in Serbia to subsume the Banat economy as a whole to itself.
1018
 Though the 
army offered the valid reason that in the Third Reich the economy was a matter of state 
control – and, for all intents and purposes, the German army was the state in occupied 
Serbia – the AA successfully countered that such a move would set a dangerous 




While deporting, interning and killing Jews was an issue on which the AA and the 
Wehrmacht were in agreement, the disposition of Jewish property was a more 
contentious issue. The AA carried the day with a solution which espoused both ideology 
and practicality. The AA defended both the Volksdeutsche‟s right to Aryanized property 
as Volksdeutsche, and the German Reich‟s right to said property by using Volksdeutsche 
as middlemen. Volksdeutsche were less ambitious and therefore more easily pleased. 
They bought mostly furniture, personal belongings and houses. The Reich profited from 
the acquisition of several of the Banat‟s major economic enterprises which had belonged 
to Jews, and often been administered by Volksdeutsche commissars.
1020
 Both groups of 
Germans were thus well-served.  
                                                 
1018
 Feldkommandant von Schlichting (Feldkommandantur 610) to Lapp, November 3, 1941, PA 
AA, Inland II D, file R 100550 Slowakei, Ungarn, Banat, Kroatien, Rumänien und Dänemark, 
Gesetze und Verordnungen, 1939-1944, p. 281. 
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 AA to OKW, December 20, 1941, PA AA, Inland II D, file R 100550, p. 280. 
1020
 These included the oil and vinegar factories in Grossbetschkerek, also numerous mills, food-
processing factories and shares in the late Viktor Elek‟s Grossbetschkerek sugar factory, and a 
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While foreign-political concerns which combined ideology with practical 
concerns continued to matter in Banat Volksdeutsche civilian affairs till the war‟s end, 
the disposition of Aryanized property did not remain untouched by another Reich 
institution which had in the beginning had only a limited influence on the Banat: Heinrich 
Himmler‟s SS and especially its militarized wing, the Waffen-SS, which dealt with 
practical matters of waging the war but was also an ideological institution par excellence.  
Starting in 1942, the Volksgruppenführung and Neuhausen expended much effort 
into securing Aryanized real estate which had not already been acquired by new owners, 
whether Volks- or Reichsdeutsche. Some of this real estate was to be kept in trust for 
Volksdeutsche socio-cultural, educational and recreational institutions.
1021
 The rest was 
to be kept – also in trust – for Volksdeutsche veterans following a German victory.
1022
 „In 
trust‟ was the key phrase. Volksdeutsche economic organizations were supposed to act as 
“trustees for all the Germans in the Banat.”
1023
  
Wartime documents were circumspect about mentioning the fact that, in principle, 
everything the Volksdeutsche owned, they owned at Hitler‟s pleasure, and could 
therefore be expected to give it all up in the future. But as historian Robert L. Koehl 
pointed out already in the 1950s, at the same time as Volksdeutsche were being settled in 
                                                                                                                                                 
shipping company and glass factory in Pantschowa. Gurski, “Treuhandverwaltung und 
Judenvermögen” (1945), NARA, RG 242, T-75/53/591-592.  
1021
 Under-State Secretary Martin Luther (AA) to AA office in Belgrade, July 22, 1942, PA AA, 
Deutsche Gesandtschaft Belgrad, file Belgrad 62/6, no page number; Gurski, 
“Treuhandverwaltung und Judenvermögen” (1945), NARA, RG 242, T-75/53/568-569. 
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 Luther to AA office in Belgrade (1942), PA AA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Belgrad, file 
Belgrad 62/6, no page number; “Aktennotiz über eine Besprechung wegen der Erfassung 
(Verwertung) des Judenvermögens” (1942), PA AA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Belgrad, file 
Belgrad 62/6, p. E422,518; Janko to Kreisleitung “Prinz Eugen,” November 2, 1943, Vojni arhiv, 
Nemaĉki arhiv, box 27-A, folder 5-III, document 55/II.  
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 “Treuhänder aller Deutschen im Banat” Janko, “Anordnung der Volksgruppenführers über die 
Übertragung von jüdischen Vermögen an Angehörige der Deutschen Volksgruppe,” 
Verordnungsblatt der Volksgruppenführung, March 1, 1942, p. 8. 
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the Warthegau and given land „in trust,‟ Himmler was building up the Waffen-SS as a 
tool for the increase of his own power and the realization of his ideas about a future 




The underlying point with regards to ownership of Aryanized property was clear: 
in order to enjoy land and security at the expense of other ethnicities, it was not enough 
for Volksdeutsche to claim kinship with the German Volk. They had to prove their 
loyalty to the Third Reich and help win the war with weapon in hand, not merely by 
delivering grain to the Wehrmacht and spreading Nazi ideology through their schools.  
If the AA and the Ministry of the Four-Year Plan had ensured the Banat 
Volksgruppenführung‟s complicity by cajoling and offering incentives to offset great 
material demands, the Waffen-SS used that established complicity as a first stepping 
stone in its efforts to create a Volksdeutsche anti-Bolshevik fighting force in Southeast 
Europe. As time passed, the Waffen-SS needed to cajole less and less, and could 
command and, even, coerce the Volksdeutsche more and more. Profoundly implicated in 
Reichsdeutsche policies by their acceptance of Dobrovoljzen-Felder and Aryanized 
property, by the responsibility entrusted in the Volksdeutsche administration and police, 
by their youth‟s rejoicing in the power National Socialism lent them while the elderly 
failed to protest too loudly, neither the Banat Volksgruppenführung nor ordinary 




                                                 
1024




Unlike the material privileges the Reich allowed the Banat Volksdeutsche which were 
discussed in Chapter 4, the opportunity to fight communism at home and to profit from 
the dispossession of the Banat Jews were purely ideological perks. This did not mean that 
they were devoid of all material interest. On the contrary, sharing in the Reich‟s anti-
Bolshevik struggle and in its anti-Semitic policies was the perfect opportunity for 
individual Volksdeutsche to indulge their material impulses and confirm their standing in 
the Nazi racial hierarchy. By shooting Partisans and abusing the Jews and their legacy, 
even those Volksdeutsche who may not have labeled themselves as National Socialists 
became an inextricable part of Hitler‟s New Order. They may not even have realized how 
easily they began to share in the Reich‟s crimes. Minimal force was needed to compel 
them to serve in the Banat police or the Deutsche Mannschaft, and none to persuade 
Volksdeutsche to avail themselves of Aryanized property.  
Participation in anti-partisan and anti-Semitic measures implicated the Banat 
Volksdeutsche in the Third Reich‟s Europe-wide policies and plans to such an extent that 
the Volksgruppenführung had nothing with which to bargain in spring 1942. This was 
when the Reich‟s need for soldiers tipped the scales in favor of mobilizing Volksdeutsche 
– policemen included – into the Waffen-SS. In the last stage of Reich-Banat relations, 
coercion became the dominant means for the Reich to get what it wanted from the 
Volksdeutsche. Even then, it was rarely open coercion. Much more frequently, the Reich 
used a combination of three factors to ensure Banat Volksdeutsche complicity with 
Waffen-SS recruitment: the implication that the Volksdeutsche owed it for all the 
privileges they had received; the personal prestige and power amassed by Heinrich 
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Himmler in the Nazi sphere of influence in Europe, and the concomitant decline in the 
importance of Reich diplomacy; and continued reliance on propaganda.  
The latter factor requires closer examination. The Volksgruppenführung 
enthusiastically and successfully tailored National Socialist ideology to fit the Banat 
Volksdeutsche‟s more localized, narrow-minded worldview, confirm their ideological 





































CHAPTER VI „THE FURTHEST WATCH OF THE REICH‟
1025
: 
THE BANAT VOLKSDEUTSCHE‟S NATIONAL SOCIALISM 
 
Despite its claims to monolithic consistency, National Socialist ideology provided the 
Banat Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) with a way of understanding and expressing local 
themes and concerns. While there are many fine studies of National Socialism in the 
Reich and the various fascist regimes elsewhere in Europe, practically no attention has so 
far been given to Volksdeutsche understandings of Nazism in the historiography of the 
Third Reich and World War II. A closer examination of the specific themes which 
allowed the Banat Volksdeutsche to adopt National Socialism as the dominant narrative 
of their historical experience opens the way to a more sophisticated understanding of 
Nazism‟s appeal to groups not confined by the borders of the Third Reich. It also 
demonstrates how the Reich ensured Volksdeutsche complicity with its policies by 
pairing material incentives with ideological themes which appealed to the Volksdeutsche 
sense of self. 
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 The title of this chapter, and this dissertation, comes from the Nazified version of the “Prinz-
Eugen-Lied”: “Settlers came to the Southeast/To stand here at their posts/As the furthest watch of 
the Reich.” (“Siedler kamen nach Südosten,/Um zu stehen hier auf Posten/Als des Reiches fernste 
Wacht.”) Nikolaus Britz, “Prinz-Eugen-Lied,” reproduced in “Prinz-Eugen-Feier in 
Grosskikinda,” Banater Beobachter [German-language newspaper published in 
Grossbetschkerek; from now on BB], August 19, 1942, p. 5. 
The notion of the Volksdeutsche as an advance guard of the Greater Reich predates the Nazi 
period. Already in the Weimar era, Volksdeutsche were portrayed in German literature as living 
in “far-flung posts . . . in the midst of a foreign land” (“weiter aussenliegenden Posten . . . mitten 
in fremdes Land hineingewagt” Hans Naviasky, Gesamtüberblick über das Deutschtum 
ausserhalb der Reichsgrenzen (Munich: Verein für das Deutschtum im Auslande, 1922), p. 20). 
In the Third Reich, specifically Southeast-European Volksdeutsche were called the “Reich‟s 
outpost” (“Vorposten des Reiches” Brunner, p. 57), while the Banat was the “Reich‟s bulwark” 
(“Schutzwall des Reiches” Herrschaft, p. 64).  
See also p. 24. 
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Volksdeutsche used Nazi ideology to articulate their own understanding of World 
War II, the meaning of Germanness and their place in Hitler‟s Europe. Volksdeutsche 
ideology did not diverge on any major points from the core of National Socialist ideas. 
The Volkdeutsche embraced the main tenets of Nazism: loyalty unto death to Führer and 
Volk, emphasis on Volksgemeinschaft (national community), anti-Semitism, perception 
of Germany as the guardian of European culture and civilization. In addition to these, the 
Banat Volksgruppenführung (Volksdeutsche leadership) used Nazi ideology and rhetoric 
to articulate the following issues: a preoccupation with Heimat (homeland) and 
Deutschtum (Germanness); somewhat forced pride in the Waffen-SS division “Prinz 
Eugen,” which was composed in large part of Banat Volksdeutsche and named after 
Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Habsburg general who expelled the Ottomans from the 
Banat and spearheaded German colonization of the region in the early 18
th
 century; and a 
strong animosity toward Slavs (especially Serbs) and communists, which tended to carry 
more weight locally even than anti-Semitism, seen by the Banat Volksdeutsche as a 
larger, literally a global issue. 
In one of his self-serving works published in West Germany, former 
Volksgruppenführung official Johann Wüscht claimed that the ethnic Germans of the 
Banat adopted only the outer trappings of Nazism, but the content was uniquely theirs.
1026
 
He failed to specify that that content actually was. Although a clear example of 
whitewashing after the fact, this statement nonetheless contains a grain of truth insofar as 
the Banat Volksdeutsche viewed Nazi themes through the prism of their specific, local 
concerns. Wüscht‟s former colleague Josef Beer took denial of complicity with the Nazi 
regime a step further when he claimed that the Banat Volksdeutsche‟s National Socialism 
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 Wüscht, Ursachen und Hintergründe, pp. 23-24.  
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was different, “completely spontaneous, in no way tied to the Nazi Party in the Reich,” 
really the “so-called völkisch movements of border and ethnic Germans [Grenz- und 
Volksdeutschen], who in affiliated [i.e. occupied and annexed] areas mostly fell victim to 
the Nazy Party bureaucracy.”
1027
 The clearly implied claim that Nazism as understood by 
the Banat Volksdeutsche was separate in both origin and content from Nazi ideology in 
the Third Reich is patently false. The degree of complicity between the Banat 
Volksgruppenführung and Berlin as well as written evidence from the Banat contradict 
Beer. 
The mentality of this ethnic German minority was shaped by territorial separation 
from its land of origin, enduring efforts to preserve a unique cultural, linguistic and ethnic 
identity, and a traditional association of Germanness with both the soil (farming) and 
military service on the political border of the Habsburg Empire. The influence of Nazism, 
and especially the immediate impact of Yugoslav defeat and Reichsdeutsche (Reich 
German) occupation, heightened the importance of these already extant themes. It also 
underscored the ambivalence of the very term „Volksdeutsche.‟ In their propaganda 
activities the Banat Volksdeutsche exerted themselves to prove their equality with 
Reichsdeutsche, their strength of purpose and supposed military might in the face of a 
hostile, majority Slavic population. 
For all his whitewashing, Beer was correct in pinpointing a specific 
“Reichsromantik,” a strong sentimental attachment to an idealized German homeland 
among Germans living outside of the Reich. This attachment skewed any evaluation of 
                                                 
1027
 “vollkommen spontane, in keinerlei Verbindung zur NSDAP im Reich . . . die sogenannten 
völkischen Bewegungen der Grenz- und Volksdeutschen, die in den angeschlossenen Gebieten 
zumeist der Parteibürokratie der NSDAP zum Opfer gefallen sind.” Josef Beer‟s report on the 
Erneurer movement (1958), Lastenausgleichsarchiv Bayreuth (LAA), Ost-Dok. 16/13, frame 233. 
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the totality of the German Reich by the Volksdeutsche.
1028
 The average Banat 
Volksdeutscher “does not know the reality of the Reich; he is a peasant, and a peasant 
does not travel.”
1029
 This practical reality enabled the Volksgruppenführung to more 
easily cast already extant elements of the Volksdeutsche sense of self in a Nazi mould 
and interpret them in the light of the dominant ideology. Even contact with 
Reichsdeutsche who failed to live up to this idealized image – as had happened during the 
Bessarabian resettlement (see Chapter 2) and throughout the years of occupation (see 
chapters 4, 5 and 7) – failed to destroy the Platonic ideal of the Third Reich as perceived 
by the Volksdeutsche.  
As shown in seminal historical works on the press and propaganda in the Third 
Reich,
1030
 the extent to which the average Reich German believed the constant 
propaganda directed at him or her is difficult to assess. However, there is no doubt that 
Reich Germans were exposed to a lot of propaganda, the contents and intention of which 
can be analyzed. The same is true of the Banat Volksdeutsche. Administrative reports 
from various Banat villages state explicitly that the Volksdeutsche listened to German-
language transmissions from Radio Belgrade and read the Banater Beobachter, a daily 
newspaper published in Grossbetschkerek and modeled on the main Reich daily, the 
Völkischer Beobachter, as well as the Belgrade German-language daily Donauzeitung.
1031
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 Beer Erneurer report (1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/13, frame 226. 
1029
 “Die Wirklichkeit des Reiches kennt der Donauschwabe nicht; er ist Bauer, und ein Bauer 
reist nicht.” Beer Erneurer report (1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/13, frame 227. 
1030
 E.g. Kershaw, The “Hitler Myth”; Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during 
World War II and the Holocaust (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2006).  
1031
 Gemeindeamt Nakodorf to Landratsamt Gross-Kikinda, November 10, 1941, Istorijski arhiv 
Kikinda, fund 84 Sresko naĉelstvo Kikinda, 1941-1944, box 1, p. 398; Gemeindeamt Sankt-
Hubert to Landratsamt Gross-Kikinda, December 9, 1941, Istorijski arhiv Kikinda, fund 84, box 
1, p. 425; Opńtinska uprava Klein Kikinda to sresko naĉelstvo Gross-Kikinda, January 31, 1942, 
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Both were published under Volksgruppenführung auspices, with a monetary subsidy 




With regard to content, as the mouthpiece of the Nazified ethnic German 
leadership the Banater Beobachter offers a view of ethnic German concerns and self-
perceptions and of the degree to which they officially embraced National Socialism 
undistorted by postwar evasions and apologia. The same is true of the 1943 Kalender der 
Deutschen Volksgruppe im Banat und in Serbien, as well as the few surviving books 
published in the occupied Banat such as the collection of Volksgruppenführer 
(Volksdeutsche leader) Sepp Janko‟s speeches and newspaper articles, Reden und 
Aufsätze (1944), and the edited volume of texts transmitted since 1941 in the popular 
Volksdeutsche Stunde program on Radio Belgrade, Volksdeutsche Stunde. Eine Auswahl 
aus Rundfunk-Feierstunden (1943). Tensions between the Volksdeutsche and their 
leadership, and between Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche can be inferred from the 
documentary record. However, the dominant, official discourse in the Banat during 
World War II blended National Socialism with the traditional Volksdeutsche self-
identification as a bastion of German culture and civilization in a savage land.  
 
Nazification and Implied Tensions 
The extent to which the Banat Volksgruppe (Volksdeutsche community) officially 
embraced National Socialism is clear from the contents of the Banater Beobachter, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Istorijski arhiv Kikinda, fund 84, box 3, p. 458; Gemeindeamt Charleville to Landratsamt Gross-
Kikinda, February 6, 1942, Istorijski arhiv Kikinda, fund 84, box 1, p. 465. 
1032
 Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda memo, December 20, 1943, 
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (BA Berlin), R 55 Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und 
Propaganda, file 890, fiche 1, frame 17. 
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especially the regular page devoted to local news under the heading “Aus unserem 
Banat” (“From Our Banat”).
1033
 This page was devoted to announcements of births, 
marriages, fatalities and funerals, as well as longer articles on issues of local interest such 
as charity drives and rallies. All emphasized the National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft as 
a living reality in the Serbian Banat. The regular birth and marriage announcements were 
given only for Banat Volksdeutsche – despite the fact that they only comprised one fifth 
of the Banat‟s total population – and stressed the men‟s belonging to “Prinz Eugen” or 
the Deutsche Mannschaft, the Volksdeutsche militia. Funeral announcements were given 
only for fallen soldiers, either “Prinz Eugen” members or Banat Volksdeutsche serving in 
other Waffen-SS units on the Eastern Front. 
 The most illuminating are reports of various public festivities, meetings and 
themed rallies that took place in all the towns and villages of the Banat with substantial 
Volksdeutsche populations. These were organized for major National Socialist holidays 
and took place in a thoroughly Nazified atmosphere. Some of the celebrations 
(Feierstunden) reported in the Banater Beobachter were occasioned by the anniversary of 
the Beer Hall Putsch (November 9, 1923),
1034
 the anniversary of the Battle of 
Langemarck in World War I,
1035
 the memorial for Hitlerjugend member Herbert Norkus 
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 Usually on page 5. The first pages of every issue were devoted to general war news directly 
transmitted from Berlin. War reporting in the Third Reich emphasized German courage and 
victories as well as the enemy‟s material losses and dishonesty. It downplayed or completely 
ignored German defeats. Good examples were headlines such as: “Der Wille der deutschen 
Führung diktiert den Verlauf des Krieges. Wunschträume der Allierten, die sich nie erfüllen,” BB, 
October 12, 1942, p. 1; “Roosevelts Friedenssabotage,” BB, January 20, 1943, p. 1; “Deutschland 
soll zerstückelt warden. Was Juden den Briten als Kriegsziel vorgaukeln,” BB, January 25, 1943, 
p. 2.  
1034
 “Feierstunde der Volksgruppe zum 9. November,” BB, November 10, 1942, p. 5; “Banat 
feierte den 9. November,” BB, November 13, 1942, p. 3. 
1035
 “Gedenkstunde in Grosskikinda,” BB, December 7, 1942, p. 5. 
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as a symbol of youth‟s National Socialist struggle,
1036
 the anniversary of the Nazi „seizure 
of power‟ (January 30, 1933),
1037
 and Hitler‟s birthday (April 20, 1889).
1038
 On occasion, 
these memorials and anniversaries explicitly linked watersheds in the history of the Third 
Reich to Volksdeutsche history, as when a November 9 gathering in Belgrade was 




 Several of the relevant texts provide telling descriptions of the decorations at 
these celebrations. For example, a November 9 celebration in Pantschowa was decorated 
thus: 
In dark contrast to the blazing swastika flags framing the portrait of the Führer, 
pylons with the death rune stood in the foreground [of the stage], crowned by the 
black and silver sign of the Iron Cross, the symbol of courage and unreserved 




Hitler‟s birthday celebration in Grossbetschkerek on April 20, 1943 looked thus: 
[T]he town was dominated by the brown shirt and the uniforms of individual 
organizations [Deutsche Mannschaft, Deutsche Jugend, Deutsche Fraünschaft, 
Deutscher Mädelbund]. Everywhere large and small national symbols [flags] of 
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 “Herbert-Norkus-Feier der DJ,” BB, January 29, 1943, p. 5. 
1037
 E.g. “Ortsnachrichten. Grossbetschkerek. Feierstunde zum 30. Januar,” BB, January 31, 1943, 
p. 7; “Ortsnachrichten.Stefansfeld. Feier zur 10jährigen Wiederkehr der Machtergreifung Adolf 
Hitlers,” BB, February 3, 1943, p. 5; “Eindrucksvolle Feierstunde am 30. Januar in Franzfeld,” 
BB, February 4, p. 5; “Im Zeichen des Dankes und der Entschlossenheit. Erhebende Feierstunde 
zum 30. Januar in Werschetz,” BB, February 6, 1943, p. 5. 
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 “Feierstunde der OG. Betschkerek am Geburtstag des Führers,” BB, April 22, 1943, p. 5; 
“Feierstunden zum Geburtstag des Führers in Kikinda … In Weisskirchen,” BB, April 24, 1943, 
p. 2. 
1039
 “Wochenbericht, Südosteuropa,” November 4-11, 1943, BA Berlin, R 58 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), file 124, fiche 2, frame 49.  
1040
 “In düsterem Kontrast zu den zu den flammenden Hakenkreuzfahnen, die das Führerbild 
umrahmten, standen im Vordergrund Pylonen mit der Todesrune, gekrönt vom Schwartz-
silbernen Zeichen des Eisernen Kreuzes, dem Sinnbild der Tapferkeit und des rückhaltslosen 
Einsatzes bis zum letzten.” “Banat feierte den 9. November,” BB, November 13, 1942, p. 3. 
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In addition, several reports state that meetings and rallies were customarily concluded by 
a triple Hitler salute.  
These examples should not lend credence to Wüscht‟s claim to the acceptance of 
Nazi trappings without the associated content. The contents of National Socialist 
ideology were also accepted by the Volksdeutsche leadership in its role as organizer of 
these festivities. Thus, on the occasion of the festive closing of a training camp for young 
women doing their labor service in Franzfeld in 1943, Volksgruppenführer Sepp Janko, 
arguably the highest authority on National Socialist orthodoxy in the Banat, referred to 
the joint duty of men and women to work for and defend the Heimat. The former should 
do so specifically in the context of the division “Prinz Eugen,” on the front, while the 
latter labored at home. The article concludes, quoting Janko:  
We must all be able to say: I am making the struggle for life [Lebenskampf] 
easier. As national comrades [Volksgenossen], we must show that we desire no 
separate destiny, rather that we are a part of the German Volk charged with the 
protection of this region. . . . Every national comrade must be included in the 
protection of the entire Volk, like the links of a chain. . . . [I]n this, the fourth year 
of the war, each one of us will fulfill his duty. 
 The Volksgruppenführer concluded the celebration, in which the residents 
of Franzfeld demonstrated to him their loyalty and readiness for exertion, with the 




                                                 
1041
 “beherrschten das Braunhemd und die Uniformen der einzelnen Gliederungen das Stadtbild. 
Überall flatterten die Hoheitszeichen des Deutschen Reiches von den Giebeln der Häuser, grosse 
und kleine, und verliehen der Stadt ein festliches Gepräge, eine freudige Stimmung.” 
“Feierstunde der OG. Betschkerek am Geburtstag des Führers,” BB, April 22, 1943, p. 5.  
1042
 “Wir alle müssen sagen können: Ich habe ein Lebenskampf zu erleichtern. Als Volksgenossen 
müssen wir beweisen, dass wir kein Sonderschicksal wollen, sondern dass wire in Teil des 
deutschen Volkes sind, der die Aufgabe hat, diesen Raum zu schützen. . . . Jeder Volksgenosse 
muss zum Schutze des ganzen Volkes eingeschaltet werden als Glied einer Kette. . . . [D]ennoch 




On other occasions, loyalty to the Führer was stated even more explicitly. Janko 
concluded a speech delivered on Radio Belgrade on the second anniversary of the April 
War with: 
The future finds us well-prepared and ready for everything. We have the Führer‟s 
orders and enter the new year with the motto: ours is the work and the bread, 




In these two representative speeches, Janko united several tenets of National Socialist 
ideology: the duty to work, national unity, loyalty unto death to Volk and Führer.  
These articles demonstrate how the Banat Volksgruppenführung used National 
Socialism as an ideology in its own right, but also as a vehicle for their self-assertion. The 
first article mentions how the Volksdeutsche in Franzfeld pledged their faith both to 
Janko as a local representative of the German people and (by implication) to Adolf Hitler 
as all-German leader. The second mentions Janko‟s emphasis on the April War and the 
defeat of Yugoslavia as an anniversary even more important for the Volksdeutsche than 
the traditional New Year.  
As suggested in Chapters 5 and 7, at the same time as the Volksgruppenführung 
exerted itself to present the image of a unified Volksgemeinschaft to its own members, it 
and the Reich also made great demands on the „national comrades‟ in the Banat. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Mit dem alten dreifachen Kampfruf Sieg Heil, in den die anwesenden Volksgenossen 
geschlossen einstimmten, schloss der Volksgruppenführer diese Feier, bei der die Franzfelder ihre 
Einsatzbereitschaft  und Treue zum Volksgruppenführer bekundeten.” Josef Zich (BB editor from 
Pantschowa), “Der Volksgruppenführer sprach in Franzfeld. Dorfabend zum Abschluss des 
Lagers der Arbeitsmaiden,” BB, February 17, 1943, p. 5. 
1043
 “Die Zukunft findet uns gewappnet und auf alles vorbereitet. Wir harren der Befehle des 
Führers, und gehen in das neue Jahr mit der Parole: unser die Arbeit und unser das Brot, unser 
die Opfer und unser der Sieg!” “Die Rede des Volksgruppenführers im Sender Belgrad,” BB, 
April 11, 1943, p. 7.  
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Banater Beobachter abounds in funeral notices and obituaries for members of “Prinz 
Eugen,” the Deutsche Mannschaft, the Banater Staatswache, the Hilfspolizei and other 
armed formations killed in combat. These became more numerous during 1943, as the 
Partisans in particular became better organized and more successful in their guerrilla 
activities. The daily news of deaths under arms even shocked Janko into briefly 
abandoning the tone of enforced optimism and cheerful sacrifice while addressing the 
attendees at a meeting in Franzfeld: “Who knows, the Volksgruppenführer continued, 
whether the news of a death is not already on its way to some among you.”
1044
 
The Volksgruppenführung also organized an endless round of donations and 
collections
1045
 to which the Volksdeutsche were encouraged to contribute in no uncertain 
terms. Though impossible to determine from the kind of controlled press the Banater 
Beobachter represents, the level of social pressure and the threat of ostracism were 
tremendous within the Volksgruppe, and aided the Volksgruppenführung in retaining 
control. It is hardly surprising that the rising cost in both money and lives, and the 
incessant round of meetings and rallies, compounded by the superior attitude of the 
Reichsdeutsche military and administrative representatives in the Banat and Belgrade, 
provoked a certain amount of discontent and complaints among the Volksdeutsche. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, this discontent took several forms: lack of outward respect for the 
                                                 
1044
 “Wer weiss es, fuhr der Volksgruppenführer fort, ob unter Ihnen nicht welche sitzen, für die 
schon eine Todesnachricht auf dem Wege ist.” “Der Volksgruppenführer sprach in Franzfeld,” 
BB, February 17, 1943, p. 5. 
1045
 In May 1943 the Volksgruppenführung proudly announced that the average amount of 
contributions gathered through various collection drives – including, but not limited to, those for 
the German Red Cross, Winter Relief, Police Day, Wehrmacht Day, Eintopfessen (single-dish 
day) – in the Banat outstripped the average amounts collected in the Reich. “Opferleistungen der 





 rumor-mongering and „grumbling‟; individual attempts to 
officially change one‟s ethnicity depending on the benefits and obligations that went with 
it (as a remedy, old Kulturbund membership cards were to be replaced by „nationality 
IDs,‟ Volkszugehörigkeitsausweise
1047
); and avoiding labor service and breaking the laws 
on price control, black marketeering, the smuggling and hoarding of food.
1048
  
Possibly the largest problem for community cohesion and morale were those 
members of the Volksgruppe whom Janko derisively called “also-Germans” 
(“Auchdeutschen”) in several speeches he gave in late 1941. These he accused of failing 
to appreciate their rare good fortune in having the protection of the Wehrmacht and 
Hitler‟s concern extended to them, and acting “without discipline and in a high-handed 
manner.”
1049
 These „bad Germans‟ were further accused of only discovering their 
Germanness since the Wehrmacht‟s arrival, when they realized they could profit 
materially from belonging to the Deutsche Volksgruppe.
1050
 They learned quickly “how 
                                                 
1046
 Kreiskommandatur Grossbetschkerek issued two official warnings aimed at the entire 
population of the Banat in June 1942, intended to ensure that German soldiers were given due 
space and respect in the streets (“Bekanntmachung der Kreiskommandantur I-823,” BB, June 19, 
1942, p. 6; see also p. 191), and that the hoisting of the German flag in front of the barracks in 
Grossbetschkerek be acknowledged by all who happened to be passing by. Volksdeutsche were 
supposed to stand still, face the flag and give the Hitler salute (Oberleutnant Krause 
(Kreiskommandantur 823), “Anordnung,” BB, June 26, 1942, p. 5). If it were only members of 
other nationalities who engaged in petty acts of disrespect, there would hardly have been any 
need to publish these warnings in the German language and in the official Volksdeutsche 
newspaper. 
1047
 “Wer gehört zur Deutschen Volksgruppe?”, BB, June 4, 1943, p. 4.  
1048
 “Volksgenosse! Du vergehst Dich am Kriege!”, BB, May 9, 1943, p. 6. 
1049
 “disziplinlos und eigenmächtig” “Volksdeutsche Grosskundgebung in Belgrad,” abridged 
version of this speech published in BB, July 6, 1941, in Janko, Reden, p. 68.  
1050
 “Take into consideration that, first of all, there is a war on, and must be won first and 
foremost, instead of striving to fully satisfy cousin Franz or cousin Peter, to give him the 
„dobrovoljac field‟ he wants or make sure he doesn‟t get mobilized.” (“Es gilt zu berücksichtigen, 
dass in erster Linie Krieg ist, und dass in erster Linie der Krieg gewonnen werden muss, und 
nicht zu trachten, dass der Vetter Franz oder Peter vollkommen zufrieden ist und das erwartete 
Feld von den Dobrowolzen erhält, oder dass er nicht einrücken muss, um nicht kämpfen zu 
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to use their elbows”
1051
 and to complain because the Volksgruppenführung did not 
consult their opinion. “Did Adolf Hitler visit every village in the German Reich and there 
organize a plebiscite before he made his great, far-reaching decisions? Then how can our 
people insist that their individual opinions be sought?”
1052
 asked Janko rhetorically.  
In order to “root out”
1053
 the „Auchdeutschen,‟ Janko proposed that – in addition 
to new personal documents for Volksgruppe members – all Volksdeutsche had to pay 
fees for membership in the Volksgruppe and for the maintenance of German schools. 
“Either one is a German and pays up like every other German, or one is an “also-
German” and we don‟t need his money. In which case he has to say, I am not 
German.”
1054
 Indeed, in June 1941 people were temporarily excluded from the 
Ortsgruppe (village chapter of the Volksgruppe) in Kathreinfeld precisely for refusing to 
pay their membership dues.
1055
 This is a rare example of a Volksgruppenführung public 
                                                                                                                                                 
müssen.”) “Zur Prinz-Eugen-Feier des Kreises Donau,” speech held in Panĉevo on August 15, 
1941, in Janko, Reden, pp. 79-80.  
This situation was not unlike that encountered by German occupation officials in Czechoslovakia 
when faced with convicted criminals and racial undesirables registering as ethnic Germans in 
order to obtain higher food rations and other benefits. Chad Bryant, “Either German or Czech: 
Fixing Nationality in Bohemia and Moravia, 1939-1946,” Slavic Review, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Winter 
2002), pp. 683-706; Benjamin Frommer, “Expulsion or Integration: Unmixing Interethnic 
Marriage in Postwar Czechoslovakia,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 14, No. 2 
(2000), pp. 381-410. 
1051
 “dann haben sie es gut verstanden, ihre Ellbogen zu gebrauchen” “Zur Grosskundgebung des 
Kreises Hennemann, Werschetz,” speech held on August 10, 1941, in Janko, Reden, p. 75.  
1052
 “Hat wohl Adolf Hitler vor seinen grossen und weittragenden Entschlüssen jedes Dorf im 
Deutschen Reich besucht und dort eine Volksabstimmung veranstaltet? Wie können dann unsere 
Leute verlangen, dass man sie einzeln um ihre Meinung befragt?” Ibid. 
1053
 “auszurotten” The use of this verb is interesting: when applied in Nazi rhetoric to Jews, it 
meant physical removal or extermination. When applied to Volksdeutsche by their own 
leadership, it meant the striking of „bad Germans‟ from membership in the Volksgruppe, a 
condition which entailed some loss of face and privilege, but by no means physical annihilation. 
“Zur Prinz-Eugen-Feier des Kreises Donau” (1941), in Janko, Reden, p. 79. 
1054
 “Entweder ist er ein Deutscher und zahlt, wie ein jeder andere, oder er ist ein 
“Auchdeutscher”, dann brauchen wir sein Geld nicht. Dann muss er aber sagen, ich bin kein 
Deutscher.” “Zur Prinz-Eugen-Feier des Kreises Donau” (1941), in Janko, Reden, p. 79. 
1055
 See p. 220. 
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announcement which proposed to enforce ideological conformity by influencing not the 
heart, the head or one‟s social standing, but the pocketbook.  
The significance of these signs of discontent should not be exaggerated: they were 
caused by demands on free time, manpower and money rather than any fundamental 
disagreement with National Socialist policy, ideology or the very fact of occupation. 
Open dissent with the orders of the Volksgruppenführung or those of the German military 
commander in Belgrade were limited to a few isolated cases.
1056
 A major reason why the 
Banat Volksdeutsche accepted – even if they did not always enthusiastically embrace – 
National Socialism was that it provided them with a heightened sense of community and 
helped them articulate common themes in their perception of self and others, their 
landscape and history.  
 
Heimat 
Much like „Volk,‟ the German concept of „Heimat‟ implies a strong emotional 
attachment not captured by the English translation „homeland.‟ Heimat was an especially 
burning issue for the Banat Volksdeutsche due to their historical experience of territorial 
separation from Germany and their heightened sense of a community separate from – and 
superior to – their Slavic neighbors.
1057
  
                                                 
1056
 See pp. 297-298. 
1057
 A closer analysis of texts produced by Banat Volksdeutsche before 1945 suggests that they 
fully internalized the German nationalist idea of themselves as pioneers of long standing on a 
physical and language border (Sprachgrenze), despite the fact that the lands inhabited by most 
ethnic German communities of East and Southeast Europe only became true borderlands after 
1918. Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial 
Austria (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 253-254.  
Paradoxically, it was the existence of state borders after 1918, which separated them from the 
majority of German-speakers in Europe, that fostered in the Volksdeutsche communities of the 
Danube Basin a self-image defined by supposedly ethnic markers (language, culture, personal 
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Heimat signified belonging to a great cultural tradition and a great nation, a 
Kulturnation. In the words of Adam Müller-Guttenbrunn, the Romanian Volksdeutsche 
poet and novelist of the interwar period whose works were embraced as emblematic by 
Volksdeutsche throughout Southeast Europe: “Our Heimat is our mother tongue, our 
German customs and culture, our folk songs and fairy tales, our Heimat is our history, the 
conscious connection we have with the great German people, [which is] our common 
mother.”
1058
 Heimat meant possession and cultivation of the land on which one lived, 
literally an earthy attachment. This attachment did not escape reinterpretation through the 
lens of National Socialist ideology. Speaking in 1941 of his listeners‟ ancestors who 
settled in the Banat in the early 18
th
 century, Sepp Janko articulated a striking image 
likening people to plants, both of which could only thrive in familiar soil: “People were 
not resettled out of the Reich; they were simply transplanted [verpflanzt] from one part of 
the Reich to another.”
1059
  
Heimat was thus an ambiguous term,
1060
 compassing not only the Banat as the 
only real home its Volksdeutsche knew, but also – to borrow Benedict Anderson‟s phrase 
                                                                                                                                                 
qualities such as cleanliness projected onto the whole group). Annemarie Röder, Deutsche, 
Schwaben, Donauschwaben. Ethnisierungsprozesse einer deutschen Minderheit in Südosteuropa 
(Marburg: N. G. Elwert Verlag, 1998), p. 54. 
1058
 “Unsere Heimat ist unsere Muttersprache, es ist die deutsche Sitte und Kultur, es sind unsere 
Volkslieder und Märchen, unsere Heimat ist unsere Geschichte, ist der bewusste Zusammenhang 
mit dem grossen deutschen Muttervolke.” Adam Müller-Guttenbrunn quoted in Wilhlem Albert, 
ed., Deutsches Volk auf fremder Erde. Auswahl aus volksdeutschem Schrifttum, Volume 1: 
Deutschtum jenseits der Reichsgrenzen (Leipzig: Verlag Ernst Wunderlich, 1936), p. 92.  
1059
 “Menschen wurden nicht etwa aus dem Reich ausgesiedelt, sondern lediglich aus einem 
Gebiet des Reiches in ein anderes verpflanzt.” “Volksdeutsche Grosskundgebung in Belgrad” 
(1941), in Janko, Reden, p. 67.  
A 1942 article in the Reich journal Deutsche Arbeit echoed this image in describing the whole 
project of Volksdeutsche resettlement as a great transplantation of people. “Umsiedeln heisst 
umpflanzen,” Deutsche Arbeit, Heft 6/7, June-July 1942, p. 158. 
1060
 This ambiguity is evident even in a postwar book by a Volksdeutscher exhibiting clear 
residual National Socialist influence: “Heimat is for us Germans a term which means deep roots 
in and an almost religious attachment to the soil, which represents for us and our folk ways a 
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– the imagined community
1061
 of all Germans. The border experience of the Banat 
Volksdeutsche did not require a physical border. A perceived border, a line of separation 
between ethnicities and languages sufficed to create a sense of separation reinforced by 
Nazified notions of blood (race) and soil.  
In the occupation period, the Volksgruppenführung stressed the traditional pride 
the Volksdeutsche took in their achievements as peasants and bearers of German Kultur 
on the ethnic borders of the Greater Reich. It also subsumed this perception under a sense 
of homecoming to Greater Germany. Johannes L. Schmidt, the editor of the regular 
broadcast Volksdeutsche Stunde on Radio Belgrade during the war years, concisely 
termed the former as “Heimat in the heart, which distinguishes a true German wherever 
he might live.”
1062
 This Heimat in the narrow sense was the fruit of German community 
life and exposure to German history and tales, a spiritual inoculation against the 
pernicious influences of schooling and socializing with non-Germans. But, Schmidt 
continued, “the knowledge of a greater soil [Boden] should go out of your narrow 




                                                                                                                                                 
living space in both a physical-natural and a spiritual sense.” (“Heimat ist für uns Deutsche der 
Begriff tiefer Verwurzelung und fast religiöser Verbundenheit mit dem Boden, der für uns und 
unser Volkstum Lebensraum im physisch-naturhaften und geistigen Sinne ist.”) Valentin, p. 7. 
1061
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of  
Nationalism, revised edition (London and New York: Verso, 1991).  
1062
 “eine Heimat in Herzen, und dies macht den wahren Deutschen aus, wo immer er auch lebe.” 
“Wachse in uns, Heimat!”, in Johannes L. Schmidt, Volksdeutsche Stunde. Eine Auswahl aus 
Rundfunk-Feierstunden, Folge 1 (Betschkerek: Buchreihe der deutsche Volksgruppe im Banat 
und in Serbien, 1943), p. 85. 
1063
 “von deiner engeren Heimat soll das Wissen um den grossen Boden ausgehen und über Berg 
und Meere ziehen bis zum letzten Volksgenossen auf den Farmen Südamerikas.” “Ein Wort über 
Ehre, Blut und Boden,” in Schmidt, p. 56.  
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In his radio speech commemorating the second anniversary of the April War, 
Janko clarified this point: “In these two fatefully difficult and eventful years, we [ethnic 
Germans and the Reich] have melted together to such a degree that we have become 
one.”
1064
 As the individual had to become part of the community to be whole – a 
commonplace in Nazi ideology and rhetoric – so Heimat in the narrow sense had to be 
integrated in the projected Greater Reich both physically and by being perceived as 
merely a part of the whole.  
This is precisely the theme emphasized in the Banater Beobachter‟s Christmas 
1942 issue, which compared the meaning of Christmas to Germans living outside of the 
Reich‟s borders to the homesickness felt by a young man far from home, “the longing for 
the greater German community.”
1065
 With an unconscious mixture of perceived 
superiority and the provincial narrow-mindedness of people for whom the possession of 
and group listening to a radio were momentous events, the article described the 
importance of the yearly radio address broadcasted from the Reich to ethnic Germans 
worldwide: 
We cared not only to hear what was said, far more that the words were meant for 
us, that we who stand on the outposts of the Reich were remembered. I shall never 
forget the words of an old peasant, who had lived in the Banat his whole life. 
Moved by the Christmas address on the radio, he took off his hat and stammered: 
“Listen to that! Germany is speaking to us!” Then, his eyes glowing with a new 
light, he added, “I am so happy to have experienced this.”
1066
  
                                                 
1064
 “Wir sind in diesen zwei schicksalsschweren und ereignisreichen Jahren so ineinander 
verschmolzen, dass wir eins geworden sind.” “Zum 6. April 1943,” radio speech delievered in 
Volksdeutsche Stunde on April 6, 1943, in Janko, Reden, p. 170. 
1065
 “die Sehnsucht nach der grossen deutschen Gemeinschaft” Sepp Kucht, “Volksdeutsche 
Weihnacht,” BB, December 25-27, 1942, p. 6. 
1066
 “Uns war nicht einmal wichtig, was gesprochen wurde, bestimmend für uns war, dass die 
Worte uns gegolten haben, dass man sich unser, die wir an den Aussenposten des Reiches 
standen, erinnerte. Unvergesslich bleiben mir die Worte eines alten Bauern, der zeitlebens im 




The importance of proving that the Volksdeutsche and their areas of settlement were as 
much a part of the Greater Reich as Germany itself was very strong year round. It tapped 
into the Volksdeutsche‟s visceral awareness of the fact that the Reichsdeutsche continued 
to see them as second-class Germans, not quite German enough. An editorial occasioned 
by the 500
th
 edition of the Banater Beobachter expressed the Volksdeutsche desire for 
full acceptance as members of the Volk forcefully, yet with familiar ambiguity: “We wish 
to work in close cooperation and tight discipline . . . [for] our home newspaper, which 
represents the interests and wishes of the Banat Swabians in their narrow area of 




This profound identification with the Reich as an imagined community of all 
Germans, more a spiritual entity than the physical reality of the Third Reich, did not 
mean that the ethnic Germans claim to full equality with Reich Germans was ever a 
matter of course. On the contrary, tension was evident between Volksdeutsche and 
Reichsdeutsche perceptions throughout the Third Reich‟s existence. In an article 
occasioned by the publication of the collection of Volksdeutsche Stunde texts, Georg 
Peierle, head of the Volksgruppe‟s culture office, wrote about the program‟s editor 
Johannes L. Schmidt: 
                                                                                                                                                 
abnehmend, ergriffen stammelte: “Hört ihr es, Deutschland spricht zu uns”, und dann, während 
ein Leuchten in seine Augen kam, “ich bin so glücklich, dass ich es erlebt habe”.” Ibid.  
1067
 “In fester Zusammenarbeit und straffer Disziplin wollen wir nun ans Werk gehen . . . unseres 
Heimatblattes, das die Interessen und Wünsche des Banater Schwaben in seinem engeren 




Schmidt is from the Baĉka. We see the publication of his first book in the Banat 
as a good sign! Where is the Reich? Wherever Germans are! Borders can no 




Peierle takes a clear stand: the Volksdeutsche were as German as the Reichsdeutsche. He 
went on to point out that since the unification of all Germans under National Socialist 
auspices and the Reich‟s territorial expansion, the term „Volksdeutsche‟ no longer meant 
second-class Germans, as it had until then. Schmidt added: “we ought to be proud of the 
fact that we are “just” “Volks-“Deutsche – for it was not given to everyone to be such a 
one.”
1069
 He even implied that Volksdeutsche achievements – “protection of the race, 
strength of the blood”
1070
 – were even greater than such achievements in the Reich, for 
the settlers did not have German state borders, law and culture to preserve them over the 
centuries.
1071
 Schmidt did not actually say this, for such a statement would have meant a 
division of the Volk into „better‟ and „worse‟ Germans, a perception the 
Volksgruppenführung was trying to extirpate once and for all. 
 Yet Peierle and Schmidt protest too much. These dogged assertions of 
Volksdeutsche equality, if not superiority, sound defensive. For all their assertiveness, the 
Volksdeutsche leadership was not unaware of the differences between the self-perception 
                                                 
1068
 “Schmidt ist Batschkaer [in the original]. Dass sein erstes Buch im Banat erschienen ist, 
wollen wir als gutes Zeichen betrachten! Wo ist das Reich? Wo Deutsche sind! Grenzen 
vermögen die grosse geistige und kulturelle Gemeinschaft unseres Volkes nicht mehr zu 
trennen!” Georg Peierle, “Johannes L. Schmidt: “Volksdeutsche Stunde”,” BB, August 29-30, 
1943, p. 3. 
1069
 “dass wir “nur” “Volks”-Deutsche sind, darauf wollen wir stolz sein – denn dies ist nicht 
jedem gegeben.” “Lob des Deutschtums im Südosten,” in Schmidt, p. 20. 
1070
 “Bewährung der Rasse, Kraft des Blutes” “Lob des Deutschtums im Südosten,” in Schmidt, p. 
16. 
1071
 Schmidt quickly made up for this daring suggestion by stating that it was not the 
Reichsdeutsche‟s fault that Volksdeutsche did not „become German‟ sooner. He blames non-
German peoples who physically separated the settlers from the Reich, imposed non-German 
names on them and made them seem not quite German. “Lob des Deutschtums im Südosten,” in 
Schmidt, pp. 17-18. 
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of the Banat Volksdeutsche and how Reichsdeutsche perceived them.
1072
 The 
Volksdeutsche considered themselves fully German. Texts in the Banater Beobachter 
usually described their readers as Germans (Deutsche), Swabians (Schwaben) or simply 
„us‟ (uns). Even so, they distinguished clearly between their readers and 
Reichsdeutsche,
1073
 indicating that the Banat Volksdeutsche felt a profound attachment to 
the Banat as their creation, and were aware of the contempt in which they were held by 
many Reichsdeutsche as not quite German enough.  
 An article from the official SS newspaper Das Schwartze Korps, reprinted in the 
Banater Beobachter at a time when the formation and training of the Waffen-SS division 
“Prinz Eugen” was in full swing, demonstrated these strong prejudices against Germans 
from outside the Reich. The crux of the matter was the average Polish or Soviet 
Volksdeutscher‟s at best imperfect, at worst nonexistent knowledge of the German 
language, which earned them nicknames such as “ethnic Polacks” and “comrade 
Katschmarek.”
1074
 Lack of linguistic ability was taken as a certain sign of racial pollution 
and inferior Germanness. The Volksdeutsche of Southeast Europe, despite their relatively 
                                                 
1072
 In the same text, Schmidt admitted that Volksdeutsche traditionally relished as well as feared 
visits from the Reich – the former because it enhanced the sense of community across state 
borders, the latter because their way of life and manner of speech might be perceived as not up to 
Reich standards. “Lob des Deutschtums im Südosten,” in Schmidt, pp. 13-14. 
1073
 In his introduction to the collection of Schmidt‟s radio texts, Belgrade Kreisleiter 
(Volksgruppe county leader) Christian Brücker wrote: “Every word is written under the auspices 
[of Auslanddeutschtum]. Even expressions and sentences, which may appear at first glance 
common, come from the standpoint of Germandom living outside of the Reich‟s borders, which 
therefore possesses its own, unconditionally Volk-related attitude to all völkisch and human 
questions[.]” (“Einmal ist hier die Bestimmung des Auslanddeutschtums immer vor Augen zu 
halten. Jedes Wort ist unter dieser Bestimmung geschrieben worden. Selbst Wendungen und 
Sätze, die auf den ersten Blick allgemein anmuten, kommen aus dem Blickfeld jenes 
Deutschtums, das ausserhalb der Reichsgrenzen lebt und so zu allen Fragen völkischer und 
menschlicher Art seine eigene, bedingungslos volkhafte Einstellung besitzt;”) Christian Brücker, 
“Zur Einführung,” in Schmidt, p. 9.  
1074
 ““Volkspolacken” . . . Kamerad Katschmarek” “Volksdeutsche durch Bewährung. Der 
unsterbliche Piefke,” BB, August 23, 1942, p. 5. 
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good command of German, did not escape derogatory nicknames either. A special one 
was given them: “Piefke,”
1075
 indicative of their insularity, tendency to think in terms of 
geographical rather than racial boundaries, and their lack of knowledge about Volk and 
Reich. Volksdeutsche efforts at preserving a unique ethnic and linguistic identity were 
thus turned on their head, and failed to earn the Volksdeutsche the praise they believed 
they deserved as German pioneers in a foreign land. The Schwartze Korps article did 
extol the courage and combat readiness of Volksdeutsche recruits in the Waffen-SS as 
signs of true Germanness far more reliable than the mere knowledge of the German 
language, but it remained suspicius of the „Piefke.‟
1076
  
Despite its ambiguous tone, this article was reprinted in the Banater Beobachter 
because it pandered to the overall Volksdeutsche sense of self. In its emphasis on a 
soldier‟s honor as the primary parameter of Germanness, this article dovetailed with a 
major theme that preoccupied the Banat Volksdeutsche: military service with the division 
“Prinz Eugen.” Moreover, it supported Peierle and Schmidt‟s claim that the 
Volksdeutsche were no longer second-class Germans, regardless of the scorn heaped on 
„Piefke‟ types.  
 While not averse to claiming the Banat as a primordial Germanic area,
1077
 the 
Banat Volksdeutsche emphasized their documented historical presence in the area as the 
                                                 
1075
 In modern usage, „Piefke‟ is a derogatory term for a person from northern Germany.  
1076
 The Schwartze Korps article concluded: “Decades of building stand before us – one can well 
learn German in that time, but whoever is not German can never become it. These are the times 
when it will always be shown whether one is a “Katschmarek” or a “Piefke.” We prefer the 
Katschmareks…” (“Wir haben Jahrzehnte des Aufbaus vor uns, und in dieser Zeit kann man sehr 
wohl Deutsch lernen, nicht aber Deutscher werden, wenn man keiner ist. In dieser Zeit wird es 
sich immer erweisen, ob einer “Katschmarek” oder “Piefke” ist. Die Katschmareks wären uns 
lieber…”) “Volksdeutsche durch Bewährung,” BB, August 23, 1942, p. 5. 
1077
 The pride of the Werschetz Heimatmuseum‟s (today Gradski muzej Vrńac, founded by 
Volksdeutsche man of science Felix Milleker) collection was a Bronze Age statue of a bird-
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basis of their identity. Their ancestors arrived as part of the official Habsburg settlement 
(colonization) drive in the early 18
th
 century. The German-speaking settlers‟ efforts to 
make a depopulated, pestilential land livable and prosperous became the core of a 
romantic historical myth of the Volksdeutsche experience epitomized in the proverb “For 




Typically of colonial projects, the area settled by German-speaking peasants was 
seen as a tabula rasa waiting to be imprinted with a specific national or racial character, 
an “unknown, unpopulated, unnamed”
1079
 land. The Volksdeutsche identified as 
“Kulturpionier” and “Kolonisator” creating a “Lebensraum” for their children.
1080
 
Distinguished by their courage and diligence, they made their settlements German soil 
because it soaked up the colonists‟ blood and sweat,
1081
 “in fulfillment of the settler‟s 
                                                                                                                                                 
headed idol in a chariot found near the village of Duplaja. The fact that it is decorated with 
swastikas was seen as proof of the existence of a great ancient “Germanic space” (“germanischen 
Raum”). “Das Hakenkreuz im Banat vor 3000 Jahren,” Volkswacht. Stimme des schaffenden und 
kämpfenden Deutschtums im Banat [regular addition to BB], October 18, 1942, p. 5.  
1078
 ““Für die ersten der Tod, für die zweiten die Not und erst für die Enkel das Brot!”” 
Referenced in “Prinz-Eugen-Feier in Grosskikinda,” BB, August 19, 1942, p. 5; “Das Banat,” VB, 
March 28, 1944, BA Berlin, R 8034 II Reichsauslandsbund, Presseauschnittsammlung, volume 
4780, p. 38; and Otto Kumm, “Vorwärts Prinz Eugen!” Geschichte der 7. SS-Freiwilligen-
Division “Prinz Eugen” (Osnabrück: Munin-Verlag, 1978), p. 18.  
Another proverb makes the point about the hard work, sacrifices and toughness demanded of the 
early German settlers more graphically: “This is the Banat,/it‟s too late to regret you 
came./Whoever can‟t work like a hack,/eat like a pig,/bark like a dog,/will never make it in the 
Banat.” (“Hier ist das Banat,/den es reut, ist zu spät./Wer nicht arbeiten kann wie ein 
Gaul,/fressen wie eine Sau,/bellen wie ein Hund,/der wird im Banat nit gesund.”) Proverb quoted 
in Hans Diplich and Hans Wolfram Hockl, ed., Wir Donauschwaben (Salzburg: Akademischer 
Gemeinschaftsverlag, 1950), p. 36.  
1079
 “In ein Land, ein unbekanntes,/Menschenloses, unbenanntes” Britz, “Prinz-Eugen-Lied,” 
reproduced in “Prinz-Eugen-Feier in Grosskikinda,” BB, August 19, 1942, p. 5.  
1080
 “Der fleissige Schwabe,” BB, August 14, 1942, p. 5. 
1081
 This theme – land made German through suffering and sacrifice – was also used by General 
Franz Böhme when he invoked the “streams of German blood” (““Ströme deutschen Blutes””) 
which flowed in Serbia during World War I to steel his soldiers‟ resolve for retaliatory actions 
against Serbian and Jewish civilians. Manoschek, “Serbien ist judenfrei,” p. 12.  
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eternal destiny” of laboring for the Reich.
1082
 They did their duty as Kulturpioniere both 
by setting a high standard of living, diligence and cleanliness to their non-German 
neighbors, and by making the Banat “blessed” and “fruitful,” a “corn-producing area of 
inestimable value for our Reich.”
1083
 The idealization of the Volksdeutsche past thus 
became a “mark of cultural distinction,”
1084
 a way of confirming their perceived ties to 
their ancestral homeland as well as their separation from the other ethnic groups in their 
surroundings.  
 Material prosperity through hard work was not represented in propaganda texts 
directed at the Banat Volksdeutsche peasantry as a completed project. On the contrary, 
the constant refrain in such texts was the continued need for hard work in service to the 
Reich. “It is not necessary to speak to my Volk on the land of work, for work is my 
Volk‟s first prayer, an inerasable sign on the forehead of every German in this 
region,”
1085
 stated one of Schmidt‟s radio broadcasts directed at the Banat peasantry. 
Such exhortations were intended to urge Banat Volksdeutsche to produce ever more food 
for the Reich (see Chapter 4). The quasi-religious tone likening the duty to work with an 
obverse Mark of Cain, a self-evident positive trait of the Volksdeutsche, appealed to the 
more conservative, traditional elements of the Volksgruppe. It lent a peasant‟s 
accustomed identification with manual labor an aura of the sacred, likening it to a God-
given duty.  
                                                 
1082
 “in Erfüllung ewigen Siedlerschicksals” Hans Rasimus, “Sieg der Arbeit. Deutscher 
Kolonistenfleiss im Südosten,” BB, May 1-2, 1943, p. 6. 
1083
 “diesem gesegten Land . . . das fruchtbare Land . . . ein Korngebiet von unschätzbarem Wert 
für unser Reich” Sepp Wildner (the Volksgruppe‟s Propaganda Amt), “Das deutsche Gesicht,” 
BB, July 30, 1943, p. 5. 
1084
 “kulturellen Distinktionsmerkmal” Luković, p. 160. 
1085
 “es müssig ist, meinem Volk auf dem Lande von der Arbeit zu reden, denn meines Volkes 
erstes Gebet ist die Arbeit, sie ist jedem Deutschen in diesem Raum als unverwischbares Mal auf 
die Stirn geschrieben” “Unser täglich Werk gib uns heute,” in Schmidt, p. 73.  
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 Lest the point be lost on younger, more Nazified members of the community, 
purely ideological texts were produced as well, which tied the ideal of a healthy, hard-
working and prosperous peasantry to the racial ideal articulated by the SS. The SS‟s 
ultimate objective was to win by force of arms and then colonize living space 
(Lebensraum) in the East, in order to ensure that German blood remained “firmly 
anchored in the soil.”
1086
 The peasant as a social bulwark against the evils of liberalism 
and socialism was an ideal propagated by the Banat Volksgruppenführung.
1087
 It told the 
Volksdeutsche peasants what they wanted to hear, linking Reich views on the peasant‟s 
role in the New Order with the local peasantry‟s largely conservative outlook and inflated 
sense of self-importance, which drew on the traditional identification of German-
speaking peasants with a civilizing influence in the land.
1088
 
                                                 
1086
 “fest im Boden verankert” Anonymous, “Blut und Boden,” in Sepp Janko, ed., Kalender der 
Deutschen Volksgruppe im Banat und in Serbien für das Jahr 1943 (Grossbetschkerek: Banater 
Druckerei und Verlagsanstalt Bruno Kuhn und Komp, 1943), p. 34.  
1087
 It was not accidental that in the official Volksgruppe calendar for 1943, the page for the 
month of October, the month of plowing and sowing in preparation for future harvests, was 
topped with the following quote from Adolf Hitler “A strong stratum of peasant small- and 
middle-holders has always been the best protection against the illnesses of society.” (““Ein fester 
Stock kleiner und mittlerer Bauern war noch zu allen Zeiten der beste Schutz gegen soziale 
Erkrankungen.””) Adolf Hitler quoted in Janko, Kalender, p. 14.  
The Volksgruppenführung was not averse to telling Volksdeutsche peasants that they were the 
backbone of all real (i.e. ideologically sound) social order even during Yugoslavia‟s existence. A 
speech given at a rally in Tschestereg in November 1940 stated: “The peasantry is evidence of a 
way of life, the scaffolding which holds up the Volksgemeinschaft. It was from this peasant 
worldview with its unspoiled, blood-bound rootedness in the Volk that National Socialism 
derived so many of its ideas. Therefore is the peasantry the foundation, the ancestral source, and 
the bearer of the German people‟s new way of life.” (““Bauerntum ist Bekenntnis zu einer 
Lebenshaltung, es ist das Traggerüst der Volksgemeinschaft, ja aus dieser bäuerlichen 
Weltanschauung mit ihren unverdorbenen, blutsverbundenen Verwurzelungen im Volke hat der 
Nationalsozialismus so manche Idee geschöpft und so ist das Bauerntum Fundament, Urquell und 
Träger der neuen Lebenshaltung des deutschen Volkes geworden.””) Leopold Egger, 
“Grosskundgebung des Banater deutschen Bauerntums in Tschestereg,” Deutsches Volksblatt 
[German-language newspaper published in Novi Sad (Baĉka)], November 13, 1940, BA Berlin, 
NS 5 VI Deutsches Arbeitsfront, Arbeitswissenschaftlichesinstitut 
(Zeitungsausschnittsammlung), file 28873, p. 6.  
1088
 A Banat German folk song posits the peasant as the root of all social and, even, divine order: 
“It‟s been heard and written and read of:/The first man became a peasant./Everything stems from 
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 A large part of National Socialism‟s appeal to the Volksdeutsche peasant was its 
romanticization of the rural existence as one of rewarding hard work, virtue and pastoral 
simplicity.
1089
 But, as indicated by the association of peasant life with the combative SS 
ideal, the historical myth of the Banat Volksdeutsche was not solely that of a prosperous, 
peaceful peasantry. It was also one of constant watchfulness and combat against the 
ethnically and racially foreign elements which surrounded them. Such a worldview 
created an almost siege mentality, and enforced the need for Volksdeutsche community. 




This tradition harked back to the Volksdeutsche role on the Habsburg Military 
Border. Especially resonant was the example set by the Prince Eugene of Savoy, 
routinely described as the “noble knight” and the “father of our homeland,”
1091
 who 
“stands at the beginning of our history,”
1092
 an “emblem” of the working and fighting 
Banat Volksdeutsche.
1093
 The Banat Volksdeutsche‟s sentimental attachment to Prince 
                                                                                                                                                 
the peasant,/Even the judge and the hardest lord.” (“Und wie man hört und schreibt und lest:/Der 
erste Mann ein Bauer ist g‟west./Vom Bauer stammt ja alles her,/Der Richter und der strengste 
Herr.”) Folk song in Konrad Scheierling, ed., Donauschwäbisches Liederbuch (Straubing: 
Donauschwäbisches Archiv, 1985), p. 113. 
1089
 For an official Reich example of the glorification of a Nazified peasantry as a pioneer of the 
future and the builder of an Eastern Eden, rather than a backward figure and the butt of jokes, see 
Lühr Oldigs (director of Bauernschule Schwanen in the Warthegau), “Dem Bauern gehört die 
Zukunft,” Sonntag. Unterhaltungsblatt der Deutschen Volksgruppe im Banat [regular addition to 
BB], February 7, 1943, p. 3.  
1090
 The SS wed the idea of racial regeneration in the East to the ideal of a healthy, militarized 
peasantry in the Schwert und Pflug (Sword and Plow) policy, developed in 1940-1941 as a part of 
the preparations for Operation Barbarossa. Jürgen Förster, “Die weltanschauliche Erziehung in 
der Waffen-SS: “Kein totes Wissen, sondern lebendiger Nationalsozialismus,” in Ausbildungsziel 
Judenmord: “Weltanschauliche Erziehung” von SS, Polizei und Waffen-SS im Rahmen der 
“Endlösung,” ed. Jürgen Matthäus et al. (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003), p. 96. 
1091
 “der edle Ritter . . . der Vater unserer Heimat” “Prinz Eugenius der edle Ritter,” Volkswacht, 
August 16, 1942, p. 1. 
1092
 “steht er am Beginn unserer Geschichte” Ibid. 
1093
 “Wahrzeichen” Anonymous, “Die SS,” in Janko, Kalender, p. 38.  
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Eugene predated National Socialism. In their folk tales, the Habsburg general figures as a 
Messianic figure bringing liberty and the promise of salvation to a land overrun by 
Turkish heathens; Moses-like he opens springs of fresh water in a parched landscape; his 
armies slaughter the enemy by the thousands.
1094
 
In the period of Reichsdeutsche occupation, the emotional attachment of the 
Banat Volksdeutsche to Prince Eugene gained an added dimension. Sepp Janko produced 
the following account of the founding of the Military Border: 
Prince Eugene was the one who realized that one of the most dangerous portals 
for invasion out of the East must be closed once and for all in this very area, in 
order to preserve the Reich from further attacks. Therefore he strove to have 
peasants settled here, peasants who knew how to use both plow and sword. . . . He 
knew that only German peasants could be settled in such a polluted region, 
menaced by enemies from within as well as without, the very peasants who made 




The „noble knight‟ of mythologized history thus became an early precursor of the Nazi 
project to unite all racial Germans in one Greater Reich – a patently anachronistic 
understanding of a man whose primary loyalties were dynastic and religious, not 
nationalist or racial. By extension, the Banat Volksdeutsche could consider themselves 
trailblazers. Their self-identification with an idealized community of peasants and 
soldiers – or peasant-soldiers – was represented as the ideal for all Germans: 
                                                 
1094
 Folk tales “Prinz Eugen bei Zenta,” “Prinz Eugen, der Streiter des Herrn” and “Der Prinz-
Eugen-Brunnen,” in Hans Diplich and Alfred Karasek, ed., Donauschwäbische Sagen, Märchen 
und Legenden (Munich: Verlag Christ Unterwegs, 1952), pp. 23-24.  
1095
 “Prinz Eugen war es, der erkannte, dass in diesem Gebiet eines der gefährlichsten Einfallstore 
des Ostens ein für alle Mal geschlossen werden musste, um das Reich vor weiteren Angriffen zu 
bewahren. Und darum trachtete er, hier Bauern anzusiedeln, einen Bauern, der nicht nur den 
Pflug, sondern zugleich auch das Schwert zu führen verstand. . . . Er wusste, dass in eine so 
verpestete Gegend, die Feinde von innen und aussen hatte, nur ein deutscher Bauer angesiedelt 
werden konnte, jener Bauer, der den Boden zu dem gemacht hat, was er heute ist – zur 




[T]he idea of soldier-peasantry was born in the SS. Men of the Waffen-SS, who 
know their way equally well around a weapon and a plow, will be settled on the 
Reich‟s borders. They will create the best bulwark against penetration by foreign 
peoples or foreign ideologies. The soldier-peasantry will form the safest 




With liberation-cum-occupation at the hands of the Wehrmacht, the local cult of 
personality built around Eugene of Savoy really took off in Serbia-Banat. The 225
th
 
anniversary of Eugene‟s final expulsion of the Ottomans from south Hungary, which 
culminated in his capture of Belgrade, and was also the “birthday of the German Banat” 
(1717), was celebrated with great pomp in 1942.
1097
 A play about the Habsburg general‟s 
Balkan operations was written by a member of the division “Prinz Eugen” and performed 
at the National Theater in Belgrade
1098
 by a Volksdeutsche cast on the occasion of the 
10
th
 anniversary of Deutsche Ortsgruppe Belgrad.
1099
  
Furthermore, the walls of the soldiers‟ rest home (Soldatenheim) in Pantschowa 
were painted with scenes from the romanticized version of Volksdeutsche history: from 
Prince Eugene‟s triumphant campaign, through the arrival of the first settlers, to the 
unification of the roles of peasant and soldier during the Military Border‟s existence. The 
last mural showed three generations of a Volksdeutsche family on a freshly plowed field: 
an old man, his adult son eagerly saluting a recruitment officer, and the little grandson 
                                                 
1096
 “Deshalb ist in der SS der Gedanke des Wehrbauerntums entstanden. Männer der Waffen-SS 
werden an den Grenzen des Reiches angesiedelt werden, die gleich gut Waffe und Pflug zu 
führen verstehen. So wird der sicherste Wall gegen das Eindringen fremden Volkstums oder 
fremder Anschauungen geschaffen. Dieses Wehrbauerntum wird die sicherste Grundlage für den 
rassischen Aufbau und für die Zukunft des deutschen Volkes werden.” “Blut und Boden,” in 
Janko, Kalender, p. 36.  
1097
 “Das Jahr 1717 was der Geburtstag des deutschen Banates” “Prinz-Eugen-Feier in 
Grosskikinda,” BB, August 19, 1942, p. 5.  
1098
 In reference to its Volksdeutsche community – the biggest in Serbia outside of the Banat – 
Belgrade itself was referred to as Kreis “Prinz Eugen.” 
1099
 Erich Queissner, ““Prinz Eugen in Belgrad.” Eine Uraufführung im Belgrader National-
Theater,” BB, March 3, 1943, p. 5. 
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saluting like his father. The painting harked back to the proverb about the three 
generations needed to transform a pestilential wasteland into a fertile, cultivated 
landscape (Landschaft), drawing a parallel between the continuity of the seasons in a 
peasant‟s life and the continuity between generations. Overlooking all was a portrait of 
Hitler, symbolically bringing the Volksdeutsche full circle, back to the Reich.
1100
 
Hitler alone could compete with the adulation accorded to the memory of Prince 
Eugene.
1101
 On the occasion of the 10
th
 anniversary of the Nazi „seizure of power,‟ the 
Banater Beobachter article on the celebration in the village of Franzfeld stated explicitly: 
“The residents of Franzfeld have shown yet again . . . how great their love is for the 
man who was and is our rescuer and liberator, who determinedly and securely 




Eugene of Savoy and Adolf Hitler were seen as the shapers of local historical 
continuity, from original settlement of German-speakers in the Banat to their political and 
military triumph under Nazism. An example of this invented historical continuity was a 
series of Banat-wide charitt drives for the Reich in 1943, headed by the motto “Die Front 
kämpft – Die Heimat schafft” (“The Front Fights – the Heimat Accomplishes”). This 
charity drive was characterized as a debt owed by all Germans to Hitler after he 
                                                 
1100
 Josef Beer (then Stabsleiter of the political section – Abteilung VI – of the division “Prinz 
Eugen”), “Aus dem Soldatenheim in Pantschowa. Bilder, die zu uns sprechen,” Volkswacht, 
November 1, 1942, p. 4. 
1101
 K. A. Wilke, the author of the aforementioned murals, was photographed one year later 
working on a larger-than-life portrait of Hitler, also commissioned by the soldiers‟ rest home in 
Pantschowa. Volkswacht, September 12-13, 1943, p. 2. 
1102
 “Auch dismal bewiesen die Franzfelder . . . wie gross ihre Liebe zu dem Manne ist, der 
unser Erretter und Befreier war und ist und der die Geschicke des deutschen Volkes 
festentschlossen und sicher leitet und uns alle in eine neue, bessere Zukunft führt.” 
“Eindrucksvolle Feierstunde am 30. Januar in Franzfeld,” BB, February 4, 1943, p. 5. 
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overcame the dominance of corrupt Jewish businessmen as well as the Banat 
Volksdeutsche‟s “unique declaration of loyalty to the Führer and the German people.”
1103
  
Volksdeutsche were supposed to feel an especially strong connection to Hitler,
1104
 
who had himself lived outside of the Reich‟s borders, and was therefore meant to 
understand the issues faced by Volksdeutsche better than anyone. Not daring to go so far 
as to claim Hitler for the ranks of the Volksdeutsche, Janko nonetheless asserted that 
Hitler‟s being at the Reich‟s helm meant even more to ethnic than to Reich Germans, 
since the former‟s need of him was implied to be greater.
1105
 The advent of Nazism was 
thus consciously recognized as the high point of Volksdeutsche historical development. 
In moments of boldness, it was even deemed a response to Volksdeutsche‟s unique 
position and problems. 
Reichsdeutsche also made the connection between the Banat‟s place in Hitler‟s 
Europe and Eugene of Savoy‟s imperial colonization project, which they reinterpreted as 
an early attempt at consolidating the Volk. An AA (Auswärtiges Amt, the German 
Foreign Ministry) memo of November 1942 stated the point explicitly: “[T]he 
importance of the former „Austrian Military Border‟ . . . cannot be overlooked in the 
politics of the Reich. Following the rebuilding of the Greater German Reich, the 
                                                 
1103
 “ein einzigartiges Treuebekenntnis der Banater auf den Führer und ihr Deutsches Volkstum.” 
“Die Front kämpft – Die Heimat schafft. Die Versammlungswelle ein einziges Treuebekenntnis 
der Banater,” BB, June 4, 1943, p. 5. 
1104
 Valdis O. Lumans tentatively suggested in his study of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VoMi) 
that before 1933 National Socialism may have even appealed to Volksdeutsche more than to 
Reichsdeutsche, since it united several themes especially close to the Volksdeutsche heart: 
völkisch nationalism, prejudice against Slavs, Jews and communists, a sense of exposure to a 
hostile environment, cultural and ethnic separation from this environment, economic corporatism 
and the idealization of the peasant experience. Lumans, Himmler‟s Auxiliaries, p. 29. 
1105
 “Rede zum Geburtstag des Führers,” April 20, 1942, in Janko, Reden, p. 120.  
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historical political means used by Reich Marshall Prince Eugene regarding the 
incorporation of Southeast Europe into Greater Central Europe gain more credibility.”
1106
  
This was never clearer than in the choice of Eugene‟s name for the Waffen-SS 
division composed primarily of Banat Volksdeutsche men. The mythologized history of 
the „father of the German Banat‟ was used repeatedly to lend credibility to the division 
“Prinz Eugen,” and to encourage acceptance of its toll on manpower and lives. Three 
themes predominated: the importance of volunteering for military duty in the Waffen-SS 
as a sign of true belonging to the Volksgemeinschaft; continuity with the original German 
settlers as peasants and border soldiers (Grenzer) defending their own villages as the 
„furthest watch of the Reich‟; and the defense of the Heimat in both its narrow (Banat) 
and its broad sense (Greater Reich) from a familiar, proverbially savage and numerically 
superior enemy.  
  
Unsere Soldaten 
Throughout the available print run of the Banater Beobachter, and in Sepp Janko‟s 
speeches and other available Volksdeutsche sources, the word „volunteer‟ („Freiwillige‟) 
was used to describe members of the 7
th
 Volunteer Mountain Division “Prinz Eugen” (7. 
SS-Freiwillige-Gebirgs-Division “Prinz Eugen”). This held true even after March 1, 
1942, when Sepp Janko issued an official announcement of obligatory military service 
for the duration of the hostilities, which affected all able-bodied Volksdeutsche men 
                                                 
1106
 “die Bedeutung der ehemaligen „Österreichischen Militärgrenze,‟ […] kann in der 
Reichspolitik nicht übersehen werden. Nach der Wiederbildung des Grossdeutschen Reiches 
gewinnen die historischen politischen Massnahmen des Reichsmarschalls Prinz Eugen in 
Hinblick auf die Einordnung des Südosteuropäischen Raumes in den Mitteleuropäischen 
Grossraum an Aktualität.” Abteilung Deutschland (AA) to German Foreign Minister Joachim von 
Ribbentrop, November 5, 1942, quoted in Manoschek, “Serbien ist judenfrei,” p. 27.  
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between the ages of 17 and 50 (see Chapter 7 for more “Prinz Eugen”). In spite of this 
state of affairs, which was very well known inside the Volksdeutsche community, the 
official emphasis on volunteering remained. Aside from the regular use of the term 
„volunteers‟ in texts referring to members of the division “Prinz Eugen” and its combat 
performance, volunteering was a constant refrain used to encourage the Volksdeutsche 
left at home to give their all for the Reich. Speaking in March 1942, Sepp Janko 
elaborated on the forms sacrifice for the common cause of all Germans would take: “Now 
is the time for us to prove our will to live and our life strength. This means not only 
material sacrifice, such as grain deliveries, donations for the German Red Cross, 
collection of furs and other such drives, but also our readiness to aid the Reich in 
achieving final victory by standing by it with weapon in hand.”
1107
  
In one of his wartime articles published in the Donauzeitung, Josef Beer explicitly 
– and paradoxically – linked volunteering with duty: “The principle of volunteering 
became a blood obligation and debt of honor for the Volksdeutsche.”
1108
 The notion that 
Volksdeutsche owed a debt of honor to the Reich for the protection it extended them in 
the form of Wehrmacht units occupying Serbia since April 1941 was tied to the idea of 
the shared, unbreakable racial bond between all Germans. It opened the way to a related 
                                                 
1107
 ““Heute stehen wir da, um unseren Lebenswillen und unsere Lebenskraft unter Beweis zu 
stellen. Nicht nur durch die materielle Opfer, wie es die Getreidelieferung, die Spenden für das 
Deutsche Rote Kreuz, die Pelzwarensammlung oder andere Spenden sind, sondern auch dadurch, 
dass wir mit der Waffe in der Hand an der Seite des Reiches den Endsieg zu erringen mithelfen.” 
“Einsatzbereitschaft im Banat. Schulungslager der Kreis- und Ortsbauernführer,” Donauzeitung, 
March 12, 1942, p. 3.  
1108
 “Die Freiwilligkeit war den Volksdeutschen des Banats  zur Bluts- und Ehrenpflicht 
geworden.” Josef Beer, “Aus dem Banater Boden gestumpft. Die Aufstellung und Ausbildung der 
SS-Division “Prinz Eugen”. Eine traditionsgebundene Kampfgemeinschaft und ihr General,” 
Donauzeitung [daily newspaper published by the Deutsche Volksgruppe of Kreis “Prinz Eugen” 
i.e. Belgrade], May 1-2, 1942, Bundesarchiv Freiburg i.B., Militärarchiv (BA MA), N 756 
Sammlung Wolfgang Vopersal Bundesvorstand der ehemaligen Waffen-SS e.V., file 149b, no 
page number.  
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notion: that of military service to the Reich as proof of one‟s manly virtue and, by 
extension, one‟s German credentials. “It is not only up to the Reich, but to us as well, to 




This avowed determination to show how “deadly in earnest”
1110
 Banat 
Volksdeutsche were in their demonstration of Germanness through military service in the 
Waffen-SS was melded with an ideal of masculine virtue even before the division “Prinz 
Eugen” was created. An article in the May 1941 issue of the Verordnungsblatt der 
Volksgruppenführung der deutschen Volksgruppe im Banat, Serbien und Ostsyrmien 
(renamed after this, its first issue the Verordnungsblatt der Volksgruppenführung der 
deutschen Volksgruppe im Banat und Serbien) praised the Volksdeutsche participation in 
the April War: “We proved ourselves worthy of this great historical hour, and bore great 
self-sacrifice in a manly way.”
1111
 The Banat Volksdeutscher was represented not only as 
hard-working, thrifty, the exponent of a superior culture, and the descendant of brave 
soldiers, but as a soldier in his own right, steadfast and loyal, a stereotypical man‟s 
man.
1112
 Coupled with equally rigid notions of womanhood, this masculine ideal was 
                                                 
1109
 “Der Krieg ist nicht nur fürs Reich, sondern auch für uns zu gewinnen. . . . Wer sich seiner 
Aufgabe entzieht, ist feige. Und feige darf kein Deutscher sein.” “Zur Volkskundgebung in 
Weisskirchen,” speech held on November 16, 1941, in Janko, Reden, p. 99.  
1110
 “blutig ernst” Sepp Janko, “Zumgeleit,” in Janko, Kalender, p. 19.  
1111
 “Wir haben uns dieser grossen geschichtlichen Stunde wuerdig erwiesen und waren mannhaft 
zum grossen Opfergang angetreten.” Anonymous, “Neuen Aufgaben entgegen,” 
Verordnungsblatt der Volksgruppenführung der deutschen Volksgruppe im Banat, Serbien und 
Ostsyrmien, May 1941, p. 1. 
1112
 Writing in his self-serving history-cum-memoir long after the war, Sepp Janko continuef this 
theme when he wrote about the possibility for Volksdeutsche to have changed sides once the tide 
of war turned against Germany: “A respectable German does not change sides as soon as the 
situation becomes dangerous. That is when he stands most firmly on [the side he chose], 
supporting the good cause he believes in.” (“Ein anständiger Deutscher wechselt nicht die Front, 
wenn as anfängt, gefährlich zu werden. Er steht dann erst recht zu den Seinen und zu seiner guten 
Sache, an die er glaubt.”) Janko, Weg, p. 301.  
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contrasted by views of the enemy as corrupt in race, politics and gender (see segment 
“Banditen” below). 
Official appeals to volunteer for armed service drew on the Volksdeutsche 
identification with three conduits of tradition: family, community and the historical 
memory of the Grenzer on the Habsburg Military Border. Announcements of deaths in 
the Banater Beobachter frequently emphasized that the deceased had been a volunteer or 
the parent of volunteers.
1113
 The Volksdeutsche parents‟ duty to raise soldiers willing to 
give their lives for the Reich was stressed at rallies as well as in death notices. For 
example, a collection drive organized by the Volksgruppe‟s propaganda office bore the 




Lest these articles gained too grim an aspect by associating military service 
exclusively with death, Janko sent a memo to all Volksgruppe leaders on the village level 
exhorting them to submit suitably uplifting articles for publication. He even proposed 
suitable topics, such as fathers of grown sons, preferably World War I veterans, 
presenting themselves as well as several of their children for service in “Prinz Eugen” or 
mothers of many children, their husbands away at war, bringing in the harvest with the 
help of neighbors. The articles were meant to be upbeat and stress joy in active service to 
the Volk, self-sacrifice, faith in National Socialism, and the militarized uprightness of the 
                                                 
1113
 E.g. a victim of drowning from Tschestereg and the three living sons of a man killed in a road 
accident in Deutsch-Etschka were both described as volunteers. “Aus dem Banat. Tschestereg. 
Soldatenbegräbnis in Tschestereg” and “Aus dem Banat. Deutsch-Etschka.Todesfall,” both BB, 
July 2, 1942, p. 5.  
1114
 “Tausende Volksgenossen hören unsere Redner. Grosser Erfolg der Versammlungswelle 





 Janko encouraged the myth of a joyful Banat community 
rushing to volunteer to such an extent that it was falsely put about he had been among the 
first to volunteer for “Prinz Eugen.”
1116
 
Some members of a farming population might have liked their adult sons to 
become soldiers for an ideology, but many would certainly object to any loss of 
manpower needed for work on the land. Janko‟s circular suggests that the general 
population‟s attitude to recruitment for the Waffen-SS was somewhat less than 
enthusiastic. If upbeat articles were needed, this was not due only to the practice common 
in the Reich press of making any event seem like a German victory. The readership in the 
Banat clearly needed some convincing, as well.  
In addition to the dutiful invocation of the “fatefully connected community of all 
Germans, whether Reichsdeutsche or Volksdeutsche,”
1117
 an effort was made to render 
the emphasis on volunteering for the Reich more acceptable to the Banat Volksdeutsche 
by placing it in a context evoking both National Socialism and their local identification as 
peasant-soldiers guarding the ethnic borders of the Greater Reich. The participation of 
“Prinz Eugen” in the German war effort was represented not as a purely local concern, 
but as part of a continuity of German struggle.
1118
 This struggle was seen to stretch across 
                                                 
1115
 Janko to Ortsleiter, September 25, 1942, Istorijski arhiv Zrenjanin, fund 131 Nemaĉka 
narodnosna grupa u Banatu i Srbiji (Deutsche Volksgruppe im Banat und in Serbien) – Beĉkerek 
(Zrenjanin) (1941-1944), 1941-1944, folder 1942, document 1161/42. 
1116
 Beer, “Aus dem Banater Boden gestumpft” (1942), BA MA, N 756, file 149b, no page 
number. 
1117
 “Die schicksalsverbundene Gemeinschaft aller Deutschen, or Reichs- oder Volksdeutsche,” 
invoked by Josef Zich in his article on the Nazified Christmas celebration in 1942, “Gemeinsame 
Feierstunde im Zeichen der SS,” BB, December 25-27, 1942, p. 4.  
1118
 The purpose of placing the participation of the Volksdeutsche in the Waffen-SS within the 
context of a broader ideological and racial struggle – in the East especially – was served also by 
the occasional column “Was SS-Kriegsberichter sehen und schreiben.” See examples in BB, April 
23, 1943, p. 4 and May 14, 1943, p. 4.  
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time (from the Wars of Liberation, through World War I and the Nazi struggle for power, 
to the millions who died for Germany in the ongoing war
1119
) and space (the struggle 
against Communist Partisans in the Balkans was related to the warfare in the East, 
especially to the example set by the German army at Stalingrad
1120
).  
The Volksdeutsche soldiers‟ model was Prince Eugene of Savoy himself, who had 
fought in the Battle of Vienna (1683) as a young volunteer.
1121
 Serving in the armies of 
the German Reich was therefore a part of the Volksdeutsche heritage, a true “heart‟s 
desire,”
1122
 which many had concealed for decades out of fear of their hostile 
surroundings.
1123
 With the coming of National Socialism, the Volksdeutsche were seen to 
have come of age, and accepted the German soldier‟s uniform.
1124
 The Nazified version 
of “Prinz-Eugen-Lied” contained the following stanza: “Adolf Hitler, our oath of 
loyalty/Accept today once again/As from Prince Eugene‟s soldier.”
1125
 This view of the 
continuity of the German Grenzer tradition from Prince Eugene to Hitler reinforced the 
ideal of the brave volunteer as a true member of the Volksgemeinschaft.  
                                                 
1119
 From a speech by SS-Ostubaf. Burghardt, commander of a part of “Prinz Eugen” stationed in 
Pantschowa, included in “Heldengedenkfeier in Pantschowa. Rekrutenvereidigung des SS-Geb.-
Jäger-Btl. “Prinz Eugen”,” BB, March 24, 1943, p. 5.  
1120
 “Die deutschen Volksgruppen und der totale Krieg,” BB, February 7, 1943, quoted in“Aus 
Zeitschriften und Zeitungen,” Nation und Staat, Heft 6, March 1943, pp. 210-211; Sepp Wildner 
speaking in Werschetz, cited in “Grosskundgebungen im Zeichen des Siegenswillens,” BB, 
March 14, 1943, pp. 2, 6. 
1121
 Kumm, p. 13. 
1122
 “Herzenswunsch” Beer, “Aus dem Banater Boden gestumpft” (1942), BA MA, N 756, file 
149b, no page number. 
1123
 “Wir stehen für den Krieg,” New Year‟s Day speech delivered on Radio Belgrade on January 
1, 1943, in Janko, Reden, p. 139.  
1124
 “Kriegsweihnacht 1942,” article appeared in Schaffende Jugend, Christmas 1942 edition, in 
Janko, Reden, p. 137.  
1125
 “Adolf Hitler, unsre Treue/Schwoeren wir Dir heut aufs neue/Als Soldat von Prinz Eugen!” 
Britz, “Prinz-Eugen-Lied,” reproduced in “Prinz-Eugen-Feier in Grosskikinda,” BB, August 19, 
1942, p. 5.  
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The Grenzer tradition thus lent the introduction of obligatory military duty for 
Banat Volksdeutsche an air of historical justification and, even, inevitability. Otto 
Kumm, the Reichsdeutsche SS-Brigadeführer who took command of “Prinz Eugen” in 
July 1943, concluded his self-serving history of the division with the following remark: 
“The division . . . did its best, and its brave Swabians and Saxons were truly worthy 
descendents of the men from the old border regiments.”
1126
 In the same vein, the 
division‟s original commander, Romanian Volksdeutsche SS-Obergruppenführer Arthur 
Phleps was touted as a prime example of the German settlers‟ racial and spiritual 
integrity, their ethos of hard work and faith in the Greater Reich.
1127
 Phleps identified 
himself as “stemming from the oldest German border line of the Southeast.”
1128
 He stood 
for the Volksdeutsche serving under him, and bolstered Volksdeutsche claims to equality 
with Reichsdeutsche: “The Führer can rest easy. Whatever task we Germans from the 
Southeast tackle will be accomplished.”
1129
  
The sense of participating in a struggle greater than the fighting in the Balkans 
was especially important on the home front (Heimatfront). National Socialist ideology 
emphasized its importance as the backbone of the armed forces, due to the „stab in the 
back‟ legend regarding Germany‟s defeat in World War I.
1130
 More importantly, the 
home front bore the brunt of industrial and – in the Banat especially – agricultural 
                                                 
1126
 “Die Division . . . hat ihr Bestes gegeben, die braven Schwaben und Sachsen waren fürwahr 
würdige Nachfahren der alten Grenzer-Regimenter.” Kumm, p. 402.  
1127
 “Der General des Südostdeutschtums,” Volkswacht, July 25-26, 1943, p. 1.  
1128
 “dem ältesten deutschen Grenzstamm des Südostens entstammend” “Worte des 
Kommandeurs der SS-Freiw. Division “Prinz Eugen”,” Volkswacht, May 24, 1942, BA MA, N 
756, File 149b, no page number.  
1129
 “Der Führer kann beruhigt sein. Wo wir Südostdeutsche anfassen, da wird ganze Arbeit 
geleistet!” “Worte des Kommandeurs der SS-Freiw. Division “Prinz Eugen”” (1942), BA MA, N 
756, File 149b, no page number. 
1130
 E.g. “Was im Reich gilt, hat auch für uns Bedeutung. Rücksichtslose Ausmerzung der 
Volksschädlinge,” BB, December 4, 1942, p. 5.  
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production for the war. In the Banat this meant the equation of the peasants‟ hard work at 
home with the risks taken by soldiers on the front: “For this [final victory] fights not only 
the soldier, but also the Heimat. For this, not only the soldier puts up with need and 
hardship, but also the Heimat.”
1131
  
A steadfast home front was crucial for German victory, but not enough in and of 
itself. In a rare moment of graphic honesty as to what awaited those who fulfilled their 
full debt of honor to the Reich, Janko wrote: “There are different kinds of sacrifice: we 
are not scared off by the sacrifice of one‟s own body and blood.”
1132
 Such honesty was an 
exception: in portraying the relations between the home front and the front lines, the 
Banat Volksgruppenführung took a page from the Reich‟s book and emphasized that, 
while bound by unbreakable bonds of blood and a mutual obligation,
1133
 the two were 
very different.  
The home front was seen as a natural extension of – yet separate from – the front 
lines. The pictures adorning the 1943 Kalender reinforced this illusion of undisturbed 
domesticity and an uninterrupted farming tradition, the cycle of seasons and succeeding 
generations. Where explicitly Nazi symbols appeared, they were placed in a civilian 
context: a Nazi party rally, a May Day celebration, a solstice ritual. Even the month of 
                                                 
1131
 “Darum kämpft nicht nur der Soldat allein, es kämpft auch die Heimat. Darum trägt nicht nur 
der Soldat Not und Entbehrung allein, es trägt sie auch die Heimat.” “Aufruf zum 
Winterhilfswerk 1942/43,” in Janko, Reden, p. 136.  
1132
 “Es gibt verschiedene Opfer: wir schrecken nicht zurück vor den Opfern des eigenen 
Koerpers, des eigenen Blutes.” “Zur Prinz-Eugen-Feier des Kreises Donau” (1941), in Janko, 
Reden, p. 81.  
1133
 The soldiers on the front who took up the Volksgruppe‟s Kalender or a copy of the Banater 
Beobachter could breathe easy in the knowledge “that the Heimat will not let them down, and 
will take care of their future and of their families at home, just as they who are on the front take 
care of the Heimat.” (“dass die Heimat sie nicht im Stiche last und für ihre Zukunft und ihre 
Angehörigen zu Hause sorgt; so, wie sie an der Front für die Heimat sorgen.”) Janko, 
“Zumgeleit,” in Janko, Kalender, p. 19.  
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March, the month when the appeal to volunteer for “Prinz Eugen” had been issued one 
year earlier, bore the stylized image of a triumphant soldier disconnected from any 
representation or hint of actual fighting.
1134
 The need to portray the Heimat as a peaceful 
refuge
1135
 fatefully tied to, yet unaffected by actual fighting was as strong in the Banat as 
in the Reich, if not stronger in view of the Banat Volksdeutsche‟s more intense 
understanding of the dangers menacing them (see segment “Banditen” below).  
One way for the Volksgruppenführug to downplay the violent nature of warfare 
was the regular Banater Beobachter column “Front und Heimat” in which family 
members at home could send greetings to their men fighting with “Prinz Eugen” and 
vice-versa. Another were photo stories which presented the life of a soldier as an 
extended holiday in nature,
1136
 struggle against an invisible and, by implication, cowardly 
enemy
1137
 or effortless military triumph.
1138
  
Another strong incentive for Volksdeutsche to give all for the Reich was the 
emphasis on “Prinz Eugen” defending the borders of Europe, not only because their 
ancestors had done so, but to prevent the arrival of warfare into the peaceful, idyllic 
Banat. In principle, this goal was supposed to make the sacrifice of soldiers‟ lives 
bearable and worthwhile. It was coupled with the celebration of youth and death at 
funerals, reported on with increasing frequency as the war progressed and clashes 
between “Prinz Eugen” and Yugoslav guerrillas became more common.  
                                                 
1134
 Janko, Kalender, pp. 5-16.  
1135
 See p. 284. 
1136
 Volkswacht, June 14, 1942, pp. 3-4 and November 8, 1942, p. 3.  
1137
 Photographs from the fighting in Bosnia – though no fighting was ever shown – were 
published in BB, March 15, 1943, p. 2; March 16, 1943, p. 1; March 17, 1943, p. 1; March 24, 
1943, p. 1; March 25, 1943, p. 1; April 5, 1943, p. 1; and April 14, 1943, p. 1. These are rare 
examples of reporting on the war in the Balkans on the front page of BB, which was usually 
devoted to reports from other theaters of war.  
1138
 “Vorwärts “Prinz Eugen”!”, Volkswacht, July 25-26, 1943, p. 4.  
377 
 
The emphasis on the sacrifice of life as a supreme service to the Volk, the 
ultimate proof of the deceased Volksdeutsche soldier‟s Germanness, could only go so far 
as a propaganda tool. Newspaper articles and radio programs might well claim that there 
was no such thing as the dead or the yet unborn in the Volksgemeinschaft, but only the 
unity of the Volk in an eternal present, the cycle of seasons and generations.
1139
 The 
creation of the division “Prinz Eugen” could be claimed as the point at which “the Banat 
came alive.”
1140
 Memorials for fallen comrades could be staged as something other than 
celebrations of the dead (Totenfeier),
1141
 but for all these efforts, the deaths of 
Volksdeutsche men in Reich uniform could not be put in an unequivocally positive light.  
Far more effective was the attempt to show a silver lining, as in a purported letter 
from the father of a fallen soldier to Sepp Janko: “Deeply affected by the loss of my 
youngest as I am, I am just as deeply proud of him, for he died a hero‟s death so that our 
Volk and the eternal Greater Germany can live.”
1142
 Speaking at the funeral of two 
youths from the village of Boka, one of whom was killed fighting in the East, the other in 
Montenegro, Josef Beer made the same connection between the death of the individual 
and the survival of the Volk as well as belief in a Greater Reich born in struggle and 
sacrifice: “Every little bit of land where German heroes lie at peace in eternal sleep will 
                                                 
1139
 “Gedenken der grossen Söhne,” in Schmidt, pp. 45-46.  
1140
 “Damit kam Leben in das Banat.” Beer, “Aus dem Banater Boden gestumpft” (1942), BA 
MA, N 756, file 149b, no page number.  
1141
 Landesführung der Deutchen Mannschaft to all Ortseinheiten der Deutschen Mannschaft, 
February 16, 1944, Istorijski arhiv Zrenjanin, fund 131, folder “Stabseinheit der Deutschen 
Manschaft,” document 31.  
1142
 “In tiefer Ergriffenheit über den Verlust meines Jüngsten muss ich eben so stolz auf ihn sein, 
weil er den Heldentod starb, damit unser Volk und das ewige Grossdeutschland lebe.” 
“Heldengedenktag,” speech held on March 21, 1943, in Janko, Reden, p. 163.  
Toeing the ideological line set down by Janko‟s proposal for suitably uplifting newspaper 
submissions, the purported author of this letter also claimed that his two surviving sons were still 
in uniform and “at their posts.” “Heldengedenktag” (1943), in Janko, Reden, p. 163. 
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This imagery built directly on that of a savage, depopulated Banat landscape 
made fertile, civilized and, above all, German by the labor and sacrifices borne by 
generations of peasants. This idea of the transformative nature of agricultural work 
birthed the image of “our blood [which] has mixed with the blood of our comrades from 
the Reich on the soil of war . . . this is the eternal chain, which will never let us go our 
lonesome way again.”
1144
 Soil became sacred – became, in fact, Heimat – through the 
sacrifice of lives, blood which made a unified Volk shed for the Volk.  
The image of a bulwark of soldiers‟ graves which surrounded Germany and was 
watched over by living soldiers
1145
 was a graphic representation of the siege mentality 
engendered in ethnic Germans by their long territorial separation from the Reich and their 
imagined (mental) separation from their host society. Such gruesome images were cold 
comfort for the grieving. Therefore the imagery turned full circle back to agricultural 
metaphor, to which a farming population would be most receptive. Soldiers‟ graves 
became the “field and seed”
1146
 of eternal victory, Germany itself – a wreath of flowers 
                                                 
1143
 ““Jedes Stükchen Land, wo deutsche Helden zum ewigen Schlafe ruhen, wird uns zum 
Heimatland, der mit dem deutschen Blut getränkte Boden wird uns zum Lebensraum.”” Josef 
Beer quoted in “Totenehrung in Boka,” BB, July 22, 1943, p. 5.  
1144
 “unser Blut [hat sich] mit dem Blut der Kameraden des Reiches auf dem Boden des Krieges 
vermengt . . . dies die ewige Kette ist, die uns nie wieder einsame Wege gehen lässt” L. Schmidt, 
“Frontbrief eines Schwabensohnes,” in Janko, Kalender, p. 70.  
1145
 “Heldengedenktag” (1943), in Janko, Reden, pp. 159-160.  
In this speech (p. 160), Janko gave a tip of the hat – but not much more – to the fact that death as 
the ultimate meaning of sacrifice was only conceivable by those mourning a “dead hero in the 
family” (“einen toten Helden aus seiner Familie”).  
1146
 “Acker und Saaten,” from a poem by Herbert Böhme suggested as suitable reading at the 
heroes‟ memorial day (Heldengedenktag). Landesführung der Deuthen Mannschaft to all 
Ortseinheiten der Deutschen Mannschaft (1944), Istorijski arhiv Zrenjanin, fund 131, folder 
“Stabseinheit der Deutschen Manschaft,” document 31. 
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left on those graves.
1147
 The individual literally joined the soil worked by his ancestors, 
which would be worked in the future by his descendants, ensuring that the soil of Heimat 
would bloom and live on. 
The enemy who threatened to destroy Heimat and Volk was the majority Slavic 
population of the Balkans. Described occasionally as “sub-human,”
1148
 but most 
frequently as „bandits‟ („Banditen‟), the Slavic enemy was embodied especially in the 
communist Partisans. Despite the racial and cultural superiority which the Volksdeutsche 
felt, they were nonetheless acutely aware of their condition as a numerical minority 
whose actions in the occupation years attracted the animosity of the majority population. 
Their fear of retribution was refracted through National Socialist anti-Semitic and anti-
Slavic ideology.  
This mixed feeling of pride and fear was heightened after “Prinz Eugen” left the 
Banat in fall 1942. Thereafter, the importance of maintaining the steadfastness of the 
home front and keeping the actual fighting away from the Heimat (both the Banat and the 
Greater Reich) gained in importance. Speaking to the new recruits assigned to the 
Enlightenment Section (Aufklärungsabteilung) of “Prinz Eugen,” its commander, SS-
Hauptsturmführer Köhler painted a terrifying image of the wasteland that the Banat 
would become if overrun by the dreaded Slavic-Bolshevik-Jewish hordes:  
The storm flood of the Jewish-Bolshevik plague would cover our homeland, 
followed by death and annihilation [Vernichtung] in its most terrifying forms. My 
comrades from the Banat, Croatia, Slovakia, Siebenbürgen [Transylvania] and the 
Reich, where your towns, villages and farms flourish today, smoking piles of 
                                                 
1147
 From a poem by W. Flex suggested as suitable reading at the heroes‟ memorial day 
(Heldengedenktag). Landesführung der Deutschen Mannschaft to all Ortseinheiten der Deutschen 
Mannschaft (1944), Istorijski arhiv Zrenjanin, fund 131, folder “Stabseinheit der Deutschen 
Manschaft,” document 31. 
1148
 “Untermenschen” Adam Paull, “Unserem toten Kameraden. Einst kommt der Tag der 
Rache…”, BB, February 27, 1943, p. 2.  
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rubble would stand. Death would look out of the window from which your wives 
and sweethearts greet you with joy. The threshold over which your siblings and 
children tripped, coming to greet your homecoming with laughing eyes, would no 
longer be there. Your weeping mother could no longer embrace you, for she 
would have already embraced death. All these people and everything you hold 
dear would lie annihilated, mutilated and dishonored beneath the rubble of what 




The war was as much an apocalyptic battle between races and ideologies for the Banat 
Volksdeutsche as it was for the Reichsdeutsche. However, for the former the perceived 
threat was rendered even greater by their long experience of living next to a despised 
Slavic majority. For all their hysterical delusions about the power of world Jewry and the 
Slavic „hordes,‟ most Reich Germans had no comparable experience. The siege mentality 
of the Volksdeutsche of East and Southeast Europe was based on their real experiences as 
a minority, heightened by their acceptance of Nazi ideology.  
 
Banditen 
The Axis invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 was the crucial event which 
completed the fusing of images of the enemy already extant in the National Socialist 
worldview. The Jew, the Bolshevik and the Slav melded into the face of a single global 
conspiracy against Germany, an extension and radicalization of the “Muscovite-Asiatic 
                                                 
1149
 “Die Sturmflut der jüdisch-bolschewistischen Pest hätte sich über unsere Heimat ergossen, 
und der Tod und die Vernichtung in ihren schrecklichsten Formen wären ihrer Spur gefolgt. Dort, 
meine Kameraden aus dem Banat, Kroatien, der Slowakei, Siebenbürgen und aus dem Reich, wo 
heute eure Städte, Dörfer und Höfe blühen, würden rauchende Trümmerhaufen sein, aus jenen 
Fenstern, aus denen Euch freundlich Eure Frauen und Mädchen grüssen, würde der Tod sehen, 
keine Türschwelle würde mehr da sein, über die Euch Eure Geschwister und Kinder 
entgegenstürzen würden, um mit lachenden Augen Eure Heimkehr zu begrüssen, und keine 
Mutter würde Euch vor Gluck weinend in die Arme schliessen, weil sie schon der Tod in die 
Arme geschlossen hätte. All diese Menschen und alles, was Euch lieb ist, das läge vernichtet, 
verstümmelt und geschändet unter den Trümmern dessen, was Ihr Euer Haus und Eure Heimat 
nanntet.” “Soldaten des Führers. Feierliche Vereidigung von Rekruten am Adolf-Hitler-Platz in 
Betschkerek,” BB, June 8, 1943, p. 5.  
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flood” threatening to destroy European i.e. German civilization.
1150
 This final creation of 
the compound enemy in the Nazi worldview contributed to the pronounced savagery of 
the warfare on the Eastern Front and to the Holocaust.  
 In the Banat, however, the acceptance of the compound Jewish-Slavic-communist 
enemy was modified by the Volksdeutsche‟s special attachment to their Banat Heimat 
and their historical experience of living among a majority Slavic population. Although 
the Banat was also inhabited by ethnic Romanians, ethnic Hungarians and others, the 
Slavs (Serbs) were a majority and were singled out by the Volksdeutsche as the 
enemy.
1151
 While the Banat Volksdeutsche accepted the idea of an international Jewish 
conspiracy threatening the Greater Reich, their concern for local safety specifically 
targeted the Serbs and especially the Partisans, most of whom were of Serbian and 
Montenegrin descent. The Slavic-communist enemy was sometimes represented as an 
agent of Jewish and Russian Bolshevism, but the derogatory language and images used in 
depictions of South Slavs emphasized their specific Balkan backwardness and 
primitiveness. In the words of Arthur Phleps: “The armies of Eastern fiends are still 




                                                 
1150
 “die moskowitisch-asiatische Überschwemmung” Förster, pp. 99-100.  
1151
 “Images of the enemy different from those in the Reich predominated among the Banat 
Volksdeutsche.” (“Unter den Volksdeutschen im Banat herrschten andere Feindbilder als im 
Reich.”) Shimizu, p. 5. 
1152
 “Noch stehen Armeen der östlichen Unholde, Nachkommen jener wilden Horden, die vor 
Jahrhunderten unsere Gefilde verwüstend durchschritten.” Arthur Phleps continued: “But they 
will be annihilated, for the Führer – that peerless soldier – stands at the head of our warriors and 
increases our strength tenfold.” (“Sie werden aber vernichtet werden, den vor unseren Streitern 
steht der Führer, – unerreicht auch als Soldat, – und verzehnfacht unsere Kräfte.”) “Worte des 




What made this enemy especially threatening was the fact that, despite their sense 
of superiority and attachment to the Reich, the Volksdeutsche remained acutely aware of 
their minority status. Johann Wüscht took the unreconstructed Nazi line in his postwar 
exculpatory writings, in which he described the expulsion of the Banat Volksdeutsche 
after the war as part of the great struggle between the Germanic West and the Slavic East, 
represented most clearly in Slavic population pressure caused by the fact that Slavs 
“bred” much faster than Germans.
1153
 Relative rates of procreation aside, the Slavic 
population of the Balkans was certainly more numerous than the ethnic German one, 
though any willfully ill-natured Slavic racial intention existed only in the imagination of 
the local Nazis.  
 The Banat Jews were deported to Belgrade in August 1941 (see Chapter 5). The 
physical presence absence of Jews seems to have been the main factor in the relatively 
equivocal stance the Banat Volksdeutsche took regarding the so-called Jewish Question. 
Nazi racial policy in Germany‟s Eastern conquests saw the true obverse of the Jew as not 
just the German but as the ethnic German, since it was the latter who profited most 
directly from the dispossession and murdering of Jews.
1154
 In the Banat, the establishment 
of a Volksdeutsche administration, the physical absence of Jews there so early into the 
occupation, and the fact that Jewish property was speedily Aryanized, combined to 
                                                 
1153
 “vermehrten sich” Wüscht, Ursachen und Hintergründe, p. 14.  
Janko chimed in in the same vein: “It is not that I wanted to do something which then led to 
disaster, but that those others, long hostile to us, decided on and planned this disaster – our 
annihilation – long before [the war]. . . . Our ultimate defeat was not due to the supposed “ill 
nature of our cause,” but to the overwhelming number of our enemies.” (“Nicht ich hatte irgend 
etwas gewollt, das dann in eine Katastrophe geführt hat, sondern die anderen, die uns seit langem 
angefeindet haben, hatten die Katastrophe, unsere Vernichtung, längst vorher geplant und 
beschlossen.. . . Dass wir schliesslich doch unterlegen sind, lag nicht an einer vielleicht 
“schlechten Sache”, sondern an der Überzahl der Gegner.”) Janko, Weg, p. 301.  
1154
 Bergen, “The Nazi Concept of „Volksdeutsche‟,” pp. 570-571. 
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produce a highly localized sense of superiority over the „Jewish enemy.‟ Anomalous as it 
may seem, given the centrality of anti-Semitism in the Nazi worldview, anti-Semitism 
was most prominent in the Banater Beobachter in articles taken from the Reich press.
1155
  
Rarely did anti-Semitism feature as the central theme of texts written by the 
Banater Beobachter‟s local contributors. This is not to say that the paper was not anti-
Semitic.
1156
 It was, but it tended to subsume Nazi anti-Semitism to (or at least combine it 
with) more pressing local concerns: negative racial attitudes to the majority Slavic 
population and growing fears of communist success. The fact that the Banat 
Volksgruppenführung lacked the material means to oppress the Banat‟s Slavic population 
as thoroughly as some Volksdeutsche may have liked
1157
 only added to this sense of 
threat.  
A clear change of tone over time is discernible in newspaper texts dealing with 
the Balkans, Serbs and (South) Slavs. During “Prinz Eugen”‟s training and first 
deployment in southern Serbia and Montenegro in 1942, the tone was one of easy 
superiority and mockery. News from Serbia proper consisted of brief articles intended to 
illustrate the backward, primitive nature of Balkan lifestyles. These stories represented 
the average Serbian peasant smallholder as dishonest (diluting milk with water,
1158
 
                                                 
1155
 E.g. Prof. Dr. Johann von Leers, “Um das Blut der Nichtjuden. Der Bolschewismus ist ein 
einziger Ritualmord der Juden” (taken from VB), BB, May 12, 1943, p. 6.  
1156
 A rare example of a locally produced text centered entirely around rabid anti-Semitism would 
be H. H. (member of “Prinz Eugen”), “Weltpest Juda,” Volkswacht, June 27-28, 1943, p. 5. 
Though penned for local consumption, its tone – and the design of the title, which includes the 
Star of David and snakes forming the word „Juda‟ – differs in no way from texts filling the pages 
of the Reich press.  
1157
 See pp. 230-233. 
1158
 “Nachrichten aus Serbien. Ueberschlauen [in original] Milchpantscher,” BB, August 18, 1942, 
p. 6.  
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 prone to criminality and violence,
1161
 and incapable of a 
normal family life (the titles say it all: “Man Murdered by His Eighth Wife,”
1162
 “Niece 
Breastfeeds Her Own Uncle”
1163
). It is highly indicative of Volksdeutsche attitudes 
towards the non-German inhabitants of the Banat that the Banater Beobachter only ever 
mentions the latter in relation to crime and labor duty. Even those qualities which the 
German valued in himself – devotion to tradition, a vital folk art, resourcefulness in an 
unforgiving landscape – became in the Serb signs not of a close connection with the soil 
but of hereditary laziness.
1164
  
For those Volksdeutsche who did not take the Banater Beobachter, the point was 
reiterated on the radio: ethnic Germans differed from their non-German neighbors in 
countenance, stature, bearing, manner of thought, speech, music, funerary customs.
1165
 
These differences were the fruit of racial distinction and of German work in the 
Southeast, biology as well as willed human action. “Your ancestors‟ work in the German 
                                                 
1159
 Peter Staadlbaur, “Banat – Land des Ackerbaues. Wertvoller Beitrag für die 
Ernährungssicherung des europäischen Raumes,” Donauzeitung, April 18, 1943, BA Berlin, R 
8034 II, volume 4780, p. 13. 
1160
 E.g. alleged reports of an old man from the provinces duped and robbed while on a visit to 
Belgrade (“Nachrichten aus Serbien. Abenteuer eines Greises,” BB, August 1, 1942, p. 6), and of 
a man duped by self-professed white witches and a stranger invited to act as godfather for the 
man‟s newborn child (“Nachrichten aus Serbien. Der Taufpate war nicht abergläubich,” BB, 
August 14, 1942, p. 6).  
1161
 E.g. a lurid tale of implied lesbian jealousy, “Mordversuch an der Freundin,” BB, August 22, 
1942, p. 6.  
1162
 “Ein Mann von seiner achten Frau ermordet,” BB, September 3, 1942, p. 6. 
1163
 “Nichte säugt den eigenen Onkel,” BB, November 8, 1942, p. 6.  
1164
 E.g. SS-Schtz. Sepp Kucht (member of “Prinz Eugen”), “Opanken,” Volkswacht, November 
15, 1942, p. 5. The article deals with traditional Serbian peasant footwear (sing. opanak, pl. 
opanci) as a prime example of Serbian folk art and sense of tradition. The ironic tone of the 
article lampoons these qualities as stubborn resistance to change. Lest the point be lost on the 
reader, the text ends with the assertion that Balkan influences in the „German‟ Banat reach only 
as far as one can find people wearing opanci.  
1165
 “Ein Wort über Ehre, Blut und Boden,” in Schmidt, p. 54.  
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Danube region is a major achievement of German blood . . . we do not scoff at foreign 
peoples, we have simply never underestimated our enemies and have always faced them 
like true knights.”
1166
 The enemy, it was implied, was and remained rather less than 
knightly.  
For the Banat Volksdeutsche the true antithesis of the orderly, hard-working 
German was not so much the crafty Jew as the lazy, dirty, dishonest Slav. The Banat was 
seen as purely German soil, part of the greater Germanic Lebensraum, whereas 
everything south of the River Danube supposedly remained as savage as it had been at 
the beginning of German settlement. Special contempt was reserved for major cities, 
particularly the Serbian capital Belgrade, and for mountainous Bosnia, a “land of 
terror,”
1167
 the very antithesis of the flat, fertile Banat.  
Belgrade was seen with the provincial‟s mixture of awe and contempt towards a 
big city. Well might Eugene of Savoy have wanted to strengthen Belgrade as the 
“extreme border town and bulwark of Christendom”
1168
 in the Southeast. By the early 
1940s, a German eye found little to support Eugene‟s noble intentions. One text 
purporting to be a private letter described Belgrade as a place where a cacophony of 
noises reigned supreme as early as 7 AM and drove the inhabitants to drink, where a 
streetcars did not so much run as “rattle along like a lightly damaged armored train,”
1169
 
and “like everywhere in the Balkans, even the smallest work assignment is accompanied 
                                                 
1166
 “Das Werk deiner Ahnen im donaudeutschen Raum ist eine Hochtat deutsches Blutes . . . wir 
verachten fremde Völker nicht, selbst unsere Feinde haben wir nie unterschätzt und sind ihnen 
immer ritterlich gegenübergetreten” “Ein Wort über Ehre, Blut und Boden,” in Schmidt, p. 55.  
1167
 “Schreckensland” Kriegsberichter Dr. Karl Bier, “Deutsche Kulturträger in den bosnischen 
Bergen. Unbedankte Kulturarbeit seit sechs Jahrzehnten,” BB, December 2, 1942, p. 4.  
1168
 “dem äussersten Grenzort und Vormauer der ganzen Christenheit” Eugene of Savoy quoted in 
Franz Thierfelder, “Peterwardein,” in Janko, Kalender, p. 44.  
1169
 “Sie rasselt daher wie ein leicht havarierter Panzerzug.” “Brief aus Belgrad,” Volkswacht, 
August 30, 1942, p. 5. 
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by a lot of fuss and noise.”
1170
 Another text stated explicitly the reason behind this chaos: 
Belgrade was a “human mill between East and West,”
1171
 a second Babel of constant 
construction lacking any pattern or reason, in which languages and ethnicities mixed and 
none but Germans managed to preserve their racial and national identity. Wehrmacht 
soldiers‟ letters from Serbia and the Banat indicate that in 1941 the local Jewish 
population could not be visibly distinguished from the Slavs i.e. the Jews of Serbia were 
not „racial Jews‟ („Rassejuden‟). If the Jews could not be clearly and easily distinguished, 
then all of Southeast Europe was „Jewified.‟
1172
 Belgrade was Southeast Europe in a 
nutshell, overlaid by the dislike of urban centers so prominent in Nazi rhetoric, with its 
horror of racial mixing.  
On the other hand, descriptions of the Bosnian landscape and population blended 
contempt of all things Balkan with the mentality of a Volksgruppe engaged in ideological 
warfare. They represented a localized exacerbation of racial attitudes and became 
especially prominent as the division “Prinz Eugen” saw action in Bosnia and Croatia 
proper in 1943-1944. The notion that Banat Volksdeutsche would be especially well 
endowed for this kind of anti-partisan warfare because they knew their enemy was 
patently untrue. Their supposed intimate knowledge consisted of ethnic and cultural 
prejudices compounded by a lack of prewar exposure to any region of Yugoslavia other 
than the Banat. Added to this were wartime racial stereotypes employed to motivate 
Waffen-SS soldiers and the civilians left behind on the home front.  
                                                 
1170
 “Wie überall auf dem Balkan wird auch hier die kleinste Arbeitsleistung mit erheblichen 
Umständen und Geräuschen verbunden.”  Ibid.  
1171
 Franz Thaler, “Aus dem Leben des Donauschwaben. Belgrad – die Menschenmühle zwischen 
Orient und Okzident,” BB, January 16, 1943, p. 5.  
1172
 Walter Manoschek, ed., “Es gibt nur eines für das Judentum: Vernichtung”: Das Judenbild 
in deutschen Soldatenbriefen 1939-1944 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995), pp. 26-27, 48. 
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If Belgrade was the urban antithesis of the German Banat, Bosnia was the city‟s 
rural counterpart: 
Who here [in Bosnia] does not think of our clean villages and hard-working 
people in the Banat? What could we do with these godforsaken lairs, where 
people are so lazy they go to seed in filth and vermin, while fertile fields yield 
only a meager harvest? Germans could make a cultured landscape 




Here the Banat Volksdeutsche animosity was compounded by the very real awareness 
that the Partisans would not be easily defeated. The moniker „Banditen‟ was prescribed 
by Hitler himself
1174
 and applied regularly to all resistance movements in Yugoslav lands 
and the Soviet Union. It reveals the frustration caused by an enemy who preferred 
guerrilla tactics to open warfare, and did not shy away from huge losses of civilian and 
military life in order to inflict damage on the Axis forces.  
The Banat press also called the royalist Ĉetnici „bandits.‟ When their leader, 
Dragoljub „Draņa‟ Mihajlović, left many of his men to be captured in Montenegro in June 
1943, this was seen as proof positive of his untrustworthiness and lack of honor.
1175
 
Treachery was perceived as a tradition of the Serbian and Yugoslav army, stretching back 
from Mihajlović to the military coup against the pro-Axis Yugoslav government in 1941 
                                                 
1173
 “Wer denkt da nicht an unsere saubere Dörfer im Banat und an seine fleissigen Menschen. 
Was würden wir aus diesen gottverlassenen Nestern, wo Menschen wegen ihrer Faulheit im 
Dreck und Ungeziefer verkommen und fruchtbare Felder eine kärgliche Ernte abwerfen, machen. 
Deutsche Menschen wären imstande, auch diesen Raum zu einer Kulturlandschaft zu formen.” 
Josef Beer, “Biwak in den Bergen,” BB, October 9, 1942, p. 5.  
1174
 See pp. 431-432. 
1175
 “Feige Flucht Drascha Mihailowitsch‟ nach Einkesselung seiner Truppen,” official war report 
from Berlin in BB, June 26, 1943, p.1.  
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and to 1903, when a “clique of corrupt, sick officers with gambling debts [sic]” plotted 
against and assassinated Serbia‟s King Aleksandar Obrenović.
1176
  
Nevertheless, since they were the more successful resistance movement, „bandits‟ 
most often meant the Partisans. Texts which passed for war reporting in the Banater 
Beobachter tended to emphasize how the „bandits‟ held the local civilian population in a 
state of constant fear. Considering their practice of living off the land and their equivocal 
stance on civilian casualties, not to mention enmity between the two resistance 
movements, this claim is not without some truth. These texts did not purport to analyze 
the military situation in the Balkans, but to emphasize the local population‟s preference 
for German rule over that of the communists.
1177
 The result was a depiction of the 
„bandits‟ as excessively cruel, treacherous and sly. These qualities, considered typical of 
the Balkans, became concentrated in the image of the semi-human raider in the night. 
There is a clear element of barely suppressed fear in this characterization, evident 
also in ever more frequent appeals to both the fighting front and the home front not to 
falter in their efforts, lest warfare should destroy the Banat. The use of photographs and 
sketches was especially effective in conveying the impression of a primitive, cruel and 
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 “Clique spielverschuldeter, korrupter und krankhafter Offiziere” “Am Rande der Belgrader 
Blutmacht,” BB, June 13, 1942, p. 5. 
1177
 Two texts by SS-Unterscharführer Hans Jakob Hein (member of “Prinz Eugen” and 
Volkswacht correspondent): ““Es war ein grosser König”,” Volkswacht, June 27-28, 1943, p. 1 
and ““Er musste gehen…”,” Volkswacht, July 4, 1943, pp. 1-2. The first text describes an 
encounter with an old Bosnian Muslim fondly remembering the time when Bosnia was an 
Austrian province, and he served under German (Austrian) officers in World War I. The second is 
an old woman‟s supposed account of how her son had to join a (presumably Ĉetnik) guerrilla 
after the Partisans robbed their smallholding.  
The same holds true of a local news article from Grossbetschkerek occasioned by the murder – 
after a long shooting match caused by the victim‟s cowardly refusal to come out of hiding – in 
this town of a single suspected Partisan by the Volksdeutsche police. The article emphasized that 
the deceased had brought nothing but shame on his country and its government (the 
collaborationist Serbian government), and that the Serbian population of the Banat would be 
grateful to the Germans for ridding them of such a dangerous presence. “Ortsnachrichten 
Grossbetschkerek. Berüchtigter Kommunist erledigt,” BB, January 8, 1943, p. 5.  
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highly dangerous enemy, sufficiently depraved to use women and children as combatants. 
Photographs purporting to represent captured Partisans were accompanied by the 
following caption:  
These creatures have shown how corrupt they are. Notions of manliness and 
womanliness, which took centuries to develop, lose in them all meaning: they are 
a drab, soulless bunch dreaming the crazy dream of taking the leadership of 
Europe into their hands. This sinister specter must be swept away, lest our 




The view of „bandits‟ as barely human creatures in whom the sexes have become 
hopelessly mixed up and lost their distinguishing features, underscores the gender 
dimension to National Socialist notions of racial purity. Volksdeutsche women in the 
Banat were seen as more than capable of fighting and guarding the home front,
1179
 but 
their fight was not the literal struggle of the female Partisans or Red Army soldiers, not 
armed service as part of the Reich‟s furthest watch. The women‟s fight was the struggle 
to maintain high agricultural productivity in the absence of men and, more importantly, to 
bear and raise racially healthy children (presumably also in the men‟s absence) as the 
surest way of defeating the racial enemy.
1180
  
A Banat Volksdeutsche man was a hard worker and a soldier, a man‟s man, but a 
woman was primarily a care giver and mother: “The man guards our Volk from external 
                                                 
1178
 “Dies sind Geschöpfe, die ihr Laster gezeichnet hat. Bei ihnen verlieren alle durch 
Jahrhunderte entstandenen Begriffe von Männlichkeit und Fraulichkeit ihren Sinn: eine graue, 
seelenlose Masse, die den wahnwitzigen Traum träumt, einst die Führung Europas in die Hände 
gelegt zu bekommen. Dieser finstere Spuk muss weggefegt werden, wenn die Geschichte unseres 
Kontinents nicht um ihren tiefsten Wert betrogen werden soll.” “Banditentypen aus Bosnien,” 
BB, August 17, 1943, p. 3.  
See also the caricatures by SS-Uscha. M. R. v. Cwitkowic depicting a wizened old Muslim with a 
turban and a demented-looking man in Serbian peasant costume in Volkswacht, July 4, 1943, p. 1.  
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 “Erntedank,” speech held in Grossbetschkerek on October 25, 1942, in Janko, Reden, p. 134.  
1180
 “Zur Eröffnung der Landfrauenschule in Weisskirchen,” speech held on November 16, 1941, 
in Janko, Reden, p. 93.  
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enemies, the mother protects it from internal decay.”
1181
 A supposed soldier‟s letter to his 
mother read on Radio Belgrade said:  
When you write to your soldiers that the fruit trees in the garden are bearing well, 
that the harvest will be good or that you have hung a small picture of the front 
above your bed, then your soldiers know that you are keeping the Heimat safe and 




A clear separation of gender roles would ensure racial purity, political and ideological 
integrity, and the endurance of the Volksgemeinschaft and Heimat. 
By contrast, the „bandits‟ knew nothing of this separation of the spheres. For 
them, all was gender, racial and political confusion. Captions accompanying another 
photo story in the Banater Beobachter described the captured Partisans in no uncertain 
terms as “criminal types, Soviet hirelings.”
1183
 The Volksdeutsche perception of non-
German inhabitants of the Balkans dovetailed with their acceptance of National 
Socialism. The Partisans were seen as exponents of a particularly Balkan type of cruelty 
and savagery,
1184
 but also as part of a greater anti-German conspiracy including the 
Soviet Union and „world Jewry.‟ The caption beneath yet another photograph of a 
captured „bandit‟ states the connection explicitly: “Such a Jew…”
1185
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 “Der Mann schützt unser Volk von äusseren Feinden, die Mutter bewahrt es vor dem inneren 
Zerfall.” “Zur Volkskundgebung in Weisskirchen” (1941), in Janko, Reden, p. 96.  
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 Nevertheless, the appearance of such an explicit reference to the „Jewish enemy‟ 
by a local contributor to the Banater Beobachter was the exception rather than the rule. 
The interpretation of Nazi ideology particular to the Banat by no means excluded anti-
Semitism and belief in a global Jewish conspiracy. If the Reichsdeutsche‟s limited 
practical experience and contact with Jews and Slavs fed the hysteria regarding the 
insidious racial enemy in their ranks,
1186
 the Banat Volksdeutsche had a different 
experience. As a self-consciously unique, closed group on the Greater Reich‟s ethnic and 
linguistic border, they accepted the Nazi idea of a global Jewish conspiracy. But the 
awareness that the majority Slavic population regarded them with animosity in both their 
old role as settlers and their new one as collaborators with the invading Reich forces, hit 
much closer to home. The Volksdeutsche did not need to imagine a „Slavic enemy‟: the 
„bandits‟ were really there.  
 
Conclusion 
The contents of the wartime Volksdeutsche press and speeches delivered by members of 
the Volksgruppenführung reveal that the Banat Volksgruppenführung fully embraced 
National Socialist ideology. A controlled press, of which the Banater Beobachter is an 
example, did not give voice to a multiplicity of opinions or to any dissent individual 
Volksdeutsche may have expressed. Nevertheless, their attitude seems to have been 
similar to that of most people in the Third Reich. While they may have objected to 
individual policies or demands made by the leadership on their time and resources, they 
did not reject National Socialism as such.  
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The appeal of Nazism to the ethnic German communities of Europe should not be 
taken for granted. The case of the Banat Volksdeutsche community suggests they used 
Nazism‟s tenets to articulate and make sense of local themes which preoccupied them. 
National Socialism among the Volksdeutsche tapped into already extant themes and 
concerns, molded them into a relatively consistent system of thought, and exacerbated 
them.  
The Banat Volksdeutsche tried, not entirely successfully, to reconcile their strong 
attachment to Heimat in the narrow sense (Banat) with their sense of belonging to a 
Greater Reich, the Volksgemeinschaft of all Germans. The disparity between the two 
concepts of Heimat was compounded by the Volksdeutsche‟s pride in their achievements 
as settlers and soldiers on the old Military Border, and their awareness of the fact that 
many Reichsdeutsche held them in barely disguised contempt as, at best, second-class 
Germans. Thus National Socialism as expressed by Banat Volksdeutsche confirmed the 
ambivalence of their position in the Nazi racial hierarchy and in the Reichsdeutsche 
worldview.  
The Banat Volksdeutsche‟s anti-Slavic sentiment was intensified by Nazi anti-
Semitism. The communist Partisans were seen as exponents of a typically Balkan cruelty, 
but also of a great Jewish-Bolshevik-Slavic conspiracy against the German Volk. In the 
Banat Volksdeutsche‟s essentially narrow-minded worldview, the „Slavic enemy‟ posed a 
was far more serious threat than the „Jewish enemy.‟ 
Attachment to the Banat Heimat, the Volksdeutsche claim to be as German as the 
Reichsdeutsche, and their growing fear of the majority Slavic population of Southeast 
Europe came together in public pronouncements regarding the Waffen-SS division “Prinz 
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Eugen.” Volunteering for military service with this division was represented to the 
Volksdeutsche community as proof positive of their German credentials and as a 
continuation of their historical traditions. The Waffen-SS forged a historical connection 
between the Banat Volksdeutsche‟s ancestral tradition and present experience. Thus a 
whole host of ideological incentives was deployed to encourage Banat Volksdeutsche 
participation in the Waffen-SS, but military service was not left solely to their good will. 
The Third Reich needed the Banat Volksdeutsche in order to secure the occupied Balkan 

































CHAPTER VII „MY LIFE FOR PRINCE EUGENE‟
1187
:  
THE WAFFEN-SS DIVISION “PRINZ EUGEN” 
AND THE END OF THE „BANAT ERA‟ 
 
As its name indicates, the Waffen-SS was conceived as the armed wing of the SS. It was 
also a paramilitary instrument for the extension of Heinrich Himmler‟s personal power 
within the Reich‟s sphere of influence. Despite its exponential growth during the war 
years,
1188
 it never quite challenged the Wehrmacht for the position of the Third Reich‟s 
primary armed force, not least because of its heterogeneity
1189
 and the varied fighting 
quality of its recruits. Arguably its greatest success was the thoroughness with which it 
reconciled ideological education with military training for its rank and file. The Waffen-
SS proved crucial for ideological warfare, especially in anti-partisan actions in East and 
Southeast Europe.  
 The Waffen-SS division “Prinz Eugen” was created in spring 1942 with the 
express purpose of harnessing the Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) of the Serbian Banat 
and Southeast Europe in general as soldiers for the Reich. At first glance, this ran counter 
to the policies of promoting Volksdeutsche materially and ideologically. As soldiers, they 
were bound to die and not be able to produce food or racially healthy children for the 
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 The chapter title is borrowed from the title of a 1941 history of German settlement in 
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Banat, ed. Dr. Walter Schreiber (Berlin: Steiniger Verlage, 1941). 
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 Thomas Casagrande estimates its growth from 18,000 members in 1939 to 910,000 members 
in 1944 (p. 19). 
1189
 By war‟s end, in addition to Reich Germans, the Waffen-SS had in its ranks ethnic German, 
Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, Flemish, Bosnian Muslim, Albanian, French, Latvian, Ukrainian, 
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Reich. In the context of wartime realities, however, Volksdeutsche armed service was an 
invaluable resource for the Nazi regime, which could not and would not separate 
ideological from military matters. In terms of their racial suitability and their ideological 
reliability, the Reich could wish for no better soldiers than Volksdeutsche. Their 
recruitment marked the final eclipse of Reich diplomacy in the latter part of the war by 
Hitler and Himmler‟s views on the war as a conflict of ideologies and races. Himmler 
also proved capable of gaining by fair means or foul the support of institutions such as 
the Wehrmacht and the German Foreign Ministry, which fought turf wars with the SS but 
shared a common ideological purpose. In the war of races and ideologies, Volksdeutsche 
were not only expected to serve the Reich, which had been their protector and champion 
– they had to serve it if they wished to prove themselves, once and for all, good Germans. 
In terms of Volksdeutsche responses, most realized that they indeed owed the Reich a 
material debt as well as a debt of honor, and served without resistance. In the course of 
the latter thirty months of the war, the Banat Volksdeutsche in the Waffen-SS 
participated in anti-partisan actions of escalating brutality and diminishing effectiveness.  
 The history of the division “Prinz Eugen” has been told in passing, and from an 
institutional perspective, in several histories of the Waffen-SS (see below). The only 
monograph on it, by Thomas Casagrande, inexplicably frames the division‟s history in a 
socio-psychological context. In terms of historical analysis, it is somewhat superficial. In 
this chapter, the goal is therefore to place this division within the context of Hitler‟s racial 
war as it played out in Southeast Europe, and to examine the European as well as the 
local developments which brought about its creation and the massive recruitment of 
Banat Volksdeutsche for it. “Prinz Eugen” was far from a crack military unit in terms of 
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efficiency, but it was peerless as a propaganda coup for the Reich. It gave the Waffen-SS 
over 20,000 recruits, a sixth of the Banat Volksgruppe (ethnic German community) and 
the second largest recruit contingent, percentage-wise, of all the Volksdeutsche 
communities in Southeast Europe.  
It was also highly successful as a means of tying the Banat Volksdeutsche finally 
and irrevocably to Reich policy – and its ultimate fate. When the Serbian Banat came 
under attack by Partisans and the Red Army in fall 1944, “Prinz Eugen” was fighting for 
the Reich far from its Banat home. This left mostly women, children, the elderly and the 
Volksgruppenführung (ethnic German leadership) to face the enemy onslaught. The 
period starting in fall 1944 and continuing into the late 1940s has been given a 
disproportionate amount of attention in the historiography and memoir literature on the 
Volksdeutsche of Southeast Europe. It has been a way for Volksdeutsche settled in West 
Germany and elsewhere to shift attention away from their wartime actions and onto the 
immediate postwar period, when they were dispossessed, expelled from or incarcerated 
by the new, communist regimes in their host states. This chapter will purposefully stop at 
the arrival of the Red Army and the Partisans in the Banat in early October 1944. Using 
Volksdeutsche postwar depositions with a beady eye to the more exculpatory among 
them, it will examine how the habits of thought formed in the war years, and the wartime 
relations between the Volksgruppe (ethnic German community) and the Third Reich, 






Volksdeutsche Peasants into Soldiers 
Historians differ as to the relative balance of ideology and sheer militarism in the 
Waffen-SS.
1190
 Relative consensus does exist that the Waffen-SS was a more openly and 
specifically ideological fighting force even than the Wehrmacht, whose postwar 
reputation as a purely professional military institution has been dismantled by historians 
such as Omer Bartov.
1191
 Consensus also exists regarding the trajectory the Waffen-SS 
described, going from a self-professed elite (in line with its origin in the Allgemeine SS, 
the Reich‟s racial and ideological elite) to a more pragmatic institution as its ranks 
expanded rapidly starting in the second half of 1942 to include soldiers whose belonging 
to the German Volk was tenuous or non-existent.
1192
 Of the former, the Volksdeutsche of 
East and Southeast Europe were an obvious choice for recruitment, though not the first 
choice. The first Germanic
1193
 divisions of the Waffen-SS were formed in 1940,
1194
 
whereas the systematic recruitment of Volksdeutsche did not begin until after Operation 
Barbarossa.  
The Waffen-SS division “Prinz Eugen” was created specifically in the context of 
the outbreak of communist resistance movements in Southeast Europe (Greece and 
partitioned Yugoslavia). These movements were ideologically and strategically related to, 
yet enjoyed much tactical independence from the state-sponsored resistance in the Soviet 
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Union. They created a manpower problem for the Third Reich, which was already 
pouring ever more soldiers into the Eastern Front. It could not spare too many 
Reichsdeutsche (Reich Germans) for the anti-communist struggle in the Balkans.
1195
 A 
solution was found in the roughly 1.5 million Volksdeutsche living in the Reich‟s allies 
Romania and Hungary and in the occupied Yugoslav lands. Assumed to be reliable 
recruits for the Reich based on racial affinity, they were nevertheless not seen as prime 
soldiering material. Hence the idea to form them into separate, Volksdeutsche units 
(rather than integrating them either into the Wehrmacht or into their host states‟ armies), 
and deploy them only on their home turf, against a Slavic, communist enemy they were 
expected to know and to distrust.
1196
 
The shift in the Third Reich‟s attitude toward Volksdeutsche with regard to 
Waffen-SS recruitment is striking. Before Operation Barbarossa, Volksdeutsche is 
general were seen as valuable additions to the Volk but also as fairly benighted, in need 
of the Reich‟s tutelage and protection. After the invasion of the Soviet Union failed to 
become the quick and decisive victory Hitler had hoped for, the Reich‟s racial policies in 
general became more radical, as demonstrated by the transition from the mass executions 
of Jews by the Einsatzgruppen in the Soviet Union in summer and fall 1941, to the 
construction of the death camps in winter 1941-1942 and spring 1942. Parallel to this, the 
paternalistic attitude of the Reich to Volksdeutsche morphed into a more demanding, less 
cajoling version of its former self. The Reich never unleashed the full force of its 
coercive and destructive potential on its „racial comrades‟ in other states, but in the 
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course of trying to win an increasingly desperate ideological war, even those it 
considered its ideological kin could no longer be treated with kid gloves alone. 
This was problematic for the Reich. For all the violence inherent in its system of 
rule, the Nazi regime liked to present a plausible legalistic façade for its actions, 
punctiliously interpreting or passing laws which allowed, for example, for the 
disenfranchisement and expropriation of Jews. As for the Waffen-SS, a 1935 law which 
limited the Wehrmacht to recruiting among Reich citizens was crucial. The SS 
interpreted this law more loosely so as to allow itself access to racial Germans (i.e. 
Volksdeutsche) from other states, provided they were volunteers.
1197
 Writing about the 
Volksdeutsche of Northern Schleswig in terms which applied to Volksdeutsche in 
general, in early 1942 Werner Lorenz of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VoMi) informed 
his superior Heinrich Himmler that the Reich had to be nurturing and welcoming if it 
wished to attract Volksdeutsche volunteers into the Waffen-SS. The Reich also had to 
accept the fact that, while Nazification may not have progressed quite as far among them 
as it had in the Reich, this in no way diminished the Volksdeutsche soldier‟s willingness 
to fight and sacrifice himself for the Reich.
1198
 From the Volksdeutsche perspective, 
volunteering for the Waffen-SS served as the ultimate proof of their loyalty to Führer, 
Reich and Volk.  
But the Volksdeutsche‟s good will and volunteering alone would not fill the 
Reich‟s depleted ranks. The Reich had to recruit able-bodied Volksdeutsche men while 
maintaining the illusion of voluntarism on the recruits‟ part. This was especially true if 
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the state in which they resided, and of which they were citizens, opposed the Reich 
recruiting its citizens openly. Such was the case in Romania and Hungary. They were 
junior partners in the Axis but had strong points of leverage to ensure they got some of 
their own way, even against Reich interest. In satellite states like wartime Croatia, the 
recruitment of Volksdeutsche was easier. Even then the formalities attendant on dealing 
with a nominally independent government had to be honored. This left territories the 
Reich occupied directly – such as Serbia-Banat – in which recruitment of Volksdeutche 
for the Waffen-SS was easiest.  
To recruit Volksdeutsche in countries with governments of their own, however 
questionable their legitimacy, the Waffen-SS needed the consent of the AA (Auswärtiges 
Amt, the German Foreign Ministry).
1199
 Like all institutions of the Third Reich, both of 
these rested ultimately on a solid, shared ideological foundation. Even though in early 
1941 the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop temporarily won the upper 
hand in matters in Volksdeutsche affairs, by the end of that year he and Himmler were 
intensely aware of their common cause: winning the war against the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, the AA proved amenable to Himmler‟s proposal to put the idea of recruiting 
Volksdeutsche into the Waffen-SS before the governments of Hungary, Romania and 
Croatia (also Slovakia and Denmark).
1200
 By consenting to this, the AA‟s influence over 
Volksdeutsche matters became gradually eclipsed by Heinrich Himmler‟s grandiose 
                                                 
1199
 Herzog, pp. 3-4.  
1200
 Under-State Secretary Martin Luther (AA – Auswärtiges Amt, the German Foreign Ministry) 
memo, December 31, 1941, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA AA), Inland II 
Geheim, file R 100981 Waffen-SS, Allgemeiner Dienst, Führeranordnung, Zuständigkeit, 
Heranziehung deutscher Volksgruppen und ausländischer Menschenreserven, 1937-1944, fiche 
2534, no frame numbers; German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to German 
Embassies in Zagreb, Bratislava, Bucharest and Copenhagen, January 17, 1942, PA AA, Inland II 
Geheim, file R 101093 Berichte und Medungen zur Lage in und über Jugoslawien, 1942, fiche 
2817, frames H298,010-011. 
401 
 
vision of an ethnic German army conquering and holding the savage miles of East and 
Southeast Europe for Führer, Reich – and himself.  
Gradually, as the Banat Volksdeutsche were trained and deployed first in Serbia 
and then in Croatia, they became a part of the murderous policies by which the Third 
Reich ruled territories riven by resistance. Volksdeutsche motives were mixed, but a 
significant element in the process by which peasants and artisans became capable of 
shooting civilians was the ideological education they received in the Waffen-SS. It taught 
them to see the enemy as a racial and criminal category, an abstract notion. Whether 
willingly or with a mere absence of objection, the Volksdeutsche became no longer just 
peasant soldiers, border guards, racial and cultural warriors for the Reich, but also trained 
killers for its cause.  
In the Serbian Banat, the prior complicity and compliance of the 
Volksgruppenführung with other Reich policies – especially the elevation of 
Volksdeutsche to a leading position in their home region and their profiting from 
Aryanization in the second half of 1941 – played into Himmler‟s hands. His reasoning 
was clear: since the Reich had given Banat Volksdeutsche security, riches and a little 
power, it was only fair that they repay the Reich with loyal service under arms for the 
greater German cause. Thus when Himmler demanded that Banat Volksdeutsche join the 
Waffen-SS, the Volksgruppenführung had no leverage with which to deny him. The 
Waffen-SS sweetened this bitter pill somewhat by adjusting the rhetoric directed at its 
Volksdeutsche recruits so as to fit them into its ranks and to fit itself into their worldview 
(see Chapter 6). Other than that, it did not even need the compliance of the AA. In an 





 Himmler secured it almost as easily as he had Ribbentrop‟s agreement for 
Waffen-SS recruitment in countries bordering occupied Serbia.  
 
This Land is Too Big for Us 
Harald Turner, head of the Reichsdeutsche administration in occupied Serbia, had hoped 
to defeat the Partisan and Ĉetnik movements with the help of the Serbian police and 
collaborationist government.
1202
 As soon as the latter proved ill-suited to the task in late 
summer 1941, Wilhelm List (Wehrmacht commander for all of Southeast Europe), 
Himmler
1203
 and the AA agreed on the undesirability of lending credence to voices 
calling for a more independent, pro-Axis Serbia by encouraging the Ĉetnici as an anti-
Bolshevik, Serbian fighting force. Instead, the AA representative in Belgrade, Felix 
Benzler, put the matter in a nutshell: “The resistance movement can only be defeated 
with German forces.”
1204
 The request General Heinrich Danckelmann, the Military 
Commander in Belgrade, had sent already the previous month for more forces to be sent 
to Serbia from the Reich
1205
 could not be granted.
1206
 Every available Reichsdeutsche 
soldier was already needed in the East as the invasion of the Soviet Union started to run 
out of steam without capturing Moscow.  
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 Even when General Franz Böhme replaced Danckelmann in late September 1941 
and brought another division with him,
1207
 the situation continued to deteriorate. Serbs 
expelled from Hungarian-occupied Baĉka, the Independent State of Croatia and the 
Bulgarian zone of occupation in southern Serbia were brutalized by the loss of homes and 
loved ones. There was an estimated 161,500 of them newly arrived in Serbia in the five 
months after the end of the April War alone.
1208
 Many flocked to the two resistance 
movements.  
Exacerbating the situation further was the general attitude of Reich personnel to 
Serbs as a people. The occupation administration‟s official line remained that the 
Reichsdeutsche soldier was the best friend a new and improved (i.e. pro-Axis) Serbia 
could have.
1209
 In truth even the relatively sympathetic Turner referred to “specific 
“Balkan relationships”,” such as lack of value for life (whether one‟s own or that of 
others) and the habit of carrying weapons, which made anti-German resistance in the 
Balkans that much more difficult to combat.
1210
 In addition, General Böhme and about 
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one third of all Reich troops stationed in Serbia were Austrian, and held traditional, 
Habsburg-era anti-Serb prejudices compounded by racial ideology (see below).
1211
  
Himmler and OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) chief Wilhelm Keitel were 
not Austrians, but neither were they circumspect in their views of Slavs and resistance 
fighters. Himmler saw the Serbs as a nation steeped in, even hereditarily disposed to 
rebellion and disobedience.
1212
 Keitel approved the routine execution of 50 to 100 
communists for every Reichsdeutsche soldier killed in Serbia, so as to cow the restive 
civilian population into submission.
1213
  
Böhme translated this into his October 10, 1941 order that for every Reichs- or 
Volksdeutsche person of any age and either sex killed in Serbia, one hundred civilians 
should be executed. Fifty civilians executed was the norm for every wounded Reichs- or 
Volksdeutscher.
1214
 By ordering that every municipality keep a ready pool of 
communists, Jews and other undesirables on hand, from which the retaliation quota could 
be filled, Böhme set the stage for the Wehrmacht to become an instrument of the 
Holocaust in Serbia. He also failed to staunch either resistance movement – if anything, 
the disproportionate numbers of people shot by Wehrmacht firing squads only inflamed 
them – leading to his own replacement already in December 1941. His successor, General 
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Paul Bader, encapsulated the problem in a missive of piercing desperation sent to Berlin 
already in August 1941: “The spaces [in Serbia] are too big! [paragraph break] The 
deployed troops too weak!”
1215
 
 Keitel had little sympathy for such complaints. He was devising a way to transfer 
a part of the already sparse Wehrmacht forces stationed in Southeast Europe to the truly 
vast spaces of the Eastern Front.
1216
 His proposed solution was to utilize Italian and 
Bulgarian soldiers. The Bulgarian zone in southeastern Serbia was extended at the turn of 
1941-1942.
1217
 The AA echoed Keitel in a peevish statement that it was not the 
Reichsdeutsche soldiers‟ job to police Serbia, however restive it might be.
1218
  
The Wehrmacht in Southeast Europe followed this with the proposal to form SS 
brigades out of Serbian Volksdeutsche, so as to allow a part of the Wehrmacht forces to 
transfer out of Serbia. This proposal rested on the assumption that said SS units would be 
subsumed under the Wehrmacht‟s tactical control in the field.
1219
  
This proposal wed a stern approach to combating the Slavic-Bolshevik enemy in 
the Balkans with the desire to use allied and collaborationist forces to free up 
Reichsdeutsche soldiers for the great showdown against the Slavic-Bolshevik-Jewish 
enemy in the East. Himmler and Hitler approved the proposal, but as it played out the 
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Wehrmacht would not be the undisputed master of military operations in Southeast 
Europe any more than in other areas where Himmler‟s Waffen-SS played a significant 
role. 
 
“Prinz Eugen” (Re)Born 
Mark Mazower pinpoints the resistance in the Yugoslav lands as the ongoing event which 
allowed Heinrich Himmler to eclipse several of his rivals in the internal power-struggle 
in the top echelons of the Third Reich.
1220
 In her study of the office of the Höherer SS- 
und Polizeiführer (HSSPF) in the Reich‟s sphere of influence, Ruth Bettina Birn 
implicitly confirms Mazower‟s point by stating that Himmler saw the Reich‟s desperate 
security situation in Serbia at the turn of 1941-1942 as the prime opportunity to install a 
HSSPF there. The HSSPF would both coordinate the anti-partisan forces in Serbia and 
act as Himmler‟s personal representative in dealing with the Wehrmacht and AA offices 
in Serbia.
1221
 The man Himmler chose, August Meyszner, was the ideal candidate for the 
job. He had the police training, the SS career and the typical Austrian view of Serbs. A 




 The process by which Banat Volksdeutsche became Waffen-SS recruits deserves 
closer attention than it has so far received. It was not a matter of course simply because 
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Volksdeutsche were considered racial Germans and therefore good soldier material. It 
involved legal and military precedents, and built on the foundation of Volksdeutsche 
complicity with the Reich built up in the first year of the occupation.  
The systematic recruitment of Volksdeutsche in Serbia-Banat for the Waffen-SS 
did not happen overnight, nor was Meyszner‟s appointment its main impetus. A 
precedent had been set shortly after the conclusion of the April War, when Waffen-SS 
chief of staff and chief of the SS main office (SS-Hauptamt) Gottlob Berger decided that 
the Volksdeutsche taken prisoner-of-war while serving in the Yugoslav Army made 
prime candidates for Waffen-SS recruitment.
1223
 While this idea did not pan out, the SS 
division “Das Reich,” which had participated in the occupation of the Serbian Banat, did 
recruit an estimated six hundred men.
1224
 Even though it was not supposed to take in 
Volksdeutsche, the Wehrmacht, too, took in around seven hundred volunteers from the 
Banat. It did so first with the AA and VoMi‟s permission, later in 1942 without it.
1225
 In 
October 1942 Himmler forbade any more of these Volksdeutsche to go to the 
Wehrmacht. Though he intended to have them transferred to the Waffen-SS,
1226
 602 of 
these men were still with the Wehrmacht in December 1943.
1227
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Since there was, as yet, no blanket order on recruitment of Banat Volksdeutsche 
by any of the Reich‟s armed formations, these early recruits were true volunteers.
1228
 This 
had been the case also with the Volksdeutsche who joined the Waffen-SS clandestinely 
during and after the resettlement of the Bessarabian Volksdeutsche in late 1940.
1229
 The 
1941 volunteers were mostly young – almost all who joined the Waffen-SS were in their 
late teens or early twenties, as were three quarters of those who joined the Wehrmacht
1230
 
– and fired by ideology and the euphoria of liberation by Reich forces. They also kept 
their Serbian (formerly Yugoslav) citizenship, which would matter in later years. 
 In addition to the avowed willingness of some Volksdeutsche to fight in Hitler‟s 
war, the Volksgruppenführung surrendered what little power it had to object to Waffen-
SS recruitment among its co-nationals. Volksgruppenführer (Volksdeutsche leader) Sepp 
Janko and his cohorts did so first indirectly by acknowledging that their administration, 
set up in spring and summer 1941, was completely dependent on the Reich‟s power, 
military backing and ideological legitimation. When the idea to form a Freikorps-type 
organization to fight communism in the Balkans was put to him in summer 1941, Janko 
not only did not object, but could not have objected had he wanted to.  
The idea originated with Berger already in the last days of the April War. Then, 
its context had been the desire to pacify Romanian clamoring for a piece of Yugoslav 
territory, possibly by forming a Volksdeutsche paramilitary formation for self-protection 
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(Selbstschutz) out of Volksdeutsche from both halves of the Banat.
1231
 Eventually the 
idea was put to Janko both by VoMi personnel and by the Wehrmacht in Serbia,
1232
 
possibly working at cross-purposes, each hoping that it could seize full control of the 
projected Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz for itself. Benzler objected strenuously, dreading 
Hungary‟s reaction and the possibility of Volksdeutsche soldiers trained by 
Reichsdeutsche personnel becoming a part of the Hungarian army following Hungary‟s 
future takeover of the Banat.
1233
  
To alleviate these fears and following the outbreak of communist resistance, in 
July the AA proposed and in August Ribbentrop approved the proposal that the formation 
might be presented to Hungary as a Volksdeutsche volunteer corps for the struggle 
against Bolshevism, thus placing it in the broader context of Hitler‟s ideological war.
1234
 
Ribbentrop‟s final approval placed the future Selbstschutz under the command of the 
German commanding general in Serbia. However, the net effect of his capitulation was 
that already in August 1941 the AA ceded control of Volksdeutsche recruitment to the 
armed forces, first to the Wehrmacht and then, with Keitel and Hitler‟s approval,
1235
 to 
the Waffen-SS in December 1941.  
                                                 
1231
 Berger to Himmler, April 17, 1941, BA Berlin, NS 19, file 2724, fiche 1, frame 38. 
1232
 Benzler to AA, July 22, 1941, PA AA, Inland II Geheim, file R 100939 Volksdeutsche: 
Jugoslawien, Banat und Batschka, 1941-1944, fiche 2423, frame H298,119. 
1233
 Benzler to AA (July 1941), PA AA, Inland II Geheim, file R 100939, fiche 2423, frames 
H298,119-120; see also Luther to Ribbentrop, July 28, 1941, NARA, RG 242, T-120/5782/ 
H298,117-118. 
1234
 Luther to Ribbentrop (1941), NARA, RG 242, T-120/5782/ H298,117; Luther to Helmut 
Triska (head of the AA‟s Volkstumsreferat), August 21, 1941, NARA, RG 242, T-
120/2424/E226,999. 
Benzler had originally suggested that Russia alone be designated as its opponent. Benzler to AA 
(July 1941), PA AA, Inland II Geheim, file R 100939, fiche 2423, frame H298,120. 
1235
 Keitel to Himmler, December 30, 1941, BA Berlin, NS 19, file 3519, fiche 5, frame 197. 
410 
 
Hitler confirmed the SS‟s jurisdiction over the planned Banat Volksdeutsche units 
that same month.
1236
 All recruitment of Banat Volksdeutsche by the Wehrmacht officially 
stopped in mid-January.
1237
 On January 22, 1942 Meyszner was appointed to his new 
position. Hitler‟s order regarding Meyszner not only confirmed Himmler‟s undisputed 
jurisdiction over Volksdeutsche affairs, but did away with any future nonsense about 
Freikorpses and Selbstschutzes: “The Higher SS and Police Chief is charged with the 




Himmler and the SS might reassure nervous Volksdeutsche by calling it 
something other than „Waffen-SS,‟ something less threatening and final, more local. 
Nevertheless, the Banat Volksdeutsche now fell squarely within Himmler‟s purview, and 
could be disposed of and deployed as he saw fit. No mention of a need for AA approval 
exists in the text of Hitler‟s order on Meyszner‟s appointment. Already the July 1941 
proposals for the formation of Volksdeutsche units mentioned that, barring the 
annexation of the Banat by Hungary, said units would almost certainly be deployed 
outside of the Banat, explicitly in Serbia proper.
1239
  
Serbia-Banat was one occupied territory, so moving a Volksdeutsche unit from 
one to the other was not explicitly a diplomatic issue. But in both Reichs- and 
Volksdeutsche perceptions, the two halves of Serbia-Banat were distinct entities. One 
was a turbulent region the Reich needed to subjugate. The other was a peaceful, fruitful 
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and essentially vulnerable area, in Benzler‟s words, “for all intents and purposes a 
Volksdeutsche reservation.”
1240
 The Reich had expended time and resources to shore up 
its beleaguered, exposed Volksdeutsche community. If the Reich chose to make 
Volksdeutsche into soldiers, that changed how they were perceived. Once the precedent 
was set to deploy Banat Volksdeutsche out of their home region, even just to Serbia 
proper, they could be deployed in other areas riven by resistance activity as well.  
In early 1941, both before and after the April War, the Volksgruppe‟s status 
depended largely on the Third Reich‟s foreign policy. After the indefinite delay placed on 
a Hungarian takeover of the Serbian Banat in summer and fall 1941 and the concomitant 
bolstering of the Volksdeutsche administration‟s position, the influence of the Reich‟s 
concatenation of ideological and martial thought started to grow. By 1942, it eclipsed the 
AA. Meyszner – and through him Himmler – effectively tied the Volksgruppe to himself, 
although he still had to report to the German commanding general in Belgrade.
1241
 That 
relationship was rarely smooth, but never so divisive as to detract from the overall 
conduct of the war in the Balkans. 
 With Meyszner‟s arrival in Belgrade, the AA‟s input became limited to 
suggesting that the Volksgruppenführung should be the one to announce the formation of 
what was then deceptively termed a Volksdeutsche home army (Heimwehr). The idea 
was to give the impression of Volksdeutsche voluntarism and local deployment only,
1242
 
in line with the official emphasis on their volunteering for the Waffen-SS. As a ploy to 
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1241
 Birn, pp. 240-241.  
1242
 Benzler to AA, January 17, 1942, NARA, RG 242, T-120/200/153,492; Luther to Triska, 
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impress Hungary with how well Hitler intended to keep his promise to eventually hand 
over the Serbian Banat with all its material and human resources intact, this was 
effective. Yet the tone of the AA memos from early 1942 reveals that this tactic fooled no 
one in the Reich‟s diplomatic corps. If anything, it only confirmed the Volksdeutsche‟s 
overall dependence on the Reich‟s pleasure – and its need for soldiers.  
 Sepp Janko‟s actions in relation to the proclamation of this new development to 
his co-nationals suggest that he was consumed by a desire to have his Volksgruppe do 
even more for Führer and Reich than was at first expected of it. Not only did Janko not 
object to the initial idea, but he proposed in February 1942, even before Meyszner‟s 
appointment, that he (Janko) should proclaim, via the Banat Volksdeutsche press, leaflets 
and posters, compulsory military service for all Volksdeutsche men between 17 and 50 
years of age, the duration of which he would determine later.
1243
 He also proposed 
sweetening the pill by promising financial support for the families of the men affected by 
this order, and the possibility of applying for individual exemptions.
1244
  
As had happened in the period before the April War, when Janko‟s ideas about 
smuggling in weapons for his co-nationals would have upset relations between the Reich 
and Yugoslavia,
1245
 in early 1942 it was not in the Reich‟s best interest for the Banat 
Volksdeutsche to set an example for too much forwardness and independent thinking to 
Volksdeutsche communities in other states. Having the Volksgruppenführer, rather than 
the Reich, proclaim obligatory military service for them would have set just such an 
example. It would also have disrupted the illusion that non-Reich nationals in the 
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Waffen-SS were all volunteers. A little ideological zeal could go a long way with a 
Volksdeutscher in Janko‟s position: influential among his co-nationals and other residents 
of his home region, utterly dependent on the Reich.  
On these points, Ribbentrop and Himmler were in agreement.
1246
 They agreed that 
Janko should issue a proclamation to his co-nationals calling on them to volunteer for 
armed service as part of the greater German anti-Bolshevik struggle. However, they 
emphasized the Grenzer (border soldiers) tradition of the Volksdeutsche‟s ancestors and 
service against the Bolshevik enemy in their own home region. Himmler himself drafted 
the text,
1247
 which Lorenz then passed to Janko around the time that Meyszner arrived in 
Serbia, ready to start mustering Volksdeutsche „volunteers.‟
1248
 
At this point, Janko made one of his only two attempts at asserting even partial 
independence from Berlin since becoming Volksgruppenführer in the occupied Banat 
(the other happened in late 1944, see below). In line with the general trend of his relations 
with Berlin, the attempt contained within it the seed of its own failure. Janko tweaked the 
text sent to him from Himmler, and jumped the gun by having it published earlier than 
had been intended.  
In altering several details of the text, Janko showed himself a better connoisseur 
of his co-nationals‟ mentality than Himmler. Himmler had written the text in the second 
person plural, stressed the suffering from which the Wehrmacht had delivered the Banat 
Volksdeutsche (“redeemed from the foreign yoke”) and their debt of honor to Reich and 
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Führer, but without acknowledging the Volksdeutsche claim on either.
1249
 Janko omitted 
the references to Reich and Führer. Instead, he stressed the all-European struggle against 
Bolshevism as a broader context into which the Volksdeutsche could fit. He also referred 
to them as “German Volksgenossen” who had played an equal part in repelling 
communist attacks within the Banat in 1941 as had the Reichsdeutsche. Finally, he put 
the text into the first person plural, thus implicitly including himself and the 
Volksgruppenführung into the common Volksdeutsche debt of honor.
1250
  
These changes did not alter the gist of Himmler‟s text, but they did agree better 
with the Volksdeutsche sense of self and with the images of their martial ancestry the 
Volksgruppenführung stressed in its propaganda (see Chapter 6). Janko confirmed and, 
even, overemphasized his fundamental agreement with Himmler by altering the 
maximum age for recruitment from 45 to 50, and sneaking in a reference to the proximate 
calling up of men born in specific years (although the original text merely emphatically 
encouraged Volksdeutsche to volunteer).
1251
 Last but not least, Janko followed this text 
with a portion of the one the AA and VoMi had expressly forbidden him from publishing. 
In it, he discussed financial care for the families of the men called up for armed 
service.
1252
 Defying orders, Janko thus invoked obligatory military service for 
Volksdeutsche twice on the front page of the March 1, 1942 issue of the 
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Verordnungsblatt der Volksgruppenführung der deutschen Volksgruppe im Banat und 
Serbien.  
Martin Luther of the AA sputtered in outrage: “[I]n future there can be no 
question of [Janko] passing such decrees of his own volition, without getting the 
permission of the Auswärtiges Amt first.”
1253
 This was more in the nature of a quibble 
about bureaucratic chains of command, and a display of the AA‟s relative impotence vis-
à-vis Himmler. In truth, Janko‟s ideological zeal had played right into Himmler‟s hands. 
Had Janko followed the line of seeming moderation and voluntarism invoked by 
Himmler and the AA, he still would not have been able to prevent his co-nationals being 
mobilized en masse at a later date. With his two proclamations, he made clear his desire 
to see his Volksgruppe do its ideological and völkisch duty to its full capacity. He also 
made a mockery of all the many subsequent invocations of Banat Volksdeutsche only 
volunteering for the Waffen-SS. 
This left the Waffen-SS free to send a recruiting commission to the Banat, while 
the Volksgruppenführung rubberstamped their demands and attempted to ease the 
recruits‟ wrenching mental transition from a newly enriched and empowered peasantry to 
second-class soldiers (see below).
1254
 While the VoMi had accepted the Volksgruppe‟s 
conservative estimate of about 10,000 men being available for inclusion in the new units 
in February 1942, Meyszner optimistically expected training to take no longer than four 
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months and suggested filling the prescribed quota of 24,000-25,000 recruits by bringing 
in 15,000 Baĉka Volksdeutsche.
1255
 In practice, the training alone would take nearly six 
months due to repeated delays necessitated by the drilling of soldierly ways into peasant 
recruits. As for numbers, in a memo dated on the first anniversary of the Axis invasion of 
Yugoslavia, Luther reported that the 7. SS-Freiwilligen-Gebirgs-Division “Prinz Eugen” 
(7
th
 Volunteer Mountain Division “Prinz Eugen” of the Waffen-SS), named after Prince 
Eugene of Savoy on April 1, 1942,
1256
 could already boast 10,000-15,000 recruits. 
Recruitment was far from over.
1257
 In fact, it did not officially begin till later in April 
1942,
1258
 suggesting that Luther may have been writing more with a reasonable hope in 
the Reich getting its way than based on current fact. 
The projected officer corps for the new division consisted of a mixture of 
Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche, especially of Romanian origin. The latter were career 
officers in the Romanian army before they defected to the Waffen-SS.
1259
 One of these 
became division commander. Arthur Phleps acted as something of a poster child for what 
a Volksdeutscher with the willpower and dedication of a true German could become. He 
had first seen action in World War I and participated in the overthrow of the Béla Kun 
regime.
1260
 He attained the rank of Lieutenant-General in the Romanian army,
1261
 then 
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moved to the Waffen-SS in 1941 and applied for service in the division “Das Reich” 
already in early April that year, while that division was stationed in Timişoara in 
preparation for the invasion of the Serbian Banat.
1262
 Instead, Phleps rounded out his 
völkisch and anti-Bolshevik credentials by commanding a Waffen-SS regiment on the 
Eastern Front
1263
 before Himmler handpicked him for the leadership of the Banat 
Volksdeutsche division. Phleps served as a kind of living training aid, a model 
Volksdeutsche soldier, and was certainly remembered as a kind and proudly völkisch 




For some of the Reichsdeutsche officers, serving in “Prinz Eugen” was an 
education for the future of the Volk in a German-dominated, but still multiethnic East.
1265
 
For others, however, it was at best a fool‟s errand. Hauptmann Amelung, commander of 
the Kreiskommandantur in Grossbetschkerek, was not shy about publicly expressing a 
very Wehrmacht-centric view of the new Waffen-SS division. He criticized its officers as 
incompetent and its recruits as “little men,” “degenerate” and unfit for military 
service.
1266
 Though such incidents had more to do with the friction between the 
Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS, even some of the new division‟s officers voiced the 
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Reichsdeutsche ambivalence toward Volksdeutsche in general, and toward their fighting 
potential in particular. The ever outspoken Franz Unterreiner, himself a World War I 
veteran conscripted by “Prinz Eugen,” remembered with lingering bitterness the youthful 
officers‟ lack of respect for many recruits‟ advanced age and supposedly insufficient 
Germanness. The officers called them, “Banat devourers of bacon, corn peasants, old 
flour sacks, night watchmen, etc.”
1267
 Even one former “Prinz Eugen” officer from the 
Danube region reminisced after the war that only because he was a Volksdeutscher 
himself did he dare to describe the initial state of the recruits as a “parcel of pigs.”
1268
 He 
hastened to add that, against all odds, a functioning division did come into being. 
This achievement can be credited in large part to the recruits‟ willingness to learn 
and drill and prove themselves good (Volks)deutsche. Few Volksdeutsche who gave 
postwar testimonies criticized the recruitment as openly as Franz Unterreiner, who 
wondered rhetorically why people received written summons
1269
 to report for duty if they 
were all supposed to be volunteers.
1270
 The vinegary Wilma Slavik gave the 
Volksgruppenführung too much credit when she saw the persecution of the Banat Jews 
and the creation of “Prinz Eugen” as their ideas alone, meant to secure for Janko and his 
cohorts the position of Hitler‟s “favorite child.”
1271
 Remarkably, even the surviving 
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members of the Volksgruppenführung and former division officers tended to admit in 
their exculpatory works of history that few of the recruits were real volunteers, but 
hastened to stress that all were glad to fight in defense of their Heimat.
1272
  
Perhaps closest to the truth – though the least garrulous on the topic – are the 
postwar testimonies of ordinary Volksdeutsche. These mention that some, especially 
young Volksdeutsche did volunteer. As far as the majority of recruits were concerned, 
many grumbled yet almost none resisted, refused their summons or absconded.
1273
 
Whether their primary motive was ideology and the desire to participate in a victorious 
war, or acceptance of the idea that they owed their armed service to the Reich as their 
protector, or fear of punishment
1274
 (and its more insidious sisters, peer pressure and the 
fear of ostracism), or a not-explicitly ideological but certainly blinkered devotion to what 
they saw as their duty as Germans,
1275
 or a plus ça change resignation (especially among 
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the men who had already been mobilized once or twice before),
1276
 the mobilized men 
accepted this last sacrifice the Reich they idealized required of them. The efficient 
mobilization as carried out by the Waffen-SS in cooperation with the 
Volksgruppenführung yielded within a year of the division‟s creation some 20,000 
men.
1277
 It proved, in the same months as the destruction of the Serbian Jews was being 
completed, that the Third Reich‟s various offices could cooperate very well in order to 
achieve its intertwined priorities: the destruction of the ideological enemy and victory in 
the war of ideologies.  
In relation to these priorities, the Volksdeutsche‟s value to the Reich became 
increasingly instrumental. Promoting them by means of access to Aryanized property 
became a mere side effect of the Holocaust in Serbia-Banat. Their military service was 
subsumed to the needs of Hitler and Himmler‟s anti-Bolshevik campaigns. The 
Volksdeutsche never lost their ideological value to the Reich, but that did not mean they 
were excused from soldiering for their supper, as it were.  
Specifically in the case of the Banat Volksdeutsche, the escalating conflict of 
personalities and jurisdictions between Harald Turner as Wehrmacht-bureaucratic 
representative in Serbia and Himmler‟s man August Meyszner resulted in Turner‟s being 
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sent home in fall 1942.
1278
 Thereafter Himmler‟s power became well and truly 
entrenched in Serbia-Banat so far as Volksdeutsche matters and, especially, their military 
deployment were concerned. This was confirmed in August 1942, as the training of the 
division “Prinz Eugen” was drawing to an end. Himmler then decided that the 
Volksgruppe in the Serbian Banat would be subject to a de facto obligatory military 
service, although this decision was not made public knowledge because it would have 




In doing so, Himmler was merely approving the state of affairs after the 
mobilization of Banat Volksdeutsche was already a done deal. He also confirmed what 
Janko had been all too eager to announce already in March. This time, Janko actually 
objected. He may have been suffering pangs of conscience at how cheaply he had sold his 
Volksgruppe and resenting the fact that Phleps had shown up the mockery of his 
presumed authority in Volksdeutsche matters. (In Berger‟s uncharitable phrase, Phleps 
had “upended [Janko‟s] throne.”
1280
) Or maybe Janko was motivated more by dread of 
running the Banat with most of his trained male personnel gone. Himmler responded that 
he was in charge of Volksdeutsche in the whole world, let alone the Banat, and that it was 
“impossible that Germans somewhere in Europe play at pacifism and sit around, while 
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our battalions protect them.”
1281
 Janko‟s continued unease about the division‟s 
deployment outside of the Banat earned him almost a literal slap on the wrist. Himmler 
instructed Lorenz to “grab Janko by the necktie”
1282
 and remind him of the chain of 
command – really of whom Janko had to thank for his position as Volksgruppenführer. 
Himmler‟s standpoint remained unaltered till the war‟s end: willy-nilly, 
Volksdeutsche had to serve the Reich under arms. He did acknowledge the need to 
cooperate with the AA by not declaring an actual obligatory military duty for all 
Volksdeutsche, regardless of citizenship.
1283
 He also modified the size of the 
Volksdeutsche levies depending on their state of residence. Only Volksdeutsche living in 
occupied territories – such as Serbia-Banat, Ukraine, later also Hungary – could be 
mobilized more or less openly. In countries not occupied by the Reich, they could be 
encouraged-cum-pressured to volunteer
1284
 or have their national military service 
transferred to the Reich by their host states, as happened later in the war in Slovakia and 
Hungary (see below). 
Even with this proviso, in 1943 Berger presented the mobilization of the Banat 
Volksdeutsche as having been based on an obscure 1872 General Levy Act for the 
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mobilization of the militia (Landsturm) in the Tyrol.
1285
 While some historians see this as 
evidence of Himmler and the SS‟s legalistic bent,
1286
 it seems more like justification of 
the 1942 mobilization after the fact, a sop to legalistic sentiment more than real devotion 
to it. It was hardly the first or the last time even the SS, the self-proclaimed ideological 
elite of the Third Reich, bent its own rules to accommodate Himmler‟s desire for power. 
Though he went out of his way to mention how Volksdeutsche had to be treated with kid 
gloves much more than Reichsdeutsche, Berger inadvertently came close to expressing 
the real sentiment of the SS leadership. He remarked that Serbia-Banat was, for all intents 
and purposes, sovereign German territory (Hoheitsgebiet) by dint of being occupied by 




Himmler also never removed the word (and ideal) of volunteering from the name 
of the division “Prinz Eugen.” He thus both extended a conciliatory gesture to the AA 
from his position of power and saved ideological face by presenting the division as a mini 
Volksgemeinschaft of happy and eager ethnic German soldiers. As already indicated, the 
motivations which spurred Volksdeutsche to comply with mobilization orders were 
mixed. Some pulled strings to be released from military service or to have relatives 
released.
1288
 The overall mood in the Banat was one of passionate pride in their soldiers, 
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Pride or not, the Volksgruppenführung‟s daily operation and the continued 
exporting of agricultural surpluses from the Reich were in danger of grinding to a halt. 
This, in turn, led to the introduction of the compulsory labor service, the Hofpatenschaft, 
and the employment of women and non-Germans in the Banat administration (see 
Chapter 4). By August 1942 the Volksgruppenführung was clamoring for six hundred 
essential administrative, economic and pedagogical personnel (Janko himself included) to 
be released from active Waffen-SS duty,
1290
 following such a release secured for Banat 
administration chief Sepp Lapp and his staff.
1291
 This request was approved in early 
September 1942.
1292
 It earned the “brave Volksgruppenführer” the scorn of at least some 
less enthusiastic, older members of the Volksgruppe, who accused him of “settl[ing] into 
his comfortable office . . . claiming to be indispensable”
1293
 and “stay[ing] at home, 
where no bullets whistle past.”
1294





 Volksdeutsche who pulled strings in order to be discharged.  
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Despite Berlin‟s decision on the essential personnel, nearly a third of the six 
hundred were still with “Prinz Eugen” in November 1942,
1297
 and required an AA 
intervention on the Volksgruppe‟s behalf.
1298
 Even so, the final decision rested with the 
Waffen-SS.
1299
 This suggests that even before the Axis defeat at Stalingrad and the 
announcement of total war in the Third Reich, mobilizing all available manpower for 
active deployment in the war took precedence over building the Nazi New Order or 
developing a long-term plan for economic extraction to feed the Reich‟s war machine. 
The destruction of the enemy in the field and the destruction of the racial enemy in the 
territories already under Reich control were two halves of one goal. Other, ideological as 
well as tangible benefits the Reich could extract from the Volksdeutsche were 
subordinated to this goal.  
 
“Prinz Eugen” in the Field 
Even in its planning stages, the new Waffen-SS division was not meant to stay in the 
Banat indefinitely. The inclusion of the word „mountain‟ in its name alone implied that it 
was not intended for deployment in the Banat lowlands, which were not plagued by the 
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resistance as were other, mountainous Yugoslav lands. Despite Benzler‟s hesitation, 
borne of his position‟s focus on Serbian affairs, Ribbentrop acknowledged already in 
February 1942 that the proposed Volksdeutsche units might completely replace 
Reichsdeutsche units in Serbia-Banat, and release the latter for the anti-Bolshevik 
struggle elsewhere.
1300
 Despite official propaganda which stressed “Prinz Eugen”‟s role 
in defending its Banat Heimat (see Chapter 6), ultimately Benzler‟s idea that the 
Volksdeutsche units might supplement and aid, but not supplant Reichsdeutsche ones 
completely,
1301
 carried the day. This was not because of any special regard for Benzler‟s 
views, but because the military decision-makers in Berlin were ideologically incapable of 
trusting a motley crowd of Volksdeutsche, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and 
Albanians to keep the Balkans pacified on their own, without Reich supervision. “Prinz 
Eugen” was fully integrated into the Nazi war effort. It had some Reichsdeutsche 
officers, received its marching orders from Berlin, and cooperated in the field with the 
Wehrmacht and other pro-Axis forces. 
 The Reich‟s urgent need for more reliable, non-Reichsdeutsche soldiers in the 
Balkans was clear already in summer 1942, in the repeated announcements and delays of 
the date when “Prinz Eugen” could be deployed. In June it was late August,
1302
 in mid-
August it was September 10,
1303
 finally in early September the date for “Prinz Eugen” to 
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 representatives were unified, for once, in their high hopes for the 
division‟s success in the field.  
 Several historians have judged “Prinz Eugen” and other ethnic divisions of the 
Waffen-SS as both cause and example of the decline of that institution‟s elite status and 
combat effectiveness.
1308
 While “Prinz Eugen”‟s efficiency was certainly greatest in 
defensive fighting,
1309
 such was ultimately its purpose. As an explicitly anti-partisan 
fighting force, “Prinz Eugen” was a responsive and defensive force, especially during its 
initial deployment in Serbia proper from October 1942 till January 1943. It combined 
police duties with regular security, patrols and anti-partisan action.
1310
 
 In this period, Himmler confirmed his supreme position in Volksdeutsche matters 
by reiterating his ban on Southeast-European Volksdeutsche being drafted by the 
Wehrmacht. He stressed that only in the ranks of the Waffen-SS could Volksdeutsche 
receive the ideological and military training they needed.
1311
 Despite these repeated 
assertions of Himmler‟s authority, the Wehrmacht remained in charge of anti-partisan 
activities in Serbia, and had the power to command even the Waffen-SS as one of the 
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 It was not until “Prinz Eugen” was deployed in the 
Independent State of Croatia in January 1943 that it was removed from Meyszner‟s – and 
the German commanding general in Serbia‟s – jurisdiction.
1313
 Although from then on its 
actions in the field were coordinated with those of the Wehrmacht in Croatia, the 
Croatian army, the Ustańa militia and, later, the Bosnian Muslim Waffen-SS division 
“Handschar,” this removal of the Reich‟s occupation infrastructure in Serbia from the 
jurisdictional melee surrounding the division
1314
 cemented Himmler‟s personal influence 
over “Prinz Eugen.” 
In the course of their deployment, the men of the division “Prinz Eugen” were 
treated to a steady round of propaganda lectures and evening gatherings intended to instill 
in them a sense of belonging to a greater, racial and fighting community of Germans, as 
was common for all Waffen-SS units.
1315
 The central element in this martial-ideological 
education, which Himmler had vaunted as essential and only to be given the 
Volksdeutsche within Waffen-SS ranks, was the notion that the enemy was not what he 
appeared to be. Although they drew on the central tenet of National Socialism – that at 
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the root of all the forces opposed to the Third Reich, be they communist or capitalist, was 
the Jewish people – the anti-Semitic aspect was not stressed in proclamations directed at 
Banat Volksdeutsche recruits. Much like Banat Volksdeutsche propaganda, the 
propaganda and the very phrasing of orders directed at the division “Prinz Eugen” did not 
discount the threat the Jews were seen to pose to the New Order. However, they stressed 
instead the perceived savagery, slyness and numerical superiority of the Slavic, and 
especially the communist, enemy. This was the enemy that the Volksdeutsche recruits 
were supposed to know
1316
 and fear. The Third Reich played on and built up that fear.  
The October 10, 1941 order issued by then-commanding general in Serbia Franz 
Böhme set the stage by establishing the punitive shooting of civilians – Serbs and Jews – 
as the norm for German anti-partisan action in Southeast Europe. It was inspired by 
National Socialism‟s ideological platform, and especially the view of Serbs as 
fundamentally untrustworthy.
1317
 Much as the Commissar Order (Kommissarbefehl) did 
in the occupied Soviet Union, this order normalized punitive action by German armed 
forces against civilians perceived as racial inferiors and enemies in Southeast Europe.  
A training document for the division “Prinz Eugen,” prepared for it by its newly 
appointed commander Arthur Phleps, confirmed the expected mode and rate of 
retaliation: either one hundred Partisans or one hundred civilians from the vicinity for 
every dead division member, fifty for every wounded comrade in arms.
1318
 The document 
went on to describe what it was like to be surrounded by enemies on all sides, a 
perspective typical of both the Reich‟s view of its position in the ongoing conflict and the 
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Banat Volksdeutsche historical sense of self.
1319
 It also substantiated the Reich‟s 
prevalent view that the “fanatically fighting enemy can only be opposed by an even more 
fanatical and more effective combatant.”
1320
 It did so by offering a more specific context 
for the need for utmost brutality in the field: the Serbian people‟s habitual perception of 
all kindness as weakness, and its pugnacious fanaticism.  
The population must be so impressed [underlined in the original] by the actions of  
our battalions and the behavior of every one of us that the mere appearance of a 
single man with the Odal rune on his collar and the national emblem [the Reich 
eagle and swastika] on his arm would cause them to show respect, and nip all 




In view of such an attitude displayed by Reichs- and Volksdeutsche officers alike to the 
civilians in Serbia proper, Phleps‟ appeal to the selfsame civilians to cooperate and aid 
the German armed forces in eradicating the communist “plague”
1322
 from their midst rang 
decidedly hollow. In vain did Phleps seek to assure his Serbian audience that “a law-
abiding population can live in peace and prosperity under the protection of the German 
sword.”
1323
 The operating principle of the division “Prinz Eugen” in the field – seconded 
by the Wehrmacht and the AA
1324
 – was expressed by Himmler with his idiosyncratic 
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The Banat Volksdeutsche recruits must have been very receptive to such a view 
of the enemy, considering the images of the Slavic communist propagated by their press. 
It also corresponded to the perception of historical exposure to an inimical and foreign 
human environment, which was central to their sense of self. The dehumanization of the 
enemy was furthered by Reich leaders‟ decisions about official terminology in 1942. First 
Himmler banned the use in German documents of the word „partisans‟ as used by the 
communist resistance in the Soviet Union and elsewhere to refer to its members. This 
word lent said resistance members an aura of martial glory where Himmler wanted 
German soldiers to see only “bandits, franc tireurs and criminal thugs” to be 
annihilated.
1326
 This decision resonated especially in Yugoslav lands, where the actual 
name of the resistance led by Josip Broz Tito was partizani.
1327
 The Yugoslav Partisans 
were not seen as partisans, but as mere criminals deserving of punishment.  
On top of this, later in 1942 Hitler decreed that the resistance in the East and 
Southeast could not be put down without considering every civilian, women and children 
included, as a potential „bandit.‟ Hitler gave legal right to every one of his soldiers to 
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abuse or kill any civilian, regardless of age or gender, who was so much as suspected of 
being a communist or aiding the communist cause.
1328
 This order declared, in effect, open 
season in East and Southeast Europe on anyone who could not prove they were an Axis 
supporter with impeccable political and ideological credentials. For the division “Prinz 
Eugen,” the atmosphere of paranoia and violence engendered by such guidelines became 
heightened when it was moved out of the jurisdictional boundaries still incumbent on it 
during its deployment in Serbia, and into the Independent State of Croatia in January 
1943. 
This move came about as a result of the movement of the majority of Tito‟s forces 
into Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was a part of the Independent State of Croatia. There the 
Partisans proceeded to attract supporters from among the ethnic Serbs, but also the Croats 
and Muslims disenchanted with the narrow ideological platforms offered by the Ustańe, 
the Reich and the Ĉetnici.
1329
 Attendant on this was the general weakness of the Ustańa 
government and its inability to police its own provincial areas, as well as Himmler‟s 
continued ambition to muster Croatian and, if possible, Hungarian Volksdeutsche and 




It was in this new arena of operations that the Volksdeutsche division started 
going on the offensive, though never independently of larger operations against resistance 
strongholds such as Operations Weiss (January-March 1943) and Schwartz (May-June 
1943). In fall 1943 it moved on to operations in Dalmatia. It was also in Croatia that the 
guidelines for anti-partisan action issued in 1942 came to the fore, especially after the 
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whole territory of the Independent State of Croatia was declared a German 
Bandenkampfgebiet (Anti-Partisan Combat Area) in mid-1943, regardless of its legal 
independence.
1331
 This gave German forces in Croatia maximum power and discretion in 
the course of anti-partisan actions. In summer 1943 the German commanding general in 
Croatia and the commander of all German forces in Southeast Europe still contradicted 
each other, but in a way which increased the discretionary power of commanders in the 
field. It was the ultimate oxymoron of ideological warfare: all harshness should be used 
in putting down the resistance,
1332
 but preferably not against friendly civilians,
1333
 
disregarding the fact that the two were often indistinguishable in guerrilla warfare.  
In this period, there was also some difference of opinion inside the division “Prinz 
Eugen” on such issues as whether anyone below the rank of battalion commander could 
order the shooting of civilians, and whether women and children should be shot.
1334
 Some 
of the older residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina had fond memories of their lives during the 
Austrian occupation of Bosnia before World War I and initially looked on all German-
speakers as the inheritors of that noble imperial tradition (see Chapter 6). Or at least they 
saw the Germans as a welcome change from the fighting between the Ustańe and the 
Partisans.
1335
 This rosy image could not last. In vain did Phleps‟ replacement as division 
commander, Karl von Oberkamp, appeal to field commanders‟ common sense in 
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assessing whether killing the families of men absent because away fighting either with 
the Partisans or with the Ĉetnici might not drive even more civilians into the arms of the 
resistance: “on such grounds one could, and would even have to, flatten substantial 




By late 1943, however, the situation had deteriorated beyond salvaging. Italy had 
departed the war, the Ustańa state was very weak, overstretched Axis forces could not 
control the Croatian and Bosnian countryside, and a state of de facto civil war existed 
between the Ĉetnici and the Partisans, in which civilians of all ethnicities and religions 
made for all too easy targets for occupier and resistance member alike. In October 1943, 
Hermann Neubacher was dispatched to act officially as the AA liaison for all of 
Southeast Europe, really to help coordinate all of the Axis armed forces there in a 
desperate effort to wrest back control of what had become a free-for-all melee.
1337
  
In typical Reich fashion, this attempt was made by means of driving the already 
established approach to anti-partisan warfare to its furthest logical extent. Starting in late 
1943, territorial commanders could, with the approval of the Oberbefehlshaber Südost 
(Supreme Army Commander in the Southeast), order retaliatory action including 
shooting, hanging, arrest and destruction of homesteads of „bandits‟ and their helpers, but 
not just anyone who lived in the vicinity. There was a fatal loophole: all those, women 
and children included, for whom a reasonable conclusion of guilt or accompliceship 
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In practical terms, this gradual exacerbation of Reich policies, shaped from the 
outset by an extremely negative ideological view of the enemy, meant that whereas in 
Serbia proper in late 1942 the division “Prinz Eugen” participated in several large-scale 
massacres of civilians, such action became standard and routine practice in the 
Independent State of Croatia in 1943.
1339
 The division gained such a reputation for 
indiscriminate trigger-happiness that the Reichsdeutsche in Croatia actually lodged a 
complaint in 1943 after members of “Prinz Eugen” killed a number of Muslims 
(including several members of the 13. SS-Gebirgs-Division “Handschar”) in eastern 
Bosnia.
1340
 The Ustańa authorities lodged a complaint of their own in early 1944 when, to 
all appearances, Ĉetnici collaborating with Axis forces
1341
 and wearing “Prinz Eugen” 
uniforms slaughtered Croatian civilians in the Dalmatian hinterland.
1342
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“Prinz Eugen” was given the right on both occasions. Its field commanders had 
merely taken the leeway given them by the general guidelines on anti-partisan 
warfare.
1343
 This wanton approach to warfare was compounded by the fact that, unlike in 
Serbia proper, where the division members‟ supposed intimate knowledge of the enemy 
was already hampered by differences in living standard and language, in Bosnia and 
Dalmatia the men of “Prinz Eugen” really could not have been said to have known their 
enemy at all. Certainly they could not have always told Muslim from Croat from Serb, 
even had they had the good will to try to do so.
1344
 Were effectiveness in killing civilians 
a measure of military prowess, then the division “Prinz Eugen” would have acquitted 
itself well. Instead, it was a division of middling success in anti-partisan activity, 
complete with the massacres of civilians this entailed. Its efforts were undone by poor 
coordination between the different Axis forces and the wartime Reich‟s perennial 
problem: lack of said forces.  
For the Waffen-SS as an institution, this meant an increased intake of 
Volksdeutsche. By June 1944, some 200,000 Volksdeutsche were under arms in the 
Waffen-SS and the German police.
1345
 The 1942 recruitment in the Serbian Banat was 
only a part of this enterprise. Already in early summer 1942, while “Prinz Eugen” was 
solely a Banat Volksdeutsche division, Himmler was considering levying Romanian, 
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Hungarian and Croatian Volksdeutsche to add to its ranks, with a racial thinker‟s 
disregard for state borders.
1346
 Following the defeat at Stalingrad, he increased pressure 
on other Axis states to transfer their Volksdeutsche‟s military obligation to the Reich. 
This would have allowed the Waffen-SS to recruit Croatian, Hungarian, Slovak and 
Romanian Volksdeutsche under the continued pretense of volunteering.
1347
  
Individual states‟ bargaining power vis-à-vis the Reich continued to matter. 
Occupied Serbia-Banat and Croatia, which was occupied in all but name, came in second 
and a very close third of all Southeast European states, percentage-wise, in terms of their 
Volksdeutsche serving in the Waffen-SS. The only state to outstrip them was as-yet 




Some of these non-Banat recruits were included in the division “Prinz Eugen,” 
since the Banat Volksgruppe had been largely drained in 1942.
1349
 Thereafter, it had to 
send more men to its division by cutting into its meager border-patrol and police 
manpower pool. By early 1944, just over half of “Prinz Eugen” still consisted of Banat 
Volksdeutsche. The rest were a mixture of Romanian, Hungarian, Slovak and Croatian 
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Volksdeutsche as well as Reichsdeutsche.
1350
 Even so, the division remained anchored in 
the image of a hardy community of Volksdeutsche frontiersmen specifically from the 
Serbian Banat, its point of origin and ideological identifier. This association was its claim 
to fame inside the Banat as well as inside the Waffen-SS, but it was also its greatest 
obstacle on the road to military-ideological greatness. 
The division‟s problems, apart from the availability of manpower, boiled down to 
the unresolved ambivalence in the Reichsdeutsche‟s attitude toward Volksdeutsche, 
exacerbated in the field by the fact that the former tended to be officers commanding the 
latter. Paying lip-service to the Volksdeutsche‟s racial and ideological steadfastness was 
all very well. At bottom, most of the Reichsdeutsche officers could not see past the 
Balkan landscape they were deployed in, and associated its Volksdeutsche with every 
detail in which Southeast Europe failed to be the German heartland. Instead, it seemed to 
them a “pig land.”
1351
  
Some of the officers praised their men for becoming true fighters.
1352
 When 
“Prinz Eugen” elicited outside praise, however, its successes were usually credited to 
Phleps‟s efforts to whip “completely Serbianized, mostly too old” recruits into shape.
1353
 
Or the compliments were backhanded at best, suggesting that the division had not done 
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too shabbily for a bunch of Volksdeutsche.
1354
 More commonly, as often happened also 
to Germanic recruits in other divisions,
1355
 “Prinz Eugen” officers expected men of 
advanced years to perform feats of physical endurance such as an uphill march, in July, 
while carrying full gear.
1356
 They also continued to heap verbal abuse on the 
Volksdeutsche.
1357
 At the same time, the ever petit bourgeois Himmler decided to root 
out the “Balkan custom” of cursing someone‟s mother in an argument by having a 
division member executed for breaching his (Himmler‟s) ban on such language.
1358
 
For their part, many Volksdeutsche seem to have become quickly disenchanted 
with the life of a soldier for Hitler. Already in 1942, Phleps (who had, as division 
commander, embraced the Reich‟s worldview as his own) castigated the men for writing 
anonymous letters to Janko, Meyszner and other occupation officials in Serbia, 
complaining of poor treatment, food and general conditions.
1359
 By 1944 the 
Volksdeutsche were voicing the same complaints in their regular letters home, possibly in 
a passive-aggressive attempt to get the censors‟ attention.
1360
 However, none of the small 
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sample of preserved excerpts from these letters reveals that their authors felt morally 
conflicted or even disgusted with what anti-partisan warfare entailed. Instead, they 
pleaded for early release for their surviving sons, after others had already died in service 
with “Prinz Eugen”
1361
 or they tried to pass the blame at that late juncture by verbally 
abusing the Croats.
1362
 The more pro-active few attempted to desert by dressing up as 
Ustańe,
1363
 hiding with relatives after failing to return from leave
1364
 or resorting to the 
classic as old as gunpowder: shooting oneself in the foot.
1365
 
Not even being granted Reich citizenship could alleviate the Banat 
Volksdeutsche‟s disenchantment. By Hitler‟s order of May 19, 1943, all Volksdeutsche, 
defined as having at least two grandparents of German origin or being members of the 
organized Deutsche Volksgruppe in their host state, who were also members of the 
Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS, the German police or Organisation Todt, received Reich 
citizenship (Staatsangehörigkeit).
1366
 Wilhelm Stuckart of the Reich Interior Ministry had 
suggested a similar move, unsuccessfully, as early as July 1941.
1367
 At that time, the AA 
had had enough clout in Volksdeutsche affairs to block such a move. The 1943 decision 
built on Himmler‟s general usurpation of all Volksdeutsche affairs as his personal 
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purview. More specifically, it built on the precedent set by granting Reich citizenship to 
the Volksdeutsche in annexed territories
1368
 as well as opening the possibility of applying 
for it to the Volksdeutsche resettled into the Reich, who were also in the Waffen-SS.
1369
 
It also built on Stuckart‟s January 1942 decision to make the “frugal” granting of Reich 
citizenship theoretically easier for mobilized Volksdeutsche from territories under the 
Reich‟s military administration, which were also German Hoheitsgebieten,
1370
 such as 
Serbia-Banat. 
The timing of this blanket order suggests that Hitler and Himmler were spurred on 
by the likelihood in May 1943 of a future weakening of the Axis by the removal of Italy 
from the war. They likely also saw in it the last, possibly the biggest privilege (more a 
perk than a real act of empowerment) for Volksdeutsche soldiers pushed to the limits of 
their personal and their Volksgruppen‟s capacity for sacrifice on behalf of the Reich. In 
the Banat the announcement was accompanied by some trepidation that Reich citizenship 
would resurrect the dreaded prospect of resettlement to the Reich.
1371
 It also caused anger 
because it failed to provide for Volksdeutsche serving in the Banat police or in offices 
which were de jure a part of the Serbian state apparatus. This was so because the granting 
of Reich citizenship did not erase the Volksdeutsche‟s earlier citizenship. Instead, it left 
them with dual citizenship.
1372
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Overall, the citizenship decree failed to make much of an impact on the Banat 
Volksdeutsche because of a clause specifying that the blanket granting of citizenship did 
not extend to the Volksdeutsche soldiers‟ wives and children. That issue was deferred till 
the war‟s end,
1373
 most likely due to the Reich policymakers‟ desire to continue to keep 
the Volksdeutsche on a very tight leash and ensure all of their fighting potential was 
realized before such a radical and sweeping change in their status could be accomplished. 
Berlin also wanted to keep many Volksdeutsche soldiers‟ non-German wives at arm‟s 
length.
1374
 Even for the new Reich citizens in the ranks of the Waffen-SS, the gain did not 
mean much since they were not at liberty to decamp to the Reich for the duration of the 
hostilities.  
So minor was the actual value of the citizenship-granting decision, and so rich and 
varied the speculation surrounding it, that the Volksgruppenführung felt obliged to 
remind its co-nationals of their real legal position. The Nedić government therefore 
reissued the July 1941 decree on the Volksgruppe‟s legal standing
1375
 in August 1943. Its 
title was changed slightly to “Verordnung über die Rechtsstellung der deutschen 
Volksgruppe im Banat und in Serbien” (“Decree on the Legal Status of the German 
National Group in the Banat and Serbia,” my emphasis),
1376
 to remind the Banat 
Volksdeutsche where and under what circumstances they lived. The new text reiterated 
all the points made in the original text, and added to them the content of the March 1942 
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“Verordnung über die Disziplinargerichtsbarkeit der deutschen Volksgruppe” (“Decree 
on the Disciplinary Jurisdiction of the German National Group”).
1377
 It thus stressed that 
nothing had really changed. For the foreseeable future, the Volksdeutsche civilians in the 
Banat went on harvesting crops to feed their men and other German soldiers, and the 
Volksdeutsche soldiers remained with the Waffen-SS at Himmler‟s pleasure.  
By early 1944, Phleps
1378
 reported that the Partisans had become a formidable 
army whose hallmarks included mobility, tactical shrewdness, the willingness to take 
huge casualties in battle, and the ability to survive and fight in the most primitive 
conditions.
1379
 The Axis forces in the Independent State of Croatia he assessed as ranging 




The division “Prinz Eugen” found itself in a position similar to the one General 
Bader had complained of in occupied Serbia in 1941. The distances it was expected to 
cover were simply too large and the terrain too difficult. In early 1944 it was in charge of 
covering all of the rugged Dalmatian and Montenegrin coast between Ńibenik (Dalmatia) 
and Shkodër (Albania), in anticipation of an Allied landing there. It also had to secure the 
communication and transportation lines leading into mountainous Bosnia.
1381
 
Once an Allied landing on the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea ceased to be a 
likelihood, “Prinz Eugen” joined the long, slow slog of the rear-guard battle fought by 
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German forces retreating toward the Reich. It went first through Bosnia to southern 
Serbia, where it protected the retreat of the Wehrmacht‟s Army Group E (Heeresgruppe 
E) from Greece.
1382
 Propaganda was stepped up throughout this period. Its content 
reveals a growing fatalism as the reality of defeat sank in, despite the use of long-
established tropes about sacrifice and unity. For example, Otto Kumm (division 
commander after Oberkamp) issued the following statement to the division, occasioned 
by the July 1944 attempt on Hitler‟s life:  
Even more than before, duty calls us to [to fight] till our last breath [with] 
unceasing loyalty in battle for the future of the Reich. We must toss the last 
indifference, the last inhibition and softness overboard. There is no going back for 




The final gasp of this desperate effort to keep up troop morale was Hitler‟s decision to 
award Volksdeutsche from Southeast Europe, who had fought for Germany or Austria in 
World War I and also fought in the German armed forces in the ongoing war, the Cross 
of Honor. He made this decision on October 20, 1944. This was two weeks after it had 
become impossible for Volksdeutsche civilians to leave the Serbian Banat before the 




Driven by despair and ideology combined into one indistinguishable whole, the 
Waffen-SS division “Prinz Eugen” spent its last days as a handmaiden of the Third 
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Reich‟s war effort. Its soldiers were deemed good enough to fight „bandits‟ and kill 
civilians, but not to have their retreat or lives protected by Reichsdeutsche troops. In 
October 1944 it started the final leg of its retreat as protection for Heeresgruppe E, back 
through Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, into Slovenia, where it was finally captured by Partisan 
forces in May 1945.
1385
 Or its remnants were: a report from late November 1944 stated its 




To Evacuate or Not to Evacuate 
Back on the home front, much administrative reshuffling took place in the occupation 
system of Serbia-Banat in the last eighteen months of the war. Felix Benzler was replaced 
by Hermann Neubacher as the AA representative for all the Yugoslav lands and Greece 
in 1943.The German civilian administration was officially unified with the office of the 
Plenipotentiary for the Economy in early 1944.
1387
 The jurisdiction of Meyszner‟s 
successor in the role of Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer, Hermann Behrends, was extended 
over the Sandņak (southwestern Serbia) and Montenegro in May,
1388
 and over the Banat 
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 All this was done in an effort to make economic extraction and anti-
partisan warfare more efficient. Without more personnel assigned to Southeast Europe, 
the repeated revamping of the occupation system yielded little improvement.  
It certainly had little effect on daily life in the Banat. Behrends had grandiose 
ideas about regimenting and mobilizing to their full capacity the Banat‟s already thinly 
stretched human and economic resources.
1390
 However, in the last two months of the 
Reichsdeutsche occupation of Serbia-Banat he did not manage to accomplish any great 




What did make a difference was the actuality of war, which made itself more and 
more noticeable starting in spring 1944, with the Allied air raids against Reichsdeutsche 
installations in Belgrade,
1392
 the radio tower in Zemun
1393
 and other targets.
1394
 Air raids 
continued through the summer, and extended their scope to include targets in Novi Sad 
(Baĉka) and Alisbrunn (Banat) in August.
1395
 Sepp Janko wasted no time in delivering a 
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rousing and reassuring speech. Despite some initial consternation the VoMi described the 
mood of the Volksgruppe in April as “dutiful and prepared [to make] sacrifices.”
1396
  
Nevertheless, the standard rhetoric was starting to ring decidedly hollow. In 
spring 1944 Wehrmacht soldiers and Italian POWs under their command dug up and 
burned the bodies buried by the Apfeldorf road.
1397
 German forces were doing the same 
with the bodies of the Nazis‟ victims in all areas of East Europe likely to find themselves 
between the Red Army and Berlin. The Banat Volksdeutsche could not have known of 
the larger implications of this massive operation intended to clean up and conceal all 
traces of the systematic slaughter which had occurred over the past three years. They 
could not fail to infer the truth of retreat-cum-defeat when Organisation Todt workers 
evacuated from Ukraine in summer 1944 scoffed at the Banat Volksdeutsche‟s 
faithfulness to the German cause: “The Germans here in the Banat act as though Hitler 
were a tin god; not so with us in the Reich,” and told children offering them the Hitler 
salute, “Soon you‟ll be giving a different salute.”
1398
 
Even so, the Romanian declaration of war to the Third Reich on August 23, 1944 
came as a shock to the Banat Volksdeutsche. They had prided themselves on the relative 
peace of their home region, and found themselves overnight living practically on the front 
lines.
1399
 Especially disturbing was the seemingly intensified Partisan activity in the 
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Banat since July 1944, but this may have been more perception than reality.
1400
 The 
expellees‟ postwar reports are unanimously silent on any major Partisan activity in the six 
weeks between August 23 and the Red Army‟s entrance into the Banat in the first days of 
October.  
In September 1944, Behrends mustered members of the Deutsche Mannschaft and 
Volksdeutsche teenagers, and sent them to fight the Red Army in the Romanian Banat. 
They were quickly pushed back from the vicinity of Timişoara.
1401
 While Behrends 
indulged in fantasies of defeating the Red Army under his own steam and the 
Volksgruppenführung ensured an article condemning the new government in Romania 
appeared in the Banater Beobachter,
1402
 the AA reached an agreement with the 
Wehrmacht to quietly evacuate Reichsdeutsche women, children and non-essential 
personnel from Serbia in early September.
1403
 
A short while later, the Reich displayed its different frequent offices‟ inability to 
agree on basic policy which did not revolve around National Socialism‟s major 
ideological goal: defeat of the Bolshevik-Jewish global conspiracy against Germany. 
Ribbentrop informed AA offices across Europe that the Wehrmacht would not be 
involved in the evacuation of Volksdeutsche from any part of Europe. He asserted that, as 
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a matter of Volk-politics as well as foreign policy, evacuation would be handled, when 
and if necessary, by the VoMi and the AA alone.
1404
 In doing so, Ribbentrop merely 
reiterated his relative weakness vis-à-vis Himmler. Since spring 1942 and the creation of 
the division “Prinz Eugen,” Himmler‟s influence in specifically Banat Volksdeutsche 
matters had risen considerably. In fall 1944 Behrends, Himmler‟s representative in 
Serbia, had the final say, not Ribbentrop‟s representative Neubacher.  
With the decision to induct Volksdeutsche into the Waffen-SS, the Banat 
Volksdeutsche proved ultimately of less worth to the Reich as civilians – even as grain-
producers – than as soldiers. Since the Reich‟s loss of control over much of Southeast 
Europe became a moot point with Romania‟s defection and the advance northwards of 
Tito‟s Partisans, even the grain deliveries from the Banat could be counted as lost. The 
Volksdeutsche‟s long-term ideological value as good racial stock, too, paled in 
comparison with immediate military realities. Since before the April War, the Banat 
Volksdeutsche‟s status was determined by an uneasy balance between the Reich‟s 
foreign-political and military need, and ideology. Whereas ideology provided the solid 
weft of their privileged status vis-à-vis non-Germans, more practical concerns tended to 
determine their actual position in Hitler‟s Europe. As the southeastern flank of the 
Eastern Front crumbled rapidly in late summer and early fall 1944, Banat Volksdeutsche 
civilians had little to recommend them to the Reich as a priority. 
Behrends expressly forbade Sepp Janko to organize an evacuation on September 
10, stressing that ordinary Volksdeutsche should not be told of this order.
1405
 In addition 
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to the general reasoning behind such a decision outlined above, Behrends (and Himmler 
and Hitler as the originators of this order) also had several immediate reasons of an 
extremely practical nature. He wished to prevent a panic, which would have resulted in 
the congestion of roads needed for the evacuation of the Wehrmacht from Southeast 
Europe
1406
 and the Volksdeutsche from Romania, who were in immediate danger from 
the Red Army. For its part, the Banat Volksgruppenführung made its second, belated and 
ultimately failed show of initiative and independence from the Reich‟s wishes by 
preparing an evacuation plan despite Behrends‟ order.  
The surviving undated drafts of this plan and the postwar testimonies of 
Volksgruppenführung members suggest that the plan was based on the idea that mothers 
with small children, pregnant women, the elderly and the infirm should be evacuated first 
by train. They would be followed by adults marching on foot with hand luggage. Groups 
from different villages would fall in with the main column as it approached the River 
Tisa, their orderly retreat protected by units of the Deutsche Mannschaft.
1407
 The plan 
was elegant, comprehensive, and so dependent on precise timing, uncongested roads and 
an absence of panic as to be utterly unworkable.  
Moreover, Behrends consistently thwarted attempts to put its initial phase – the 
evacuation of children and the infirm – into action, though he did little more than issue 
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threats over the phone from his office in Belgrade.
1408
 Even at this last juncture, when the 
situation was truly desperate and the Reich could not spare the soldiers or police to 
compel it to compliance, the Volksgruppenführung failed to establish itself as an agent 
independent of the Reich‟s wishes. The long habit of dependence on the Reich‟s support 
and approval took its toll in the form of the Volksgruppenführung‟s month-long 
vacillation. Janko issued a proclamation to his co-nationals, in which he prevaricated 
between assuring them that Hitler would not allow any of them to come to harm and 
warning them that it might prove necessary to evacuate for a short while, until the Reich 
could send more troops to take the Banat back from the communists.
1409
 
The Volksgruppenführung cannot bear all of the blame, however, since it did 
issue an evacuation order on September 8 or 9, but then had to rescind it following 
Behrends‟ September 10 missive to Janko. This alone caused much confusion. Expellees‟ 
testimonies reveal a wide range of false hopes and rationalizations individual 
Volksdeutsche clung to for comfort. These rationalizations were refined in many a tense 
conversation with neighbors, while the thundering echo of Russian artillery could be 
heard clearly from the direction of Timişoara.  
Many felt themselves personally blameless of any crimes or iniquities committed 
by the Reich and its soldiers during the war.
1410
 A few clung to their Serbian neighbors‟ 
promises of protection or the hope that “Prinz Eugen” would be transferred to the 
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 Others, especially World War I veterans who had spent time as POWs in 
Imperial Russia, lay their faith in the Volksdeutsche‟s and the Russians‟ common 
humanity.
1412
 Most saw in this war‟s end a repetition of the last war‟s end: governments 
and states would change, but the peasant‟s situation would not.
1413
 One expellee‟s father 
shrewdly concluded that those who had the most to fear from the Russians were 
Reichsdeutsche, and that refugees newly arrived into the Reich would be especially 
vulnerable to deportation to the Soviet Union as laborers, human war reparations.
1414
 
Underlying all these hopeful rationalizations and denial was the fact that it was harvest 
time, and the harvest would wait for neither Stalin nor Hitler.
1415
 In the words of one 
expellee from Stefansfeld, although aware of the danger, the Volksdeutsche did not wish 
to “leave their beautiful Heimat and go forth into the unknown.”
1416
 One of his neighbors 
declared that “it wouldn‟t be so bad, he would stay in his house, whatever happened.”
1417
 
Rather than proving that ordinary Volksdeutsche never accepted the ideological 
view of the enemy propagated by the Reich and their own leaders, these attempts to think 
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away the cannons heard just over the horizon suggest the extent to which Volksdeutsche 
in the Banat had accepted the idea of an undefeatable German Reich which would always 
protect them. Paired with the peasant‟s habitual narrow-mindedness revolving around the 
desire to bring in the crops unmolested and a fatal lack of imagination, this persuaded the 
vast majority of the Banat Volksdeutsche civilians to stay where they were as the 
September days wore on. Very few were as enterprising as a woman from Rustendorf, 
who credited her habit of listening in secret to enemy radio stations with the decision not 
to listen to her neighbors‟ fond hopes and the Pantschowa Kreisleiter‟s assurances, but to 
pack and make her way to Vienna well before October 1, 1944.
1418
  
Behrends finally rescinded his ban on organized evacuation on October 1 – the 
same day the first Russian units entered the Serbian Banat. They consisted mostly of 
POWs newly released from Romanian prisons. They came “[w]ith a howl and a roar, 
only every fifth had a weapon, barefoot, a savage pack.”
1419
 The Volksgruppenführung 
could not reach all villages by phone, leaving individual village notaries and Volksgruppe 
representatives very much to their own devices.
1420
 The former mayor of Kubin gave 
Janko credit for telling him to get his people out even before Behrends finally rescinded 
his original order, although the mayor had had to initiate the conversation. He then 
promptly ran up against the refusal of the local Deutsche Mannschaft commander to 
break Behrens‟ standing orders.
1421
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An organized, but haphazard and incomplete evacuation of children and the 
infirm did take place. The evacuees had to jostle for a place on the trains with other 
refugees, including stragglers from Romania.
1422
 On October 3 the Luftwaffe airlifted 
some four hundred people from Franzfeld, which had an airstrip nearby. About five 
thousand were left behind when Russian heavy artillery made further landings 
impossible.
1423
 On the same day, Neubacher reported to the AA in Berlin that the Red 
Army was closing in on Belgrade from the north and east, while Partisans approached 
from the south and west.
1424




The places that saw anything resembling a large-scale evacuation were 
Grossbetschkerek and the villages closest to the Tisa
1426
 and to the section of the Danube 
closest to Belgrade. Even from there people escaped with only the clothes on their 
backs,
1427
 rushing to get on a river boat in Pantschowa
1428
 or jostling with Wehrmacht 
transports to cross the Tisa before all the bridges across it were blown up. Despite 
Behrends‟ strict orders, the Volksgruppenführung‟s technical section prepared a pontoon 
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bridge at some point in September, which allowed many to cross into the Baĉka.
1429
 
Among the latter were Sepp Janko, Josef Beer and other Volksgruppenführung 
members,
1430
 though their staying in Grossbetschkerek until Russian shells started falling 
in the city earned them little gratitude from many Volksdeutsche who gave their 
testimonies after the war. They described with lingering bitterness how the 




Care of the evacuees remained the VoMi‟s responsibility, in line with 
Ribbentrop‟s earlier announcement. On October 14, Hitler approved what was by then an 
unspooling reality: the imminent arrival of over 200,000 Volksdeutsche from all over 
Southeast Europe into the Reich.
1432
 Of these, the VoMi‟s initial estimate pegged the 
number of Banat evacuees at 35,000.
1433
 By November 1, that number had dropped to 
20,000.
1434
 Out of a population of about 127,000, with about 21,000 men under arms, this 
means that less than one fifth of the Volksdeutsche still in the Banat in fall 1944 got 
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 Those that did took up to a month to reach Reich territory by train or on foot. 
They were quartered in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia until their final, more 
orderly evacuation into the Reich proper in spring 1945.
1436
 
The first impressions of those left behind are best encapsulated by the opening 
pages of a memoir written by the Austrian artist Robert Hammerstiel more than five 
decades after the events he describes. In October 1944 he was eleven years old, his 
family one of the few Volksdeutsche families residing in the Serbian quarter of 
Werschetz, near the Romanian border. His father had been mobilized and was away 
fighting, most likely with the division “Prinz Eugen.” Hammerstiel‟s memoir, which 
focuses on life in the internment camps for Volksdeutsche in postwar Yugoslavia, is 
written from a child‟s perspective and sometimes unclear on the details. This does not 
diminish the emotional clarity of his remembered childhood self‟s perception. 
Hammerstiel depicts a deceptively quiet morning following the sounds of weapons fire 
and then of loud celebrations in the town center: 
The milk-sellers do not pass by, our neighbor does not sing, as she is wont to do 
of a morning, nor does she take her baskets to market. Instead she comes into our 
kitchen and screams and screams and weeps loudly. In the grey morning of that 
dark October day, she cries that people are being shot in the German quarter, she 
has seen it. My mother lays her hand on the door so as not to fall down. Her nails 
dig into the doorframe like the claws of a wild animal.
1437
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Like Hammerstiel‟s family, most Volksdeutsche from the Banat villages and towns close 
to the Romanian border were too far from the escape routes to get out in time. In several 
villages, commanders of the Deutsche Mannschaft or the Deutscher Arbeitsdienst, clearly 
having learned nothing from Behrends‟ expedition into Romania a few weeks earlier, 
tried to mount an armed resistance to the Russians. They managed to enrage the Russians 
and get their own boy-soldiers killed.
1438
 There ensued scenes of rapine and rape 
replicated across East Europe behind Red Army lines.
1439
 These events coincided with or 
were followed shortly by the arrival of Partisan forces, some composed of men who had 
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become Partisans rather late in the day: “Young men who had worked in factories or in 
the fields till the previous week put the five-pointed star on their hats overnight, and 
started calling themselves Partisans and front-line fighters [prvoborci], shouting 
communist slogans and writing [them] on walls.”
1440
 In this respect, at least, the 
expectation of many Volksdeutsche that not much would change with the new regime 
proved true. Just as some Volksdeutsche embraced Nazism around the time of the April 
War as a means to enrichment and better self-esteem, so at war‟s end some Serbs adopted 
communism as an equally profitable wave of the future, which was even compatible with 
Slavophilism.  
In its pursuit of the retreating Wehrmacht, the Red Army did not linger in the 
Banat. The Partisans spent the first weeks of their rule divvying up Volksdeutsche 
property as war booty, killing, attacking and arresting Volksdeutsche at random.
1441
 
Whatever their memories of the Russians, the Volksdeutsche survivors, who were 
eventually allowed to emigrate starting in 1948, remembered the Partisans with special 
bitterness. In the words of a Volksdeutscher from the village of Franzfeld, “It didn‟t hurt 
so much to have the Russians take [our best horse], at least it did not fall to one of those 
[Partisans] from [neighboring] Crepaja to enjoy.”
1442
 The Volksdeutsche had habitually 
seen Serbs and Serbian (Yugoslav) communists as more viscerally dangerous than even 
the Russians (or the Jews). There was also a decided element of Schadenfreude in the 
                                                 
1440
 “Mladići koji su do prońle nedelje radili u fabrikama ili na zemlji preko noći su stavili 
petokrake na kape i govorili das u partizani i prvoborci, uzvikivali su komunistiĉke parole i pisali 
po zidovima.” Sohl-Daxer testimony in Stefanović, p. 105.  
1441
 Schneider testimony (1952), LAA, Ost-Dok. 2/392, frame 50; Rohrbacher testimony (no 
date), LAA, Ost-Dok. 2/387, frame 335; testimony of Lorenz Baron from Rudolfsgnad in 
Stefanović, p. 93. 
1442
 “Lakńe nam je palo kad su ga Rusi uzeli, barem da ovi iz Crepaje nemaju koristi.” Stein 
testimony in Stefanović, p. 86. 
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Partisans‟ first depredations, especially those committed by Banat Serbian peasants 
enjoying their own euphoria of liberation and empowerment.
1443
  
An early sign of this last abrupt shift in the mental and physical landscape 
occurred when the bodies of the nine Volksdeutsche killed during the April War and 
interred with much pomp in Pantschowa in 1941 were dug up in October 1944 and 
replaced by the bodies of Soviet officers killed in the fighting around the town.
1444
 In late 
November 1944 the new Yugoslav government proclaimed a law expropriating all 
“persons of the German nationality” and other “war criminals and their helpers.”
1445
 
Unless they could prove that they had actively aided the communist resistance or were 
citizens of neutral states, this law meant the loss of all property rights held by Yugoslav 
Volksdeutsche still on Yugoslav territory. It was accompanied by the opening of 
internment camps in which Volksdeutsche were subject to unsystematic but effective 
maltreatment for the next four years and, in July 1945, a law taking away their citizenship 
rights and leaving them in legal limbo.
1446
 Those events fall outside the scope of this 
dissertation. The events of early October 1944 decisively closed not only the era of 
                                                 
1443
 Though there were exceptions. The former village notary in ethnically mixed Perlas described 
after the war how the commander of the first Partisans in his village allowed him to take the five 
hundred Volksdeutsche residents safely out (Schmidt testimony (1953), LAA, Ost-Dok. 2/395, 
frame 193). In Deutsch-Zerne, a Serb who had joined the Partisans in 1942 protected his 
Volksdeutsche sweetheart‟s family from the Russians and the Partisans alike (testimony of Eva 
Spitz from Deutsch-Zerne (1946), LAA, Ost-Dok. 2/389, frame 98). 
1444
 Köller testimony in Stefanović, p. 114.  
1445
 “lica nemaĉke narodnosti . . . ratn[i] zloĉin[ci] i njihov[i] pomagaĉ[i]” “Odluka o prelazu u 
drņavnu svojinu neprijateljske imovine; O drņavnoj upravi nad imovinom neprisutnih lica i o 
sekvestru nad imovinom koju su okupatorske vlasti prisilno otuĊile,” published in Borba [official 
Communist Party newspaper in postwar Yugoslavia], November 22, 1944, in Ausgewählte 
Dokumente zur neuesten Geschichte der Südostdeutschen Volksgruppen. Staatsbürgerschafts-, 
Ausweisungs- und Beschlagnahmebestimmungen [from now on Ausgewählte Dokumente] 
(Munich: Verlag des Südostdeutschen Kulturwerks, 1956), p. 5. 
1446
 “Zakon o potvrdi i izmenama zakona o drņavljanstvu Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavije 
od 23. VIII. 1945 god. – gubitak drņavljanstva,” published in Službeni list, July 5, 1946, in 
Ausgewählte Dokumente, pp. 11-12. 
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Volksdeutsche dominance in the Serbian Banat, but of large-scale, organized 
Volksdeutsche minority life in East and Southeast Europe.  
 
Conclusion 
The participation of Banat Volksdeutsche in the Third Reich‟s war effort culminated in 
their recruitment for the Waffen-SS in spring 1942. This event built on propaganda 
extolling the Volksdeutsche tradition of serving as border guards and soldiers for the 
Habsburg Empire; the earlier, sporadic recruitment of Banat Volksdeutsche for the police 
and border patrols in their home region; and especially on the perception held by Berlin 
and the Banat Volksgruppenführung alike that the Banat Germans owed the Reich for all 
the material and ideological privileges the Reich had allowed them. Both the ordinary 
Banat Volksdeutsche and their leaders had allowed themselves to become implicated 
gradually into the Third Reich‟s policies by accepting Aryanized propertly, serving as 
policemen, delivering food to the Reich and administering their home region on its 
behalf. In spring 1942, they therefore had neither the material nor the moral leverage to 
refuse compulsory service in the Waffen-SS. The use of the word „volunteer‟ to describe 
the Waffen-SS division “Prinz Eugen” was spurious, but that did not mean that Banat 
Volksdeutsche objected to being recruited for it. Mixed motives including ideology, a 
sense of duty and vulnerability, and material indebtedness conspired to ensure that 
minimal coercion was necessary to ensure Volksdeutsche recruits‟ compliance.  
 In the field, “Prinz Eugen” participated in Axis anti-partisan activities in 
Southeast Europe between fall 1942 and spring 1945. In the course of these activities, it 
perpetrated alone or took part in several massacres of civilian populations suspected of 
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collusion with the Partisans or the Ĉetnici. These events confirmed the association 
formed in the minds of non-German Yugoslavs between the crimes of the Nazi regime 
and ordinary Volksdeutsche. The massacres committed by the division “Prinz Eugen” 
guaranteed that even non-combatant Banat Volksdeutsche shared in the retribution meted 
out to Volksdeutsche across East and Southeast Europe after the war. The last days of the 
Banat Volksdeutsche administration replicated the trends established earlier in the war. 
The Reichsdeutsche in Belgrade and Berlin placed Reich interest first and blocked 
proposals to evacuate the Banat Volksdeutsche so as to ensure an orderly Wehrmacht 
retreat from Southeast Europe. The failure of Volksdeutsche to try to leave as soon as the 
Russian arrival became apparent was wrought of mental habits established in the 
preceding years, not least an overreliance on the Reich‟s protection and a fundamental 
narrow-mindedness, the inability to perceive the meaning of defeat in a war of ideologies. 
Because this aspect of the Volksdeutsche experience of World War II has been 
overemphasized in the memoir literature produced by Volksdeutsche expellees after the 
war, this account closes with the arrival of the Red Army and the Partisans into the 



















The story of Banat Volksdeutsche‟s collaboration with Nazi Germany in World War II is 
a story of choices. Reich Germans often saw the Volksdeutsche as passive human 
material to be disposed of according to Hitler‟s will. Much of the postwar memoir 
literature produced by Volksdeutsche expellees rests on the same implicit assumption of 
Volksdeutsche passivity-cum-blamelessness for Nazi crimes. However, it would be too 
easy to take the opposite approach of postwar Yugoslav historiography, and lay a blanket 
accusation against all Volksdeutsche as being dyed-in-the-wool Nazis, thoroughly 
complicit from the start with the Third Reich‟s discriminatory, murderous policies. Such 
a blanket accusation obviates the need for analysis or explanation of Volksdeutsche 
complicity. The real issue is not whether Banat Volksdeutsche were Nazis or not. The 
issue is the complex mixture of reasons and motivations which prompted them to choose 
ever deeper complicity with the Reich, which also meant becoming embroiled in the Nazi 
regime‟s policies and crimes.  
 The very term „Volksdeutsche‟ was fraught with complexity. In National Socialist 
propaganda, Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) were extolled as champions of 
Germanness, their communities as physical, biological and cultural bastions of superior 
civilization in foreign lands. They were also a useful diplomatic ploy for the Reich to 
exert pressure on the Volksdeutsche‟s host states. Such had been the case with the 
Volksdeutsche residing in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the late 1930s and early 1941. 
At the same time, Reichsdeutsche policymakers could not break free of a way of thought 
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shaped by the idea of a kleindeutsch German state. They saw ethnic Germans who had 
never resided in the Reich proper as at best in need of Reich paternalistic guidance, 
advice and protection, at worst as racially and culturally far inferior to Reichsdeutsche. 
Volksdeutsche, by contrast, extolled their legacy of hardy pioneering work on the Reich‟s 
far-flung ethnic and linguistic borders, but also their close inner connections to the 
German Volk. The Nazi racial hierarchy was rife with internal contradictions, which were 
never resolved. It went back to the fundamental disparity between National Socialism‟s 
elevation of the German Volk above all others and the Third Reich‟s need to find 
common ground with other regimes and ethnicities in its continued search for ideological, 
political and military allies.  
 In Yugoslavia before the April War, Volksdeutsche were useful to the Third 
Reich as a pressure point to help entice Yugoslavia into joining the Axis Pact. At the 
same time, their new (since 1939), Nazified leaders‟ ideas about enhancing their co-
nationals‟ position would have disrupted the stability of the Yugoslav state, and were 
roundly suppressed by the Reich. In this period, Reich diplomacy was even more 
important than purely ideological policymaking. In early 1941, a temporary agreement 
between the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Hitler‟s fellow 
ideological mastermind Heinrich Himmler gave the former the upper hand in 
Volksdeutsche affairs. When the April War in 1941 resulted in the destruction of 
Yugoslavia as a sovereign state, Reich diplomacy more than ideology dictated that the 
Serbian Banat be occupied by Reich forces. However, in a totalitarian regime like Nazi 
Germany, not even the diplomatic corps was free of ideological influence. The 
Reichsdeutsche occupation of the Serbian Banat was itself due to a mixture of military 
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(keeping Hungary and Romania from fighting each other in the run-up to Operation 
Barbarossa), diplomatic (ditto), economic (the Reich‟s need for food imports and the 
Banat‟s agricultural potential), and political-ideological reasons. The presence of the 
Volksdeutsche minority in the Serbian Banat was both one of the reasons and the 
justification for the region‟s occupation by Reich forces. 
 Exigencies of Reich diplomacy alone could not have produced the dramatic shift 
in Volksdeutsche loyalties evident in late 1940 and throughout 1941. The 
Volksdeutsche‟s communal sense of self was shaped by their historical residence in a 
majority non-German environment, their engagement in agriculture, and preservation of 
their ancestors‟ linguistic, cultural and sentimental attachment to German-speaking 
Central Europe. This led the Nazified leadership under Josef „Sepp‟ Janko to focus in its 
ideological and propaganda pronouncements on themes of Heimat (homeland as both the 
Banat and the idealized Greater Reich), the connection between working the soil and the 
military tradition of Grenzer (Volksdeutsche soldiers on the old Military Border), and the 
Volksdeutsche‟s supposed endangerment by the hostile majority Slavic population. The 
Volksdeutsche leadership tapped into preexisting themes in order to make National 
Socialism more acceptable and attractive to their co-nationals, as did the leaders of other 
fascist movements in Europe. Volksdeutsche propaganda never broke from the core of 
National Socialist ideas. In fact, it shared them to such an extent that it even replicated 
the Reich‟s ambivalent attitude to Volksdeutsche, as indicated not least by the dual 
meaning of the term „Heimat‟ to Volksdeutsche. 
In the months preceding the April War, some Yugoslav Volksdeutsche actively 
turned away from the loyalty they owed to their host state and threw in their lot with the 
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Reich‟s promises of protection. This was most evident in the decision taken by several 
thousand Volksdeutsche, who had been called up to serve in the Yugoslav Army on the 
eve of the April War, to dodge the draft. In less overtly political ways, the Yugoslav state 
actually undermined its claim on Volksdeutsche loyalties, for example by giving in to 
Reich pressure to open private German-language schools in which the curriculum was 
Nazified already in late 1940. The vacillations of Yugoslav minority policy, the Reich‟s 
apparent diplomatic and military invincibility in early 1941, and Volksdeutsche 
perception of their relationships with the Reich and with Southeast Europe conspired to 
ensure that when the Reich forces entered the Banat in April 1941, they received an 
enthusiastic reception from the Banat Germans.  
The shift in Volksdeutsche loyalties did not end then. The very fact of occupation 
did not immediately secure the Serbian Banat as a German territory. Until the end of 
1941, Reich diplomacy continued to play a leading role in balancing Volksdeutsche 
demands against those of Hungary, Romania and the collaborationist government in 
Belgrade. The establishment of a Volksdeutsche administration in the Banat and the 
bolstering of the Volksdeutsche position through a series of laws on their legal standing, 
education and administrative prerogative came out of this delicate diplomatic 
maneuvering. It also played into Hitler‟s desire to use reliable local collaborators in 
Southeast Europe so as to release most Wehrmacht personnel stationed there for the 
invasion of the Soviet Union.  
The confirmation of the Banat‟s occupation by Reich forces and of the 
Volksdeutsche‟s predominance over other Banat residents was also a confirmation of the 
Volksdeutsche dependence on the Third Reich. However, in internal, civilian matters the 
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Volksdeutsche leadership seemed to most ordinary Volksdeutsche to be the undisputed 
authority. This successful assumption of some of the Reich‟s prestige by Sepp Janko and 
his cohorts was coupled with the rapid elevation of Banat Volksdeutsche in 
administration and education, and the corresponding waning of the threat of Hungarian 
annexation. It produced an atmosphere in which Volksdeutsche who harbored anti-Nazi 
sentiments or belonged to an older generation whose views were more conservative, 
traditional, shaped by long residence in the Dual Monarchy and the Yugoslav Kingdom, 
did not dare raise their objections too vocally.  
Their reluctance to do so was due to social and peer pressure more than any overt 
threat or use of violence. The single case of a group of Volksdeutsche called up for police 
service in the village of Franzfeld, who were physically punished for refusing those 
orders, sufficed to set an example to other Volksdeutsche. Even so, the physical 
punishment suffered by the recalcitrant villagers was arguably less influential than the 
power wielded in the small, tightly knit, self-consciously vulnerable Volksdeutsche 
community by rumor, informal networks and the appearance of respectability (or the lack 
thereof).  
These social mechanisms had even more impact than usual because they 
coincided with a range of material perks the Reich government offered to Volksdeutsche 
in the occupied Banat, unimpeded by the need to appease an independent host state. 
Ordinary Volksdeutsche did not only respond to their leaders‟ and the Reich‟s 
propaganda became it pandered to their view of themselves as superior in culture, work 
habits, living standard and, even, biology to their non-German neighbors. Access to 
arable land, many more German-language schools, rare or controlled foodstuffs, and 
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property which had used to belong to the Banat Jews tempted even the most reluctant 
Volksdeutsche. As they chose to accept one perk or another, they gradually but 
inexorably lost their already limited ability to say no to their leaders or to the Reich. It 
should be stressed that the Third Reich never bargained with Banat Volksdeutsche: it 
offered privileges and then made the Volksdeutsche pay for them many times over. 
Nevertheless, the Volksdeutsche failure to object strenuously even to individual Reich 
policies highlights the issue of the choice they made to comply with the Nazi regime.  
The policymakers in Berlin and occupied Belgrade successively ordered the Banat 
Volksdeutsche to export large amounts of food for Reich needs, conscript their co-
nationals and other Banat residents as laborers, recruit some Volksdeutsche as policemen 
and border guards, and the latter to aid in the rounding up and deportation of the Banat 
Jews to Belgrade. The Volksdeutsche leadership agreed because it shared completely in 
Hitler‟s worldview and subsumed their community‟s interests to those of the Reich. 
Ordinary Volksdeutsche complied – albeit somewhat less graciously in matters which 
took resources and manpower away from agriculture – out of a mixture of ideological 
agreement, moral and material indebtedness, and the underlying understanding that the 
German Banat could not survive without the German Reich behind it.  
It would be as simplistic and reductive to say that the Reich bought 
Volksdeutsche loyalties as it would be to say all Volksdeutsche were ardent Nazis. The 
Reich pandered to Volksdeutsche material acquisitiveness as well as to their view of the 
world. This successful blend of „high‟ and „low‟ motives was the key to the Reich‟s 
success at home and abroad. Its successful balancing of diplomacy and military might 
even at the height of its wartime successes is also a sign of this. Moreover, external 
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factors such as the diminished Hungarian threat, the Reich‟s concentration on the East, 
the weakness of the Serbian collaborationist government, and even the Volksdeutsche 
leaders‟ successful projection of a unified, racially sound, ideologically reliable ethnic 
German community came together to create a situation in which Volksdeutsche in the 
occupied Banat had more local prestige and power than anywhere else in Hitler‟s Europe. 
This complex set of conditions made it easier for them to accept Reich policies as their 
own, and made the Reich amenable to using willing Volksdeutsche collaborators. 
The ambiguities of the seemingly clear-cut Nazi racial hierarchy came to the fore 
in relation to the recruitment of Banat Volksdeutsche for the Waffen-SS. Although they 
were valuable racial stock as well as practically useful to the Third Reich as peasants, 
administrators and policemen, the greatest service Volksdeutsche could render the Reich 
turned out to be military service. With this development in early 1942, Himmler 
reasserted himself as the ultimate authority on all Volksdeutsche questions as the Reich‟s 
military-ideological need and ambition eclipsed Nazi diplomacy.  
Despite the loss of manpower and disenchantment with the soldier‟s life it 
entailed, the creation of the Volksdeutsche Waffen-SS division “Prinz Eugen” had the 
effect of tying Banat Volksdeutsche irrevocably to the Reich‟s actions and fate. It also 
confirmed in the Volksdeutsche worldview their perceived standing as dependent on the 
Reich for everything, even their physical existence. Service with the Waffen-SS 
cemented ideological affinity between the Reichs- and Volksdeutsche as the latter 
embraced fully the former‟s view of their enemy as inferior, violent Slavs and Jewish 
hirelings, mercy against whom would be a crime against the German Volk. “Prinz 
Eugen”‟s participation in the massacres of civilians did little to help the Axis anti-
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partisan struggle in Southeast Europe. If anything, it exacerbated matters by driving more 
people into the resistance movements. The ossifying of ethnic stereotypes in the 
Volksdeutsche worldview under the impact of National Socialism and Waffen-SS service 
also had the inadvertent effect of identifying all Volksdeutsche with Waffen-SS and Nazi 
crimes in the minds of Yugoslavia‟s postwar leaders and many non-German Yugoslavs.  
These rigid perceptions, in turn, caused the dispossession, incarceration and 
suffering of Volksdeutsche who did not escape the Banat before the Red Army and the 
Yugoslav Partisans occupied it in early October 1944. Volksdeutsche suffering in the 
immediate postwar period has been given a disproportionate amount of attention, 
especially in West German historiography as well as memoir literature by Volksdeutsche 
who escaped, were expelled or emigrated out of East and Southeast Europe in the mid-to-
late 1940s. Paradoxically, these works (some more valuable as historical analysis than 
others) of Volksdeutsche exculpation make a spurious claim on the moral high ground, 
and have the same effect as postwar Yugoslav historiography of World War II. The latter 
also claimed moral superiority for its side by painting all Volksdeutsche as enthusiastic 
Nazis, without examining what motivated them to collaborate. Combined, these two 
groups of works reduced the Volksdeutsche and their chapter of World War II to a two-
dimensional sketch. Some German-language works have started to redress this balance 
with monographs and articles on the various Volksdeutsche communities during the war.  
Despite a wealth of historical literature on collaboration, Volksdeutsche in World 
War II in general and the case of the Banat Germans in particular remain under-
researched in English-language historiography on World War II. One of the goals of this 
dissertation was to help redress the balance and contribute to the evolving literature on 
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collaboration and the shifting balance between ideology, diplomacy and militarism in 
Hitler‟s Europe. The finest works on collaboration stress precisely the multiplicity of 
motives which inspired those who collaborated openly and enthusiastically as well as 
those who cooperated to an extent or found a way of accommodating the Nazis and other 
fascist regimes. Using archival materials which have not been used before or have been 
used only superficially, I have attempted an analysis of the complex motivation behind 
the Banat Volksdeutsche collaboration with the Nazi regime. Parallel to this, I examined 
external factors which influenced the wartime Banat and its Volksdeutsche.  
The Banat Volksdeutsche – leaders as well as individuals – had limited scope for 
choice. They chose to collaborate with the Third Reich in line with their communal and 
cultural identity, their perception of other Southeast-European ethnic groups, the 
narrowed political and military circumstances wrought by war and the Nazi domination 
of Europe, the perception of Nazi omnipotence, and the privileges they received as well 
as the sense of indebtedness these privileges produced. Even with all these factors 
limiting their options, choose to collaborate they did. A close examination of 
Volksdeutsche reasons and motivations provides more insight into the manner in which 
an occupation-cum-collaborationist regime operates than either a conclusive blanket 
accusation of unreconstructed Nazism or the backhanded compliment of assuming 
Volksdeutsche were innocent of any association with National Socialism simply because 








GUIDE TO PLACE NAMES 
 
Often the German name was interchangeable with the Serbo-Croatian one, even in 
original German-language documents. Also, spellings vary in both languages. This table 
provides only the most common variations. Most of these villages and towns also had 
Hungarian and/or Romanian names, but I only offer those for the major geographic 
terms.  
 
S = Serbian/Serbo-Croatian name 
SP = Serbian postwar/communist-era name, if different from prewar/wartime name 
H = Hungarian name 
R = Romanian name 
 
GERMAN NAME OTHER NAME 
 Banatsko KaraĊorĊevo* 
 Vojvoda Stepa* 
Abthausen or Apatin Apatin (S) – in the Baĉka  
Agram Zagreb (S) – in Croatia 
Alisbrunn Alibunar (S) 
Alt-Kanischa Stara Kanjiņa (S), Kanjiņa (SP)** 
Apfeldorf Jabuka (S) 
Arad Arad (R, H, S) – in Romania 
Aradatz Andrejevac or Aradac (S), Aradac (SP) 
Aranka Aranca (R, H) River, Zlatica (S) – in 
Romanian and Serbian Banat 
Aratsch Vranjevo (S) 
Banat Banat (S) region 
Banater Hof Banatski Dvor (S) 
Banjica Banjica (S) – suburb of Belgrade, location 
of Banjica concentration camp 
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Baranya Baranja (S) region 
Batschka Baĉka (S), Bácska (H) region 
Belgrad  Beograd (S) i.e. Belgrade, capital city of 
Serbia and Yugoslavia 
Beodra (also H) Novo Milońevo (SP)*** 
Betschkerek, Grossbetschkerek or Gross-
Betschkerek 
Petrovgrad or Veliki Beĉkerek (S), 
Zrenjanin (SP) 
Blauschütz Ploĉice (S), Ploĉica (SP) 
Boka Boka (S) 
Botschar Boĉar (S) 
Brestowatz or Rustendorf Banatski Brestovac (S) 
Charleville Ńarlevil (S), part of Banatsko Veliko Selo 
(SP)*** 
Crepaja  Crepaja (S) 
Debeljatscha Debeljaĉa (S) 
Deutsch Elemer or Elemer Nemaĉki Elemir or Elemir or Srpski 
Elemir (S), Elemir (SP)† 
Deutsch Etschka or Deutsch-Etschka Eĉka or Pavlovo (S), Eĉka (SP) 
Deutsch Zerne  Crnja or Nemaĉka Crnja/Srpska Crnja (S), 
Srpska Crnja (SP)† 
Duplaja Dupljaja (S) 
Elisenheim Belo Blato (S) 
Ernsthausen Banatski Despotovac (S) 
Farkaschdin Farkaņdin (S) 
Franzfeld Kraljevićevo or Kaĉarevo (S), Kaĉarevo 
(SP) 
Georgshausen Velika Greda (S) 
Glogau Glogonj (S) 
Gottschee Koĉevje (S) – region in Slovenia  
Grosskikinda, Gross-Kikinda or Kikinda Kikinda or Velika Kikinda (S), Kikinda 
(SP) 
Heideschütz Hajduĉica (S) 
Heufeld  Hajfeld (S), Novi Kozarci (SP)*** 
Homolitz Omoljica 
Inseldorf or Sakula Sakule (S) 
Karlowa Dragutinovo (S), Novo Milońevo (SP)*** 
Karlsdorf Banatski Karlovac (S/SP) 
Kathreinfeld Katarina (S), Ravni Topolovac (SP) 
Klausenburg Cluj (R) – in Romania 
Klein Kikinda Bańaid (S) 
Kowatschitza Kovaĉica (S) 
Kubin Kovin (S) 
Kudritz Gudurica (S) 
Kuman or Kumane Kumane (S) 
Laibach Ljubljana (S) – in Slovenia  
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Lasarfeld Lazarevo (S) 
Marburg Maribor (S) – in Slovenia 
Marosch or Muresch Mureş (R) River – in Romania  
Mastort Novi Kozarci (SP)*** 
Melenz  Melenci (S) 
Modosch Jańa Tomić (S) 
Mokrin Mokrin (S) 
Molidorf Molin (S) 
Nakodorf Nakovo (S) 
Neu-Betsche Novi Beĉej (S) 
Neuhatzfeld or Tschestereg Ĉestereg (S) 
Neukanischa or Neu-Kanischa Nova Kanjiņa (S), Novi Kneņevac (SP)** 
Neusatz Novi Sad (S), Újvidék (H) – in the Baĉka 
Neu-Vrbas, Neu-Werbass or Werbass Novi Vrbas (S), Titov Vrbas (SP) 
Padej  Padej (S, H) 
Palanka or Plankenburg Baĉka Palanka (S) – in the Baĉka 
Pantschowa Panĉevo (S) 
Pardan Ninĉićevo or Srpski Pardanj (S), MeĊa 
(SP) 
Pavlis Pavliń 
Perlas Perlez (S) 
Petersheim or Setschan Seĉanj (S) 
Peterwaradein or Peterwardein Petrovaradin (S) – in the Baĉka 
Rudolfsgnad Knićanin (S) 
Ruskodorf  Rusko Selo (S) 
Sajmińte Sajmińte – concentration camp on the 
outskirts of Belgrade†† 
Sankt Georgen Begej Sveti ĐuraĊ (S), Ņitińte (SP) 
Sankt Hubert Sveti Hubert (S), part of Banatsko Veliko 
Selo (SP)*** 
Schurjan Ńurjan (S) 
Semlin Zemun (S) – in the Srem 
Setschanfeld Seĉenovo (S) 
Sigmundfeld Martinica (S) 
Soltur Soltur (S) , part of Banatsko Veliko Selo 
(SP)*** 
Startschowa Starĉevo (S) 
Stefansfeld Ńupljaja (S) 
Syrmien Srem (S) region 
Temeschburg or Temeschwar Timişoara (R), Temesvár (H) – in Romania 
Theiss Tisa (S) River, Tisza (H) 
Timok Timok (S) River, Timoc (R) – in eastern 
Serbia  
Toba Toba (S, H) 
Torda Torda (S, H), Vujićevo (S), Torda (SP) 
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Tschoka Ĉoka (S) 
Verbitza Vrbica (S) 
Weisskirchen Bela Crkva (S) 
Werschetz or (more rarely) 
Hennemannstadt 
Vrńac (S) 
Woiwodina or Wojwodina Vojvodina (S) region 
Wojlowitz Vojlovica (S) – today a part of Panĉevo 
Zichydorf Mariolana (S), Banatsko Plandińte (SP) 
 
* To the best of my ability, I have not been able to find German names for these villages, 
which were founded in the early 1920s and populated mostly by World War I veterans.  
 
** Two towns (or two halves of one town) separated by the river Tisa, officially 
separated after World War II. 
 
*** Two or more neighboring villages were combined into one after World War II. 
Charleville, Soltur and Sankt Hubert became Banatsko Veliko Selo, Heufeld and Mastort 
became Novi Kozarci, and Beodra and Karlowa/Dragutinovo became Novo Milońevo.  
 
† Until October 1944, all three original names were used, because the village had a 
Serbian as well as an ethnic German quarter, which were sometimes considered to be 
twin towns, named either separately or together.  
 
†† Sajmińe was the location of the concentration camp for Jews and communists on the 
left bank of the Sava River. It is referred to sometimes by its German name, Semlin, but 
since this is also the German name for the Zemun municipality, also on the left bank of 
Sava, and which was the location of another camp – a transit camp for Volksdeutsche 
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resettled from Bessarabia in late 1940 – I will use the Serbian name to refer to the 



























POSTWAR FATES OF SOME MAJOR PERSONAGES 
 
The most remarkable fact about the postwar careers of the leading Banat Volksdeutsche 
is the ease with which most of them evaded any legal consequences of their wartime 
involvement. They were so successful in leaving their wartime past behind that 
information on their postwar activities is not always readily available. Probably this was 
due in no small part to the fact that, as Volksdeutsche, they were less obvious targets for 
Allies prosecution than their more famous – and infamous – Reichsdeutsche counterparts. 
By subterfuge or escape, almost all managed to avoid trial in Yugoslavia, which did have 
a great vested interest in making examples of them.  
 Sepp Janko (Volksgruppenführer) was interned in Carinthia, but escaped in order 
to avoid being extradited to Yugoslavia as a war criminal. After hiding out in 
Württemberg and the Ruhr, he finally emigrated to Argentina.
1447
 His exculpatory 
history-cum-memoir Weg und Ende der deutschen Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien 
came out in Germany and Austria in 1982. He died in 2001. 
 Sepp Lapp (head of the Banat administration) lived in Hamburg and worked as 
chief of the Southeast-European section of the German Red Cross‟ service 
helping to find people who became separated from family members in the war.
1448
 
 Josef Beer (deputy Volksgruppenführer) worked in the Restitution Office 
(Landesausgleichsamt) in Stuttgart,
1449
 and was probably the most prolific author 
                                                 
1447
 Testimony of Richard Lackner (1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/39, frames 722-723. 
1448
 LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/191, frame 609.  
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of exculpatory books and depositions to the Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, 
Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte of all the former members of the 
Volksgruppenführung. 
 Juraj Spiller (in charge of security operations) was interned by the Americans in 
Dachau, extradited to Yugoslavia, sentenced to death and executed in 1948.
1450
 
 Arthur Phleps (first “Prinz Eugen” commander) was killed in action in Romania 
in fall 1944.  
 Gustav Halwax (first, clandestine Waffen-SS recruiter from among his co-





As already mentioned, Reichsdeutsche represented visible and obvious targets for Allied 
justice, which was nevertheless notoriously fickle: 
 Adolf Hitler committed suicide as the Red Army waged the Battle of Berlin in 
1945.  
 Heinrich Himmler (SS and RSHA chief) committed suicide in 1945 while 
awaiting trial at Nuremberg.  
 Joachim von Ribbentrop (German Foreign Minister) and Wilhelm Keitel (OKW 
chief) were sentenced to death at Nuremberg and executed in 1946.  
 August Meyszner (HSSPF in Serbia) was sentenced to death by a Yugoslav court 
and executed in 1947.  
                                                                                                                                                 
1449
 LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/191, frame 644. 
1450
 Testimony of Oskar Krewetsch (1958), LAA, Ost-Dok. 16/149, frame 678. 
1451
 “Gustav Hallwax. Er fiel fuer Fuehrer und Volk,” Donauzeitung, October 25, 1941, BA 
Berlin, NS 5 VI, file 29266/a, p. 23. 
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 Hermann Behrends (Meyszner‟s successor) was interned by the British before 
being extradited to Yugoslavia, sentenced to death and executed in 1948.  
 Otto Kumm (Phleps‟ second successor as “Prinz Eugen” commander) founded 
and presided over HIAG, the Waffen-SS veterans‟ association in West Germany. 
His exculpatory history of the division “Prinz Eugen” came out in 1978. He died 
in 2004.  
 Heinrich Danckelmann (German commanding general in Serbia in 1941) retired 
from active duty, but was extradited to Yugoslavia, tried as a war criminal and 
executed in 1947. 
 Franz Böhme (Danckelmann‟s successor in fall 1941) was captured in Norway 
and tried in the second round of the Nuremberg Trials for war crimes committed 
during his tenure in Serbia. He committed suicide in 1947. 
 Paul Bader (Böhme‟s successor till summer 1943) retired in 1944. In later years 
he denied any knowledge of the shooting of civilians in Serbia by the Wehrmacht 
during his tenure. He died in 1971. 
 Hermann Neubacher (AA representative for all of Southeastern Europe) was 
arrested by the Americans and extradited to Yugoslavia. Sentenced to twenty 
years hard labor by a Yugoslav court in 1951, he was released in 1952 for reasons 
of health.
1452
 He died in 1960. 
                                                 
1452
 Auswärtiges Amt – Historischer Dienst (ed), Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen 
Auswärtigen Dienstes, 1871-1945, Volume 3 (Paderborn and Munich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 
2008), pp. 350-351. 
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 Felix Benzler (AA representative in Belgrade) retired from the diplomatic service 
in 1944.
1453
 Despite being interrogated in the late 1960s, he was never brought to 
trial. He died in 1977. 
 Otto von Erdmannsdorff (German ambassador in Hungary) was tried in the 
Wilhelmstrasse Process and cleared of all charges in 1949.
1454
 He died in 1978. 
 Mannfred von Killinger (German ambassador in Romania) committed suicide 




The postwar ideological shift is perhaps most evident in the careers and fates of the main 
Yugoslav (non-German) personages: 
 Dragińa Cvetković (Yugoslav Minister President until March 27, 1941) refused to 
collaborate and was arrested and interned by the Reichsdeutsche in Serbia on two 
occasions. In 1944 he left the country permanently. The postwar Yugoslav 
authorities declared him an enemy of the people. He died in 1969.  
 King Petar II KaraĊorĊević left Yugoslavia for England in 1941, where a 
Government in Exile formed around him. More inclined to the Ĉetnici than to the 
Partisans, his influence on Yugoslav affairs in the last stages of the war was 
minimal. Although the monarchy was abolished in Yugoslavia in 1945, he refused 
to formally renounce his title. He died in 1970. 
                                                 
1453
 Auswärtiges Amt – Historischer Dienst (ed), Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen 
Auswärtigen Dienstes, 1871-1945, Volume 1 (Paderborn and Munich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 
2000), pp. 108-109. 
1454
 Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen Auswärtigen Dienstes, 1871-1945, Volume 1, pp. 
518-519. 
1455
 Auswärtiges Amt – Historischer Dienst (ed), Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen 
Auswärtigen Dienstes, 1871-1945, Volume 2 (Paderborn and Munich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 
2005), p. 552. 
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 Duńan Simović (army general and head of the March 27, 1941 Yugoslav 
government) became head of the London Government in Exile, but after a falling 
out threw in his lot with the Partisans. He returned to Belgrade and testified 
against Mihajlović at the latter‟s trial. He died in 1962.  
 Dragoljub „Draņa‟ Mihajlović (Ĉetnik leader) was captured in Bosnia in 1946, 
tried in a Yugoslav court, and executed in 1946.  
 Milan Nedić (head of the Council of Ministers) fled to Austria in 1944, was 
extradited by the British to Yugoslavia in 1946, and officially committed suicide 
while in custody awaiting trial for high treason.  
 Milan Aćimović (Nedić‟s predecessor and then Interior Minister in the Nedić 
government) was killed in battle with the Partisans while withdrawing through 
Herzegovina with the Ĉetnici in 1945. 
 Josip Broz Tito (Partisan leader) broke with Stalin and the Communist Bloc in 
1948, established a separate form of „national communism‟ in the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose president and commander-in-chief he 














Abwehr      German military intelligence organization 
 
Allgemeine SS    General SS, major branch of the SS 
 
Aryanization     the process of transferring ownership of  
property from Jews to non-Jews („Aryans‟) 
 
Auslandsdeutsche     persons of German origin residing outside  
Germany, largely synonymous with  
Volksdeutsche 
 
Auswärtiges Amt (AA)   German Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
ban      head of a banovina 
 
Banater Hilfspolizei (Hipo)   Banat auxiliary police  
 
banovina (pl. banovine)   Yugoslav administrative unit in the period  
1929-1941 
 
Bauernführer     official in charge of peasant affairs 
 
Bundesministerium für Vertriebene,   West German Federal Ministry for  
Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte  Expellees, Refugees and Persons Damaged  
by the War 
 
Ĉetnici (sing. Ĉetnik)    Serbian royalist-nationalist resistance 
 




Deutsche Jugend (DJ)    Banat Volksdeutsche youth organization 
 
Deutsche Mannschaft (DM)   Banat Volksdeutsche militia 
 
Deutscher Arbeitsdienst (DAD)  German Labor Service 
 
Deutscher Mädelbund (DMB)   the girls‟ wing of the Deutsche Jugend 
 
Deutschtum      Germanness or Germandom, German  
Volkstum (see below) 
 
Dobrovoljzen-Felder    volunteer fields, land given to Serbian  
World War I veterans in the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia 
 
Donauprotektorat    proposed separate protectorate or state of the  
Danube Swabians under Nazi auspices  
 
Donauschwaben    Danube Swabians, group moniker for  
Volksdeutsche inhabiting the Danube Basin 
(Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia) 
 
Einsatzgruppe     task force or strike force, SS squads charged  
with the mass killing of Jews and political  
enemies of the Reich in newly conquered  
Eastern territories 
 
Erneurer     Renewers, younger generation of  
Kulturbund leaders in the period of Nazi  
ascendancy 
 
Feldkommandantur (FK)  field command, subdivision of a 
commanding German army general‟s 




Freikorps      Free Corps, Right-wing paramilitary units  
 
Freistaat      free state 
 
Führer      leader, when used alone title refers to Adolf  
Hitler 
 
Führerprinzip     the leader principle, the Nazi principle of  
government, by which the Führer was the 
ultimate source of both authority and 
legitimacy 
 
Gau      administrative unit in the Third Reich 
 
Gaugrenzlandamt    Gau Border Land Office, an office in charge  
of land lying along the edges of border Gaue 
 
Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo)  Secret State Police, Nazi secret police 
 
Gemeinschaft     community, also togetherness, collective,  
association 
 
Generalbevollmächtigter für die Wirtschaft General Plenipotentiary for the Economy in  
(GBW)     occupied Serbia-Banat 
 
gleichgeschaltet     the result of Gleichschaltung  
 
Gleichschaltung    the „coordination‟ of society in line with  
National Socialist principles 
 





Grenzer      border soldiers, associated especially with  
the Habsburg Military Border 
 
Grossraumwirtschaft     the economy of large areas, the Nazi view of  
European economies as needing to be 
subordinated to Germany‟s requirements 
 
Gymnasium (also Realgymnasium)  secondary school emphasizing academic  
preparation for university 
 
Habag-Haus      headquarters of the Kulturbund in Novi Sad  
until the end of the April War 
 
Heimat     homeland 
 
Hitlerjugend      Hitler Youth, the Nazi youth organization 
 
Hofpatenschaft    practice of assigning Volksdeutsche  
peasants to act as custodians for the land of  
other Volksdeutsche peasants mobilized by 
the Waffen-SS 
 
Hoheitsgebiet      sovereign territory  
 
Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer (HSSPF) Higher SS and Police Chief, officer in  
charge of security and police matters in an 
occupied territory 
 
Honvéd     Hungarian army 
 
judenfrei     Nazi term for an area or country made „free  
of Jews‟ 
 




Kommando der Staatswache   Command of the State Guard  
 
Kommando Öffentliche Sicherheit  Command of Public Safety 
 
Kreis       county (administrative unit) 
 
Kreisgruppe (KG)    subdivision of the Volksgruppe, consists of  
one or more Ortsgruppen 
 
Kreiskommandantur (KK)   subdivision of a Feldkommandantur,  
originally called an Ortskommandantur 
(OK)  
 
Kreisleiter     county chief, head of a Kreisgruppe  
 
Kultur      culture seen as Volk-specific and embracing  
all of a Volk‟s spiritual tendencies and 
achievements 
 
Kulturbund (Schwäbisch-Deutscher   organization of the Volksdeutsche in the  
Kulturbund in full)    Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
 
Kulturgrenze     a perceived border between different  
Kulturen 
 
Kulturnation     cultural nation, nation defined by its  
inherent cultural traditions 
 
Lebensraum     living space, territories perceived as  
belonging to the German Volk by dint of 
racial superiority 
 




Levente      Hungarian youth organization  
 
Luftwaffe      German air force  
 
Magyar      ethnically Hungarian, even if not always of  
the Hungarian state; from the Hungarian 
word for „Hungarian‟ 
 
Meldungen aus dem Reich   Reports from the Reich, monthly summary  
of Reich and Volksdeutsche affairs 




  German military commander in occupied  
Serbia 
 
Mischlinge      in Nazi terminology, a person of partial  
Jewish heritage, a person of mixed Jewish 
and Aryan blood 
 
Nachbarschaft     neighborhood, subdivision of an Ortsgruppe 
 
Nationalrat     national council  
 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche   National Socialist German Workers‟ Party 
Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) 
 
NS-Frauenschaft    Nazi women‟s organization 
 
Oberbefehlshaber Südost   Supreme Army Commander in the Southeast 
 
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) German Army High Command  
 
                                                 
1456
 The title was changed in June 1941 to Befehlshaber Serbien, and in October 1941 to 
Bevollmächtigte kommandierende General und Befehlshaber in Serbien; expanded in summer 
1943 to become Militärbefehlshaber Südost. 
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Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH)  German High Command of the Land Forces 
 
Ordnungspolizei (Orpo)   Order Police, regular uniformed police in  
the Third Reich 
 
Organisation Todt    Nazi engineering organization 
 
Ortsgruppe (OG)    subdivision of the Volksgruppe on the local  
(village or town) level 
 
Ortsleiter      village or town chief, head of an Ortghruppe 
 
Partisans (orig. partizani, sing. partizan) here, communist resistance in occupied  
Yugoslav lands 
 
Partei der Deutschen in Jugoslawien  political party of the Volksdeutsche in the  
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, active 1922-1929 
 
Polizeipräfektur des Banates   Police Prefecture for the Banat 
 
Rassenpolitisches Amt   the NSDAP‟s Office of Racial Policy 
 
Realpolitik     politics based on considerations of power  
and material resources rather than ideology 
 
Reichsdeutsche    persons of German origin who were also  
citizens of the Third Reich 
 
Reichsführer-SS (RFSS)   Himmler‟s main title, Reich SS Leader 
 
Reichskommissar für die Festigung   Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of  
deutschen Volkstums (RKFDV)  Germandom, one of Heinrich Himmler‟s  




Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA)  Reich Security Main Office, under Heinrich  
Himmler 
 
Schulstiftung der Deutschen im Banat  Banat Volksdeutsche organization for  
German-language schools  
 
Selbstschutz     self-protection, paramilitary Volksdeutsche  
units 
 
Sicherheitsdienst (SD)   SS intelligence service  
 
Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo)   Security Police  
 
Sokol      Slavophile gymnastic society 
 
sreski naĉelnik    district president 
 
srez       district, subunit of a municipality in Serbia 
 
Srpska Drņavna Straņa (Serbische   Serbian State Guard 
Staatswache) 
 
staatstreu und volkstreu    loyal to the state and to the Volk, slogan of  
the Partei der Deutschen in Jugoslawien 
 
Sturmabteilung (SA)    paramilitary wing of the Nazi Party  
 
Südostdeutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Society for the Research of German [Life] in  
(SOFG)     the Southeast, a Nazi scholarly institute 
located in Vienna 
 




Vizebanus     deputy to a ban  
 
Volk      an ethnic or national group inclusive of its  
culture, language and other perceived 
intrinsic biological qualities, which define it 
and all its members 
 
völkisch     of the Volk, adjective describes qualities  
seen as biologically determined and intrinsic 
to a specific nation or ethnicity 
 
Volksdeutsche     ethnic Germans, persons of German origin  
who were not citizens of the Third Reich 
 
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VoMi)  main Reich office for dealings with  
Volksdeutsche, under the jurisdiction of the 
RSHA 
 
Volksehrengericht    people‟s honor court 
 
Volksgemeinschaft    the national community or the people‟s  
community, term implied the organic and 
unbreakable unity of the Volk 
 
Volksgenosse      national comrade, a (fellow) member of the  
Volk 
 
Volksgruppe     a Volk-based, organized ethnic minority;  
here refers specifically to the ethnic German 
community in the Serbian Banat 
 
Volksgruppenführer    leader of a Volksgruppe; here specifically  
Sepp Janko 
 
Volksgruppenführung    leadership of a Volksgruppe; here  
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specifically of the ethnic German 
community in the Serbian Banat 
 
Volksliste (Deutsche Volksliste in full) system of classifying inhabitants of  
territories occupied by Nazi Germany 
according to their ascribed racial desirability  
 
Volkstum     folklore in the broader sense of including all  
of a people‟s (Volk) ethnic, spiritual and 
cultural achievements, seen as intrinsic to it 
and inseparable from it 
 
Volkstumsarbeit    organized ideological efforts to consolidate  
Volkstum  
 
Volkszugehörige     persons of German ethnic origin, members  
of the German Volk 
 
Volkszugehörigkeitsausweis   ethnic ID 
 
Waffen-SS     armed wing of the SS 
 
Wehrbauer      peasant soldier, armed peasant 
 
Wehrmacht     German army in World War II 
 
Weltanschauung     worldview, especially an ideological one 
 
Winterhilfswerk    Winter Relief, a Nazi charity 
 










PRIMARY SOURCES  
 
Newspapers and periodicals 
 
Amtsblatt für das Banat (1941-1944), Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Belgrade 
 
Banater Beobachter (June 1942-June 1943), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
 
Banater Beobachter (July-September 1943), United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Banater Beobachter (issues for June 9, 1943 and August 10, 1944), Narodna biblioteka 
Srbije, Belgrade 
 
Bekanntmachungen und Veröffentlichungen der deutschen Behörden in Serbien (1942), 
Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Belgrade 
 
Deutsche Arbeit (published by the Verband für Deutschtum im Ausland, Berlin: Verlag 
Grenze und Ausland,1940-1942), Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin 
 
Deutsches Volksblatt (November 1940-June 1941), United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, Washington, D.C. 
 
Deutschtum im Ausland (published by the Deutsches Ausland-Institut, Stuttgart: W. 
Kohlhammer Verlag, 1939-1943), Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin 
 
Donauzeitung (1941-1942), Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin 
 




Kikindske novine (2001), Istorijski arhiv Kikinda 
 
Nation und Staat (published by Werner Hasselblatt for the Verband der Deutschen 
Volksgruppen in Europa, Vienna: Universitäts Verlagsbuchhandlung Wilhelm 
Braumüller, 1939-1944), Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin 
 
Službene novine (June 1941-September 1944), Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore (Arhiv 
Jugoslavije), Belgrade 
 
Verordnungsblatt der Volksgruppenführung der deutschen Volksgruppe im Banat und 
Serbien (1941-1944), Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin  
 
Verordnungsblatt des Befehlshabers Serbien (incomplete record, 1942), Politisches 
Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin  
 
Verordnungsblatt des Befehlshabers Serbien (1941-1943), Narodna biblioteka Srbije, 
Belgrade 
 
Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers Serbien (1941), Narodna biblioteka Srbije, 
Belgrade 
 







 NS 3 SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltunghauptamt 
Files 484, 488, 1624 
 NS 5 VI Deutsches Arbeitsfront, Arbeitswissenschaftlichesinstitut 
(Zeitungsausschnittsammlung) 
Files 28872-28874, 28909, 29266/a, 29276, 29277/a, 29279 
 NS 7 SS- und Polizeigerichtsbarkeit  
Volumes 91, 117, 131 
493 
 
 NS 19 Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-SS 
Files 45, 279, 292, 319, 370-371, 777, 938, 1341, 1434, 1464, 1671-1672, 1727-
1728, 1875, 2154, 2222, 2248, 2358, 2370, 2386, 2389, 2526, 2563, 2601, 2635, 
2653, 2724-2725, 2802, 2834, 2846, 2878, 2953, 3504, 3517, 3519, 3798, 3886, 
3888, 3896, 3910, 3925, 3947  
 NS 31 SS-Hauptamt 
File 367  
 NS 43 Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP 
File 202 
 R 19 Chef der Ordnungspolizei (Hauptamt Ordnungspolizei) 
Volumes 123-124, 322, 465 
 R 55 Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda  
Files 890, 964, 1042, 1337  
 R 58 Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) 
Files 124, 146, 154-158, 160-167, 170, 184, 218, 303, 537, 7733, 1139 , 8102 
 R 59 Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle  
Files 28, 32, 51, 63, 65, 94, 375, 415  
 R 63 Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft E.V., Wien 
Volumes 87-88, 100, 138, 213, 284, 286, 288-289 
 R 69 Einwandererzentralstelle Litzmannstadt 
Files 205, 322, 557, 958, 1001, 1099  
 R 4902 Deutches Ausslandswissenschaftliches Institut 
File 274, 4281, 7799, 10970 
 R 8034 II Reichsauslandsbund, Presseauschnittsammlung  
Volumes 2489, 4779-4780 
 
Bundesarchiv Freiburg i.B., Abteilung Militärarchiv (BA-MA) 
 N 756 Sammlung Wolfgang Vopersal Bundesvorstand der ehemaligen Waffen-SS 
e.V. 
Files 149a, 149b, 149c 
 RH 2 Oberkommando des Heeres/Generalstab des Heeres  
Files 466, 680, 685 
 RH 20-12 Armeeoberkommando [AOK] 12 
Files 88, 113, 398 
 RS 1 Führungsstellen und Oberkommandos der Waffen-SS 
Files 2, 16 
 RS 2-5 Generalkommandos der Waffen-SS V. SS-Gebirgskorps 
File 2 
 RS 3-7 7. SS Freiwilligen-Gebirgs-Division “Prinz Eugen”  
Files 1-7, 13-20 
 RS 4 Brigaden, Kampftruppen und Einheiten der Feldformationen der Waffen-SS  
File 1132 
 RW 4 Oberkommando der Wehrmacht/Wehrmachtführungsstab (OKW/WFSt) 
Files 668, 757 
494 
 
 RW 5 OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr  
Files 236, 476, 497-498 
 RW 40 Territoriale Befehlshaber in Südosteuropa  
Files 1-5, 11-13, 16-17, 23, 26-30, 32-36, 40-43, 52, 54-55, 57, 59, 71, 80, 85, 89, 
115, 117, 183-195 
 
Lastenausgleichsarchiv Bayreuth 
 Ost-Dokumentation 2 
Files 386-393, 395-398 
 Ost-Dokumentation 16 
Files 1, 3-4, 8, 13, 23, 34-35, 37-39, 72, 97, 149-151, 153, 162-164, 166, 168-172, 
174, 182, 191 
 Ost-Dokumentation 17 
Files 3-9 
 Ost-Dokumentation 18 
File 20 
 
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin  
Deutsche Gesandschaft Belgrad 
 Belgrad 36/3 Deutschtum in Jugoslawien, 1938-1939 
 Belgrad 59/3 Deutsche Volksgruppen und ihre Organisationen, 1939-1940 
 Belgrad 60/2 Tagesbefehle Stabsbefehle, 1944 
 Belgrad 60/4 Politische Beziehungen des Gastlandes zu Deutschland, 1942-1943 
 Belgrad 60/17 Politik, politische Beziehungen und Verträge des Gastlandes und 
Deutschland zu Ungarn, 1940 
 Belgrad 61/8 Interventionen für Kriegsgefangene, 1942-1943 
 Belgrad 61/10 Militärangelegenheiten und sonstige Kriegsvorbereitungen, 1942-
1943 
 Belgrad 62/6 Judenangelegenheiten, 1941-1944 
 Belgrad 63/3 Aussiedlung Volksdeutscher, 1939-1940 
 Belgrad 64/8 Veesenmayer (Sonderbeauftragter des AA in Belgrad) 
 Belgrad 64/9 Stab, Band 1 (Sonderbeauftragter des AA in Belgrad) 
 Belgrad 64/11 Bombardierung Belgrads (Sonderbeauftragter des AA in Belgrad) 
Inland I D 
 R 98822 Serbische Kirche, 1942-1944 
Inland I Partei 
 R 98952 Politik Jugoslawien, 1940-1941 
Inland II A/B 
 R 99436 Juden in Serbien, 1941-1944 
Inland II C 
 R 100342 Allgemeines Inland II C (D VIII), Band 2, 1942-1944 
 R 100380 Deutschtum in Serbien-Banat, Band 2, 1942-1944 
 R 100381 Deutschtum in Serbien-Banat, 1944 
495 
 
 R 100382 Deutschtum in Serbien, 1942-1943 
 R 100383 Deutschtum in Serbien, Band 3, Nr. 1, 1940-1944 
 R 100384 Deutschtum in Serbien, 1944-1945 
 R 100414 Übermittlung von Büchern für die deutschen Volksgruppen im 
Ausland, 1944 
 R 100417 Volksdeutsche Schulwesen im Ausland – Allgemein, 1943-1944 
 R 100418 Volksdeutsche Schulsachen im Ausland – Allgemein, 1944 
 R 100426 Deutsches Schulwesen in Serbien 
 R 100427 Deutsches Schulwesen in Serbien-Banat, 1944 
 R 100456 Südostdeutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1939-1940 
 R 100458 Südostdeutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1944 
 R 100459 Südostdeutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1944 
 R 100472 Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, Band 5, Nr. 2, 1941-1944 
 R 100489 Kirchliche Angelegenheiten, Ev., Nr. 1, Serbien Banat, 1942-1943 
 R 100500 Nichtdeutsche Minderheiten in Serbien, 1943-1944 
Inland II D 
 R 100533 Wirtschafliche Lage der deutschen Volksgruppen, 1938-1943 
 R 100540 Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, 1944 
 R 100548 Banat – Deutsche Volksgruppe, 1942-1944 
 R 100549 Ungarische Minderheiten, 1942-1943; Rumänische Minderheiten, 1943 
 R 100550 Slowakei, Ungarn, Banat, Kroatien, Rumänien und Dänemark, Gesetze 
und Verordnungen, 1939-1944 
 R 100566 Deutscher Genossenschaftsverband in Posen usw., 1937-1944 
 R 100572 Habag Haus, Neusatz, Jugoslawien, 1936-1943 
 R 100587 Banat: Finanzierungen, 1941-1944 
 R 100588 Landwirtschaft allgemein, Osten und Südosten, 1936-1944 
 R 100591 Landwirtschaft in Nordschleswig, Slowakei und Banat, 1941-1944 
 R 100614 Bodenbesitzfragen im Banat, 1941-1944 
 R 100615 Allgemeine Lage im Banat, Ariesierungen, Liefer- und 
Wirtschaftsangelegenheiten, 1941-1944 
 R 100659 Osteuropa Institut Pol. Genoss. Bank Vereinigte Finanzkontore, 1945 
Inland II Geheim  
 R 100686 Personalien 
 R 100692 Geheime Reichssachen, 1942-1943 
 R 100695 Geheime Reichssachen, 1941-1942 
 R 100696 Geheime Reichssachen, 1942-1943 
 R 100779 Serbien, Tätigkeit des SD, der Abwehr, der Agenten und 
Polizeiattaches, 1939-1943 
 R 100830 Auslandsreisen nach Jugoslawien (Serbien, Kroatien), 1940-1943 
 R 100839 Auslandsreisen nach Serbien, 1942-1943 
 R 100874 Judenfrage in Jugoslawien, Kroatien und Serbien 
 R 100896 Volksdeutsche (Allgemeines), Volkstumsfragen, 1938-1944 
 R 100935 Geheime Reichssachen des Referats Kult A (Jugoslawien), 1941 
 R 100937 Geheime Verschlusssachen des Referats Kult A (Jugoslawien), 1941 
496 
 
 R 100939 Volksdeutsche: Jugoslawien, Banat und Batschka, 1941-1944 
 R 100956 Volksdeutsche: Serbien, Haushaltsplan der Volksgruppe Serbien, 1943-
1944 
 R 100957 Volksdeutsche im Südosten; Laufende Berichte sowie Evakuierung; 
Umsiedlung aus Ungarn und Rumänien, 1940-1944 
 R 100969 Fremde Volksgruppen: Ungarische Flüchtlinge im serbischen Banat, 
1942-1944 
 R 100981 Waffen-SS, Allgemeiner Dienst, Führeranordnung, Zuständigkeit, 
Heranziehung deutscher Volksgruppen und ausländischer Menschenreserven, 
1937-1944 
 R 101011 Waffen-SS: Serbien, Werbeaktion, 1942-1944 
 R 101092 Berichte und Meldungen zur Lage in Jugoslawien, 1940-1941 
 R 101093 Berichte und Medungen zur Lage in und über Jugoslawien, 1942 
 R 101094 Berichte und Meldungen zur Lage in und über Jugoslawien, 1943 
 R 101095 Berichte und Meldungen zur Lage in und über Jugoslawien, 1944 
 R 101096 Berichte und Meldungen zur Lage in und über Jugoslawien, 1944-1945 
 R 101097 SD-Berichte und Meldungen zur Lage in und über Jugoslawien, 1940 
 R 101098 SD-Berichte und Meldungen zur Lage in und über Jugoslawien, 1940 
 R 101099 SD-Berichte und Meldungen zur Lage in und über Jugoslawien, 1941 
Kult VI A 
 R 60491 Minderheiten 1, Band 2, Akademie für deutsches Recht, 1937-1938 
 R 61631 Evangelische Angelegenheiten 1, Jugoslawien, Band 2, 1933-1938 
 
Arhiv Beograda, Belgrade 
Registar imena  
 Personal file n. J-167 
 
Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore (Arhiv Jugoslavije), Belgrade 
Fund 110 Drņavna komisija za utvrĊivanje zloĉina okupatora i njihovih pomagaĉa  
 Box 33 Ńematizmi i spiskovi zloĉinaca, godina 1945-1947  
 Boxes 34, 42 Spiskovi zloĉinaca  
 Box 73 Statistiĉki podaci, grupa A.P. Vojvodina  
 Boxes 663-666 I grupa – “sistematski teror”  
 Boxes 667-668 II grupa – “logori”  
 Boxes 669-671 III grupa – “masovna ubistva”  
 Boxes 672-673 IV grupa – “deportacija i prinudni radovi”  
 Boxes 674-676 V grupa – “zloĉin protiv imovine”  
 Box 676 VI grupa – “namerno ońtećenje kulturnih i istorijskih dobara”  
 Box 691 Zloĉini prema Jevrejima u Vojvodini  
 Box 746 Razni dokazni materijali, grupa Srbija, Kosovo, Vojvodina  
 Box 827 Optuznice i presude, grupa SAP Kosovo i Vojvodina  




Vojni arhiv, Belgrade 
Nemaĉki arhiv  
 Boxes 10, 27-A, 27-C, 32, 70, 72, 77-78, 83 
Nedićev arhiv  
 Box 20A 
 
Muzej Vojvodine, Novi Sad 
Dokumenti okupatora u Banatu 1941-1944  
 Box K-3013  
 Documents 2722, 2809, 2826, 2833, 3009/8, 3009/23, 6308-6309, 18777, 18785, 
18940, 18999, 19563, 19576, 19580, 19588, 19616, 19622, 19624, 19709, 19715, 
19721-19723, 19736/1, 19736/13-14, 19741/1-6, 19741/10-16, 19843-19844, 
23526, 23586, 23588 
 
Arhiv Vojvodine, Novi Sad 
Fund 183 Anketna komisija za utvrĊivanje zloĉina okupatora i njihovih pomagaĉa  
 Box 584  
 File 122 Nemaĉka narodnosna grupa u Banatu i Srbiji (Deutsche Volksgruppe im 
Banat und in Serbien) 
 
Istorijski arhiv Zrenjanin 
Fund 128 Prefektura policije za Banat (Polizeipräfektur des Banates) – Betchkerek 
(Zrenjanin) (1942-1944), 1941-1944 
 Molbe za dozvolu boravka, 1942-1944  
Fund 131 Nemaĉka narodnosna grupa u Banatu i Srbiji (Deutsche Volksgruppe im Banat 
und in Serbien) – Beĉkerek (Zrenjanin) (1941-1944), 1941-1944 
 Various materials, 1941-1944 
 
Istorijski arhiv Kikinda  
Fund 79 Gradsko poglavarstvo Velika Kikinda (Bürgermeisteramt), 1941-1944 
 Book 1 Zapisnici gradskog veća, 1942  
 Box 11 Prepiska, 1941  
Fund 84 Sresko naĉelstvo Kikinda, 1941-1944  
 Boxes 1, 3, 5  
Fund 126 Narodni odbor sreza Kikinda 1945-1960  
 Files 193, 228, 2656, no number 
 
National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
RG 84 Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State 
 Entry 3349 American Mission Near the Yugoslavian Government in Exile, 




 Entry 3352 Belgrade Embassy Top Secret General Records, 1945-53 
Box 1 
RG 165 Records of the War Department 
 Entry 77 Military Intelligence Division, G-2 “Regional Files” 1922-1944 
Boxes 3285, 3287-3288, 3293, 3295-3296, 3304 
RG 226 Records of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
 Entry 99 OSS History Office 
Box 43 
RG 238 World War II War Crimes Records  
 Entry 1 Records of the US Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, US Evidence, Series C 
 Entry 170 Records of the US Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, NG Series, 1933-
1948 
 Entry 174 Records of the US Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, Organizations, NO 
Series 
 Entry 175 Records of the US Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, NOKW Series, 1933-
1947 
RG 242 Captured German Records 
Paper records: 
 Berlin Document Center Administrative Materials 
Nazi Party Membership Lists (Foreign Countries), Box 4 Poland (Danzig)-
Yugoslavia  
NSDAP Foreign Membership by country (Subseries 2), Box 11 (Syria-
Yugoslavia) 
 Collections of Miscellaneous Foreign Records, Yugoslavian Section  
Boxes 203-204, 206 
Microfilm records:  
 Berlin Document Center (BDC) SS Officers Files 
Rolls 066B, 168A, 193B, 230A, 315A, 378A 
 T-75 Records of the General Plenipotentiary for the Serbian Economy 
Rolls 18, 53, 55, 57, 60-63, 65, 67-70, 72, 74 
 T-81 Records of the Deutsches Ausland-Institut 
Rolls 264-266, 269, 273, 285, 291, 294, 300, 304, 306-307, 317, 319, 325, 327, 
349-350, 371, 400, 412-414, 417, 419, 421-422, 424-425, 448, 490-491, 502, 517, 
521-522, 531-532, 540, 544, 553-554, 558-561, 563-565, 569, 576, 597, 604, 608, 
611 
 T-81 Records of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) 
Roll 734 
 T-82 Records of Nazi Cultural and Research Institutions 
Roll 20 
 T-84 Miscellaneous German Records Collection 
Rolls 165, 182 
 T-120 Records of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AA) 
Belgrade Embassy, Rolls 102, 124, 197, 199-200, 280, 304, 310, 313, 390, 402, 
703, 705, 707, 738, 742, 775, 780, 917, 1005, 1025, 1030, 1042, 1146, 1174, 
499 
 
1206, 1280, 1298, 1306, 1363, 1369, 1372, 1421, 1451, 1453, 1597, 1687, 1757, 
1766, 2415, 2423-2424, 2468-2469, 2565, 2723, 2908, 2955, 3155, 4199, 4204, 
4726, 5781-5786 
 T-120 Records of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AA) “Yugoslav 
Archive” Rolls 786, 789, 803, 813, 821, 823, 825, 833, 835, 839, 856, 858 
 T-175 Records of the Reichsführer-SS 
Rolls 7-8, 19, 21-22, 24-26, 29-31, 33, 36, 40, 43, 48, 52, 54, 59-60, 62, 64-75, 
80-81, 83-84, 90, 92, 94, 103, 109-112, 117, 119-120, 122-130, 140-141, 145, 
150, 159-161, 175, 181, 188, 190, 194, 201, 460, 466, 577, 646-648, 676, R77 
 T-315 Records of German Field Commands: Divisions 
Rolls 2258, 2290 
 T-354 Records of the Waffen-SS 
Rolls 120-122, 130, 145-146 
 T-501 Records of German Field Commands: Rear Areas, Occupied Territories, 
and Others 
Rolls 245-254, 256-260, 264-266, 269, 273, 351-352 
 T-580 BDC Materials: Miscellaneous Non-Biographic Materials (“Schumacher 
Material”) 
Roll 59 
RG 466 Records of the US High Commisioner for Germany 
 Extradition Board, Country Subject Files 1946-1951, Yugoslavia 
Box 6 
 Extradition Board, War Crimes Case Files 1945-1954, Yugoslavia 
Boxes 177-178, 180, 184 
RG 549 Records of Headquarters, US Army Europe, War Crimes Branch 
 War Crimes Case Files (“Cases Not Tried”), 1944-48 
Boxes 277, 515 
 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C. 
RG-49.002*01 Records Relating to the Occupation of Yugoslavia during World War II – 
Records Relating to Crimes of the German Occupying Forces against the Yugoslav 
Peoples during the Holocaust (originally obtained from the Savez jevrejskih opńtina 
Jugoslavije), 1941-1945 
 Microfiche sheets 1, 3-4, 7-9, 12-14, 16, 20 
RG-49.007M Selected Records from the Archives of the Jewish Historical Museum, 
Belgrade, 1941-1953 
 Microfilm reels 1-4 
RG-49.008M Selected Records from the Archives of the Military Historical Institute of 
the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Serbia relating to the German Zone of 
Occupation Yugoslavia, 1941-1944 
 Microfilm reels 1-3 
RG-49.010M Selected Records from the “Nedić Archives” of the Military Historical 
Institute of the Ministry of Defense of Serbia, 1941-1944 





Published Primary Sources 
 
Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945, Serie C, Volumes 1-6, Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971-1981.  
 
Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945, Serie D, Volumes 5-13, Baden-
Baden: Imprimerie nationale/Frankfurt: P. Keppler Verlag KG/Bonn: Gebr. Hermes 
KG/Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1953-1970. 
 
Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945, Serie E, Volumes 1-7, Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969-1979. 
 
Albert, Wilhlem, ed.  Deutsches Volk auf fremder Erde. Auswahl aus volksdeutschem 
Schrifttum.  Volume 1: Deutschtum jenseits der Reichsgrenzen.  Leipzig: Verlag Ernst 
Wunderlich, 1936.  
 
Aly, Wolfgang.  Denkschrift über die Batschka und das südliche Banat. Reisebericht.  
Berlin: Bernard & Graefe, 1924.  
 
Ausgewählte Dokumente zur neuesten Geschichte der Südostdeutschen Volksgruppen. 
Staatsbürgerschafts-, Ausweisungs- und Beschlagnahmebestimmungen.  Munich: Verlag 
des Südostdeutschen Kulturwerks, 1956.  
 
Auswahl aus den Veröffentlichungen zur Volkstumsfrage, Bevölkerungsstatistik und 
Landeskunde des Südostens. Vienna: Verlag des Publikationsstelle Wien, 1943. 
 
Bahr, Richard.  Deutsches Schicksal im Südosten.  Hamburg: Hanseatische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1936.  
 
Barth, Peter.  Die Erde lebt! Deutsche Gedichte aus dem Banat.  Edited and introduced 
by Heinz Kindermann.  Vienna and Leipzig: Adolf Luser Verlag, 1939.  
 
Brücker, Christian.  Deutsche Spuren in Belgrad.  Betschkerek: Buchreihe der Deutschen 




Brunner, Heinz.  Das Deutschtum in Südosteuropa.  Leipzig: Verlagsbuchhandlung 
Quelle & Mener, 1940. 
 
Burgdörfer, Friedrich.  Volksdeutsche Zukunft. Eine biologisch-statistische Betrachtung 
der gesamtdeutschen Bevölkerungsfrage. Schriften der Hochschule fuer Politik, Heft 34.  
Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag, 1938. 
 
Christmann, E., and H. Kloss, ed.  Pälzer Stimme in aller Welt.  Bad Dürkheim: Verlag 
Deutsche Volksbücher, 1937.  
 
Ćetković, Nadeņda and Dobrila SinĊelić-Ibrajter, ed.  Dunavske Švabice.  Belgrade and 
Kikinda, 2000.  
 
Dammang, Andreas.  Die deutsche Landwirtschaft im Banat und in der Batschka.  
Munich: Verlag Ernst Reinhardt, 1931.  
 
Dienstausweisung über den Gebrauch deutscher Ortsnamen im Ausland für den Bereich 
des Reichsführers SS, Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums, 
Hauptamt Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. Teil I Banat.  Stuttgart: Deutsches Ausland-Institut, 
1943. 
 
Diplich, Hans.  Am Prinz Eugen Brunnen. Auswahl donauschwäbischer Sagen und 
Legenden.  Munich: Verlag des südostdeutschen Kulturwerks, 1964.  
 
Diplich, Hans.  Deutsche Geschichte.  Folge 5.  Schulungsdienst der deutschen 
Volksgruppe im Banat und in Serbien, 1942. 
 
Diplich, Hans and Alfred Karasek, ed.  Donauschwäbische Sagen, Märchen und 
Legenden.  Munich: Verlag Christ Unterwegs, 1952.  
 
Documents of German Foreign Policy, Series D, Volume 12, Washington: United States 




Documents of German Foreign Policy, Series D, Volume 13, Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1964. 
 
Dokumente zum Konflikt mit Jugoslawien und Griechenland.  Auswärtiges Amt 1939/41 
Nr. 7.  Berlin: Deutsches Verlag, 1941.  
 
Dwinger, Edwin Erich.  Der Tod in Polen. Die volksdeutsche Passion.  Jena: Eugen 
Diederichs Verlag, 1940.  
 
Facts Concerning the Problem of the German Expellees and Refugees.  Bonn: Federal 
Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims, 1966.  
 
Gelemann, Gerhard.  Das Deutschtum in Südslavien.  Munich: Verein für das 
Deutschtum im Auslande, 1922. 
 
Grazie, Marie Eugenie delle.  Die kleine weisse Stadt und andere Kurzgeschichten aus 
der Banater Heimat.  Salzburg: Donauschwäbisches Archiv, 1977.  
 
Herrschaft, Hans.  Das Banat. Ein deutsches Siedlungsgebiet in Südosteuropa.  Second 
edition.  Berlin: Verlag Grenze und Ausland, 1942.  
 
Hoffmann, Emil and Alfred Thoss.  Der vierte Treck. Leistung und Heimkehr der 
Deutschen aus Bessarabien.  Volume 7 of series Volksdeutsche Heimkehr.  Berlin and 
Leipzig: Nibelungen Verlag, 1941.  
 
Horváth, Eugene.  The Banat: A Forgotten Chapter of European History.  Budapest: 
Sárkány Printing Company/The Hungarian Frontiers Readjustment League, 1931.  
 
Hügel, Kaspar.  Abriss der Geschichte des Donauschwäbischen Schulwesens.  Munich: 
Verlag des Südostdeutschen Kulturwerks, 1957. 
 
Jahrbuch der Deutschen aus Jugoslawien. Volkskalender 1960.  Stuttgart: 




Jahrbuch der Deutschen aus Jugoslawien. Volkskalender 1961.  Stuttgart: 
Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Jugoslawien – Bundesverband E. V., 1961.  
 
Jahrbuch der Deutschen aus Jugoslawien. Volkskalender 1962.  Stuttgart: 
Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Jugoslawien – Bundesverband E. V., 1962.  
 
Janko, Sepp, ed.  Kalender der Deutschen Volksgruppe im Banat und in Serbien für das 
Jahr 1943.  Grossbetschkerek: Banater Druckerei und Verlagsanstalt Bruno Kuhn und 
Komp, 1943.  
 
Janko, Sepp.  Reden und Aufsätze.  Betschkerek: Buchreihe der Deutschen Volksgruppe 
im Banat und in Serbien, 1944.  
 
Janovsky, Karl.  Grossdeutschland und der südosteuropäische Raum.  Selbstverlag, 
1940.  
 
Kreuz, Wilhelm.  Mein Leben für Prinz Eugen. Deutsche Bauern siedeln im Banat.  
Edited by Dr. Walter Schreiber.  Berlin: Steiniger Verlage, 1941. 
 
Leidensweg der Deutschen im kommunistischen Jugoslawien.  Four volumes.  
Munich/Sindelfingen: Donauschwäbische Kulturstiftung, 1992-1995.  
 
Leuschner, Egon.  Nationalsozialistische Fremdvolkpolitik.  Berlin: Rassenpolitisches 
Amt der NSDAP, 1942. 
 
Michaelis, Herbert.  Beiträge zur Kulturgeographie des Südbanats und Nordserbiens.  
Doctoral dissertation defended at Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1939.  Berlin: Mier & 
Glasemann, 1940.  
 
Möller, Karl von.  Deutsches Schicksal im Banat.  Vienna and Leipzig: Adolf Luser 
Verlag, 1940. 
 
Naviasky, Hans.  Gesamtüberblick über das Deutschtum ausserhalb der Reichsgrenzen.  




Petri, Martha, ed.  Donauschwäbisches Dichterbuch.  Vienna and Leipzig: Adolf Luser 
Verlag, 1939.  
 
Petri, Martha.  Das Schriftum der Südostschwaben in seiner Entwicklung von den 
Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart.  Doctoral dissertation defended at Friedrich-Wilhelms-
Universität, Berlin, 1940.  Novi Vrbas: Wrbaser Buchdruckerei, 1940.  
 
Radović, Nadeņda, Dobrila SinĊelić-Ibrajter and Vesna Weiss, ed.  Dunavske Švabice II.  
Sremski Karlovci, 2001.  
 
Retzlaff, Hans and Johannes Künzig.  Deutsche Bauern im Banat. 80 Aufnahmen.  Berlin: 
Verlag Grenze und Ausland, 1939.  
 
Rohrbach, Paul.  Deutschtum in Not! Die Schicksale der Deutschen in Europa ausserhalb 
des Reiches.  Berlin and Leipzig: Wilhelm Undermann Verlag, 1926.  
 
Rüdiger, Hermann.  Das Deutschtum an der mittleren Donau (Ungarn, Jugoslawien, 
Rumänien).  Munich: Verein für das Deutschtum im Auslande, 1923. 
 
Scheierling, Konrad, ed.  Donauschwäbisches Liederbuch.  Straubing: 
Donauschwäbisches Archiv, 1985.  
 
Scherer, Anton, ed.  Unbekannte SS-Geheimberichte über die Evakuierung der 
südostdeutschen im Oktober und November 1944 sowie über die politische Lage in 
Rumänien, Ungarn, der Slowakei, im serbischen Banat und im “Unabhängigen Staat 
Kroatien.”  Graz: Donauschwäbisches Bibliographisches Archiv, 1990.  
 
Schieder, Theodor, ed.  Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien. Dokumentation der 
Verteibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa.  Volume V.  Published by the 
Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte.  Munich: 
Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984.  
 
Schmidt, Heinrich.  Einige Probleme der donauschwäbischen Volksforschung.  Novi Sad: 
Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund, 1933.  
 
Schmidt, Johannes L.  Volksdeutsche Stunde. Eine Auswahl aus Rundfunk-Feierstunden.  
505 
 
Folge 1.  Betschkerek: Buchreihe der deutsche Volksgruppe im Banat und in Serbien, 
1943.  
 
Schnabel, Reimund.  Macht ohne Moral. Eine Dokumentation über die SS.  Frankfurt: 
Röderbergverlag, 1957.  
 
SS im Einsatz: Eine Dokumentation über die Verbrechen der SS.  East Berlin: Deutscher 
Militärverlag, 1967.  
 
Stanglica, Franz.  Die Auswanderung der Lothringer in das Banat und die Batschka im 
18. Jahrhundert.  Frankfurt: Selbstverlag des Elsass-Lothringen-Instituts, 1934.  
 
Stefanović, Nenad, ed.  Jedan svet na Dunavu: Razgovori i komentari.  Sixth edition.  
Belgrade: Druńtvo za srpsko-nemaĉku saradnju, 2007. 
 
Türcke, Kurt Egon Freiherr von.  Das Schulrecht der deutschen Volksgruppen in Ost- 
und Südosteuropa.  Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1938.  
 
United Nations War Crimes Commission.  Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals.  15 
volumes.  London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1947-1949.  
 
Wagner, Viktor.  Das Banat im Spiegel der Geschichte.  Novi Sad: Schwäbisch-
Deutscher Kulturbund, 1930.  
 
Winkler, Wilhelm.  Statistisches Handbuch der europäischen Nationalitäten.  Vienna and 
Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumüller Universitäts-Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1931. 
 
Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda.  
Volume I, Books One and Two: Borbe u Srbiji 1941 god.  Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski 







Aly, Götz.  „Final Solution‟: Nazi Population Policy and the Murder of the European 
Jews.  Translated by Belinda Cooper and Allison Brown.  London and New York: 
Arnold, 1999.  
 
Aly, Götz.  Hitler‟s Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State.  
Translated by Jefferson Chase.  New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006.  
 
Aly, Götz.  Macht-Geist-Wahn. Kontinuitäten deutschen Denkens.  Berlin: Argon, 1997.  
 
Anderson, Benedict.  Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism.  Revised edition.  London and New York: Verso, 1991.  
 
Aschenbrenner, Viktor, Ernst Birke, Walter Kuhn and Eugen Lemberg, ed.  Die 
Deutschen und ihre östlichen Nachbarn. Ein Handbuch.  Frankfurt: Verlag Moritz 
Diesterweg, 1967.  
 
Auswärtiges Amt – Historischer Dienst, ed.  Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen 
Auswärtigen Dienstes, 1871-1945.  Three volumes.  Paderborn and Munich: Ferdinand 
Schöningh, 2000-2008.  
 
Bagnell, Prisca von Dorotka.  The Influence of National Socialism on the German  
Minority in Yugoslavia: A Study of the Relationships of Social, Economic and Political 
Organizations between the German Minority of the Vojvodina and the Third Reich, 1933-
1941.  Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1997.  
 
Bartov, Omer.  Hitler‟s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and the War in the Third Reich.  Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
Beer, Josef.  Donauschwäbische Zeitgeschichte aus erster Hand.  Munich: 
Donauschwäbische Kulturstiftung, 1987.  
 
Beer, Josef, et al.  Heimatbuch der Stadt Weisskirchen im Banat.  Salzburg: Verein 
Weisskirchner Ortsgemeinschaft, 1980.  
 
Beer, Matthias.  “Im Spannungsfeld vom Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Das 
Grossforschungsprojekt „Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutsche aus 
507 
 
Ostmitteleuropa.”  Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 46, No. 3 (July 1998), pp. 
345-389.  
 
Benz, Wolfgang, ed).  Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten. Ursachen, 
Ereignisse, Folgen.  Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985.  
 
Bergen, Doris L.  “The Nazi Concept of „Volksdeutsche‟ and the Exacerbation of Anti-
Semitism in Eastern Europe, 1939-1945.”  Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 29, 
No. 4 (October 1994), pp. 569-582.  
 
Bergen, Doris L.  “The „Volksdeutschen‟ of Eastern Europe, World War II, and the 
Holocaust: Constructed Ethnicity, Real Genocide.”  In Germany and Eastern Europe: 
Cultural Identities and Cultural Differences, Yearbook of European Studies, Volume 13, 
edited by Keith Bullivant, Geoffrey Giles and Walter Pappe, pp. 70-93.  Amsterdam and 
Atlanta: Rodopi, 1999. 
 
Berger, Stefan.  “Germany: Ethnic Nationalism par excellence?”  In What is a Nation? 
Europe 1789-1914, edited by Timothy Baycroft and Mark Hewitson, pp. 42-60.  New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006.  
 
Biber, Duńan.  Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji, 1933-1941.  Ljubljana: Cankareva 
Zaloņba, 1966.  
 
Birn, Ruth Bettina.  Die Höheren SS- und Polizeifuehrer. Himmlers Vertreter im Reich 
und in den besetzten Gebieten.  Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1986.  
 
Böhm, Johann.  Hitlers Vasallen der Deutschen Volksgruppe in Rumänien vor und nach 
1945.  Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2006.  
 
Bohmann, Alfred.  Menschen und Grenzen. Volume 2: Bevölkerung und Nationalitäten 
in Südosteuropa.  Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1969.  
 
Boog, Horst, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller and 
Gerd R. Ueberschär.  Germany and the Second World War, edited by 
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Freiburg, Volume IV: The Attack on the Soviet 
Union, translated by Dean S. McMurry, Ewald Osers and Louise Willmot.  Oxford: 




Boņić, Nikola and Ratko Mitrović.  “Vojvodina i Beograd sa okolinom u planovima 
Trećeg Rajha.”  Zbornik za društvene nauke, No. 48 (1967), pp. 116-125.  
 
Broszat, Martin.  Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939-1945.  Frankfurt and 
Hamburg: Fischer Bücherei, 1965.  
 
Browning, Christopher R.  Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final 
Solution.  New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1985.  
 
Browning, Christopher R.  The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office: A Study of 
Referat D III of Abteilung Deutschland 1940-43.  New York and London: Holmes and 
Meier Publishers, 1978.  
 
Browning, Christopher R.  “Harald Turner und die Militärverwaltung in Serbien 1941-
1942.”  In Verwaltung contra Menschenführung im Staat Hitlers. Studien zum politisch-
administrativen System, edited by Dieter Rebentisch and Karl Teppe, pp. 351-373.  
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986.  
 
Browning, Christopher R.  The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi 
Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942.  Lincoln and Jerusalem: University of 
Nebraska Press and Yad Vashem, 2004.  
 
Bryant, Chad.  “Either German or Czech: Fixing Nationality in Bohemia and Moravia, 
1939-1946.”  Slavic Review, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Winter 2002), pp. 683-706.  
 
Bryant, Chad.  Prague in Black: Nazi Rule and Czech Nationalism.  Cambridge, Mass. 
and London: Harvard University Press, 2007.  
 
Buchsweiler, Meir.  Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten 
Weltkriegs – ein Fall doppelter Loyalität?  Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1984.  
 
Burleigh, Michael.  Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of Ostforschung in the Third 




Burrin, Philippe.  France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise.  
Translated by Janet Lloyd.  New York: The New Press, 1996.  
 
Marie-Janine Calic.  “Die Deutsche Volksgruppe im “Unabhängigen Staat Kroatien”  
1941-1944.”  In Vom Faschismus zum Stalinismus. Deutsche und andere Minderheiten in 
Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa 1941-1953, edited by Mariana Hausleitner, pp. 11-22.  
Munich: IKGS Verlag, 2008.  
 
Casagrande, Thomas.  Die volksdeutsche SS-Division „Prinz Eugen‟. Die Banater 
Schwaben und die nationalsozialisten Kriegsverbrechen.  Frankfurt and New York: 
Campus, 2003.  
 
Chickering, Roger.  We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-
German League, 1886-1914.  Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984.  
 
Cohen, Gary B.  The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861-1914.  
Second revised edition.  West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006.  
 
Connelly, John.  “Nazis and Slavs: From Racial Theory to Racist Practice.”  Central  
European History, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1999), pp. 1-33. 
 
Cornwall, Mark.  “The Habsburg Monarchy: „National Trinity‟ and the Elasticity of 
National Allegiance.”  In What is a Nation? Europe 1789-1914, edited by Timothy 
Baycroft and Mark Hewitson, p. 171-191.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.  
 
Cornwall, Mark.  “The Struggle on the Czech-German Language Border 1880-1940.”  
The English Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 433 (September 1994), pp. 914-951. 
 
Cseres, Tibor.  Titoist Atrocities in Vojvodina, 1944-1945: Serbian Vendetta in Bácska.  
Buffalo: Hunyadi, 1993.  
 
Deák, István, Jan T. Gross and Tony Judt, ed.  The Politics of Retribution in Europe: 
World War II and Its Aftermath.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.  
 
Eberl, Immo, ed.  Die Donauschwaben. Deutsche Siedlung in Südosteuropa.  Exhibition 




Diplich, Hans.  Aus donauschwäbischem Erbe. Zweiter Teil der Betrachtungen und  
Bemerkungen.  Freilassing: Pannonia-Verlag, 1956.  
 
Diplich, Hans.  Essay: Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte der Donauschwaben.  
Homburg/Saar: Verlag Ermer KG, 1975.  
 
Diplich, Hans and Hans Wolfram Hockl, ed.  Wir Donauschwaben.  Salzburg: 
Akademischer Gemeinschaftsverlag, 1950.  
 
Döscher, Hans-Jürgen.  SS und Auswärtiges Amt im Dritten Reich. Diplomatie im 
Schatten der “Endlösung.”  Frankfurt and Berlin: Zeitgeschichte/Ullstein, 1991.  
 
Eberhardt, Martin.  Zwischen Nationalsozialismus und Apartheid. Die deutsche 
Bevölkerungsgruppe Südwestafrikas 1915-1965.  Berlin: Lit, 2007. 
 
Engelmann, Nikolaus.  Banat. Ein Buch der Erinnerung in Bild und Wort.  Freilassing: 
Pannonia-Verlag, 1959.  
 
Erpenbeck, Dirk-Gerd.  Serbien 1941. Deutsche Militärverwaltung und serbischer 
Widerstand.  Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1976.  
 
Fahlbusch, Michael.  Wissenschaft im Dienst der nationalsozialistischen Politik? Die 
“Volksdeutschen Forschungsgemeinschaften” von 1931-1945.  Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesselschaft, 1999.  
 
Fielitz, Wilhelm.  Das Stereotyp des wolhyniendeutschen Umsiedlers. Popularisierungen 
zwischen Sprachinselforschung und nationalsozialistischer Propaganda.  Marburg: N. G. 
Elwert Verlag, 2000.  
 
Förster, Jürgen.  “Die weltanschauliche Erziehung in der Waffen-SS. "Kein totes Wissen, 
sondern lebendiger Nationalsozialismus.”  In Ausbildungsziel Judenmord. 
“Weltanschauliche Erziehung” von SS, Polizei und Waffen-SS im Rahmen der 
“Endlösung,” edited by Jürgen Matthäus, Konrad Kwiet, Jürgen Förster and Richard 




Friedrich, Klaus-Peter.  “Collaboration in a “Land without a Quisling”: Patterns of 
Cooperation with the Nazi German Occupation Regime in Poland during World War II.”  
Slavic Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Winter 2005), pp. 711-746. 
 
Frisch, Helmut, ed.  Werschetz (Versecz – Vršac). Kommunale Entwicklung und 
deutsches Leben der Banater Wein- und Schulstadt.  Vienna: Verlag des Werschetzer 
Buchausschusses, 1982.  
 
Fritz, Stephen G.  ““We are trying . . . to change the face of the world” – Ideology and 
Motivation in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below.”  The Journal 
of Military History, Vol. 60, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 683-710.  
 
Frommer, Benjamin.  “Expulsion or Integration: Unmixing Interethnic Marriage in 
Postwar Czechoslovakia.”  East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2000), 
pp. 381-410.  
 
Frommer, Benjamin.  National Cleansing: Retribution against Nazi Collaborators in 
Postwar Czechoslovakia.  Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.  
 
Gaćeńa, Nikola L.  Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu 1919-1941.  Novi Sad: 
Matica srpska, 1972.  
 
Gaćeńa, Nikola L.  “Nemci u agrarnoj reformi i vlasnińtvu obradivog zemljińta u 
Vojvodini 1919-41.”  Zbornik za istoriju, No. 13 (1976), pp. 71-92.  
 
Gebel, Ralf.  “Heim ins Reich!” Konrad Henlein und der Reichsgau Sudetenland (1938-
1945).  Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999.  
 
Gellately, Robert.  The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-
1945.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. 
 
Gellner, Ernest.  Nationalism.  London: Phoenix, 1997.  
 
Gerlach, Christian.  Kalkulierte Morde. Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und 





Glassheim, Eagle.  Noble Nationalists: The Transformation of the Bohemian Aristocracy.  
Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2005.  
 
Glińić, Venceslav.  Teror i zločini nacističke Nemačke u Srbiji 1941-1944.  Belgrade: 
Rad, 1970.  
 
Grimm, Gerhard and Krista Zach, ed.  Die Deutschen in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa. 
Geschichte, Wirtschaft, Recht, Sprache.  Volume 1.  Munich: Verlag Südostdeutsches 
Kulturwerk, 1995.  
 
Gross, Jan Tomasz.  Polish Society under German Occupation: The 
Generalgouvernement, 1939-1944.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.  
 
Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev.  “Deutschland und Südosteuropa 1871-1945. Zwischen 
Gegnerschaft und Partnerschaft.”  In Osteuropa und die Deutschen. Vorträge zum 75. 
Jubiläum der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde, edited by Oskar Anweiler, 
Eberhard Reissner and Karl-Heinz Ruffmann, pp. 247-287.  Berlin: Arno Spitz, 1990.  
 
Gruber, Wendelin.  In the Claws of the Red Dragon: Ten Years Under Tito‟s Heel.  
Translated by Frank Schmidt.  Toronto: St. Michaelswerk-Toronto, 1988.  
 
Gündisch, Konrad.  Siebenbürgen und die Siebenbürger Sachsen.  Munich: Langen 
Müller, 1998.  
 
Gündisch, Konrad, Wolfgang Höpken and Michael Markel, ed.  Das Bild des Anderen in 
Siebenbürgen. Stereotype in einer multiethnischen Region.  Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 
1998.  
 
Haar, Ingo and Michael Fahlbusch, ed.  German Scholars and Ethnic Cleansing 1919-
1945.  New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005.  
 
Haar, Ingo and Michael Fahlbusch, ed.  Handbuch der voelkischen Wissenschaften.  




Hammerstiel, Robert.  Von Ikonen und Ratten. Eine Banater Kindheit 1939-1949.  
Vienna and Munich: Verlag Christian Brandstätter, 1999.  
 
Hass, Gerhart and Woflgang Schumann, ed.  Anatomie der Aggression. Neue Dokumente 
zu den Kriegszielen des faschistischen deutschen Imperialismus im zweiten Weltkrieg.  
East Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1972.  
 
Hausleitner, Mariana.  “Politische Bestrebungen der Schwaben im serbischen und im 
rumänischen Banat vor 1945.”  In Vom Faschismus zum Stalinismus. Deutsche und 
andere Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa 1941-1953, edited by Mariana 
Hausleitner, pp. 41-62.  Munich: IKGS Verlag, 2008. 
 
Hausleitner, Mariana and Harald Roth, ed.  Der Einfluss von Faschismus und 
Nationalsozialismus auf Minderheiten in Ostmittel- und Suedosteuropa.  Munich: IKGS 
Verlag, 2006. 
 
Hayden, Robert M.  “Schindler‟s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population 
Transfers.”  Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 727-748. 
 
Heimatbuch Setschan. Ein deutsches Dorf im Banat.  Ortsgeschichte und 
Bilddokumentation von Alfred Riedinger.  Schwaikheim, 2006. 
 
Heinemann, Isabel.  “Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut”. Das Rasse- und 
Siedlungshauptamt der SS und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas.  Göttingen: 
Wallstein Verlag, 2003.  
 
Herbert, Ulrich, ed.  National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German 
Perspectives and Controversies.  New York and Oxford: Beghahn Books, 2000.  
 
Herf, Jeffrey.  Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys.  Cambridge, Mass. 
and London: Harvard University Press, 1997. 
 
Herf, Jeffrey.  The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the 
Holocaust.  Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 




Herzog, Robert.  Die Volksdeutschen in der Waffen-SS.  Tübingen: Institut für 
Besatzungsfragen, 1955.  
 
Hockl, Hans Wolfram, ed.  Heimatbuch der Donauschwaben.  Baden Württemberg: 
Donauschwäbischer Heimatverlag/Munich: Südostdeutschen Kulturwerk, no year.  
 
Hoffmann, Dierk, Marita Krauss and Michael Schwartz, ed.  Vertriebene in Deutschland. 
Interdisziplinäre Ergebnisse und Forschungsperspektiven.  Munich: R. Oldenbourg 
Verlag, 2000.  
 
Höpfner, Hans-Paul.  Deutsche Südosteuropapolitik in der Weimarer Republik.  Frankfurt 
and Bern: Peter Lang, 1983.  
 
Höpken, Wolfgang and Michael Riekenberg, ed.  Politische und ethnische Gewalt in 
Südosteuropa und Lateinamerika.  Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2001.  
 
Höpken, Wolfgang and Holm Sundhaussen, ed.  Eliten in Südosteuropa. Rolle, 
Kontinuitäten, Brüche in Geschichte und Gegenwart.  Munich: Südosteuropa-
Gesellschaft, 1998.  
 
Horak, Karl.  Das deutsche Volksschauspiel im Banat.  Marburg: N. G. Elwert Verlag, 
1975.  
 
Hösch, Edgar and Gerhard Seewann, ed.  Aspekte ethnischer Identität. Ergebnisse des 
Forschungsprojekts “Deutsche und Magyaren als nationale Minderheiten im 
Donauraum”.  Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991.  
 
Ivković, Boņidar.  “Unińtenje Jevreja i pljaĉka njihove imovine u Banatu 1941-1944.”  
In Tokovi revolucije: Zbornik istorijskih radova, pp. 373-402.  Belgrade, 1967.  
 
Ivković, Boņidar.  “Zatvori, koncentracioni logori i radni logori u Banatu od 1941-1944. 
godine.”  Zbornik za društvene nauke, No. 39 (1964), pp. 108-134.  
 
Jäckel, Eberhard.  Hitler's World View: A Blueprint for Power.  Translated by Herbert 




Jackson, Julian.  France: The Dark Years 1940-1944.  Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001.  
 
Janjetović, Zoran.  Between Hitler and Tito: The Disappearance of the Vojvodina 
Germans.  Belgrade, 2000. 
 
Janko, Sepp.  Weg und Ende der deutschen Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien.  Graz and 
Stuttgart: Leopold Stocker Verlag, 1982.  
 
Jansen, Christian and Arno Weckbecker.  Der "Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz" in Polen 
1939/40.  Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Band 64.  Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1992 
 
Judson, Pieter M.  Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of 
Imperial Austria.  Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2006.  
 
Judson, Pieter M.  “Rethinking the Liberal Legacy.”  In Rethinking Vienna 1900, edited 
by Steven Beller, pp. 57-79.  New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2001.  
 
Judson, Pieter M.  ““Whether Race or Conviction Should Be the Standard”: National 
Identity and Liberal Politics in Nineteenth-Century Austria.”  Austrian History Yearbook, 
Volume 22 (1991), pp. 76-95.  
 
Judt, Tony.  Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945.  New York: The Penguin Press, 
2005.  
 
Kaĉavenda, Petar.  Nemci u Jugoslaviji 1918-1945.  Belgrade: Institut za savremenu 
istoriju, 1991.  
 
Kaĉavenda, Petar.  “Zloĉini nemaĉke okupacione vojske i folksdojĉera nad Srbima u 
Banatu 1941-1944. godine.”  Istorija 20. veka: Časopis Instituta za savremenu istoriju, 
Vol. 2, No. 2 (1994), pp. 91-99.  
 
Kaplan, Marion A.  Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany.  Oxford 




Kay, Alex J.  Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder: Political and Economic Planning 
for German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1940-1941.  New York and Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2006.  
 
Kershaw, Ian.  The “Hitler Myth”: Image and Reality in the Third Reich.  Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.  
 
Kochanowski, Jerzy, ed.  Die "Volksdeutschen" in Polen, Frankreich, Ungarn und der 
Tschechoslowakei: Mythos und Realität.  Osnabrück: fibre Verlag, 2006. 
 
Koehl, Robert L.  RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939-1945.   
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957.  
 
Komjathy, Anthony and Rebecca Stockwell.  German Minorities and the Third Reich: 
Ethnic Germans of East Central Europe between the Wars.  New York and London: 
Holmes & Meier, 1980.  
 
Komorowski, Jutta.  “Die wirtschaftliche Ausbeutung des serbischen Banats zur Zeit der 
faschistischen deutschen Okkupation 1941-1944 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 
Rolle der deutschen Minderheit.”  Jahrbuch für Geschichte der UdSSR und der 
volksdemokratischen Länder Europas, Volume 31 (1988), pp. 211-246. 
 
Kotzian, Ortfried.  Die Umsiedler. Die Deutschen aus West-Wolhynien, Galizien, der 
Bukowina, Bessarabien, der Dobrudscha und in der Karpatienukraine.  Munich: Langen 
Müller, 2004. 
 
Kumm, Otto.  “Vorwärts Prinz Eugen!” Geschichte der 7. SS-Freiwilligen-Division 
“Prinz Eugen.”  Osnabrück: Munin-Verlag, 1978.  
 
Kunz, Norbert.  Die Krim unter deutscher Herrschaft (1941-1944). 
Germanisierungsutopie und Besatzungsrealität.  Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesselschaft, 2005 
 
Lakeberg, Beata Dorota.  Die deutsche Minderheitenpresse in Polen 1918-1939 und ihr 




Lampe, John R.  Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country.  Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Latzel, Klaus.  “Tourismus und Gewalt. Kriegswahrnehmungen in Feldpostbriefen.”  
In Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944, edited by Hans Heer and 
Klaus Naumann, pp. 447-459.  Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995. 
 
Leitfaden zur Dokumentationsreihe. Verbrechen an den Deutschen in Jugoslawien 1944-
1948.  Munich: Vorstand der Donauschwäbischen Kulturstiftung/Stiftung des 
bürgerlichen Rechts, 2005.  
 
Leniger, Markus.  Nationalsozialistische “Volkstumsarbeit” und Umsiedlungspolitik 
1933-1945. Von der Minderheitenbetreuung zur Siedlerauslese.  Berlin: Frank & Timme, 
2006.  
 
Levntal, Zdenko, ed.  Zločini fašističkih okupatora i njihovih pomagača protiv Jevreja u 
Jugoslaviji.  Belgrade: Savez jevrejskih opńtina FNR Jugoslavije, 1952. 
 
Liulevicius, Vejas Gabriel.  The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present.  Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.  
 
Łossowski, Piotr.  “The Resettlement of the Germans from the Baltic States in 
1939/1941.”  Acta Poloniae Historica, Issue 92 (2005), pp. 79-98.  
 
Lower, Wendy.  Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine.  Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2005.  
 
Luković, Jovica.  ““Es ist nicht gerecht, für eine Reform aufkommen zu müssen, die 
gegen einen selbst gerichtet ist.” Die Agrarreform und das bäuerliche Selbstverständnis 
der Deutschen im jugoslawischen Banat 1918-1941 – ein Problemaufriss.”  In 
Kulturraum Banat. Deutsche Kultur in einer europäischen Vielvölkerregion, edited by 
Walter Engel, pp. 141-166.  Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2007. 
 
Lumans, Valdis O.  “The Diplomacy of Resettlement: Eliminating Trouble Spots in the 
Third Reich‟s Foreign Relations.”  In German Minorities in Poland and Italy during the 
Second World War and Minorities in Germany after 1945, pp. 15-37.  Beiträge aus dem 




Lumans, Valdis O.  Himmler's Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the 
German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945.  Chapel Hill and London: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1993.  
 
Lumans, Valdis O.  “The Military Obligation of the Volksdeutsche of Eastern Europe 
towards the Third Reich.”  East European Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Fall 1989), pp. 305-
323.  
 
Madajczyk, Czesław, ed.  Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan.  Munich and 
New Providence: K. G. Saur, 1994.  
 
Mann, Michael.  Fascists.  Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004.  
 
Manoschek, Walter, ed.  “Es gibt nur eines für das Judentum: Vernichtung”. Das 
Judenbild in deutschen Soldatenbriefen 1939-1944.  Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995.  
 
Manoschek, Walter.  ““Gehst du mit Juden erschiessen?” Die Vernichtung der Juden in 
Serbien.”  In Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941-1944, edited by Hans 
Heer and Klaus Naumann, pp. 39-56.  Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995. 
 
Manoschek, Walter.  “Serbien ist judenfrei”. Militärische Besatzungspolitik und 
Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941/42.  Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1993.  
 
Mariĉić, Slobodan.  Susedi, dželati, žrtve: Folksdojčeri u Jugoslaviji.  Belgrade, 1995.  
 
Marrus, Michael R.  The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century.  New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.  
 
Marrus, Michael R. and Robert O. Paxton.  Vichy France and the Jews.  New York: 
Basic Books, 1981.  
 





Mazower, Mark.  Hitler‟s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe.  New York: The 
Penguin Press, 2008.  
 
Mesaroń, Ńandor.  “MaĊarska istoriografija o diplomatskim pripremama za napad 
MaĊarske na Jugoslaviju.”  Vojvodina 1941: Radovi i diskusija sa skupa istoričara u 
Subotici 9 i 10. decembra 1966. god, pp. 201-221.  Novi Sad, 1967.  
 
Milońević, Slobodan.  “Kvislinńke snage u Banatu u sluņbi nemaĉkog okupatora 1941-
1944. godine.”  Vojno-istorijski glasnik, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1979), pp. 139-153.  
 
Moeller, Robert G.  War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of 
Germany.  Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001. 
 
Momĉilović, ĐorĊe.  Banat u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu.  Belgrade: Vojnoizdavaĉki 
zavod, 1977.  
 
Momĉilović, ĐorĊe.  Zrenjaninske vatre: Zrenjanin u ratu i revoluciji.  Zrenjanin, 1987.  
 
Mosse, George L.  The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism.  New 
York: Howard Fertig, 2000. 
 
Mosse, George L.  Nazi Culture, A Documentary History: Intellectual, Cultural and 
Social Life in the Third Reich.  With translations by Salvator Attanasio and others.  New 
York: Schocken Books, 1966.  
 
Müller, Norbert and Martin Zöller.  “Okkupationsverbrechen der faschistischen 
Wehrmacht gegenüber der serbischen Bevölkerung im Herbst 1941.”  Zeitschrift für 
Militärgeschichte, Issue 6 (1970), pp. 704-715. 
 
Musial, Bogdan.  Deutsche Zivilverwaltung und Judenverfolgung in 
Generalgouvernement. Eine Fallstudie zum Distrikt Lublin 1939-1944.  Wiesbaden: 




Neubacher, Hermann.  Sonderauftrag Südost 1940-1945. Bericht eines fliegenden 
Diplomaten.  Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1956. 
 
Nubert, Roxana and Ileana Pintilie-Teleagă.  Mitteleuropäische Paradigmen in 
Südosteuropa. Ein Beitrag zur Kultur der Deutschen im Banat.  Vienna: Praesens Verlag, 
2006.  
 
Olshausen, Klaus.  Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkan. Die deutsche Politik gegenüber 
Jugoslawien und Griechenland von März bis Juli 1941.  Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1973.  
 
Orlow, Dietrich.  The Lure of Fascism in Western Europe: German Nazis, Dutch and 
French Fascists, 1933-1939.  New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.  
 
Paikert, G. C.  The Danube Swabians: German Populations in Hungary, Rumania and 
Yugoslavia and Hitler‟s Impact on their Patterns.  The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967.  
 
Pavlowitch, Stevan K.  A History of the Balkans 1804-1945.  London and New York: 
Longman, 1999.  
 
Pavlowitch, Stevan K.  Hitler‟s New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia.  
New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.  
 
Paxton, Robert O.  The Anatomy of Fascism.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.  
 
Paxton, Robert O.  Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944.  Revised 
edition.  New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 
 
Payne, Stanley G.  A History of Fascism, 1914-1945.  London: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1995. 
 
Pinto, António Costa and Stein Ugelvik Larsen.  “Conclusion: Fascism, Dictators and 
Charisma.”  In Charisma and Fascism in Interwar Europe, edited by António Costa 





Popov Mińa, Branislav.  Nemački zatvori i koncentracioni logori u Banatu 1941-1944.  
Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1992. 
 
Popov, Ĉedomir, ed.  Vojvodina u Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu i socijalističkoj 
revoluciji 1941-1945.  Novi Sad: Filozofski fakultet, Institut za istoriju, 1984.  
 
Radna grupa za dokumentaciju.  Genocid nad nemačkom manjinom u Jugoslaviji 1944-
1948.  Belgrade: Druńtvo za srpsko-nemaĉku saradnju and Donauschwäbische 
Kulturstiftung, 2004.  
 
Radspieler, Tony.  The Ethnic German Refugee in Austria 1945 to 1954.  The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1955.  
 
Rasimus, Hans.  Als Fremde im Vaterland. Der Schwäbisch-deutsche Kulturbund und die 
ehemalige deutsche Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien im Spiegel der Presse.  Munich: 
Arbeitskreis für donauschwäbische Heimat- und Volksforschung in der 
Donauschwäbischen Kulturstiftung, 1989.  
 
Rasimus, Hans.  Die Deutsche Schulnot im ehemaligen Königreich Jugoslawien. Vom 
Leben und Wirken des donauschwäbischen Schulmannes Nikolaus Arnold.  Munich: AG 
Donauschwäbischer Lehrer im Südostdeutschen Kulturwerk, 1979.  
 
Rein, Leonid.  “Local Collaboration in the Execution of the “Final Solution” in Nazi-
Occupied Belorussia.”  Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 2006), 
pp. 381-409.  
 
Rich, Norman.  Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of 
Expansion.  New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1973.  
 
Riedl, Franz Hieronymus.  Das Südostdeutschtum in den Jahren 1918-1945.  Munich: 
Verlag des südostdeutschen Kulturwerks, 1962.   
 
Ristović, Milan D.  Nemački „novi poredak‟ i jugoistočna Evropa 1940/41-1944/45: 




Ritter, Ernst.  Das Deutsche Ausland-Institut in Stuttgart 1917-1945. Ein Beispiel 
deutscher Volkstumsarbeit zwischen den Weltkriegen.  Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1976.  
 
Röder, Annemarie.  Deutsche, Schwaben, Donauschwaben. Ethnisierungsprozesse einer 
deutschen Minderheit in Südosteuropa.  Marburg: N. G. Elwert Verlag, 1998.  
 
Sajti, Enikő A.  Hungarians in the Vojvodina, 1918-1947.  Translated by Brian McLean, 
translation edited by Julianna Parti.  Boulder, Colorado and New York: Social Science 
Monographs/Distributed by Columbia University Press, 2003.  
 
Scherer, Anton.  “Cvaj dojče profesorn – fatherland ferlorn.” Tendenziöse 
Darstellungen, unzulässige Verallgemeinerungen, unwahre Behauptungen, Irrtümer bei 
deutschen und jugoslawischen Historikern. Ausganspunkt: Günter Schödl in: “Land an 
der Donau”.  Graz: Donauschwäbisches Bibliographisches Archiv, 1997. 
 
Scherer, Anton.  Felix Milleker (1858-1942). Persönlichkeit und Werk des Archäologen, 
Polyhistors und Schöpfers des Städtischen Museums zu Werschetz (Banat).  Munich: 
Verlag des Südostdeutschen Kulturwerkes, 1983.  
 
Scherer, Anton.  Irrtümer, Manipulationen und Fälschungen im neuesten Werk über die 
Deutschen in Jugoslawien.  Graz: Donauschwäbisches Bibliographisches Archiv, 1997.  
 
Schlarp, Karl-Heinz.  Wirtschaft und Besatzung in Serbien 1941-1944. Ein Beitrag zur 
nationalsozialistischen Wirtschaftspolitik in Südosteuropa.  Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 
Verlag, 1986.  
 
Schlau, Wilfried, ed.  Die Ostdeutschen. Eine dokumentarische Bilanz 1945-1995.  
Munich: Langen Müller, 1996.  
 
Schmieder, Karl.  “Auf Umwegen zum Vernichtungskrieg? Der Partisanenkrieg in 
Jugoslawien, 1941-1944.”  In Die Wehrmacht. Mythos und Realität, edited by Rolf-
Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann, pp. 901-922.  Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 
1999.  
 
Schramm, Josef.  Prof. Dr. Anton Scherer Persönlichkeit und Werk. Zu seinem 75. 




Schwartz, Michael.  “Vertriebene im doppelten Deutschland. Integrations- und 
Erinnerungspolitik in der DDR und in der Bundesrepublik.”  Vierteljahrshefte für 
Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 56, No. 3 (July 2008), pp. 101-151.  
 
Schwartz, Peter, Alexander Trautner and Margaretha Wittje, ed.  Kikinda, eine Stadt im 
Banat.  Sersheim: Hartmann Verlag, 1996.  
 
Seeber, Eva.  “Der Anteil der Minderheitsorganisation “Selbstschutz” an den 
faschistischen Vernichtungsaktionen im Herbst und Winter 1939 in Polen.”  Jahrbuch für 
Geschichte der sozialistischen Länder Europas, Volume 13, Issue 2 (1969), pp. 3-34. 
 
Senz, Ingomar.  Die Donauschwaben.  Munich: Langen Müller, 1994.  
 
Senz, Josef.  Deutsche Schule und Lehrer in Südslawien.  Munich: AG 
Donauschwäbischer Lehrer im Südostdeutschen Kulturwerk, 1964. 
 
Senz, Josef Volkmar.  Geschichte der Donauschwaben. Von den Anfängen bis zur 
Gegenwart.  Vienna and Munich: Amalthea, 1993.  
 
Senz, Josef Volkmar.  Das Schulwesen der Donauschwaben von 1918 bis 1944.  Volume 
2: Das Schulwesen der Donauschwaben im Königreich Jugoslawien.  Munich: Verlag des 
Südostdeutschen Kulturwerks, 1969.  
 
Senz, Rotraud and Ingomar.  Ein Leben für die Donauschwaben. Ein Porträt von Josef 
Volkmar Senz und seinem Werk.  Munich: Verlag der Donauschwäbischen Kulturstiftung, 
1999.  
 
Shelach, Menachem.  “Sajmińte – An Extermination Camp in Serbia.”  Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies.  Vol. 2, No. 2 (1987), pp. 243-260. 
 
Shimizu, Akiko.  Die deutsche Okkupation des serbischen Banats 1941-1944 unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien.  Münster: Lit 
Verlag, 2003. 
 
Smith, Anthony D.  The Ethnic Origins of Nations.  Oxford and Malden, Mass.: 




Snyder, Timothy.  Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin.  New York: Basic 
Books, 2010.  
 
Sonnleitner, Hans.  Symbole der Donauschwaben. Wappen, Wappenspruch, Fahne und 
Hymne.  Munich: Donauschwäbisches Archiv, 1982.  
 
Stein, George H.  The Waffen-SS: Hitler‟s Elite Guard at War 1939-1945.  Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1966.  
 
Steinacker, Harold.  Das Südostdeutschtum und der Rhythmus der europäischen 
Geschichte.  Munich: Verlag des Südostdeutschen Kulturwerkes, 1954.  
 
Stenweis, Alan E.  “Eastern Europe and the Notion of the “Frontier” in Germany to 
1945.”  In Germany and Eastern Europe: Cultural Identities and Cultural Differences, 
Yearbook of European Studies, Volume 13, edited by Keith Bullivant, Geoffrey Giles 
and Walter Pappe, pp. 56-69.  Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1999. 
 
Sterbling, Anton.  “Elitenwandel in Südosteuropa. Einige Bemerkungen aus 
elitentheoretischer Sicht.”  In Eliten in Südosteuropa. Rolle, Kontinuitäten, Brüche in 
Geschichte und Genegwart, edited by Wolfgang Hoepken and Holm Sundhaussen, pp. 
31-47.  Munich: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1998. 
 
Stola, Dariusz.  “Forced Migrations in Central European History.”  International 
Migration Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, Special Issue: The New Europe and International 
Migration (Summer 1992), pp. 324-341. 
 
Streicher, Therese.  Erinnerungen – Bildband der kreisfreien Stadt Pantschowa im Banat.  
Stuttgart: Donauschwäbisches Archiv, 1999.  
 
Sundhaussen, Holm.  “Die Deutschen in Jugoslawien.”  In Deutsche im Ausland – 
Fremde in Deutschland. Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart, second edition, edited 




Sundhaussen, Holm.  “Die Deutschen in Kroatien-Slawonien und Jugoslawien.”  In Land 
an der Donau (Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas), edited by Guenter Schödl, pp. 
296-348.  Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1995. 
 
Sundhaussen, Holm.  “Eliten, Bürgertum, politische Klasse? Anmerkungen zu den 
Oberschichten in den Balkanländern des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts.”  In Eliten in 
Südosteuropa. Rolle, Kontinuitäten, Brüche in Geschichte und Genegwart, edited by 
Wolfgang Hoepken and Holm Sundhaussen, pp. 5-30.  Munich: Südosteuropa-
Gesellschaft, 1998. 
 
Sundhaussen, Holm.  Geschichte Jugoslawiens 1918-1980.  Stuttgart: Verlag W. 
Kohlhammer, 1982.  
 
Sundhaussen, Holm.  “Improvisierte Ausbeutung – der Balkan unter deutscher 
Okkupation.”  In Das organisierte Chaos. “Ämterdarwinismus” und “Gesinnungsethik”. 
Determinanten nationalsozialistischer Besatzungsherrschaft, edited by Gerhard Otto and 
Johannes Houwink ten Cate.  Berlin: Metropol, 1999.  
 
Sundhaussen, Holm.  “Jugoslawien.”  In Dimension des Völkermords. Die Zahl der 
jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus, edited by Wolfgang Benz, pp. 311-330.  
Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991. 
 
Ńijaĉki, Ljubica.  “O zatvorima, logorima i logorskim radionicama u Banatu 1941-1944. 
godine.”  Vojno-istorijski glasnik, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1979), pp. 175-190.  
 
Ńosberger, Pavle.  Jevreji u Vojvodini: Kratak pregled istorije vojvoĎanskih Jevreja.  
Novi Sad: Prometej, 1998.  
 
Terzić, Velimir.  Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941: Uzroci i posledice poraza.  Two 
volumes.  Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1982. 
 
Tibor, Toro.  Regional Identity in Elite Discourse: The Case Study of Banat.  
Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2008.  
 
Tilkovszky, Loránt.  Ungarn und die deutsche “Volksgruppenpolitik” 1938-1945.  




Tomasevich, Jozo.  War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and 
Collaboration.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.  
 
Urban, Thomas.  Deutsche in Polen. Geschichte und Gegenwart einer Minderheit.  
Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1993.  
 
Valentin, Anton.  Die Banater Schwaben. Kurzgefasste Geschichte einer Sudöstdeutschen 
Volksgruppe mit einem Volkskundlichen Anhang.  Munich: Veröffentlichung des 
Kulturreferates der Landsmannschaft der Banater Schwaben, 1959.  
 
Vegh, Sandor.  “Le système du pouvoir d‟occupation allemande dans le Banat 
yougoslave, 1941-1944.”  Translated by Madeleine Stevanov-Charlier.  European 
Resistance Movements, 1939-1945: Proceedings of the International Conference (1963), 
pp. 495-561.  
 
Vogel, Detlef.  “German Intervention in the Balkans.”  In Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd 
Stegemann and Detlef Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, edited by 
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Freiburg, Volume 3: The Mediterranean, South-
East Europe, and North Africa 1939-1941, translated by Dean S. McMurry, Ewald Osers 
and Louise Willmot, pp. 451-555.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
 
Volk, Hans.  150 Jahre Karlsdorf. Geschichte der Gemeinde Kalrsdorf im Banat.  
Freilassing: Pannonia-Verlag, 1958.  
 
Völkl, Ekkehard.  “Das Deutschtum in Südosteuropa vor und nach 1945.”  In Osteuropa 
und die Deutschen. Vorträge zum 75. Jubiläum der Deutschen Gesellschaft für 
Osteuropakunde, edited by Oskar Anweiler, Eberhard Reissner and Karl-Heinz 
Ruffmann, pp. 288-303.  Berlin: Arno Spitz, 1990.  
 
Völkl, Ekkehard.  Der Westbanat 1941-1944. Die deutsche, die ungarische und andere 
Volksgruppen.  Munich: Rudolf Trofenik, 1991.  
 
Wegner, Bernd.  The Waffen-SS: Organization, Ideology and Function.  Translated by 
Ronald Webster.  Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990.  
 
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich.  Nationalitätenpolitik in Jugoslawien. Die deutsche Minderheit 




Wehler, Hans-Ulrich.  ““Reichsfestung Belgrad.” Nationalsozialistische “Raumordnung” 
in Suedosteuropa.”  Vierteljahreshefte für Zietgeschichte, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 1963), 
pp. 74-86.  
 
Weiner, Georg, ed.  Heietere Geschichten aus der Heimat der Donauschwaben.  Munich: 
Donauschwäbische Kulturstiftung, 1997.  
 
Wild, Georg.  Die deutsche evangelische Kirche in Jugoslawien 1918-1941.  Munich: 
Verlag des Südostdeutschen Kulturwerkes, 1980.  
 
Wildt, Michael.  “Generation of the Unbound: The Leadership Corps of the Reich 
Security Main Office.”  Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2002.  
 
Wille, Manfred, Johannes Hoffmann and Wolfgang Meinicke, ed.  Sie hatten alles 
verloren. Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands.  
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1993.  
 
Wüscht, Johann.  Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich. Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der 
deutsch-jugoslawischen Beziehungen von 1933 bis 1945.  Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 
1969.  
 
Wüscht, Johann.  Ursachen und Hintergründe des Schicksals der Deutschen in 
Jugoslawien. Bevölkerungsverluste Jugoslawiens im Zweiten Weltkrieg.  Kehl: self-
published, 1966.  
 
Yahil, Leni.  “Methods of Persecution:  Comparison of the “Final Solution” in Holland 
and Denmark.”  In The Nazi Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of 
European Jews, edited by Michael R. Marrus, IV The “Final Solution” Outside Germany, 
Volume 1, pp. 169-190.  Westport and London: Meckler, 1989. 
 
Zayas, Alfred-Maurice de.  A Terrible Revenge: The Ethnic Cleansing of the East 
European Germans.  Second, revised and updated edition.  Translated by John A. 




Ziegler, Walter, ed.  Die Vertriebenen vor der Vertreibung. Die Heimatländer der 
deutschen Vertriebenen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Strukturen, Entwicklungen, 
Erfahrung.  Two volumes.  Munich: Iudicium, 1999.  
